THE GIFT OF
MAY TREAT MORRISON
IN MEMORY OF
ALEXANDER F MORRISON
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN
BY
A. W. KINGLAKE
CHEAPER EDITION
VOL. VIII.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCMI
X\*f
\°(0\
v.S
CONTENTS.
CHAPTEE I.
THE SIEGE OF SKBASTOPOL FROM THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER ]S."4
TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ENSUING FEBRUARY.
I.
PAGE
The Allies now committed to what might prove a long siege, . 1
The predicament in which they had placed themselves, . . 2
The duress they suffered, ....... 2
The bearing of this duress upon their power as combatants, . 3
The task of defence now weighing upon their energies, . . 4
And defence under hard conditions, ..... 4
No idea of raising the siege could be well or even prudently
harboured, ......... 4
II.
The double task now pressing upon the Allies, ... 5
Their defensive works, ........ 5
III.
The designs of the French, though postponed, still pointing to
the Flagstaff Bastion, ........ 6
Checked in carrying forward their approaches, ... 6
They resort to mining, ........ 6
Kxtension towards their left of siege-work carried on by the
French, 7
The part taken at this time by the English in the work of the
siege, ........... 7
The great strain put on their fortitude, ..... 8
>5
VI
CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
IV.
One of the advantages conferred on the enemy by giving him
time, ........... 9
Todleben's means of drawing advantage from time, . . 9
As compared with the means which the Allied Engineers could
command, ......... 10
Todleben's defences, . . . . . . . .11
His more strictly defensive measures, ..... 11
By his strictly defensive measures did he make the fortress
secure ?.......... 12
His opinion, 12
Todleben's measures for averting attack, .... 13
His aggressive batteries, . . . . . • .14
His rifle-pits, .......... 14
His lodgments, ......... 15
His aggressive countermines, ....... 16
Petty sorties, ..... ... .17
The strain they put on the guards of the trenches, . . 17
Novel contrivance resorted to by the Russians when attacking
the French in these sorties, ...... 17
Indignation of the French army, . . . . . .18
Generous concession to its feeling by Osten-Sacken, . . 18
The sorties always sooner or later repressed with due vigour, . 19
The French guards of the trenches compared with the English, 19
The enemy encountering our guards of the trenches, . . 20
Without discovering their extreme numerical weakness, . . 20
Departure of Prince Napoleon, ...... 20
VI.
Natural reluctance of the French to alter their main plan of
siege, . 21
Burgoyne's insistence upon the expediency of assailing the
Malakoff, 22
The French at first adverse to his counsels, .... 23
But afterwards more willingly listening to them, ... 23
Acceptance of Burgoyne's opinion in a Conference of Three, . 24
CONTENTS.
Vtl
Chapter I. — continued.
Step tending in an opposite direction immediately taken by
Canrobert, .......... 25
Sis official letter to Lord Raglan, ...... 25
Lord Raglan's way of dealing with it, . . . . .25
The French ultimately reverting to the decision of the ' Three, ' tl
And on certain conditions agreeing to assail the Malakoff front, 27
The gravity of the dangers thus averted, .... 28
The envoy sent by Lord Raglan to the French headquarters, . 29
Long delay, .......... 30
1st and 2d February. Modified plan put forward by the
French, 31
And approved by Lord Raglan, . . . . . .31
But now known to have masked another design, ... 32
VII.
Import of the change of plan as first understood by the French,
VIII.
The French mining operations, ....
Todleben's skill and power in the science of mining,
His countermines, .......
Progress of the mining and countermining operations,
Their result, ........
IX.
The peremptory part of the besieger's design now shifting from
the Flagstaff Bastion to the Malakoff, .....
X.
Dispositions consequent upon C'anrobert's resolve to operate
against the Malakoff, ........ 38
The Allies commencing works destined to aid a meditated
attack on the Mamelon, ....... 38
XI.
Various movements and changes, ...... 39
On the part of the Russians, ....... 39
On the part of the French, ....... 40
Their reconnaissances, ........ 40
The treatment experienced by Forey, ..... 41
32
33
34
34
34
37
87
Vlll CONTENTS.
Chapter I. — continued.
The French breastplates, ....
. 42
On the part of the English, ....
42
Field-telegraph, ......
42
Kuilvv.iv, .......
. 43
Command of fleet, ......
. 43
XII.
Result of the conflict from the 6th of November 1854 to the
middle of February 1855, 48
XIII.
Questions raised by scientific critics, ..... 45
CHAPTER II.
EUPATORIA.
J.
Condition of things in Eupatoria and its neighbourhood, . 46
II.
Assembly of the force under Baron Wrangel, . . . .47
Its task, .......... 47
Danger threatening the enemy's communications, ... 47
Arrival of some Turkish battalions, and soon of Omar Pasha in
person, at Eupatoria, ........ 48
Question calling for Mentschikoff's decision, .... 48
His measures, ......... 48
Mentschikoff's resolve to have Eupatoria attacked, . . 49
By forces withdrawn from Baron Wrangel, .... 50
And placed under General Khrouleff, . . . . .50
III.
The defences and resources of Eupatoria, .... 50
The forces under General Khrouleff now charged to attack
Eupatoria, .......... 52
Their preparations, . .52
Their plan in its earlier stages, ...... 53
CONTENTS. IX
Chapter II.— continued.
IV.
The engagement of the 17th of February 53
The enemy's acquiescence in this repulse, .... 58
CHAPTER III.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
The Czar's feelings after his discomfiture before Eupatoria, . 59
His illness 59
Subsequent rumours, ........ 59
Power of grief over the body, ...... 59
Official account of the Czar's malady, ..... 60
This consistent with the belief that it was brought about by
grief, 60
Sequence of facts, . . .... .60
Death of the Czar, 60
The personal contention thus brought to end, ... 60
The fate of Nicholas, 61
Justice administered to a highly placed criminal, ... 62
CHAPTER IV.
SIEGE OF 8EBASTOPOL FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 1855
TO THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL.
I.
Morning of the 22d of February, 64
Sight observed by the French, 64
Todleben's inferences from what the Allies had been visibly
doing, .......... 65
His counteracting plans, 66
His Selinghinsk Redoubt, 67
II.
French night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt, ... 68
False report of this fight made to Canrobert, .... 72
Truce for burying the dead, ....... 73
VOL. VIII. 0
CONTENTS.
Chapter IV. — continued.
III.
Reason of the French for not renewing the attack, ... 73
The Volhynia Redoubt, 73
Continued acquiescence of the French, ..... 74
Import and effect of these counter-works on Mount Inkerman, 74
Decisions of the French on finding themselves thus confronted, 74
IV.
Council assembled, but with little prospect of advantage, . 75
Council of the 4th of March, 75
Adjourned Conference sitting on the 6th of March, . . 77
8th March. Canrobert renewing his endeavours to obtain
Turkish reinforcements, .....-• 78
Completion and armament of the two White Redoubts, . . 79
V.
Arrival of the young Grand-Dukes Nicholas and Michael, . 79
The Mamelon, 79
Advice of Bizot to Canrobert, 80
Declined, 80
Night of the 10th of March, Todleben establishing a Work on
the Mamelon, ......... 80
Sight greeting the French on the morning of the 11th, . . 80
The Kamtchatka Lunette, 80
Deliberations of the French in face of this new apparition, . SO
They resolve not to assault the new work, . . . .81
But to proceed against it by 'approaches,' .... 81
21st March. Todleben's completion and armament of his
Kamtchatka Lunette, 82
VI.
Mortifying and perplexing effect of Todleben's counter- works, 82
Canrobert's reason for declining to seize the Mamelon, . . 82
The vast scope of his objection, ...... 83
Its dangerous tendency, 84
Niel's comment on the objection 84
Canrobert's determination to abstain from assaulting the
embryo Lunette, ........ "4
Representation on this subject imparted by Lord Raglan to
Canrobert 85
CONTENTS.
XI
Chapter IV. — continued.
VII.
The gloomy apprehensions of Canrobert imparted to Lord
Eaglan, .......
Lord Raglan's comment, ....
And its tendency to relieve his despondency, .
Lord Raglan's power of repressing despondency,
Did this change Canrobert's tone ? .
Allusion to recent disclosures,
VIII.
Vigorous advance of the French 'approaches' against the new
Lunette, .......
Anxiety of the enemy to check them,
His night sorties, 22(1 of March,
His great night sortie against the French,
The sorties effected against the English siege- works
Colonel Kelly's dispositions, ....
Zavalichine's flank movement,
Boudistcheff's attack, .....
Charge by Vicars with 70 or 80 men of the 97th,
Vicars joined by Kelly and Gordon,
Defeat of the column, .....
Defeat of Zavalichine's column,
Sound of firing towards the more western part of the TV
zoff ltidge, .......
Colonel Kelly taking his measures,
But wounded and taken prisoner, . .
The attack under Astapoff, ....
Means of resistance collected,
Fight at the Mortar Battery, ....
Defeat and flight of the Russian column,
BeruleiTs surprise of our advanced siege-works in the Left
Attack, .......
Part of the invading force checked by some men of the 21st
Fusiliers under Carlton, ....
And ultimately retreating before it,
Russian troops for a while in the two advanced batteries
But routed by the men of our working-parties,
Comment on the four sorties directed against the English,
Comments on the great sortie effected against the French
Xll
CONTENTS.
Chapter IV. — continued.
IX.
Great extension given by Todleben to his counter-approaches, 106
The design of the 1st of January now so far frustrated as to
be almost in abeyance. . . . . . . .107
X.
The siege operations maintained against the town front, .
And by the English against the Redan and its neighbours,
XI.
Continuance and final success of General Canrobert's efforts to
draw reinforcements from the Turkish army at Eupatoria, .
Arrival of Omar Pasha in person with a large force of Turks, .
XII.
Sinking of more Russian ships, ....
Death of Nicholas imparted to the Sebastopol garrison,
Change of Russian commanders,
Prince M. Gortchakoff, .....
What made this a supremely fortunate choice ?
Admiral Istomine killed, ....
Departure of Sir John Burgoyne, .
XIII.
Preparations for a great cannonade, . .
Allusion to recent disclosures, . . ,
108
108
108
109
110
110
110
110
110
111
llL'
114
115
CHAPTER V.
THE SECRET TERMS OF THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO GENERAL NIEL.
The French Emperor beginning in secret to interfere with the
siege, ...••••••
General Niel,
His opinions on the subject of the war in the Crimea,
The desire of the French Emperor, ....
The ' mission ' of General Niel, ....
Niel's position at the French Headquarters, .
His plan, .... ...
116
117
117
118
118
119
119
CONTENTS. Xlll
Chapter V. — continued.
The plan in general conformity with the wish of the French
Emperor ; and approved by Canrobert,
Niel's task, .......••
The army of Canrobert kept secretly under restraint,
The Emperor's plan put in course of execution,
Concealment of the plan from the English,
And of its ' separate article ' from Canrobert, .
Impressions caused by the prospect of the Emperor's going to
the Crimea, ......••
The concealment from Lord Raglan maintained with continued
success, ......•••
Greatness of the difference between the plan concerted with
Lord Raglan by Canrobert, and the one framed by Niel,
The all but inevitable consequence of imparting the Emperor'
plan to Canrobert, .......
Disloyalty of the concealment practised against the English,
Way in which the Imperial will was brought to bear on Can
robert, ......-•■
No apparent reluctance on the part of Canrobert to be guided
by his Emperor's wish, ......
Lengthened and baneful incumbency of the Emperor's plan,
Explanations that might be appropriately given by Marshal
Canrobert, .......••
The bare facts, ........
The light thrown by this chapter on Canrobert's successive
'abstentions,' . 132
121
122
122
122
123
123
124
125
127
129
129
130
130
131
131
132
CHAPTER VI.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
I.
Expectations formed by those who were uninitiated in the
secret of Niel's mission, ... . 183
II.
Preparation for the April cannonade, . . • 135
Counter-preparations by the Russians, 136
Conditions placing the Russians at a disadvantage, . . .136
xiv CONTENTS.
Chapter VI. — continued.
ill.
Opening and continuation of the April l.'Ml>ardinent, . . 138
Continuance and general effect of tlic lininliardinent, . . 139
Over both the Town front, and the eastern part of the Fau-
bourg, ......... 139
But not over the intermediate batteries directly confronted by
the English, Ill
IV.
What kept within limits the battering-power of the 1 11
Incompleteness of some of the English preparative. . . 142
The Left Attack, 142
The arming of its two advanced batteries delayed, . . .113
The angry impatience thus caused, . . . . . .144
Its apparent cil'ect, . . . . . . • .145
A coincidence, . . . . . . • • .145
Order given to Captain Oldershaw, 146
And executed the same night,
12th April. The advanced No. VII. completed, and its guns
before sunset engaged with the enemy, . . . .146
Decision said to have been based on observation of I
encounter, . . . . . . . . . .11/
V.
The two advanced batteries of our Left Attack, . . . 147
The 'advanced No. VII.,' 148
The enemy's accustomed way of dealing with an advanced
battery, 148
Great, yet insufficient strength of its parapet, . . . 150
The ways of a cannon-ball when obstructed without !>•
stopped, 151
The 'advanced No. VIII.,'
VI.
The order directing Captain Oldershaw to engage the ' ad-
'vanced No. VII. battery* on the 13th of April, . . 153
Captain Oldershaw, . . . . . . . .154
Entering the battery, 155
Its state, 155
CONTENTS. XV
Chapter VI. — continued.
Sir Gerald Graham, . . . . . . . .156
His account of what the battery confronted, .... 156
The fight, 158
The losses sustained in Oldershaw's battery, . . . .169
General Dacres, . . . . . . . . .171
His words to Oldershaw, . . . . . . .171
An order given out by mistake, . . . . . .171
And the touching incident to which it gave rise, . . .172
VII.
Ground for laying full stress on the fight of the 13th of April, 173
Sir Gerald Graham, . . . . . . . .174
His judgment of Oldershaw's fight, . . . . .175
VIII.
Both the advanced Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries got ready for
fighting on the morning of the 14th, . . . . .175
Engagement of the No. VII. battery under Captain Henry on
morning of the 14th of April, . . . . . .175
Simultaneous engagement of the No. VIII. battery, under
Captain Walcott, on the morning of the 14th, . . .178
The engagements in the Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries on the
14th continued by the reliefs until dark, . . . .180
IX.
What put limits on the bombardment, . . . . .181
Consumption of siege-gun ammunition, . . . . .181
Losses of men sustained by the Allies in the artillery conflict, 182
Large proportion of the losses sustained by our sailors, . .182
Their ways whilst manning a battery, . . . . .182
X.
The defenders of Sebastopol, . . . . . . .183
Their Easter festivities mingling with the fights in the bat-
teries, 183
The fortitude they needed for their task, . . . .184
Their want of ammunition, . . . . . . .184
The sacrifices they had to make in order to be ready to meet
assaults, .......... 184
The heroism of their defence at this time, .... 185
XVI CONTENTS.
Chapter VI. — continued.
Supplies of ammunition and reinforcements, .
The tasks which the defence of Sebastopol at this time in
volved, .........
The two White Redoubts crushed and silenced, and not re
paired, .........
But still not assaulted by the French, ....
The Malakoff covered by counter-approaches, and not therefore
strongly assailed, ....
The Kamtchatka Lunette brought to ruin,
Not, however, assaulted by the French, .
But still ' approached ' by their s;ip,
Complete failure of the English batteries against the Great
Redan, ..........
The Town Front,
The Russians imagining the French to be resolute, and deter
mined to seize the Flagstaff Bastion, ....
Havoc sustained by the Flagstaff Bastion and its auxiliaries on
the first day,
So, on the second day,
So, on the third day,
So, on the fourth day,
So, on the fifth day,
So, on the sixth day,
State of Flagstaff Bastion,
The great effort made to repair it, .
Peril of the Bastion on the seventh day,
On the eighth day,
On the ninth day, ....
On the tenth day, ....
Desperate state of Bastion,
Cessation of the general bombardment,
Flag of truce. Compliments exchanged between French and
Russian officers, ........
'Siege of Troy,' ........
Continuation of the bombardment directed again
staff Bastion and its auxiliaries, .....
Their peril on the 21st of April
CONTENTS. XV11
Chapter VI. — continued.
XL
Question whether the bombardment opened paths for assault, 196
Answered by the facts, and by the authoritative opinion of
General Todleben, 196
The bombardment achieved its set purpose ; but, not being
followed up, it resulted in harm to the Allies, . . .198
Todleben 'b enquiry, . . . . . . . .199
The clue, 199
CHAPTER VII.
THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL (WITH EXCLUSION OF THE APRIL BOMBARD-
MENT, ALREADY NARRATED) FROM THE 9TH OF APRIL TO THE
MIDDLE OF MAY.
I.
Bizot mortally wounded, ....... 200
And succeeded after an interval by Niel, .... 202
The French opening ground by mines in front of the Flagstaff
Bastion, 202
And there forming a 4th Parallel, ...... 2Q3
The tendency of this successful exploit to embarrass Canrobert
and Niel, 204
Todleben's encroachments in front of the Central Bastion, . 205
Canrobert's unwillingness to resist them, .... 205
This, however, overcome, ....... 206
Pelissier, 206
Not brooking the encroachments against his own front, . . 206
The anomaly thence resulting, ...... 207
Fights for the Cimetiere Lodgments, ..... 207
Resulting, after some days, in the definitive success of the
French, 208
Todleben's project for a new work of counter-approach, . . 208
The fighting for lodgments constructed in furtherance of the
project, .......... 208
The Sousdal Counter-guard, ....... 209
lirilliant attack by the French on the Sousdal Counter-guard, 210
And capture of the Work, . . . . . . .210
Resulting in the complete success of the French, . . . 211
xviii CONTENTS.
Chapter VII. — continued.
Losses sustained in the night combat of the 1st of May, . .211
Canrobert apologising for this victorious exploit, . . .212
The Sousdal Counter-guard converted into a French Work, . 212
And held fast, 212
The fighting for lodgments in front of ' Gordon's Attack,' . 212
Egerton's achievement, . . . . • ■ • .213
His death, 214
His fame, 214
The praises bestowed by Lord Raglan on the troops taking part
in this combat, .......•• 215
The losses it caused our people, . . . . . .215
The night sorties during this period, 215
A reconnaissance by Omar Pasha, . . . . . .216
Why recorded, . . . • • • • • .21/
Submarine telegraph connecting the Chersonese with Varna, . 217
Its counterbalancing mischiefs, ...... 217
The Eupatoria cable, . . . . • ■ • .217
The accession of 15,000 Sardinian troops under General de la
Marmora, . . . • • • • • • .217
CHAPTER VIII.
TROUBLED COUNSELS OF THE FRENCH.
I.
Tendency of a successful bombardment to derange the working
of Niel's ' mission,' ...•■••• 220
Canrobert ignoring the success of the bombardment, . . 221
II.
Conference of 14th April, 222
Disposition on the part of the French, except PeTissier, to stop
the bombardment, ...••••• 222
But successfully combated by Lord Raglan and Lyons, . . 222
A slight relaxation of the fetters imposed on Canrobert by
Niel's ' mission,' ....••••• 222
The miserable instruction given to Canrobert by his Emperor, 224
Canrobert's state of mind, 224
The conduct and bearing of Niel, 225
CONTENTS. XIX
Chapter VIII. — continued.
His letter of the 16th of April to the Minister of War, . . 225
No termination of the secrecy which had shrouded Niel's
'mission,' .......... 226
16th April. Agreement made between Canrobert and Lord
Raglan, 226
But abandoned three days afterwards by Canrobert, . . 227
17th April. Letter from Niel to the Emperor, . . . 227
111.
Ebullition of warlike impatience on the part of the French
army, .......... 228
Canrobert either sharing the feeling or hurried along by it, . 229
Niel, 229
23d April. The French ostensibly ready to assault, . . 230
Preliminary conference, ........ 230
Evening of the 23d, 230
Agreement between Canrobert and Lord Raglan for a general
assault of Sebastopol, ........ 230
Lord Raglan's impression, ....... 231
IV.
General Canrobert's apparently uneasy state, .... 231
His letter next day (24th April) to the Emperor, . . . 231
Niel writing to the Emperor at the same time, . . . 232
The Emperor's account of the two letters, .... 232
Morning of 25th. Canrobert resolved to put off the assault, . 232
The interview between Niel and Lord Raglan, . . . 233
Course taken by Lord Raglan, ...... 234
25th April. Canrobert's letter putting off the attack, . . 234
Lord Raglan's observation on the French change of counsel, . 235
Circumstances under which the letter to Bruat was put for-
ward, ........... 235
Weight due to the letter of the 7th of April, .... 236
V.
The previous concealment from Canrobert, . . . 237
VI.
Uncertainty as to the duration of the postponement, . . 238
Canrobert's idea of its scope, ....... 239
The old fetters refastened upon him, ..... 239
XX CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX.
THE NOW ACTIVELY PERTURBING INTERFERENCE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON
IN THE WAR FOR SEBASTOPOL.
I.
The hitherto paralysing interference of the French Emperor, . 241
Now changed into actively perturbing dictation, . . . 241
His visit to England, 241
The Council of War at Windsor Castle, . . . . .242
The Emperor's resolve to join his army, ..... 242
His agreement with our Government upon preliminary ques-
tions,
II.
The Emperor's proposals, ....... 243
Acceptance by our Government of the preliminary arrange-
ments, . . . . . . . . . .244
As recorded at Buckingham Palace, ..... 244
III.
The Emperor's plan of campaign, . . . . . .244
His plan as regarded the ' 1st army of operation,' . . .214
That not objected to by our Government, . . . .245
The Emperor's plan as regarded the ' 2d army of operation,' . 245
Opinion formed by our Government of that last part of the
plan, ........... 246
General purport of the entire plan, ..... 246
IV.
The Emperor abandoning his intention of going out to the
Crimea, 247
His letter of instruction to Canrobert, . . . . .247
V.
3d of May. The Generals in the Crimea accmaiuted with the
imperial plan, ......... 250
The joy of Lord l'anmure, .251
VI.
The frail basis on which it all rested, ..... 252
CONTENTS.
XXI
CHAPTER X.
THE INTERPOSITION OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CONTINUING AND
BRINGING ABOUT THE RECALL OF A JOINT EXPEDITION.
Project for opening a passage into the Sea of Azof, .
The Straits of Kertch,
II.
The enemy's endeavours to guard them,
The Peninsula of Kertch,
Baron Wrangel there in command, .
His forces, .....
The task set before him,
His dispositions, ....
254
254
255
256
256
256
257
257
III.
The eagerness of the English to have the attack set on foot,
General Canrobert's assent to it, .
His subsequent doubts and objections, ....
Lord Raglan's masterly answer to him, ....
Canrobert deferring to Lord Raglan, ....
IV.
Sailing of the expedition on the 3d of May, . .
V.
The Submarine Cable, 263
259
259
260
260
261
262
VI.
Telegrams from Paris, .
Night of the 3d of May,
Canrobert's visit to Lord Raglan with a new telegram,
Discussion between the two commanders,
Its result, .........
'2.15 a.m. Arrival of aide-de-camp with yet another telegram
And letter from Canrobert declaring himself, .
Compelled to recall Admiral Bruat, ....
Reception of this by Lord Raglan, .....
264
264
265
265
266
266
267
267
267
X.\ii CONTENTS.
Chapter X. — continued.
VII.
Venturesome course taken by Lord Raglan, .... 268
The latitude he gave to Sir George Brown, .... 270
VIII 271
IX.
Return of the expedition, ....... 274
Feelings excited by its recall, . . . . . . .275
On board the flotilla, 275
In Constantinople, . . . • • • .276
On the fleet and the troops, . . . . • • -' 7
Canrobert's account of the recall, . . . . . .278
The justice due to him, . 279
X
Letter from the French Emperor, 279
In explanation of the course he had taken 280
Comment on the letter, . . . . . . .281
CHAPTER XL
TIIE EMPEROR'S DICTATION RESISTED, THE COLLAPSE OF HI8 PLAN,
AND THE RESIGNATION OF CANROBERT.
I.
Canrobert and Nicl proposing consideration of the Emperor's
plan, 283
Course taken by Lord Raglan, 284
His opinion of the plan, 284
And of what would be the right course, 285
II.
Pelissier's letter of the 5th of May, 285
Wholesome bearing of the letter upon the counsels of the
Allies, 287
Corollary resulting from the letter in ite bearing upon the
Past 287
I'e.i tier's growing ascendant, • 288
CONTENTS. XX111
Chapter XI. — continued.
Contrast, 289
Effect of the letter, 289
III.
Expositions of the Emperor's plan now before the Com-
manders, .......... 289
The duties it assigned to Canrobert and Pelissier, . . . 290
12th May. The three allied Commanders in Conference, . 290
14th May, renewed Conference. Lord Raglan prevailing, . 290
Agreement as to plan of field operations, .... 291
But no further, 291
Canrobert peremptorily refusing to guard the English trenches, 292
Omar Pasha also refusing, ....... 292
The consequences of these refusals, ..... 292
Lord Raglan's mortification, ....... 292
Rejection of plan, ......... 293
An anomaly, .......... 293
Canrobert's idea that the English army might be split into
two, 293
The Emperor's plan exposed to contact with realities, . . 294
With what result, 294
Statement by Canrobert that he was going to take the field, . 295
Duration of the harm done by General Niel's ' mission,' . . 296
IV.
General Canrobert's first endeavour to rid himself of the com
mand, .....
16th April. His second endeavour,
His resignation tendered,
Strange interposition of Niel, .
Canrobert's command given up and transferred to Pelissier,
Assigned causes of Canrobert's resignation,
The merit of Canrobert's self-sacrifice, ....
The lesson apparently taught him by Pelissier's letter, .
Feeling of the French army towards Canrobert,
The ' morale ' of the French army under Canrobert,
Opinions of Canrobert expressed by men in authority, .
Effect of recent disclosures on Canrobert's reputation,
296
;
297
298
•298
300
301
301
302
304
306
XXIV
CONTENTS.
CHATTER XII.
THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA WITH THE BELLIGERENTS. —
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA. — THE AUSTRIAN PRO-
POSALS.— THEIR ULTIMATE REJECTION ENTAILING A CHANGE OP
AUSTRIA'S POLICY.
The union of Austria and Prussia with the Western Powers,
Its anomalous character,
Its efficacy for the first proposed object,
Tendency of this too speedy success,
The danger increased by another cause,
The defection of Prussia,
The loyal course taken by Austria,
307
308
309
310
310
311
314
II.
Step taken by Austria which made a beginning of her media-
tion, 315
Course taken at first by the Czar Nicholas, . . . .315
And afterwards, ......... 315
His acceptance of the Four Conditions, . . . . . 31 G
Treaty of the 2d of December 1854, 316
Preliminary negotiations for the Conference, . . . .316
Exclusion of Prussia from the Conferences, . . . .317
Question as to the effect of Nicholas's death on the prospects
of peace, .......... 318
IIL
The Peace Negotiations at Vienna, 319
Lord John Russell. ........ 320
Prince Alexander Gortchakoff, 322
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, ........ 323
Debates in the Conference, ....... 323
Compared with the mere adduced ' reasons,' the actual stress
of the 'motives,' ........ 329
Failure of the Peace negotiations carried on between the
belligerents, ......... 334
CONTENTS.
XXV
Chapter XII. — continued.
IV.
The Austrian proposals, ......
Allusions to a subsequent attack on Lord John Russell
The Third of the three Austrian plans, .
The dead-lock in front of Sebastopol,
The need that there was for effecting a new move against
Russia, .....•••
The lever to be found at Vienna, ....
Neglect of this by the Rulers in Paris and London,
But not by De Lhuys and Lord John,
The tendency and value of the measure,
De Lhuys, ........
Lord John Russell, ......
Reception of this plan by Lord Palinerston's Cabinet,
And by the French Emperor, ....
Pronounced difference in the counsels of the Western Powers,
The French Emperor and Lord Cowley, .
Marshal Vaillant, .......
His words, ........
Their sudden effect, ......
Resignation of De Lhuys, .....
Unaccepted resignations of Lord John Russell,
Unanimity after the 5th of May of the English Cabinet,
The Governments of France and England once more in sub-
stantial accord, .......
Opening for the new policy suggested by Vaillant, .
The soundness of Vaillant's conclusion, .
The course of duty prescribed to D. de Lhuys and Lord John,
What they did, .......
Vote of the House of Commons, ....
The Conference kept formally open till the 4th of June,
And then closed, .......
335
335
337
339
341
341
342
342
343
344
344
344
345
346
346
347
348
348
348
349
349
349
350
350
351
352
354
354
354
Change brought about by the rejection of the Austrian pro-
posals, .......... 354
Austria set free to change her course, ..... 355
The course she rightly took, ....... 355
VIII
XXVI
CONTENTS.
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.
1. Outnumbered by tens of thousands,
2. On General Bosquet's front,
3. Only by hundreds,
4. Of the Flagstaff Bastion,
5. Minor pieces of ordnance,
6. Only 290 men, .
7. At the object kept always in sight,
8. Against the Malakoff front,
9. Happily able to accept the condition imposed,
10. Till the latter part of the month,
11. Words described as ' Instructions,'
12. Other mortal then living, .
13. Spreading system of countermines,
14 Unleashed a camouflet,
15. The intervening Mamelon, .
16. Did the work, ....
17. Destroying the Inkerman Bridge,
859
359
359
360
360
360
360
360
360
361
361
361
362
362
362
362
362
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.
1. With their blows, 362
2. Lost their way in the darkness, ...... 363
8. Had been victoriously achieved, ..... 363
4. Without a simultaneous advance on the Malakoff front, . 363
5. Not again to attempt to drive the enemy from their new-
works 363
6. For which he was yearning, ...... 363
7. With grossly inadequate means, ..... 364
8. Were ' postulates ' rather than facts, 364
NOTES TO CHAPTER V.
1. 14th February 1855, 365
2. Begun and continued, ....... 365
CONTENTS. XXVU
Appendix — continued.
3. Lasting success, 3(5J>
4. By ' approaches/ ......•• 365
5. To Vaillanb, 8th February 1855, 366
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.
1. Grave affair, 36^
2. See Appendix, Note (2), 367
3. Enthusiasm, 367
4. Camel, 368
5. Battery 368
6 ' To retire,' 368
7. To Oldershaw 369
8. Came to an end, . . ...-•• 369
9. Strength of only three men, 369
10. Any less formal document, 370
11. Under him, 371
12. To make the truth known, • 3'1
13. Engaged under them, 372
14. The fire of the two ' advanced batteries,' .... 373
15. Defence of Sebastopol, 373
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.
1 . Might not after all be unwise, 373
2. Somewhat unscrupulous, .....•• 3' *
3. Always thoroughly cordial, 874
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.
1. To be attempted, 375
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.
1. This part of the plan, 375
2. Take effect by surprise, 375
3. Or otherwise into the sea, 375
4. To avert the catastrophe, 376
XXV111 CONTKNTS.
Appbn dix — con tinned.
NOTES TO CHAPTER X.
1. Into full play, 376
2. Could not divine, 377
3. In their rear, 377
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.
1. Campaigning Plan, ........ 377
2. To act in the field. 377
3. The hopes he had entertained of being attacked by the
enemy on the reopening of the bombardment, . . 37£
FROM THE MORROW OF INKERMAN
TO THE FALL OF CANROBERT.
CHAPTER I.
THE SIEGE OP SEBASTOPOL PROM THE 6TH OP NOVEMBER
1854, TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ENSUING FEBRUARY.
I.
By following the course they approved on the chap.
morrow of ' Inkerman,' the Allies did more than '
siege.
make waste of that onward momentum which nowtom-8
victory is wont to confer ; * for they even, as we wh^might
saw, gave their adversary the priceless respite he '"
needed for his Flagstaff Bastion ; t and not judg-
ing the Sebastopol front to be anywhere else
in a state that could warrant assault, they now
found their armies committed to what — unless
roughly cut short by recurrence to bold resolves,
or by some grave disaster befalling them — seemed
destined to prove a long siege.
* See ante, vol. vi. p. 488 et seq., and also note to chap. i. vol. vii.
t See ante, vol. vi. pp. 5, 6, and 488.
VOL. VIII. A
CONDITIONS AFFECTING TIIK BESIEGERS.
C HAP.
I.
which they
had placed
themselves.
Yet, to any such task as that of putting stress
on Ssbastopol by , what men in general mean
Ime,runic" when they spy'akV a 'siege,' the Allies were
tliei- w.hoUy unequal.- They had been guided
into their troubles by accomplished, highly
skilled engineers, but of those there were none
who at first saw whither their counsels were
tending;* and thus it resulted — anomalously —
that by great scientific advisers they had been
not only led by degrees into what was an ugly
predicament, but also into open rebellion against
the first precepts of Science. Instead of ap-
proaching their object with that huge prepon-
derance of numbers — before Vauban's time ten
to one — which Science had declared to be needed
for the reduction of a fortress, they were them-
selves on the contrary outnumbered by tens of
thousands ; (l) and far from having the power
to fold their coils round the place after the
manner of normal besiegers, they had confessed
themselves unable to invest it at all on the north,
whilst even too on the south — their own chosen
side of the Roadstead — they were leaving the
enemy free to come in and go out as he chose.
And whilst thus altogether unable to beleaguer
Sebastopol, the Allies were in some sort be-
leaguered. Confronting them — and this at close
quarters — with the garrison part of his forces
now strongly entrenched, the Russian commander
The duress
they
Hiitt'ered.
* See vol. iv. chap. vii. Men thought they could use batter-
ing-guns, and even give those guns cover, without sliding intc
-,\ ' siege.'
CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE BESIEGBES. 3
there leant upon the resources of a vast naval chap.
arsenal, and a fleet broken up for land-service,
whilst — left free, as he was, to communicate with
Simpheropol, Odessa, St Petersburg — he could
always be drawing new strength from the Musco-
vite empire at large, and moreover could wield at
his pleasure the army he always kept imminent
in the open field.
By a part of that Eussian field-army on their
flank, and the garrison of Sebastopol entrenched
along their whole front, the Allies, as we saw,
had allowed themselves to be completely hemmed
in on the land side ; and how they thus became
hampered in the task of supplying their armies,
we already have painfully learnt ; * but the bear- The bearing
, • i 11 \.i ■ offchis
ing that this duress had upon their powers as duress upon
. , their power
combatai bs must not the less be remembered, as combat-
ants.
So long as they had been able to promise them-
selves that within a few days they would break
their way into Sebastopol, the duress they suffered
could of course be regarded as only a brief re-
straint to be followed by a dazzling conquest
well fitted to end all their troubles ; but the
moment they had resolved that the crisis of their
enterprise should be indefinitely put off, this
Chersonese on which they had lighted, as though
it were simply their stepping - stone, seemed
thenceforth rather their prison. With their
' parallels ' ' first,' ' second,' and ' third,' and all
their siege apparatus, they still had the air of
assailants, yet were not in reality minded to
* Ante, vol. vii., chaps, i. v. vi. vii. and viii.
CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE BESIEGERS.
CHAP.
I.
The task of
defence now
weighing
upon their
energies :
and defence
under hard
conditions.
No idea of
raising the
siege could
be well or
even pru-
dently har-
boured.
risk striking any prompt blow ; and on the other
hand now, they lived subject to whatever might
be adventured against them by a closely hover-
ing army which they could not shake off, and be-
sides— at still closer quarters — by the garrison of
a fortress which they had not even tried to invest.
They indeed might still be preparing the means
of some future attack, but meanwhile, they found
themselves thrown upon the defensive, and this
too, under conditions of a perilous kind; for
whilst closely cooped in as we saw, on the land
side, they stood with their backs to a shore over-
hung by precipitous cliffs ; and tacticians all know
that to have to accept battle from a powerful
enemy without enjoying due freedom of move-
ment towards the rear, is to be in a sort of pre-
dicament which is adverse to the hope of a vic-
tory, and makes defeat utter ruin.
Pride alone would perhaps have sufficed to pre-
vent the thus hampered Allies from indulging
any thought of retreat ; but it is certain that
motives deriving from a warlike sense of honour
and courage were reinforced by the dictates of
prudence ; for, whatever the peril and difficulty
of forcibly reducing Sebastopol, an undertaking
to withdraw the Allied armies, and to cover their
embarkation, would have been one of a kind still
more formidable, and — except upon condition of
abandoning siege-guns to the enemy — must have
proved a task utterly desperate.*
* Under stress of an imprudent question exacting a categori-
cal answer, Lord Raglan confidentially informed Lord I'anrnure
THE NOW DOUULE TASK IMPOSED ON THE ALLIES. 5
CHAP.
I.
II
So, because the Allies were now minded to The double
o i • v task now
defer their assault of Sebastopol, it did not at pressing
. upon the
all therefore follow that, by coming to such a re- Allies
solve, they had purchased the bliss of repose ; for
their now doubly aiming exertions were not only
henceforth addressed to the object of an ulterior
attack, but also — and this with great diligence —
to the more instant task of defence.
Imagining that the enemy might some day re- Their de-
new his great enterprise of the 5th of November, works,
they constructed, they armed, they maintained
defensive works on Mount Inkerman ; they threw
up works of countervallation on their left ; they
perfected the eastern and north-eastern defences
of Balaclava, and even strengthened yet further
the hardly assailable lines which crested the
Sapoune Heights on General Bosquet's front.(2)
They still indeed aimed a great proportion of
their labours at the capital object of some day
reducing Sebastopol ; but even where so applied,
their efforts tended also to guard them against
apprehended attacks, because the maintenance of
their attitude as apparently determined assailants
helped largely to keep unimpaired the moral
strength and weight of their armies, whilst more-
over their long chain of siege-works, though of
course designed for attack, was also a formidable
that any such withdrawal was 'impossible.' He added — 'We
' have no retreat.' Letter marked 'Confidential,' 3d March 1855.
FRENCH OPERATIONS.
CHAP
I.
barrier in the way of any armed force coming out
from the place to assail them, and therefore
formed part of the means by which they were
able to hope that any new Eussian onslaught
directed against their ' approaches ' might be
either averted or battled. Thus — even more
largely than observers might judge at first sight
— self-defence entered into the motives which im-
pelled the now harassed Allies to toil day and
night at their works.
The designs
of the
French
though
postponed,
still point-
ing to the
Flagstaff
Bastion.
Checked
in carrying
forward
their ap-
proaches,
they resort
to mining.
III.
It was still by the Flagstaff Bastion that the
French at this time were hoping they might, some
day, break into Sebastopol. Because battled by
conditions which made it seem unduly hazardous
to attempt such a step, they did not indeed try to
lessen the distance of some 180 yards which still
parted their most advanced trench from the coun-
terscarp of the opposite Bastion, and on the con-
trary resigned themselves to the plan of construct-
ing their foremo.st batteries on the line they had
reached (at night) between the 2d and the 3d of
November; but they did their full utmost to per-
fect the third parallel then opened, to give it due
extension at the flanks, and prepare to break
down by over - dominant metal the fire that
threatened to rage against any column advanc-
ing to storm and capture the Work.
As is usual with besiegers when stayed in their
task of pushing forward 'approaches' by trench-
PART TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH. 7
work, the French with great diligence resorted to cha p
the expedient of mining. J
The besiegers by this time had learnt, yet Extension
. towards
were day by day learning more thoroughly, that their left
— because each opposite bastion was so placed work
A •*■ . carried on
and so armed for duty towards its neighbour bythe
J m ° French.
as to be effectively subserving the principle of
' mutual support ' — they must choose a wider
'front for attack' than at first appeared to be
necessary; and the French by degrees got to
see that their own special task (as distinguished
from that of our people) must be made to include
a great extension of siege-work towards their left.
They therefore not only made ready to deal with
the ' Central ' as well as the ' Flagstaff ' Bastion,
but became step by step the besiegers of all the
Sebastopol front from the line of the Woronzoff
Road to the edge of the Quarantine Bay.
The French also very well understood that, The part
because the Flagstaff Bastion drew support from this time
the Barrack Battery and the Great Eedan, they English in
. the work of
would need once again some such aid on their the siege,
right as Lord Eaglan had been able to give them
on the day of the first bombardment ; but for the
siege-like co-operation thus wanted they looked,
as before, to the English, and our people, with
small and decreasing resources, and difficult
ground before them, were unable to execute
earth-works upon any scale matching the great-
ness of Todleben's new creations. To maintain,
to improve, and a little advance their approaches,
to confront now and then with new batteries an
8 THE STRAIN ON OUR MEN.
chap, enemy ever restless and aggressive in his use of
1 — . the pickaxe and spade, and finally to prepare
for the object of supporting the French on their
right, if ever, in the future, disposed to assault
the Flagstaff Bastion — this was all that in the
way of siege-work our people were able to do.
They did no less than their utmost ; yet in face
of the mighty defences by this time piled up
before them they could not at all make sure,
nay indeed could scarce venture to hope that
they would once more be able to win for the
French such immunity in the direction of their
right front as was given them — though given
in vain — on that 17th of October when under
the fire of our guns the Malakoff Tower was
silenced and the Great Redan lay in ruins.
The great Only those who have formed some conception
strain put „ , . . . .
on their or the hardships undergone by our army at the
time of the ' Winter Troubles ' will fully imagine
the strain that was put on its fortitude by the
exigencies of siege-work and continuous strife
with the enemy, superadded to the bare task of
living or painfully trying to live ; * yet some-
times it happened that the nature, though not
the extent, of the struggle maintained, and the
imperious domination of military exigencies over
other dire needs, could almost be learnt at a
glance. In the midst of its most grievous straits
for want of other means of land-transport, one
might too often count several hundreds of our
weary soldiery — every man of them heavily laden
* See ante, vol. vii. chap. viii.
fortitude.
EFFECT OF GIVING TIME. 9
— painfully employed in carrying up the supplies chap,
over miles and miles of deep quagmire, whilst '
also, and at the very same time, might be seen on
the track by Karani a team reckoning no less
that from thirty to forty of our few surviving
horses, engaged in dragging up to the front by
ploughing and ploughing and ploughing through
depths and depths of clay some mighty gun,
judged to be wanted for the all - demanding
siege* There were Frenchmen at this cruel
time who complacently spoke of their efforts
to 'galvanise' into activity the English sloth ;t
yet Canrobert himself frankly owned that the
whole of the army thus taunted for not doing
more heavy siege-work in addition to its other
huge tasks, was scarcely greater in numbers
than one of his strongest divisions.}
IV
When determining once more to take time, one of the
the Allies of course could not but know they confemwfoD
were giving time to the enemy; but, though by giving
making him, and knowingly making him, this
dangerous concession, they did not apprehend its
full import.
In words hardly varied from those that were Todieben's
used once before, it seems fitting here to repeat drawing
that, besides their other artillery, the garrison from time;
* Journal Royal Engineers, vol. i. p. 69.
t Bizot to Marshal Vaillant, quoted by Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32.
t Ibid., p. 14.
10 todleben's vast resources.
chap, had not only all the ship's guns — some 1900
' in number — not only the ammunition, the iron,
the timbers, the cordage, the spars, the tanks,
the canvas — all, in short, that a great fleet could
need, with vast quantities of stone, already de-
tached from the neighbouring rocks, but also the
machinery, the implements, and the materials
which had been in use for the ordinary business
of the dockyards, or for quarrying stone on the
Chersonese, or carrying on endless works in the
port, whether formed by excavations, by em-
bankments, or masonry, including amongst such
resources the windlasses, the cranes, the gins,
the levers, the engines of all kinds, by which
Man enforces his dominion over things of huge
bulk and weight, and that all these appliances
were not only at the disposal of the defenders,
but closely within their reach, coming apt to the
hands of labourers who had long been accus-
tomed to wield them.* "What, however, still re-
mains to be shown is the strength in numbers
of workmen which the besieged and the besiegers
respectively could during this winter command
for the purposes of defence or attack,
as compared Whilst the suffering and hampered Allies
means winch could employ workmen only by hundreds, (3) the
Engineers Kussians kept engaged on their works an organ-
could com- . . .
mand. ised body of labourers with a varying strength
of no less than from six to ten thousand ; t nor
* Vol. iv. chap. iii.
t Todleben, i. p. 514. The men were organised in two
brigades.
HIS DEFENSIVE MEASURES. H
does even this statemenl suffice to show the real chap.
disparity; for, comparing them man against man, . —
the Russian labourers were a great deal more
hardy, were endowed with more physical strength
than those the Allies could employ ; and if we
take care to remember that the enormously
superior command of constructive resources thus
possessed by the garrison was wielded by Colonel
de Todleben with prodigious skill and activity,
we shall form perhaps some conception of that
inferiority in working power which long kept
down the Allies. I suppose it might safely be
reckoned that in military engineering well con-
ceived and well executed, the enemy — whom
ardent besiegers had invited to a trial of strength
at this very sort of toil — could achieve much
more in one day than his challengers could ac-
complish in ten.
It was with these vast advantages, wielded by Todieben-s
consummate genius, that the formidable colonel
of Sappers proved able to work his wonders.
Not even neglecting that quiet, that unmolested msmore
strictly
'North Side' which a less wary man might have defensive
• measures.
judged to be exempt from all risk, he converted
Sebastopol into a mighty fortress prepared for
the fight at all points, and defended on the land
side alone by great guns already numbering no
less than 700, with besides all the lesser artillery
held ready at every apt spot to confront storming
columns with round-shot, or to greet them when
a little more near with his favourite salutes of
mi trail.
12 todleben's opinion.
chap. He closed the gorge of the Little Redan, and
1 of the Malakoff, and afterwards that of the
Flagstaff Bastion. (*)
To make sure, if he could, that in the event
of their carrying the Flagstaff Bastion, the
French should there meet destruction, he, by
means of conductors laid down underground,
connected the powder - magazine of the Work
with a peaceful spot answering his purpose in
one of the Sebastopol churches ; * and — not
forgetting our people — he took like precautions
for arresting the triumph of Englishmen who,
after storming their way through all the four-
fold defences of the Great Redan, might find
themselves alive in its precincts, t
As regards the French mining operations,
Colonel Todleben met them by countermines in
a way we shall presently learn.
By his By all the works thus accomplished did the
defensive great engineer make his fortress secure against
measures , .. . . ,
did lie make any attack of such kind as — with even the
secure? strength they then had — the Allies, if they
chose, might attempt ?
He himself did not so believe. If trusting
that everywhere else he as yet might defy the
assailants, he still confessed to himself that he
His opinion, had a weak point in his armour which could not
by art be made good. He knew indeed that the
troops defending his Flagstaff Bastion might be
supported by such strong appliances as would
enable them, if they chose, to ' die hard ' ; and
* Todleben, p. 503. t Ibid.
HIS AGGRESSIVE MKASURES. 13
to that end amongst many others he bent his chap.
i.
designs, never ceasing to provide for the Work,
and for all the ground near its gorge such
doubled, such trebled, such quadrupled means
of resistance that the assailants on the day of
the struggle must either recoil from the venture,
or dearly buy their conquest with blood ; but he
believed that with all his resources he could not
defend the threatened Bastion against a deter-
mined attack ; whilst, moreover, he judged that
the loss of the Work would so split the Sebas-
topol defences as to ensure the fall of the place.*
It may seem at first sight that this twofold
conclusion would warrant an approach towards
despondency.
V.
But apart from what, narrowly speaking, may Todieben-s
be called the ' defence ' of ' the Flagstaff Bastion,' for averting
° > attack.
there might be measures well fitted to save it by
averting, instead of resisting, the threatened at-
tack ; and indeed, as we saw, it was to a policy of
that sort, adopted on the 5th of November, that
the Bastion then owed its immunity from what
on the previous day seemed a closely impending
assault.
Colonel Todleben could not well ask that an-
other battle of Inkerman should be hazarded for
the Flagstaff Bastion, and apparently it may be
taken for granted that he did not perseveringly
counsel that measure of a ' sortie in strength and
* See his words, quoted post, p. 197.
14 TODLEBEN 's AGGRESSIVE MEASURES.
OHAP. ' by daylight,' winch, according to the judgment
' of many highly skilled engineers, might have
brought the besiegers to ruin ; for he almost
acknowledges that his own darling plan — his
plan of assailing Mount Kodolph with powerful
forces and so wresting it from the grasp of the
French — was one hardly within the competence
of Prince Mentschikoff's army when crippled and
in some sort disorganised by its losses on the
Inkerman day.
Hisag- But short of undertaking great sorties, Colonel
gressive ° °
batteries. Todleben did all he could to conduct his defence
of Sebastopol in an eagerly aggressive spirit. His
lately, his yet more lately, his still more lately
raised batteries never ceased to be harrying the
besiegers with new, perturbing challenges deliv-
ered at break of day by means gathered during
the night which forced his overmatched adver-
saries to be straining their inferior resources in
efforts to meet his designs ; and, so great was the
quickness, the ease with which he thus prepared
fire — the fire of heavy, well-covered guns — from
changed and changing fronts, that, if hazarding
a form of expression rather true than exact, one
might say he ' manoeuvred ' with earth-works as
others 'manoeuvre' with troops.
ma rifle- Another way in which Todleben maintained
pits.
his aggressive defence was by sinking and main-
taining 'Eilie-pits' at points so far in advance
that the fire from marksmen there posted tor-
men tingly galled the besiegers, thus oftentimes
making it hard for them, if not indeed almost
todleben's aggressivk measures. 15
impossible, to mend their embrasures in the day- Cii A P.
time, and subjecting them besides to the bane of ! —
having their lines overlooked by observers both
near and well sheltered.
So vexatious a kind of encroachment was not
to be always maintained without provoking resist-
ance, or rather counter-attack, and the struggles
for Kifle-pits occurring in the course of the siege
may be said to have only begun with the exploit
of young Tryon, who wrested one of these lairs
from the hands of the enemy, and achieved his
little conquest so brilliantly as to win and de-
serve the warm praises of both the Allied com-
manders, General Canrobert no less than Lord
Eaglan.
But the idea of the Kifle-pit soon proved to be His lodg
x . ments.
only the embryo of another and more formidable
conception which was afterwards brought to
maturity by Todleben's fertile brain. Instead
of sending out a small party of riflemen to
choose, on the spur of the moment, a speck of
ground in advance, and there dig themselves
down into shelter, might he not rather act —
though of course on a diminutive scale — as be-
siegers are wont to do ? Might he not cause
beforehand a sufficing breadth of ground to be
scientifically chosen and duly taped out by
skilled engineers, then deliver it, under cover
of night, into the hands of strong working-par-
ties, who would instantly and swiftly entrench
it ? All this, he saw, could be done ; and thence-
forth the besiegers had cares which resembled
16 HIS COUNTERMINES.
CHAP, in some sort the cares of a people besieged;
L for too often the morning disclosed a small bit
of what, if more lengthy, might almost have
been called a ' counter parallel '; and these ' lodg-
' merits ' — so Todleben called them — from which
the harassed Allies could be either assailed or
inspected, soon became beyond measure oppres-
sive. It was on the French — not the English
(whose ' approaches ' had been less closely pressed)
— that the ' lodgments ' especially frowned* The
besiegers could resent these aggressions, could
assail a lodgment in force, and perhaps drive
out of its precincts the enemy's troops; but,
such attacks being foreseen, and therefore of
course counter-planned by gunners kept on the
watch, they used to involve heavy loss,
iiisag- When speaking of Todleben's measures for
Muster- simply resisting attack, I of course included the
countermines by which he found means to arrest
the subterranean advance of the French ; but the
genius of this man in war was essentially ag-
gressive ; and, far from being content with the
strictly defensive results attained by his under-
ground warfare, he besides strove to make it
the means of assailing the French, in their siege-
works ; and thus — taking, as it were, the offen-
sive in regions below — he kept his foes under
dread of the mighty volcano lie, some day, might
bid to break out from the ground lying under
their feet. The explosion he effected on the 9th
* Out of 34 'lodgments' which at one time were counted,
bwo only menaced the English.
mines.
PETTY SORTIES. 17
of February did the French no physical harm ; chap.
but they well might see in it an earnest of
further attacks bursting up from the ground
underfoot, and thus find themselves kept more
or less on the torturing rack of expectancy.
Todleben indeed was convinced that by the
vigour of his countermining operations he caused
the French to mistrust every foot of the ground
they must tread when marching against the Flag-
staff Bastion, and in that way did much to deter
them from ever assaulting the Work.*
There was no resort during the winter to that Petty sor-
measure of a powerful sortie which, as some able
critics conceived, the Russians ought to have
hazarded, but of small sallies, ventured at night,
the garrison made frequent use; and, although of The strain
course reckoned singly, each enterprise of this theena»*»
i • i of t,ie
petty sort did no more than augment by a httlu trenches.
the troubles of the harassed Allies, its repetition,
occurring again and again and again, contributed
and contributed sensibly towards the weight of
that hostile pressure which Todleben was always
applying; for the more — though by only small
onsets — the guards of the trenches were kept
on the alert, the greater of course was the strain
— the continuous strain — on their powers.
And, to all the vexations inflicted by these Novel con-
triv&nc©
pettv sorties, the Russians superadded at one resorted
• i • ,i • i-i . to by the
time a newly mvented oppression which, al- Russians
f P . wheu at-
though perhaps seemmg half comic to people tacking
* This impression is not strongly supported by French ac-
counts of the siege.
VOL. VIII. B
18
PETTY SORTIES.
CHAP.
I.
the French
in these
sorties.
Indignation
of the
French
army.
Generous
concession
to its feelin
by Osten-
Sacken.
in safety at home who have never known any
such trials, proved outraging — beyond measure
outraging — to the feelings, the not unjust pride,
and the self-respect of the French. It was only
against them that the Eussians put their odd
contrivance in force.
The expedient, I suppose, was less meant for
the exigencies of actual fighting than as one
for dealing with soldiers surprised, confused, and
distracted by a sudden incursion at night-time;
but, be that as it may, the Eussians at one time
did certainly use the lasso, and also the 'gaff,'
or some tool resembling a boat-hook, as their
means of first upsetting or otherwise arresting
an adversary, and then so pulling him in as to
be able to make him their prisoner. The French
were indignant at this measure, denouncing it
loudly as one that had never before been em-
ployed except against the brute creation ; and
certainly it is intelligible that a soldier with
his mind duly schooled to meet the event of
being killed, wounded, or made prisoner in the
ordinary way, should revolt at the thought of
being caught by the lasso like a wild horse in
Mexico, or — still worse — gaffed and secured like
a floundering salmon or trout.
The feeling of the French ran so high against
? this abhorred innovation, that General Canrobert
under a flag of truce made it the subject of a
complaint addressed to the Eussian authorities;
and in a kindly, magnanimous spirit of con-
cession to the feelings and just pride of a gallant
PETTY SORTIES. 19
enemy, General Osten-Sacken (then command- chap.
ing the garrison) at once put an end to the
practice.*
There was one sortie pushed to the length The sorties
always
of enabling those who took part in it to wrest sooner or
° . . later rc-
from Canrobert's trenches some minor pieces pressed
with due
of ordnance ;(5) but I believe it may be said vigour.
— speaking generally — that, whether made
against the French or the English, these on-
sets— sooner or later — were always repressed
with due vigour.
When making their sorties, the Eussians com-
monly found that, to receive their sudden attacks,
the French guards of the trenches were not only The French
° guards of the
in far greater strength than the English engaged trenchjs
in like duties, but also much better prepared, ™£\^
much more on the alert ; and the difference they
observed will not surprise those who, whilst
knowing the characteristics of English troops
generally, have also learnt the conditions under
which at this period our men in the trenches
were acting. Even when enjoying full health,
English soldiery are more apt to be wanting
in vigilance than those of most other nations;
and at this cruel time, the bodily state of our
men was scarce such as would make it possible
for them to go through their long hours of duty
in the trenches with the watchfulness, the vig-
our, the care which from men in full health the
plain rules of siege-business exact. The excuses
for default of vigilance were therefore only too
* Niel, pp. 128, 129.
20
PRINCE NAPOLEON.
CHAP.
I.
The enemy
encounter-
ing our
guards of the
trenches;
without
discover
ing their
extreme
numerical
weakness.
Departure
of Prince
Napoleon.
sound, but still, the default was grave. There
prevailed indeed so great a laxity that men were
not seldom found to be cooking their food in
the trenches ; and indeed our engineers became
sure that their siege -work appliances proved
only too often the store from which a half-
famished soldier with a piece of raw meat in his
sack took what he wanted for fuel.*
But happily, there was one priceless truth
which the enemy always failed to discover.
When making these sorties against the English
lie might well enough see or infer that the
guards of our trenches were few as compared
to those of the French ; but he did not unmask
that extremity of numerical weakness which
really existed, and perhaps at the time, there
was no sort of testimony that well could have
made him believe in the statement I am going
to present. I base it on the authority of our
Eoyal Engineers. They assure us that, instead
of the thousands whom the routine of siege-
business would assign for the task, our cover-
ing party on duty along the entire right attack
(upwards of a mile in extent) was at this period
only 350 in number, and that on the night
of the 21st of January it mustered only 290
men ! (6)
Whilst the garrison was plying its foes with
all these hostile expedients, the French army
saw a step taken which apparently was not one
well fitted to cheer a soldiery tried by hardships
* Journal of the Royal Engineers, Part II., p. 2.
COUNSELS OF BUKOoYNK. 21
ami .stress of war. Prince Napoleon quitted his chap.
division, departed from the Crimea, went down !
to Constantinople, and left those who till then
had been his companions in arms to imagine
how gloomy their prospects must seem in the
eyes of the augurs, when — whatever the cause
— this gifted, this keen-witted member of the
then reigning family proved no longer minded
to stand fast with them in the conflict, and
share their doubtful fortunes. Upon receiving
intelligence of his cousin's departure, the French
Emperor gave strong expression to the anger he
felt; but I abstain from recording the measures
he took in his rage, because they were not fol-
lowed up, and there is consequently room for
conjecturing that they may have been stayed
from a sense of justice, after learning aright the
condition of Prince Napoleon's health* The
Prince returned to France.
VT.
Still, though under this weight of discouraging Natural
- , . reluctance
troubles, the irencli were so deeply committed to of the
. 111 French to
the enterprise of breaking into Sebastopol by the alter their
■*• * main plan
path of the Flagstaff Bastion that, without the of siege,
support of reasons adduced from outside their
own camp, they could hardly perhaps have en-
* I do not myself choose to touch any question respecting
his health, though materials for doing so have been placed
within reach of the curious by M. Rousset's book, vol. i. pp.
397 et seq.
22
RECONSIDERATION OF PLANS.
CHAP.
I.
Burgoyne's
insistence
upon the
expediency
fit' assailing
Die Mala-
kofc
dured to make such a change in their policy as
would seem to admit that for months their en-
ergies had been wrongly applied, and their sacri-
fices made all in vain.
Burgoyne all this while had not ceased to in-
sist that the Malakoff front was the one more
than all others meet for attack — had not ceased
to be counselling plans put forward day after day
which, whether directly or not, were aimed with
commanding ability at the object kept always in
sight ; (7) and apparently, it was almost a torture
to him to find that, the French being deaf to his
counsels, and the English having no men to spare,
he could not induce the Allies to press the left
flank of the Work from the side of Mount Inker-
man — could not even make them determine that
their defence of that part of the Mount which
they knew they must hold should at least be that
kind of defence which, far from being inert, is
active, bristling, elastic, and always in its spirit
aggressive.*
In the face of our dread ' Morning States,' and
the only too well foreknown scantiness of any
English succours approaching, he long clung fast
to a hope that the honour of attacking that Work
which he held to be the one all-mastering key of
the position might accrue to his own fellow-coun-
trymen ; and even when forced to see that there
could not be laid on our people any heavier share
of siege-duty than the one they already were
bearing, he still tried to find a way to the object
* Journal Royal Engiueera, p. 72.
THE FRENCH AT FIRST ADVERSE. 23
of his heart's desire by proposing that Canrobert's chap.
troops should relieve the English infantry from
the task of supporting our Left Attack, and that
with the force thus set free Lord Eaglan should
undertake the Malakoff.*
This English proposal, however, was not adopt-
ed by Canrobert ; t and all people now at length
saw that, to insist on the necessity of subduing
the Malakoff was substantially the same as de-
claring that French troops ought to assail it.
So long as they were ardently hopeful of bring- The French
in<? the strife to an issue on their own chosen verse to his
O counsels.
ground, the French seemed to hearken unfavour-
ably, and not always without signs of impatience,
to Burgoyne's able counsels, all tending to draw
their energies eastward, and engage them in some
way or other against the Malakoff front ;(8) but
at last, when under the stress of those gathering
perils and troubles to which we saw them laid
open by their measures against the Town front,
they became more ready to listen ; and Burgoyne, But after-
■' wards more
on ihe other hand, seemed going half-way to meet willingly
° listening to
them ; because under one of its aspects, he treated them.
the new move as one that was auxiliary to their
* Journal Royal Engineers, pp. 63, 139. M. Rousset there-
fore errs when making it appear, as he does (vol. ii. p. 31), that,
instead of assailing it themselves, our own people cast off on the
French the great task of assailing the Malakoff. He errs also
when saying (ibid.) that the French consented to 'substitute
' themselves for the English in besieging the Malakoff.' The
English had never besieged it. When they ruined it on the
17th of October 1854, they did this by firing across the Dock-
yard Ravine. t Ibid., p. 63.
24 CANUOMKKTS DISSENT.
chap, old plan of siege against the Sebastopol town.
' Assuming that the French, as before, would as-
sail the Flagstaff Bastion, and that — still as be-
fore— our people would give them the best sup-
port that they could by operating against the
Great Redan and the Barrack Battery, he showed
that in the existing state of the defences — very
different from what they had been on the 17th of
October — that support would almost surely be
neutralised or made ineffective, unless the fire
from the Malakoff could first be subdued. He
urged, therefore, that the fire of the Malakoff
should be subdued accordingly ; * and it followed
that the task of subduing it must rest with the
French, because they, and they only (since refus-
ing to take on themselves the duties of our Left
Attack), could dispose of any bodies of troops
great enough for the object thus sought.
Acceptance These ideas found favour with Bizot, the com-
goyne'a mander of the French Engineers ; t and prevailed)
a conference in a Conference of Three (attended by Bizot, Bur-
et Three. . . . t i j
goyne, and General Airey), which accordingly de-
termined (though subject of course to the approval
of the Commanders-in-Chief) that, before it would-
be possible to assail the Redan and the Barrack
Battery with any prospect of success, it was nec-
essary to attack the left of the enemy's works, and.
to get the better of the defences of the Malakoff.;]
* Journal Royal Engineers, Part I., p. 85.
+ From the papers before me I gather that his conversion-
must have taken place so early as the 26th of December.
X Lord Raglan to Secretary of State — Secret — January 2..
1855.
CAN ROBERT'S DISSENT. 25
The conversion of the French at that time was, CHAP
however, so far from complete that, instead of the
ratification expected from their Commander-in- ^^f"
Chief, there came from him to Lord Raglan a dfwctton
paper so framed that, far from importing agree- tX^oy*1*
ment, it bristled with language well fitted to pro- anro '
voke dispute and antagonism.
Accompanied by a short private note which His official
merely announced the sending of the other epistle, Lord
this paper was in form a despatch — an official
letter — from Canrobert detailing the several
schemes that had been put forward, reflecting
upon the different plans that had been suggested
by Sir John Burgoyne, setting forth the various
duties which the French army had to perform,
and calling upon Lord Raglan to state specifically
what he could undertake to do in a given time *
Lord Raglan had ' always felt that as the Lord Rag-
' French army increased in numbers his personal of dealing
' position would become more difficult ; ' and he
now at once saw that, if met in the spirit which
seems to have dictated its composition, or even
if fully answered at all by a despatch from him-
self, this missive might prove, with its set inter-
rogatories, to be the beginning of an antagonistic
correspondence imperilling that thorough accord
between the French and the English which, he
said, it had been the object of his ' almost every
1 thought to maintain.' t
* General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th December 1854.
t Lord Raglan to Secretary of State — Secret — January 2,
1855.
26 COURSE TAKEN BY LOUD HAG LAN.
chap. Lord Raglan therefore determined to address
' to the French headquarters some ' indirect coni-
' munications,' which he hoped might serve as a
substitute for any full, written answer proceed-
ing straight from himself, and might even per-
haps enable him to ward off altogether that
interchange of controversial epistles which (for
reasons already made plain) he judged to be
a 'great evil.'*
Accordingly, after handing to Sir John Bur-
goyne the French commander's despatch, in order
that Sir John might prepare replies to that part
of the missive which an officer of engineers might
fairly consider professional, he conversed very
fully with General Rose,t and then took his
ulterior step. Believing it politic that — at least
for the moment — he himself should stand aloof
personally from the approaching discussion, he
requested one of his Staff officers to wait upon
General Canrobert.
Accordingly, on the 1st of January the Staff
officer charged with this mission rode off to the
French headquarters, where Canrobert received
him with kindness in presence of the 'Etat
' Major,' as well as of General Hose, and he then
adduced grounds in support of the plan approved
at the recent Conference of Three by Bizot as
well as Burgoyne.
That the Staff officer charged with this task
pressed his way to the object in view with con-
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State— Secret— Jan. 2, 1855.
t The English commissioner at the French headquarters.
OANBOBBRT CONVERTED. 27
summate ability will l>e almost taken for granted chap.
by those who happen to know how richly he was . —
gifted with that kind of natural eloquence which
rapidly, vividly pictures a given condition of
things, and at once unleashes such motives upon
the minds of his hearers as shall drive them to-
wards action in the sense desired by the speaker ;
but it is hardly credible that the drama of real
life should — like the more clear, the more com-
pact drama of poets — display such a sequence as
that of persuasive speech causing instantly, by
its own force alone, a change of design moment-
ously affecting great nations ; and accordingly,
one may treat it as probable that before this last
meeting took place, General Canrobert must al-
ready have felt some regret for the step he had
taken when sending his recent despatch — must
already have much reconsidered his objections
to that joint advice which his own engineer
General Bizot had concurred with Burgoyne in
submitting.
Be that as it may, he at once, and in presence The French
of the officers of the French headquarters staff reverting
and of General Rose, admitted the accuracy or sionoftue
J ' Three ' ;
what Lord Raglan's envoy had urged, and then
intimated that he would, after all, follow the
decision of the last Conference.* He required
that, to cover his troops whilst effecting a lodg- and on
ment on the Mamelon in front of the Malakoff, condition!
the English should furnish two Hanking batteries to assail
— one of eight, one of fifteen great guns ; but be- koff front
* The English commissioner at the French headquarters.
28 CHANGE OF l'l,AN ACCORDINGLY.
CHAP, ing provided witli the heavy pieces of ordnance
as well as the ammunition required, and under-
standing that their known want of 'hands'
would be made good by French working-parties,
our people were happily able to accept the con-
dition imposed. ('•')
The gravity Thus at last General Canrobert acceded to the
of the
dangers gist of the counsel long tendered and pressed by
averted. Burgoyne ; but of even higher moment, and of
more happy augury than the change he so made,
was his consequent, though tacit withdrawal of
the perilous despatch he had sent hardly two
days before to Lord Eaglan's headquarters.
What appeared on the Saturday evening to be
only too probably the opening of an antagonis-
tic correspondence between the French and the
English commanders was happily turned into
nothingness on the following Monday ; and the
almost measureless value of the service Lord
Raglan thus rendered will be recognised by any
one competent to imagine the train of calamities
that might well have been expected to follow any
lengthened dissension, or even approach to dis-
sension, between the French and the English
headquarters. Lord Raglan accomplished his
object by boldly taking a course which struck
out of the beaten path, and by making that
gentle, yet powerful use of sagacity which, until
some one called it ' tact,' people hardly knew
how to designate. Still, fortune too, under one
aspect, may be said to have aided Lord Raglan
in this anxious crisis of his relations with the
LORD RAGLAN'S KNVOY. 29
French; for it is rarely the lot of a general not CHAP.
also a sovereign to have at his side so gifted, so __
persuasive an envoy as the one he charged with
that mission to General Canrobert's quarters.
But who was the envoy thus trusted for a work The envoy
sent by
trulv vital — the envoy thus happily able to return Lord Bag-
J J rl ' lan tn the
from his mission with tidings of absolute concord French
° head-
instead of the threatened dissension ? quarters.
He was one whom our people at home were
visiting with their bitterest wrath — wrath not
caused, I gladly believe, by any deep malice, but
rather by sheer mistake. It sometimes happens
in battle that — confused by mist, smoke, and
tumult — a regiment stands busily firing upon
a friendly body of troops, because taking it for
an enemy's column ; and the regiment, if English,
and therefore tenacious of purpose, is not very
easily checked ; for the men — having warmed to
their baneful work — look up angrily and deafly
at the excited young aide-de-camp who has gal-
loped up shouting, protesting with a vehemence
they quite disapprove, and turn savagely on the
bugler who, under some orders from an unknown
officer on horseback, has begun to sound the
' Cease firing ' !
It was by a mistake no less innocent, yet also,
one must own, no less obstinate, that whilst this
devoted Staff officer — the right-hand man of Lord
Raglan — was toiling day and night at head-
quarters in the business of the winter campaign,
our misjudging people in England were making
him a mark for attacks, conducted with a power,
30 LONG DELAY.
chap, strength of will, and set purpose sufficing to carry
' along with them 'the Government' of what used
to pass for a sober monarchical State. So high, so
seemingly absolute was the warrant his assailants
obtained for the cry they set raging against him,
that two successive Administrations at home per-
sistently, angrily laboured to deprive our head-
quarters of his services, and were only prevented
from thus doing grievous harm to their country,
because met and baffled by Lord Raglan's un-
shaken firmness, and fairly conquered at last by
the sure yet slow progress of truth.* The envoy
was General Airey.
General Canrobert on the 1st of January had
insisted with energy that the arrangements then
made should be ' instantly ' carried into effect ;
but his words, as it happened, were followed by
Long delay, immensely protracted delay. The stress of hard
winter, the sufferings of the troops, the throes of
that vital, that painful, that dangerous question
between General Canrobert and Lord Raglan,
which we saw lasting on till the latter part of
the month, (10) the harassing communications from
the French Emperor, now gravely alarmed —
alarmed, it was said, for his ' dynasty ' — the per-
turbing foreshadow of a general coming out to
the Crimea from Paris with full power, as was
thought, to ' advise,' to conduct an inquisition in
camp, nay even indeed to 'reorganise' the staff
of Canrobert's army, the arrival on the 27th of
January of General Xiel, the engineer officer
* See vol. vii. chap. ix.
THE MODIFIEI) IT, AX OF 1ST FEBRUARY. 31
supposed to be armed with all this transcendent chat.
authority, the painful changes that followed, and
then afterwards, under new auspices, the reopen-
ine of a once closed discussion about choice of
plans for the siege — these circumstances, and
perhaps many more, contributed to prevent the
besiegers from giving any effect to the agree-
ment of the 1st of January until more than four
weeks had elapsed ; and meanwhile — as though
having learnt something of Anglo-French counsels
— the enemy had been visibly devoting increased
attention and care to his Malakoff front.
This Kussian change on the one hand, and on
the other, the presence of General Niel with
authority to inquire and ' advise,' made it seem
very natural that — without being therefore sus-
pected of any desire to retreat from their engage-
ments of the first of January — the French should
bring fresh thought to bear on the management
of their promised enterprise against the Malakoff
Tower.
After lengthened discussions with Burgoyne, istandia
„ ,.,.,,. February.
our allies framed a plan from which indeed it Modified
*■ . plan put
appeared that they then were more strongly in- forward by
clined to proceed against the Mamelon by 'ap-
' proaches ' than by summary modes of attack ;
but still the plan seemed to aim at a faithful, if
not swift performance of the engagement made
on the 1st of January, and accordingly Lord p°,vto'hy
Raglan approved it.* After having been also ian:
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State — Secret — 6th February
1855.
32 THE MODIFIED PLAN OF 1ST FEBRUARY.
C H A P.
but now
known
to have
masked
another
design.
approved by a council of French generals, held
on the 1st of February, the particulars of the
newly wrought plan were recorded on the follow-
ing day in words described as ' Instructions.' (u)
We now know that, though outwardly wear-
ing an honest appearance, this ' plan ' masked a
settled design on the part of Niel and his Em-
peror to take a course irreconcilable with the
engagements of the 1st of January*
Import ol
the change
of plan as
first under-
stood by
the French.
VII.
When determining, on the ground we have
shown, to assail the Malokofi' front, our allies,
we know, looked on the measure as auxiliary
to their former operations ; and even when see-
ing deeper into the consequences of the change,
they still did not at all mean to loosen that
pressure by siege-work and heavy batteries which
they had long been applying to the defences of
the Sebastopol town, nor indeed did they all at
once tell themselves that they would abandon
the idea of storming the Flagstaff Bastion. On
the contrary, both the resolutions of the council
of the 1st of February, and the paper of In-
structions which issued from the French head-
quarters on the following day, were based upon
a supposition that assaults of the Flagstaff Bas-
tion, if not indeed also of the ' Central,' were
soon to be hazarded.
But, however regarded at first, this now or-
* See post, chap. v.
MINING AND COUNTERMINING. 33
dained war against the Malakoff was, after all, chap.
war against the masterful key of the position,
with therefore a tendency — an ever-increasing
tendency — to draw to itself more and more of
the energies that could be roused on each side
by a conflict charged with great issues; and
besides, it so happened that on the very morrow
of the day when they issued that paper of In-
structions our allies encountered a blow which
destroyed some long-cherished hopes, and mate-
rially weakened their prospect of ever breaking
through the Town front.
VIII.
It was on the 20th of November that the The French
mining
French had begun to push forward their great operations.
mining enterprise, and they had thenceforth
conducted it with unwearied energy, their first
design being to surprise the enemy by effecting
an explosion under his Flagstaff Bastion. Unen-
lightened, it seems, by either spies or deserters,
or by even those inferences which might fairly
have been drawn from known facts, they worked
their way somewhat unguardedly, moving earth-
trucks backwards and forwards without duly
niurlling their sounds, and besides often talking
aloud, as though — because twenty feet deep in
the bowels of the earth — they needs must be out
of the earshot of any listening enemy.
Yet the foe whom they had challenged by
entering on this underground warfare was per-
VOL. VIII. c
34
MINING AND COUNTERMINING.
C II A P.
I.
Todleben's
skill and
jiower in
the science
of mining.
His counter-
mines.
Progress of
the mining
and coun-
termining
operations.
haps one more thoroughly practised, more highly
skilled in its mysteries, more eager to use its
resources than any other mortal then living ; (12)
and before they had burrowed their way to the
ground required for their purpose, an enemy —
like themselves subterranean, but — silent, un-
heard, unsuspected, was awaiting them in his
listening galleries.
The great engineer whose sagacity they were
going to encounter scarce awaited the reports
of deserters; for, when he saw that the French
(after having had time for the venture) did not
visibly push their approaches beyond the third
parallel, he inferred that — almost as of course —
they would try to work their way underground,
and therefore at a huge cost of labour, he re-
solved to meet any such enterprise by a vast,
spreading system of countermines. (13) The work
he thus set on foot was continued with unflag-
ging energy, though during several weeks it did
no more than aim darkly at an enemy — unseen
and unheard — who was only to be reconnoitred
by inferences, and as yet earned no certain re-
ward. But at length, on the 30th of January,
the expected reward of long toil was attained
and joyfully welcomed; for then Colonel Tod-
leben learnt that at the extremity of one of his
listening galleries the French could be heard,
and he even proved able to assure himself that
— burrowing through the same stratum (a
stratum of yellow clay) in which he had estab-
lished his countermines — they were piercing
COUNTERMINING. 95
ground on a level with that to which he pressed chap.
his keen ear when listening for signs of their ! —
presence.
In the dark, creeping science of underground
war, the moment of first hearing the enemy is
one of enthralling interest, whilst also it is one
of exultation, if there be reason to think that
the hearing has not been reciprocal ; for in the
strife between miner and counterminer, he who
is the first to hear his antagonist has already
obtained the ascendant. On the 30th, those
sounds of hostile mining that the Eussian coun-
terminer deteoted were only slight and faint ;
but the very next day, sounds reached his lis-
tening ear with so great a distinctness as to
prove that the underground Frenchmen must
be then very near; and moreover, it could be
soundly inferred that they were suspecting no
countermine, because they worked noisily, and
could even be heard freely talking. By means
of a powerful explosion, Colonel Todleben could
have then broken through what remained of the
clay still dividing him from the French ; but a
charge strong enough for that purpose would
have also pressed up with such force as to dis-
turb the surface of the ground above, and might
thus afford cover to an enemy advancing against
the Flagstaff Bastion. Therefore Todleben, with
a great self-restraint, determined that, before he
assailed them, he would let the French burrow
still closer, and thus so reduce the thickness of
the interposed clay as to give him the means cf
36 COUNTERMINING.
chap, overwhelming them by an explosion of only
. — moderate strength.
At length, on the 3d of February — the fourth
day after the one when the miner's approach was
first heard — Colonel Todleben unleashed a cam-
ouflet (u) which left undisturbed the whole sur-
face of the ground overhead, but tore its way
into the gallery where the French had been
heard, killing two of their men as it passed,
and visibly rinding its issue in the open air
through ground behind their third parallel, thus
showing him where lay the entrance to their
system of mines.
The French of course then understood that
their project of surprising the enemy by a mine
to be sprung from ground under his Flagstaff
Bastion had been discovered and baffled ; but it
occurred to their chief engineer that they might
still draw advantage from the system of under-
ground approaches on which they had bestowed
so much labour, because it would enable their
miners to open up by explosion a line of craters
half-way between their foremost trench and the
counterscarp of the opposite bastion, and he
hoped that the ground, when so broken, and
therefore affording some cover, might be made
the beginning of a fourth parallel. He therefore
by means of explosion threw up, to begin with,
one crater of moderate size ; * but it was seized,
was crowned, was definitely held by the Eus-
* Evening of the 7th of February. — Niel, p. 146 ; Todleben,
p. 619 et seq.
ITS BEARING ON THE FRENCH PLANS. 37
siaus;* and, the second design of the French chap.
being thus — like the first one — defeated, it re-
sults that, so far, Colonel Todleben obtained and Their re-
suit.
kept his ascendant at the seat of this under-
ground war.
IX.
This result of their mining operations against The per-
the Flagstaff Bastion tended strongly of course to part of the
it -n besieger's
withdraw our baffled allies from any still extant design now
idea of making the Work their real pathway for from the
° • Flagstaff
leading them into Sebastopol ; and thenceforth, Bastion to
if not yet resolved, they were far on the road koff
towards resolving that their plans against the
main town need no longer include a set pur-
pose to carry its defences by storm ; so that
what perhaps one may call the peremptory part
of their siege, that is, the 'Attack' they would
push to the issue of a determined assault, was
the one now about to be opened against the
Malakoff Tower, or rather that girdle of works
which by this time had closed round its base.
In bringing themselves to this choice the
French were much governed by thinking of
what might await them after once breaking
through the defences. They judged that their
troops in such case would operate much more
massively, and therefore more advantageously,
in the spaces afforded by the Karabel Faubourg
than in the ravines and the streets which inter-
sected the town.t
* Niel and Todleben, ubi ante. t Niel, p. 139
4 KJ\J
38 DISPOSITIONS RESULTING Klto.M CHANGE OF PLAN.
CHAP.
I.
Dispositions
consequent
upon Can-
robert's
resolvo to
operate
against the
Malakoff.
The Allies
commenc-
ing works
destined
to aid a
meditated
attack on
the Mame-
lon.
General Canrobert entrusted the operations be
was going to undertake against the Malakoff to
his second corps — the 'Corps of Observation'
then still posted, as before, under Bosquet along
the Sapoune Heights. With forces thence drawn
he relieved our troops theretofore holding the
lofty Victoria Eidge, and completed the Work
at its summit. This Work was a simple redoubt,
but by many — including Lord Eaglan — had been
called the Victoria Fort.
The works of defence on Mount Inkerman
were by this time complete ; and those of them
which from the first had remained in charge of
the English our people continued to hold ; but
the bulk of our troops on the Chersonese lay
henceforth compactly disposed between the 2d
French Corps on their right, and the 1st French
Corps on their left.
Acting smoothly in concert, and each, in so far
as was possible, making good the other's defici-
encies, the French and the English armies began
to fulfil the condition laid down on the 1st of
January, and accordingly to construct the two
batteries which (by means of flanking fires
thrown from different and far- parted ridges)
were destined to aid our allies in their medi-
tated attack on the Malakoff, or rather as their
more immediate object on the intervening Mam-
elon.(15)
VARIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES. 39
The greater of these was the one — here called chap.
the Artilleur Battery* — which (after first opening .
approaches on ground near the site they designed
for itt) the French began to construct on a
western spur of Mount Inkerman ; the other one
— the King Battery — found a place in the second
parallel of Gordon's Attack, and fronted towards
the north.! It was constructed in the main by
French soldiery ; and the sight of those troops
briskly, steadily, ably performing their allotted
task, caused our people to admire, caused them
even indeed to record the efficient, the orderly
way in which their allies did the work.(16)
XI.
In the course of the long winter period which various
i i • i ii t movements
this chapter spans, there occurred, besides all 1 and
have told, and much more that I leave unrecorded,
the following movements and changes : —
"When towards the close of November a French on the part
officer, M. Saint Laurent (a chief of battalion), sians:
taking with him a few engineers, supported by
* An aggregate appellation comprising what were more
strictly called the 'No. 1,' and the 'No. 2.' The battery,
destined from the first for fifteen heavy guns, received after-
wards more, and was armed by our people. It was constructed
by the Ficnch Artillery.
+ Niel, pp. 141, 150.
X This battery — strictly called ' No. 9 ' — was armed by our
people with eight guns. In calling the parallel which received
it the 2d, ' Parallel,' I follow the old nomenclature, though, in
consequence of new siege-works taking ground in its rear, the
authorities afterwards promoted it to the rank of a 3d Parallel.
40 VARIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES.
chap, a number of Zouaves, performed the gallant ex«
L ploit of cutting the 'East Sapper's Road/ Prince
Mentschikoff no longer clung to his power of
moving guns and wheeled carriages by that line
of route, but on the contrary, stopped short its
connection with the opposite bank of the Tcher-
naya by destroying the Inkerman Bridge ; (17)
so that thenceforth he trusted exclusively to
his peaceful, undisturbed communications still
effected, as usual, by moving across the road-
stead to or from what was called the ' North
' Side.' The arrangements for that last course of
transit were carefully systematised, and brought
to a high state of efficacy.*
In the early part of December, the Russians
dismantled the little redoubts on the line of the
Woronzoff Road, withdrew their camps from the
plain of Balaclava, and thenceforth kept only out-
posts on the left bank of the Tchernaya.t
After his defeat at Inkerman, General Dannen-
berg was removed from the command of the 4th
Army Corps, and replaced by General Osten-
Sacken.
on the part More than once in the course of this period,
French; French troops reconnoitred a broad sweep of ter-
ritory, which comprised the whole plain of Bala-
clava, with also a Line of country extending
their recon- beyond towards the east ; and they not only
pushed to completeness their search for the
* Todleben, p. 589.
t Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, December 8, 1854, No,
120.
naissances.
VARIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES. 41
knowledge desired, but effected their tasks with c ha p.
a brilliant smartness and skill which drew warm . —
praise from Lord Kaglan.
It was to one of these admirably conducted
reconnaissances that the Allies owed their know-
ledge of the enemy's withdrawal from the plain
of Balaclava.
Amongst those 'reorganising' directions which The treat
° o o merit ex-
General Niel had brought out, there was one perienced
° by Forey
which removed General Forey from the command
of the 1st Corps d'Armee, and entrusted it to
General Pelissier — an officer destined to reach,
though not until some months afterwards, a yet
more exalted command.
General Forey on the 2d of December 1851
had done an act of great moment, and he possibly
thought himself one who, whatever might be the
mute feeling of his country at large, did at least
deserve well of the ' Empire.' *
So far as concerns his part in the siege of
Sebastopol, I am not myself cognisant of any
fault or shortcoming with which he could rightly
be charged ; for the care, the severity with which
he strove to maintain the warlike spirit of the
French army, and to expose evasions of duty on
the part of its officers was plainly a merit, and
one of very high value. Still, by merit of that
unpleasing kind he of course stirred up hatred;
and it seems probable that the enemies he thus
raised up against himself may have been the men
* He captured Parliament ' sitting,' and marched it off to
prison. See ante, vol. i. chap. xiv. p. 260 et seq.
42 THE EMPEROR'S BREASTPLATES.
chap, who found means to compass his fall. Be that
' as it may, he was visited by treatment which, in
the absence of any more knowledge than I on
this subject possess, must seem unaccountably
harsh. Deposed from the command of his Corps
d'Arm^e, he was relegated to the command of a
single division forming part of Canrobert's forces,
and being also refused permission to retire from
active service, he was thus, as it were, kept
picketed under the eyes of that army which had
seen him put down from the higher to the lower
place. It was only after some lapse of time that
the treatment of the General was softened by
appointing him to the governorship of Oran.
The French The French Emperor in this month of Feb-
piates. ruary gave actual, physical effect to what modern
soldiers regard as a fanciful notion. The bet-
ter to enable his soldiers before Sebastopol to
carry defences by storm, he sent out to them
4000 breastplates* Of these, 3000 were divided
equally between the 1st and 2d Corps d'Arm^e,
but were never used ; and — alive to what they
call ' a Kidicule ' — the French, as they expressed
it, advised themselves to ' maintain on this deli-
' cate subject a prudent silence.'!
on the part Under the directions of Lieutenant Stopford of
English. the Eoyal Engineers, our people in the beginning
of December constructed an electric field -tele-
tfjiegraph. graph ; I and it was towards the close of the
* Vaillant, Minister of War, to Canrobert, Feb. 3, 1855.
Quoted by Rousset, vol. ii. p. 23. t Ibid., p. 24.
J Journal of Royal Engineers, p. 66.
RESULTS. 43
same month that a civil engineer (Mr Campbell) chap.
began his operations for making the railway be- —
tween Balaclava and cam]) of which we before had Bm]
to speak when dealing with the means of supply.*
In December the command of our fleet passed command
from Admiral Dundas to Admiral Sir Edmund °
Lyons.
XII.
The defenders of Sebastopol entered upon this Result of
1 the conflict
period of the conflict on the morrow of Inkerman, from the 6th
■t of November
and therefore whilst under the shadow of not lsgtto tie
simply, a bloody defeat sustained by the ' reliev- ^uary
' ing army,' but a defeat with all its horrors
brought closely home to the garrison by the
propinquity of the battle-field, by the spectacle
of disordered troops coming back beaten into the
streets, by the piteous sight and sound of the
wounded whether led or supported or carried in
heaps by endless trains of waggons, and soon
after by seeing and hearing how what a few
hours before had been strong, proud battalions,
were some of them only poor remnants — rem-
nants stricken with even more weakness than the
scantness of their numbers imported, because in a
measure disorganised by the huge loss of offieers ;
yet, so high was the spirit of the people, and so
great the firmness, the skill, the resource of the
great engineer then directing their energies that,
far from yielding to depression, or suffering the
defence to grow weak, they carried it on with a
* See ante, vol. vii. p. 33tj.
44 RESULTS.
chap, vigour which almost undid the curse — the potent
. — curse — of defeat, and so bore themselves that,
after a while, they stood, as some thought, in less
jeopardy than the baffled victors of Inkerman.
This vigour did not drive the Allies to so
desperate a course as that of raising the siege,
and trying to regain their ships ; but at least it
impelled them so strongly to escape from an ugly
predicament that they resigned themselves to a
change implying confession of error. By accept-
ing Sir John Burgoyne's counsels, they seemed in
effect to acknowledge that what they had done
already had been, much of it, done in vain, and
that what they would henceforth treat as the
cardinal act of their enterprise was only now
to begin.
In the course of this period therefore, as must
now have been seen, the great colonel of Sappers
wrought wonders ; for, as before under yet more
appalling conditions he (with Korniloff then at
his side) had found means to ward off from Eussia
what seemed the natural consequence of her de-
feat on the Alma, so now he in large measure
neutralised the effect of her terrible overthrow
sustained on the 5th of November, and even
turned the scale against victory by a masterful
exertion of power which made the invaders de-
spair— not indeed of their siege altogether, but —
of their siege as hitherto planned.
QUESTIONS RAISED. 45
XIII.
Since vast efforts during this period had on Questions
° f raised by
both sides been made without bein" brought to scientific
critics.
the test of a great and determined attack by
either the Allies or the Eussians, there of course
was left open a field for any critic inclined to
speak in the potential mood, saying — not what
happened in fact, but — what in his judgment
might well have been expected to happen, if the
measure he approved had been tried.
Some not only judged, as we have seen, that a
determined assault of the Flagstaff Bastion must
needs have carried the Work, but also declared
it certain that the fall of the Bastion must have
rendered altogether impossible a continued de-
fence of Sebastopol ; whilst others maintained
that the Eussians by a powerful sortie might
have brought the besiegers to ruin. The two
creeds at first glance might seem to be antag-
onistic, because he who clung to the one hap-
pened often, if not almost always, to run down
the other, yet they did not in reality clash ; for
possibly either expedient, if ventured with bold-
ness and skill, might have served to achieve its
full purpose ; so that victory under this aspect
would be said to have awaited the bidding of him
who might be the assailant — of him who, whether
Eussian or French, should prove himself the first
of the two to strike a determined blow.
If this last conclusion were sound, we might
say of the besieger and the besieged that during
several months, each lay at the mercy of each.
46
EUI'ATOUIA.
CHAPTER II.
EUPATOKIA.
A P.
Condition
ot things in
Eui'atoria
and its
neighbour-
hood.
That seaport town Eupatoria which surrendered
to our Admiral in the earliest hour of the in-
vasion had of late been a subject of conflict.
From the day when Mr Hamilton, the humor-
ous purser of the Britannia, first set his foot in
the place, and there jovially opened a market, the
owners of flocks and herds pasturing in the ad-
jacent districts had been glad to sell their cattle
to purchasers who approached them with money
in hand ; and the Allies thus established close,
friendly relations with not only the people of the
town but also their country neighbours.* Those
countrymen, however, soon found that they were
dangerously circumstanced ; for — unable to plead
compulsion, like their happier brethren in the
surrendered town — they lay open of course to the
charge of wilfully aiding an enemy. Therefore,
when they descried Kussian cavalry alarmingly
near to their homesteads, these yeomen hastened
* Ante, vol. ii. chap. xxi.
CHAP.
II.
EUPATORIA. 47
to fly from the imagined wrath of their Czar, took
shelter within the town, and pastured their Hocks
in its neighbourhood.
Eussian cavalry after a while drew a cordon
about Eupatoria on its land side., and took care
to maintain it so closely that the flocks in their
neighbouring pastures were no longer safe against
capture. Some ten thousand head of cattle which
would otherwise have furnished good meat to our
suffering troops on the Chersonese, were seized
instead by the enemy, and driven off into his
camp.*
II.
At the close of the out-pasturing season, the
cavalry, busied till then in maintaining this land-
ward blockade, became the nucleus of a much
larger force of all arms placed under General Assembly of
Baron Wrangel. The force stood charged with under Baroc
Wranyel;
the task of securing Prince Mentschikoff's line of ita task. '
communication from those attacks on its flank
which, he thought, might be made by an army
brought over the sea, and collected in the town of
Eupatoria. Prince Mentschikoff's apprehensions Danger
were sound ; for the Czar's retreat from the coun- the enemy's
try of the Danube had set free the victorious sol- tkme.
diery of Omar Pasha; and by using the mighty
prerogative which belongs to command of the sea,
the Allies could present a new army on the flank
of those all-precious roads which carried the
* Todleben, vol. i. p. 649. The number carried off is there
stated at 9872.
48
EUPATOMA.
CHAP.
II.
Arrival
of some
Turkish
battalions,
and soon
of Omar
Pasha in
person, at
Eupatoria.
Question
calling for
Mentsehi-
koff'a deci-
sion ;
his meas-
ures.
life-blood of Kussia to nourish her strength in
Sebastopol.
The English indeed had begun to seize this
plain opportunity, and already their Admiral
(Lyons) had moved some of Omar's battalions
across the Black Sea to their destined post in
Eupatoria, when Prince Mentschikoff, made
aware of their landing, and assured that more
battalions would follow, became absolutely obliged
to determine a question of no small moment. —
Should he patiently stand acquiescent whilst our
seamen were planting an army on the flank of
his artery-roads, or try, whilst yet there was time,
to reconquer the seaport and town in which this
new danger was gathering 1
With an eye to his eventual choice of that
latter alternative, he at once, though not yet quite
resolved, brought up Baron Wrangel's troops to a
strength great enough for the purpose — that is,
for the twofold purpose of continuing to guard
the communications, and also attacking Eupa-
toria.
After causing the ground to be examined, Baron
Wrangel confronted the notion of hazarding the
projected attack with a judgment decisively
adverse; but Prince Mentschikoff' bluffly com-
manded him to execute another reconnaissance,
saying also that he was to do this in person ; and
besides, put General Khrouleff — an officer about
to be prominent in recommending the measure —
at the head of the Baron's artillery.
Then — excited by the visible passing of great
EUPATORIA. 49
English steamers in the direction of Eupatoria, chap
and not waiting for the fruits of the newly '
directed reconnaissance — Prince Mentschikoff on
the 8th of February directed Baron Wrangel to
assault the place — to assault it without delay.*
Baron Wrangel, however, by this time had com-
pleted his further reconnaissance ; and — speaking
now even more confidently than ever before — he
stated it to be his opinion that an attack on
Eupatoria would be hazardous in the extreme.
He declared that upon receiving from his chief a
formal order in writing to attack the place he
would do his best to attain the end proposed, and
said he was proceeding accordingly — despite the
state of the ground, and despite want of water
and firewood — to effect the necessary concentra-
tion of troops ; but he declined to ' accept respon-
' sibility ' for the consequences of an assault.t
For a moment, Prince Mentschikoff yielded to
the resistance thus offered, and sent a reply in
that sense ; but two hours afterwards, he did
the very opposite. Upon learning that General
Khrouleff had carefully explored the ground, and
considered it possible to take Eupatoria without
incurring great losses, he not only made up his Mentschi-
mind to have the enterprise tried, but to have it solve to
conducted by him who — directly in the face of patoriaat-
the judgment pronounced by his immediate chief
(Baron "Wrangel) — had formed a counter-opinion,
and imparted it to the Commander-in-Chief.
To General Khrouleff accordingly, by Ment-
* Todleben, p. 679. t Ibid., p. 681.
VOL. VIII. D
50
EDPATORIA.
CHAP.
II.
by forces
withdrawn
from Baron
Wrangel ;
and placed
under
General
Khrouleff.
schikofFs orders, Baron Wrangel at once handed
over that chosen part of his forces which was
to make and support the attack.
A man of Teuton blood set aside for giving
what he thought prudent counsels, and a Sclave
leaping up into power with the force of his
more sanguine nature — such a spectacle could
not but charm any Eussians indulging that
jealousy with which the bricks of the fable are
said to have looked on the builder. Yet before
giving vent to the joy of seeing a vehement
Sclave vault over the head of a Teuton, those
Eussians perhaps should have waited to see the
result — should have waited till a quarter past
ten on the morning of the 17th of February.
III.
Tnede- Before the 17th of February, Eupatoria under
resources of the auspices of the French Major Osrnont (the
governor of the place) had been fortified on the
land side by an arc-shaped belt of defence with
a crown-work in front of its centre. The belt
was formed mainly of earthen ramparts (with a
fosse sunk along the outside), but consisted in
part of only piled stones, or the ruins of de-
molished houses provided with banquettes for
infantry.
All these works, it is true, were still but half
finished, yet already they furnished the means of
offering fair resistance to troops which might
seek to carry the place by merely summary
EUPATORIA. 51
means. Owing only, it seems, to the thaw, and chap.
not to laboured design, the fosse had some water ! —
within it, and was destined to pass with the
ilussians for what science calls a 'Wet Ditch.'
The Works had been armed with 34 heavy guns,
and provided with five rocket - stands. Omar
Pasha in person had landed; and the part of
his army already in Eupatoria numbered 23,000
men.* There was also in the place a detach-
ment of nearly 300 soldiers left in garrison there
by the French, with besides, the saved crew of
their stranded ship Henri IV. The place was
not only secure towards the sea, but moreover
so circumstanced that ships could take part in
the land-side defence. Besides the stranded ship
(which could still use some of her batteries)
another French steamer — the Veloce — was lying
on the east of the bay ; as was also the Turkish
ship Shaffaer, with the Admiral Ahmed Pasha
on board her; and near its western extremity
there lay an English detachment under Captain
Hastings, comprising the Curasao, the Furious,
the Valorous, and the gunboat Viper.
The place held within it a native population
which may be computed at about 26,000, of whom
some 5500 were in easy circumstances, and the
rest in a state of indigence.!
* Colonel Simmons (Major-General on the staff of Omar
Pasha) to Lord Raglan, Feb. 22, 1855.
t The Report of the Commission which sat on this subject
gives exact numbers and is before me, but it relates to the 16th
of March.
52 EUPATORIA.
chap. At short distances outside the town, there
were not only quarries, but also several burial-
grounds, and the desire of the engineers to clear
the ground under their guns from all such ob-
structions was controlled by respect for the
dead.
The forces Without reckoning — although it lay near —
General any part of the much -reduced force still left
now charged under Wrangel's command, the enemy's troops
Eu'patoria. set apart for this enterprise against Eupatoria
comprised horse, foot, and artillery, with a
strength of about 20,000, and 108 guns, of which
24 might be said to have siege-train calibres.*
All this force, as already we know, was com-
manded by General Khrouleff.
Their pre- To shelter their guns and their gunners when
opening tire on the morrow, the Kussians passed
the night of the 16th in throwing up a line of
epaulments at a distance of from 600 to 800
yards from the place ; and in front of each
interval they sank rifle-pits for five sharp-
shooters.
Nor was this line of 76 guns the only one
destined to press upon Omar's defences ; for at
an early hour, General Khrouleff brought up two
light batteries from his reserves to positions
* Without the artillerymen, Todleben (p. 684) puts the
strength at 18,883. The 24 heavy guns were what the Rus-
sians call 'guns of position,' and included some which— though
heavier — our people called 32-pounders.
khrouleff's attack. 53
uorth-east of the town, whence their fire mitiht chap.
ii
take it in flank. L_
The Eussians meant first to deliver a strong, Their piau in
yet brief cannonade, and then to advance towards stages. L
the place disposed in a line of three columns of
infantry supported by squadrons of horse.* For
the purposes of the intended assault, Khrouleffs
forces brought with them a quantity of fascines,
or, as our people called them, small fagots, with
also ladders, and planks.
IV.
From the line of epaulments at daybreak on The engage-
the 17th of February, the Russians opened their mhof
fire against the defences of Eupatoria with 76
pieces of cannon ; but they afterwards pushed
forward their line of artillery to ground so far
in advance as to be within some four or five
hundred yards of the defences. On the whole,
aided always by riflemen, this strong cannonade
proved effective. It completely disabled one
Turkish battery, inflicting upon it a loss of 19
men. It weakened more or less other batteries.
It killed Selim Pasha and struck down another
general. It brought about several explosions,
and the town at last slackening fire seemed to
own itself ripe for assault.
Then accordingly General Khrouleff began to
move forward his columns. Against the western
* I say nothing of the ulterior measures designed, because
they were not executed.
54 KHKOULEFFS ATTACK.
chap, part of the town he made only a feint — a feint
' very soon checked and stopped by the presence
of the English ships, and the fire that poured
from the ramparts.
It was on the opposite — the eastern Hank
that the General had by this time resolved to
deliver his real attack ; and at length by a cir-
cuitous march he brought down his left-hand
column to ground on the shore of Lake Sassic
some 900 yards from the town. .
Omar Pasha perceiving all this, took care to
strengthen his right with additional troops, and
besides, asked Captain Hastings to send across
his gunboat, the Viper, to the eastern side of
the bay. The Viper moved thither accordingly ;
and — along with the Veloce and the Shaffaer —
was soon taking part in the combat.
Whenever occasion allowed, these vessels of
course brought their lire to bear on the enemy's
troops ; but great would be the error of fancying
that the value of this naval contribution to the
defence of Eupatoria can be measured by count-
ing the Eussians struck down by fire from the
ships. The seamen did more than kill and
wound. Because forcing the enemy to know or
imagine what they could and would do against
him, if seen by their gunners, they painfully
cramped his movements ; and besides, kept him
under that sense of being assailed by unassail-
able adversaries which must and will always be
hateful to even the most valiant men.
In execution of his real attack General Khrou-
khkouleff's attack. 55
leff by this time was operating against the east chap.
and north-east of the town with a chosen part . —
of his forces no less than some 6000 strong ; but
substantially, all his movements of troops brought
about only one little effort of a combative sort —
the effort we shall now see him make with a
couple of light field-batteries, and two of his
Azoff battalions.
Close outside of the town on its north-eastern
side, there lay the burial-ground of the Eussians,
and beyond it one of much greater size set apart
for the Jewish community. Being surrounded
by walls, and containing many tombstones and
monuments, both the burial-grounds offered cover
to any forces advancing against that part of the
' courtine ' which connected the ' No. 2 ' with the
'No. 3' salient. So, against that same part of
the courtine General Khrouleff at last had re-
solved to deliver his promised assault.
Along with other bodies of infantry the two
chosen Azoff battalions were drawn up under the
shelter afforded by the Jewish burial-ground;
and bringing up his two reserve batteries to
within grape-shot range of the parapet, General
Khrouleff caused the part of the ramparts marked
out for assault to be well plied with round-shot
and shell, but also with blasts of mitrail. Then,
after a while, the almost abrupt cessation of this
artillery-fire portended a coming of infantry ; and
at last — in columns of companies — the two bat-
talions approached. They attained to within
some twenty-five yards of the ditch, but were
66 KEPULSED BY THE TDEKS.
chap, tlien beaten back by the fire of the place. Sooii,
' however, they rallied, and were advancing once
more when — stricken again by the fire from the
parapet — they again began to fall back.
Rallied yet once again, and yet once again
brought to move forward, the two Azoff bat-
talions, this time, reached ground almost close
to the ditch ; but — assailed as before by the
Osmanli's withering fire — they yet again shrank
from its blast; and, their movement of simple
recoil lapsing now into final retreat, they made
off — with no aid from 'supports' — to regain, if
they could, their old shelter under the walls of
the Jewish burial-ground. Yet, to do even this
unmolested was more than their foes would allow
them; for now — led out opportunely from the
Perekop gate, and then facing half-about to its
left — a Turkish battalion pressed forward with
bayonets fixed, sprang intent on the beaten
columns retreating across its front, and ap-
parently so pushed them northwards as to pre-
vent their yet reaching the shelter of even the
nearest burial-ground. Nor was this the last
blow they sustained ; for before their retrograde
movement had brought them even so far as the
wall of the Eussian burial-ground, a new dis-
turber appeared on what — since they began to
fall back — had become of course their right hand.
With some two hundred horsemen who consti-
tuted what was almost the whole of Omar's then
landed cavalry, Iskender Bey trotted up on the
flank of the beaten battalions, cut them off from
khrouleff's repulse from before eupatoria. 57
the shelter of the Russian burial-ground, and chap.
. ii.
pressed their retreat in the open till one of them
— formed up at last in a hollow square — proved
able to stop the pursuit.
General Todleben has sought to account for
this little discomfiture by saying that the water
found in the Ditch was a surprise upon the as-
sailants, and that the ladders they brought were
too short to be serviceable for the planned escal-
ade ; but he also has stated a circumstance that
well might have more lasting weight than any
slight physical obstacle, or any mechanic defect
in the Russian preparatives. A strange revulsion
took place in the opinion of General Khrouleff.
When he found himself closely engaged with the
valorous Turks, that sanguine anticipation of his
which had lifted him up into power was turned
to nought all at once by an access of chilling de-
spair. He suddenly found himself sure that, to
take Eupatoria would cost the Russians enormous
losses — cost them losses so great that even at the
price of the greatest sacrifices they would not be,
after all, able to hold their ground in the place.*
So, conforming — conforming too late, and under
the stress of a fight — to what the good Teuton
had counselled before being rudely supplanted,
this more fiery, less steadfast Sclave accepted the
trebled repulses of his two vanquished Azoff bat-
talions as putting an end to the strife.
After what proved a farewell discharge from
Khrouleff's line of artillery, his general retreat
* Todleben, p. 695.
pulse.
58 KHROULEFF'S REPULSE FROM BEFORE EUJ'ATORIA.
chap, began, and it was not molested, since Omar,
II
scarce having more than one full squadron of
horse, could undertake no pursuit. At half-past
ten o'clock in the morning, the engagement had
come to an end.
In killed and wounded the Russians lost some
800 men, and the garrison about half that
number.*
The enemy's This repulse in itself might seem only a trifling
acquiescence j. n, . , e. .. , . .
in this re- discomnture, yet (as oftentimes happens in war)
was destined to gather some weight from the fact
of its proving conclusive. From the moment of
Khrouleff's retreat to the end of the war, Russia
always acquiesced in the briefly delivered arbitra-
ment of the 17th of February, and thenceforth
left to her foes the absolute, unchallenged owner-
ship of that Eupatoria which, as many advisers
believed, was the key, was the true master-key
for laying open Sebastopol.
Why ' the key,' though held fast, was not used,
we shall by-and-by have means of seeing.
* More exactly, the Russian loss is put at 769 (Todleben, p.
696), and the loss of the garrison (including 13 French) at 387.
Of the native Tartars also 24 were cither killed or wounded.
--Colonel Simmons to Lord Raglan, Feb. 18, lb55.
THE EMPEKOK NICHOLAS. 59
CHAPTER III.
THE EMPEROK NICHOLAS.
Although the little discomfiture thus sustained chap.
by the Paissians was only one of the kind that IIL
soldiers call a 'repulse/ the Czar Nicholas still Jhf .Czar'8
x reelings
felt it acutely as another of the humbling blows after i»s dis-
•' ° comfiture
dealt him by those very Turks whom he had {^rf°ar? Eupa"
loved to imagine less warlike than his own high-
ly disciplined troops. By relieving Prince Ment- hismness.
schikoff of the command he perhaps found some
vent for his feelings, yet could not allay his
anguish, and — continuing to grieve — he fell ill.
Weeks after, the voices of Eumour grew busy subsequent
with more tragic versions of what at this time
had been happening; but the Palace account
after all seemed for once better worthy of cred-
ence than the whispered assurances ; and at
least one may say that it harmonised with what
we know of the facts.
Grief perhaps may have rarely killed men by Power of
, . 11-1 grief over
direct and summary means, but at least it can do the body,
piteous harm to a human body, whilst also it can
weaken the springs by which Nature, if not thus
60
THE EMPEROK NICHOLAS.
CHAP.
III.
Official
account of
the Czar's
malady.
This con-
sistent with
the belief
that it was
brought
about by
grief.
Sequence
of facts.
Death of
the Czar.
beset, might perhaps win a way back to health.
Official statements have told us that the Em-
peror's malady was ' paralysis ' of a part of his
lungs; and, whether so called, with strict accur-
acy, or more properly deserving the name of
what Science here terms 'Congestion,' this dis-
order was certainly one of which the immediate
cause may have well been a 'want of heart-
' power.' Now, ' want of heart-power,' we know,
is a kind of bodily ailment not unfrequently
brought on by grief; and thus, putting all to-
gether, we see that the Palace accounts of this
illness are consistent, so far as they go, with the
commonly accepted belief — the belief that it
sprang from a sense of humiliation, entailing
bitter anguish of mind.
The bare sequence of facts ran thus : — The
Czar's troops were repulsed by the Turks on the
17th of February: the cruel wires of the tele-
graph soon forced him to know the truth; and
he died on the 2d of March.
The personal In that pregnant time of a former year when
thus brought the question between continued peace and event-
ual war still hung in a trembling balance, Lord
Stratford one day at Therapia received a com-
munication from Dundas which — read as he
knew how to read it — imported the ending of
doubt — imported the — not yet immediate but —
sure approach of war. Then, whilst yet in the
presence of one who had come in all haste with
a duplicate of the Admiral's words, he fell into
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS. 61
a mood so abstracted as to be pacing up and down chap.
the long room with the air of a man half forget- .
ting that he was not alone, who, although he
allowed a few words to drop from his lips, was
still rather intent on reflection than wishing to
make his thoughts known. "With something of
sadness he said : — ' "Well, well, there'll be war ;
' the Emperor has chosen to make this a personal
' question against me, and he must take the
' consequences.'
On the 2d of March 1855, the misery of ' tak-
' ing the consequences ' had at last been endured
to the full by unhappy Nicholas ; and, although
the war might still rage, there at least was on
that day an end of the great single combat
maintained through many a year between the
once haughty Czar and the always haughty
Ambassador.
It is interesting to know, as I do, that — mag-
nanimous in spite of his wrath — the Ambassador
had always acknowledged the best, the noblest
qualities of his Imperial adversary, regarding him
even as one who, by Eussians with Eussian ideas,
might well be revered and admired.
The Emperor's noble face after death wore an
air of majestic repose ; and perhaps gave support
to a writer who brought himself to believe that
this man, after all, though betrayed into wrong
and sinuous paths, when vanity had weakened
his judgment, was not without love of honour*
The fate of
The fate of the Emperor Nicholas may be said Nicholas.
* See ante, vol. i. chap. iv.
62
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
CHAP.
III.
Justice ad-
ministered
to n. highly
placed
criminal.
to have furnished a sample of good, wholesome
justice administered to a highly placed criminal.
From that fatal hour in 1853, when he de-
spatched Prince Mentschikoff to the Porte, he
had been encountering a lengthened series of
reverses both diplomatic and warlike ; had
been publicly forced to disgorge that 'material
* guarantee,' as he called it, which he had osten-
tatiously seized ; had been defeated on the Alma,
defeated at Inkerman ; had so quickly repressed
his outrageous, though not steadfast, pride as to
be treating already for peace with invaders close
fastened on Eussia ; and now writhing under the
agony of a military discomfiture once more in-
flicted upon him by the valorous Turks — whom
he had thought he could venture to scorn— he
died, it seems, at the last from ills due to his
sense of disgrace, a humbled, coerced, and even
disciplined man, believed by some who well knew
him to be conquered in mind, and yearning to
end the war on almost heart-breaking terms.
Nor did sympathy with the fallen, this time, undo
any part of the good that is wrought by chastis-
ing great criminals. Men remembered that the
Czar had been cruel.
We long ago saw that despite his fond love of
details connected with soldiering, this Czar was
an unwarlike man. Believing that he could best
serve his cause by attending to business at home
he still — far away at St Petersburg — went on
inspecting, inspecting — inspecting troops to the
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS. 63
last: and, indeed, it was when he came in after chap.
in
one of these tasks that an uneasy panting for !_
breath disclosed his fatal illness. To judge from
those letters of his which have happened to meet
the light, he did not at all understand the won-
drous defence of Sebastopol. I can hardly indeed
even say that he knew who defended the place,
for in all of the letters I have seen, he omits the
illustrious name ! He was not a sovereign worthy
of so great a subject as Todleben.
By initiating that strife for Sebastopol from
which neither they nor the Czar could recede
without something like shame, the Allies had
built up a new quarrel less easy perhaps to
assuage than the one which a few months before
had caused them to take up arms ; but now be-
sides, there was danger that — freshly acceding to
empire — a Czar more gentle than Nicholas might
scarcely have power enough to make his subjects
content with a plainly inglorious peace.
Thus, strangely enough, it resulted that the
prospects of peace were not strengthened by even
the death of a Czar who, without the advice or
support of any true statesman, had recklessly
brought on the war.
<;i
THE COUNTER-APPROACHES.
CHAPTER IV.
SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEB-
RUARY 1855 TO THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL.
CHAP.
IV.
Morning of
the 22d of
February.
I.
Looking out in the early morning — the morning
of the 22d of February — from their works of
' approach ' on Mount Inkerman the French de-
scried a new object which excited at first curi-
osity, then graver attention, but still, it would
seem, did not cause any anxious foreboding of
sigiitob- evil. What they saw was a white-looking circlet
served by
the French, or loop which somehow had come to appear on the
ground lying north-west before them.*
Portending, as we now so well know, a fresh
and mighty development of the enemy's defen-
sive resources, and — by consequence — a long, long
frustration of all the besieger's fond hopes, this
white circlet flung round a knoll on the north-
western side of Mount Inkerman did not in-
stantly show its full import to even the more
skilled observers.
* The white line had its angles, but seen from afar appeared
rounded.
THE COUNTER-APPROACHES. 65
The white circlet or loop had been made in the chap.
night-time by workmen whose diggings laid bare ! —
an extended, re-entering strip of the natural lime-
stone rock ; and of course the new object im-
ported some fresh creation of earth-works ; but
why a garrison busied in defending Sebastopol
should come out far from their lines to fasten
with pickaxe and spade on a part of Mount Inker-
man, few or none at first seemed to divine.
Yet the new apparition sprang out of a piece of Todieben-s
inf6r6Dccs
sound knowledge which by acts — not unseen from from what
the Allies
afar — the Allies had themselves disclosed to their had "been
visibly
watchful, sagacious adversary. doing.
To seam the hills with fresh earth- work on
the sites we saw chosen for the ' King ' and the
'Artilleur' batteries, and to do this under the
field-glass of the enemy's keen engineer, was to
tell him as though in plain speech of the great
change of counsel to which the besiegers had
come ; for, although the two specks he descried
were on different ridges, and parted the one from
the other by a distance of more than a mile, he
perceived them to import works designed for the
same immediate purpose — works, both of them,
fashioned for guns which would cross their fires
on the Mamelon, and the interposed neck of
ground that divided it from the Malakoff front.
Inferring thence that the Mamelon must be
the proximate object of attack, and one plainly
craved as a stepping-stone from which to spring
at the Malakoff, he cpiickly went on to convince
himself that the more early measures to be taken
VOL. VIII. E
66 todleben's counter-approaches.
CHaP. for its defence must be — not on the Mamelon
IV.
! itself, but — on ground far away towards his left ;
for he judged that the new French 'approaches'
then making their way on Mount Inkerman
would bring his opponents to ground whence
their batteries might take the Mamelon in flank,
take it even almost in reverse ; and he conceived
that it could not be held, if assailed in that way,
whilst also under the fire of the ' King ' and the
His coun- ' Artilleur ' batteries. He therefore resolved that,
tcracting
plans. to defend the Mamelon, he must arrest the new
French ' approaches ' on his left front, and that,
to do this effectually, he must move out beyond
the near borderland of his Faubourg defences,
must cross the Careenage Ravine, must ascend
the steep hillside above it, and construct a new
system of Works on the north-western heights of
Mount Inkerman. The new system of Works,
whilst fulfilling its primary object, and baffling
the Inkerman approaches, might also, he saw,
be conducing to an ulterior purpose — might give
him the means of directing such a fire towards
the south as would cover his efforts to fortify the
Mamelon in the teeth of the French, thus barring
their road to the Malakoff.
In determining to take this bold course, he
was moved by yet one other reason ; for he hoped
that by arresting the approaches of the French
on Mount Inkerman lie might prevent them from
attaining to ground whence their batteries would
be able to drive off all Kussian ships from the
eastern part of the Roadstead.
TODLEBEN'S COUNTER-APPROACH is. 67
The steps he took were like those which be- chap
siegers — and not the besieged — are commonly !_
wont to adopt. Having taped down beforehand toghiLk
the lines of his newly planned Work, and already
bespoken such aid as the ships in the Roadstead
could give, he at night on the 21st of February
moved out with seven battalions commanded by
General Khroustchoff, crossed the chasm of the
Careenage Ravine, ascended to the heights of
Mount Inkerman, and there under shelter of
darkness laid hands on the fore-chosen site.
To cover his designed operation, the four
Volhynia battalions drew up on a front placed
half-way between the newly marked site and
the foremost of the enemy's trenches ; whilst the
three Selinghinsk battalions which made up the
rest of the force were charged to construct the
planned work, and with all the speed they could
use to make it grow under their hands. These
men — each with his musket beside him — were
kept in a state of readiness to lay down their
tools, and to take instant part as combatants
whenever the need might occur ; but they toiled
undisturbed the first night, and when morning
broke, it was seen that the cover already obtained
by dint of pickaxe and spade and gabions rapidly
filled was even then solid enough to be good
against musketry-fire. This "Work, after the
name of the regiment which bore the toil of
constructing it, was called the Selinghinsk Re-
doubt.
So, the white-looking circlet or loop which met
68 TODLEBEN'S COUNTER-APPROACHES.
chap, the gaze of the French on the morning of the
IV •
' 2 2d, marked simply the slight, early rudiments
of a new, though fast-growing earth-work — the
Selinghinsk Kedoubt, and the firstling of those
'Ouvrages Wanes' — for so our allies always
called them — which were destined to play no
small part in the subsequent defence of Sebas-
topol.
Colonel Todleben did not suppose that the
French, when seeing his purpose, would brook
this counter - approach, and in concert with
General Khroustchoff prepared to resist their
attacks.
So long as day lasted, the troops not busied
in working were withdrawn to sheltered ground
near at hand ; but, when darkness returned on
the 22d, and again on the 23d, the four Volhynia
battalions were thrown forward once more to the
ground they had held the first night, and they
ranged in what, with their people, was the fav-
ourite order of battle, that is, with, in front, a
line of skirmishers, next, a line of small company
columns, and in support to all, a line of three
columns each massed, and comprising each one
whole battalion. With their muskets at hand,
the men of the Selinghinsk battalions still toiled
at the new redoubt.
II.
French Except by distant musketry -fire, producing
tack on but little effect, the French did not molest the
FRENCH NIGHT ATTACK. 69
new Work until the night of the 23d, or rather chap.
the early morning of the 24th. They then un- - 1—
dertook to assault it with a force of three bat- hhiskRe?"
talions, supported by two more in reserve, and
entrusted the command of the troops to General
Mayran. The attacking part of the force was
under the immediate orders of General Monet,
and consisted of one battalion column of Zouaves
at each flank and one of Marines in the centre.
The two battalions ordained to be held in reserve
were selected from the troops of the Line.
When the moon had gone down, General
Monet's three battalions moved forward ; and,
although the expedient of attacking at night
was not destined to give them the advantage
of surprising the enemy, they made good their
advance with great spirit, driving in both the
line of skirmishers and the line of company
columns which constituted the front of the
Volhynia regiment, and apparently forcing back
also two out of its three massed battalions. The
ships in the Roadstead and even the Karabel
batteries soon began to intervene with their
thunder, if not indeed with their blows ; (x) but
the onset of the French was not checked. The
battalion of Zouaves on the right of the assail-
ing force was commanded by Colonel Cler — a
daring and brilliant officer much liked and ad-
mired by our people. At the head of his Zouaves
he turned the flank of the Russians, and pushed
forward so vigorously that before long, he car-
ried the tumult of midnight fighting to ground on
70 FKENCH NIGHT ATTACK
chap, the left — Russian left — of the growing redoubt.
' To meet the stress of battle brought thither, the
unengaged column of the Volhynia regiment was
by Khroustchoff moved laterally from his right
towards the ground on his left where the Rus-
sians were most hotly pressed. Before long, it
resulted that the four Volhynia battalions with
some men of the Selinghinsk intermixed became
gathered irregularly in advance of the new Re-
doubt and presented to their assailants a broad,
concave front.
Like their comrades on the right, the Zouaves
on the opposite flank of the assailing force had
by this time pressed forward with vigour, and
a corresponding effort of will on the part of
the centre column (with which General Monet
was present) might perhaps have enabled the
French to deliver their final assault with a great
compactness and weight ; but this column was
seemingly weakened by the absence of some of
the men who had lost their way in the dark-
ness^2) and besides, it unhappily chanced that
General Monet now received several wounds.
Finding himself compelled to give up the com-
mand, he handed it over to Cler, who was called
away from the right in order to receive his new
charge.
Cler, however, soon returned to his Zouave
battalion, taking with him all the troops that
he found on his road. Then in person going
up to the Work he knocked over the gabions
revetting a part of its counterscarp, crossed its
ON THE SELINGHINSK REDOUBT. 71
Ditch, overthrowing the Eussians there gathered, chap
and mounted the parapet. To be there was to !
learn, notwithstanding the interposed darkness,
that the Kedoubt and its precincts were swarm-
ing with troops ; * and those of the French who
had till then remained alive on the parapet were
forced back into the Ditch and there surrounded
by Eussians coming from all directions. To the
fire of musketry then converging on the French
there seemed to be added the fire from ships in
the Eoadstead and even from the Faubourg De-
fences. Still as yet — because not without hope
that reinforcements might come — Colonel Cler
stood his ground in the fosse.
Where General Mayran was posted at this
turning moment, or why he judged it expe-
dient to withhold reinforcements, I am unable
to say ; but becoming, it seems, convinced that
his foremost troops were in danger of being over-
whelmed by numbers, he caused the retreat to be
sounded.
Thereupon Colonel Cler passed back over the
counterscarp, led the men acting with him against
the host of Eussians who were barring his path,
clove a way through their ranks with the bayonet
or the musket-stock used as a club, and rejoined
the rest of the force which General Monet had led.
The thus reunited French force made good its
retreat without seemingly being pursued.
General Mayran did not bring into action the
troops which formed his ' reserve.'
* Obviously the bulk of the Selinghiusk battalions.
72 CLOSE OF THE ATTACK.
chap. The fight lasted an hour*
iv. .
In killed, wounded, and missing the French
lost some 270,t and the Russians rather more
than 400.+
False report The reports of this fight made to Canrobert
of this fight nil
made to and by him despatched to Lord Raglan, con-
Oanrobert. ^ r o >
veyed a full assurance that by dislodging the
enemy and demolishing his redoubt the enter-
prise had been victoriously achieved ; (3) and
Lord Raglan, on Canrobert's authority, imparted
at once to his Government what seemed true
and joyful intelligence.! He afterwards saw Gen-
eral Canrobert, and learnt from him that he had
not received any further account of the fight. ||
Lord Raglan afterwards visited the brave Gen-
eral Monet, and found him laid up with five
wounds. Several other French officers were
present, including Colonel Cler, the hero of the
right wing. All spoke with truthful candour of
the late night-attack, and simply called it a
failure.1T
When the truth at last made its sure way to
the French at headquarters, they seemed to be
gravely distressed.**
* Niel's narrative of the combat is in p. 152 et scq., and Tod-
leben's (vol. ii.) in p. 27 et seq.
+ Including a few who were struck in the daytime of the
23d, they officially acknowledged a loss of 275. — Niel, p. 154.
t Todleben, vol. ii. p. 30.
§ Despatch to Secretary of State, 24th February 1855.
|| Lord Kaglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, March 27
1855.
H 'Un coup manque.' — Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Feb.
27, 1855. ** Ibid.
ANOTHER COUNTER-APPROACH. 73
On what caused not only the error of mistak- CHAP.
ing a repulse for a victory, but also the ugly ! —
scandal of a French commander-in-chief being
put, and long kept in the dark by his own
trusted officers, a veil was indulgently thrown.
When askintz on the 24th for a truce in order Truce for
O burying the
to bury the dead, General Osten-Sacken preferred dead,
his request with exuberant politeness, and ac-
companied it by an acknowledgment of the
'exemplary intrepidity' which the French had
displayed in the fight. The communication ex-
cited much interest, and even some speculation.
III.
The French did not renew their attack. Con- Reason of
. the French
vincinsr themselves that, if captured, the beling- for not
° renewing
hinsk Kedoubt might be swept by so potent a the attack,
fire of artillery as would make it untenable, they
resolved, however unwillingly, that they needs
must stand by acquiescent whilst the enemy —
losing no moments — completed and armed his
new Work.*
And this bold encroachment effected under TheVoi-
... P hvnia Be-
their eyes was only, after all, a beginning of the doubt.
counter-approaches with which the Czar's great
engineer was minded to try their patience. Seiz-
ing ground that lay towards the left front of the
newly formed Work, he there, on the night of
the 28th of February, began to construct yet an-
other one of a similar kind which was called the
* Kiel, p. 154.
74 RESOLVK OF THE FEENCH.
chap. Volliynia Redoubt;* and, the French once more
! acquiescing, he made haste, as may well be sup-
acquie£ posed, to render it stronger and stronger with
cence of tlie t m> t ±
French. every day suffered to pass.
import and New counter- works thus springing up to chal-
effectof r o o r
these lenge the new French approaches were all the
counter- ° *•
works on more galling to some French and English ob-
Mount . .
inkerman. servers because perceived to be fastening on a
part of their Inkerman battle-field, and so tak-
ing away with the pickaxe what soldiers had
won with the sword ; but men of skill knew that
the check was other than one of a sentimental
kind. It was painfully real.
Decisions of Our allies by this time saw the object at which
the French J , J
on finding their foe must be aiming. They even indeed
themselves ° ^
thus con- divined his ulterior purpose, and perceived that
these new works of his would enable him to
attempt with advantage the fortification of the
Mamelon, thus throwing perhaps a strong barrier
directly across that one path by which they could
reach the Malakoff. With this clearly scanned
prospect before them, they still resolved to ab-
stain from storming the newly reared Works
which now formidably obstructed their siege,
and made to themselves instead a kind of pro-
mise or vow — not destined to receive its fulfil-
ment— a vow that, so soon as the enemy should
try to plant any field-work on the coveted Mame-
lon, they would carry it at once by assault.!
Meanwhile, their counsels induced them to
await the actual happening of the appre-
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 32. + Niel, p. 157.
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS. 76
hended contingency, and not undertake to avert CHAP.
it* _^_
IV.
However, the question whether the Allies council
,,,,., . „ assembled,
should submit to these agressions was one or but with
. . . . little pros-
COUrse meriting their omt consideration, and pectof
. advantage.
accordingly, a Council assembled ; but not with
any good prospect of being able to choose a vig-
orous course of action ; for it was in the teeth
of French troops that the encroachments had
been dared ; and, since Canrobert after the
morning of the 24th had persistently acquiesced
in such measures, no words of any English
deliberator, whether uttered in Council or not,
seemed likely to change their resolve.
The longer our allies acquiesced in the spec- council of
tacle of hostile redoubts thus fastened and fast- March.
ening on Mount Inkerman, the clearer it seemed
that the whole plan of siege which had been
adopted on the 1st of January, and ratified on
the 2d of February, was being brought under
challenge; and, if Todleben had (by witchcraft)
been present in the Council of generals which
sat at the English headquarters on the 4th of
March, he could hardly have failed to exult in
that power of his by which he had raised up
the fallen, and confounded the design of the
victors.
The Council included General Canrobert, Lord
Raglan, General Bosquet, General Niel, General
* Niel, p. 157.
76 CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
chap. Bizot, Sir John Burgoyne,* Sir George Brown,
! — and General Harry Jones. It lasted several
hours without coming to any decisive re-
solve.
Against any proposal requiring them to assail
the new works our allies put forward the theory
before ascribed to them, and maintained that,
even if captured, the ground would not be ten-
able under the fire that might be brought to
bear upon it from three sides.
Burgoyne controverted the opinion thus formed,
and maintained that by taking due precautions
the evil anticipated might be more or less com-
pletely averted.
The Conference determined that the question
thus raised should be investigated on the follow-
ing day by the general officers of engineers be-
longing to both armies ; but meanwhile, went on
with its debates, and discussed the general pro-
spects of the siege.
'The difficulties of the attack on Sebastopol
' were a good deal dwelt upon, and were acknow-
' ledged to be increasing rather than diminishing,
' and in consequence of the impediment placed
' upon the progress of offensive operations on the
' right by the bold advance of the enemy in that
' direction, a desire was manifested by the French
c engineer officers to revert to the desperate ex-
' pedient of an assault on the Eedan, under cir-
' cumstances much more unfavourable than when
' it was rejected by the Note of the 2d of Feb-
* Respecting Burgoyne's presence, Bee post, p. 111.
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS. 77
' ruary, without a simultaneous advance on the chap.
' Malakoff front.' (4) ■
The importance of after all endeavouring to
take what with normal besiegers has commonly
been the first step, that is, to invest the place,
or in other words to cut off communication be-
tween Sebastopol and the Eussian field -army,
was much dwelt upon ; * whilst General Can-
robert — and not for the first time — declared his
opinion to be that, if from any cause Omar Pasha
should be unable to act upon the rear or flank
of the enemy from Eupatoria, he should be re-
quested to come to the Chersonese with two-
thirds of his army.
Lord Eaglan stated his reasons for not at all
sharing the opinion thus formed by General
Canrobert.t
The French and English engineers did not Adjourned
' Conference
come to any agreement, and the adiourned Con- Bitting on
J . ' J the 6th of
ference sat again on the 6th of March. Then, March,
the French making no proposal, Burgoyne sub-
mitted a memorandum recommending an attack
on the Selinghinsk and Volhynia Eedoubts with
a view to drive the enemy effectually from that
part of the ground. He urged that the French
objections to that plan were not of the import-
ance apprehended, and that the French Note of
the second of February (in which all had con-
* No doubt by Niel. See the next chapter, and the Ap-
pendix, Note (2), thereto annexed.
f Despatch marked ' Secret,' from Lord Raglan to Secretary
of State, March 6, 1855.
78 CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
chap, curred) could never be carried into effect with-
IV
' out first obliging the Russians to loose their new
hold on Mount Inkerman.
General Canrobert and the French officers at-
tending him 'did not consider his [Burgoyne's]
' scheme, nor the reasoning by which Sir John
' Burgoyne supported it, to be well founded ; and
' they at once declared their determination not
' again to attempt to drive the enemy from his
' new works.' (6)
A weak resolve that for months kept back and
kept down the Allies !
For a purpose no longer worth notice, the Con-
ference directed an examination of some specified
ground, but did nothing more*
8th March. Late in the evening of the 8th of March, Gen-
reTewing his eral Canrobert came to Lord Raglan's head-
to obtain'8 quarters, and again urged that it should be
reinforce- proposed to Omar Pasha to come to the Cher-
sonese with a considerable part of his army.
Lord Raglan saw no reason for changing his
former opinion ; but consented that (with a view
to full discussion of the question) Omar Pasha,
with also Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat,
should be invited to attend a Conference on the
following Monday. In his almost passionate
eagerness to have Turkish troops on the Cher-
sonese, General Canrobert refused them French
aid for any operations elsewhere. He announced
that he could not reinforce Omar Pasha whilst at
* Despatch (Secret) from Lord Raglan to Secretary of State,
March 10. 1855.
THE MAMELON. 79
Eupatoria with any force at all of either cavalry chap.
or infantry * !
Whilst the Allies were thus vainly deliberating,
their adversary was acting, and acting with cease-
less vigour.
The ' Volhynia ' Work was completed in the completion
course of ten days ; and the armament winch the ment of the
■nii it •! iirvip *,wo White
two new Kedoubts had received on the 10th of Redoubts.
March comprised twenty-two pieces of cannon.!
V.
The pair of Grand-Dukes whom we saw driving Arrival of
into Sebastopol on the eve of the battle of Inker- Graud-
r Dukes
man were destined to pass as the harbingers of Nicholas
and Michael
Eussian enterprise ; and their return to the
Crimea soon after Todleben's enterprise of the
21st of February was rightly thought to portend
an increase of warlike activity.
To have a strong hold on the Mamelon — this, TheMamo
we saw, was the object of besieged and besiegers
alike — the object for which they were toiling on
several distant hills — but it had not been up to
this time the chosen scene of their efforts. Light-
ly held — though of course duly watched — by an
outpost of Eussian infantry, it had neither been
touched by the pickaxe nor assaulted by troops,
nor even approached by ' approaches ' ; but on
the morning of the 10th of March, its time of
repose was drawing fast to an end.
* Despatch (Secret) from Lord Raglan to Secretary of State,
March 10, 1855. t Todleben, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35.
80
THE KAMTCHATKA LUNETTE.
CHAP.
IV.
Advice of
Bizot to
Canrobert,
declined.
Night of
the 10th
of March,
TodlehcTi
establishing
a Work on
the Mame-
Ion.
Sight greet-
ing the
French on
the morning
of the 11th.
The Kanit-
chatka
Lunette.
Delib'ra-
tions of the
French In
face of this
new appari-
tion.
By that time, the jointly planned Works of
the French and the English — the ' King ' and the
'Artilleur' batteries — were closely approaching
completion, and Bizot, the commander of the
French engineers, proposed to General Canrobert
that on the following night the Mamelon should
be seized by his troops.*
General Canrobert met the proposal by a reason
of great scope and gravity, which shall be after-
wards stated, and brought himself to resolve that
he would not hazard the step.t
On the night of that very same day, the enemy
passed into action. Colonel Todleben at last gave
reality to what from the time of his planning the
two White Redoubts, had been his ulterior pur-
pose, and prepared a new, unwelcome spectacle
for those of our baffled allies who held the Vic-
toria Ridge.J Looking towards the north-west
on the morning of the 11th of March, they saw
that during the night, their great adversary had
been fastening on the Mamelon, and that there,
with the rudiments of a Work plainly meant to
defend it he already had saddled the Ridge.§
Though as yet of course only inchoate, this new
barrier — the Kamtchatka Lunette — lay directly
across the one path by which the French could
advance against the Malakoff front, and they
knew that they must needs overcome the inter-
posed obstacle, if they meant to go on with the
siege in accordance with their last ordained plan.
* Niel, p. 168. t Ibid., p. 169.
t Todleben, vol. ii. p. 46 et seq. § Niel, p. 167.
canrobert's determination. 81
They, however, could still question whether their chap,
more prudent course would be to attack the new ! —
outwork at once whilst still only in embryo, or
wait until it should grow up to the estate of a
completed Lunette, and be bristling with guns.
The alternative which forbade a recourse to any Their re-
solve not
speedv assault was the one the French chose ; assault the
* J _ new work;
and accordingly on the following night — the
night of the 11th — they opened their first par-
allel against the young, tender ' Work,' not then
one day old ; * thus almost repeating in miniature
the all-involving mistake of the previous autumn
— the mistake of ' besieging ' an embryo.
To enter on a course of ' approaches ' was to but to
. proceed
give the enemy time ; and time or course was the against
. Jt t>y 'aP-
blessing he craved for his infant Lunette. So, 'preaches.'
whilst day after day, and night after night, his
antagonists worked in their trenches, he was
driving on the completion of his newly inter-
posed outwork, and covering both its front and
its flanks with a double chain of ' lodgments.'
The Allies before long brought a powerful fire
of artillery to bear on the growing Lunette, and
the French battled hard — battled even on the
whole with advantage — for some of its covering
' lodgments ' ; but — taken alone — no such meas-
ures were sufficing to carry the Work ; and, since
(under the bonds of that reason which had held
back their general on the 10th of March) the
French as yet were not minded to undertake an
assault, they had to bear the torment of seeing or
* Niel, p. 170.
VOL. VIII. F
82 canrobert's reason.
chap, otherwise knowing that every day, every night,
! — their unwearied adversary was bringing his Work
21st March, towards completeness. He finished it on the 21st
Todleben s *
completion 0f March ; * and by that time had not only armed
and anna- ' ^ °
Kamtchitka ** w^n ^en 24-pounder guns,t but covered it too
Lunette. Dy ^he lire of twelve other pieces of ordnance for
that purpose planted in battery on chosen sites
less in advance.^
VI.
As may well be supposed, this condition of
things proved distressing to both the Trench and
the English, but of course to the French more
especially, since theirs, as it chanced, was the
army, and theirs too the anxious commander,
confronted, mocked, baffled, perplexed by the
enemy's advancing encroachments.
Mortifying The third stage of Todleben's triumph began,
and perplex- n -» «-
ing effect of as we saw, on the night of the 10th or March,
Todleben's ' °
counter- and that day (at an earlier hour) was also the
one on which Canrobert — after carefully weigh-
ing the question — brought himself to reject the
proposal of his chief engineer, and abstain from
seizing the Mamelon — an enterprise that ap-
peared to be almost peremptorily required for
the advancement of the siege, and besides to be
one recommended by many favouring circum-
stances,
canrobert's Then, by what course of reasoning was it that
declining to Canrobert maintained his conclusion ? What re-
* Niel, p. 175. t Todleben, p. 55.
t Ibid., p. 57.
cankobert's reason. 83
strained him, according to Niel, and prevented CHAP.
his seizing the Mamelon was — not any grave !_
apprehension of the obstacles his troops might Mameion.
encounter whilst performing so simple a task,
but rather — a belief that the measure would
provoke some great sortie directed against the
guards of the trenches, thus bringing about an
engagement of more or less extended dimen-
sions, and doing so under conditions which he
judged to be disadvantageous.* Whether sound, The vast
or deceptive, the objection was one of vast scope ; ins obj<>(«
for, if valid against that proposal of the 10th of
March which asked General Canrobert to seize
what was then an unfortified knoll, it would
seemingly prove no less adverse to any real step
in advance that could well be conceived ; for how
to carry Sebastopol without doing some act of
aggression ? And, how to plan an act of aggres-
sion which the enemy, if such were his mood,
might not answer with powerful sorties ? And,
again, how on earth to contrive that any en-
gagement thus generated should take place under
conditions well fitted to please the besieger — to
please a besieger so circumstanced that, whether
lor conquest or whether for safety, he must fight
under the guns of Sebastopol, with before him a
labyrinth of mighty defences, and behind him
the sea and sea-cliffs ? To harbour such an ob-
jection whether sound or fallacious was plainly
to open a path that led down towards despon-
dency; and, although of course none can be
* Niel, pp. 168, 169.
84 canrobert's reason.
chap, sure that the painful decision of Canrohert may
' not have averted disasters, it is hard to see how
!™n" a commander, whilst haunted by forecasts so
tendency. Cljsniai; could be keeping his mind or his will
in the iron condition required for breaking into
Sebastopol.
Niei'scom- Marshal Niel in recording the objection did
ment on the . . ,
objection, not either support or condemn it; but — pursu-
ing his fixed idea — he took care to insist that
the fact of its having stayed Canrobert, and pre-
vented him from seizing the Mamelon, brought
out into strong relief the inherent vice of that
policy which had turned the conquerors of the
Alma into hampered besiegers.* And indeed
the original error of laying siege to Sebastopol
without forces meet for the purpose might well
seem more glaring than ever to the official nar-
rator, when lie not only heard Science telling him
that no belligerent weak enough to be confronted
in a serious engagement by the garrison of a
fortress can have any warrant in reason for at-
tempting to reduce it by siege, but also saw her
teaching illustrated by the predicament of Gen-
eral Canrobert, who could not dare drive in an
outpost for fear of provoking a battle.!
canroijcrt'K The ' reason ' which had prevented Canrobert
tionto from consenting on the 10th of March to seize
from as- the then unfortified Mamelon proved sufficiently
embryo Lu- strong to deter him from assaulting the em-
notte.
* Niel, p. 169.
f Cormontaigne, Memorial pour l'attaque des places, chap.
vi., cited Niel, pp. 181, 182.
caniiobert's gloomy STATE. 85
bryo Work which had newly grown over its chap.
surface* - — ! —
To our people the notion of suffering the
enemy to construct a defensive Work on the path
— the one path — which could lead our allies to
the Malakoff, seemed almost the same as aban-
doning the main design of the siege; and, to
deprecate such acquiescence, our chief engineer Represent*.
it tion on this
drew up a memorandum ' on the expediency subject™
' of occupying the Mamelon,' which Lord Rag- Lord Raglan
Ian imparted to Canrobert ; t but all this insist- robert.
ence proved vain ; and the Mamelon — growing
daily in strength — continued to remain unas-
saulted.
VII.
Meanwhile, the French commander had been The gloomy
apprehen-
gouig yet further and further on that gloom v sionsof
° & J . . " Canrobert
road towards despondency which his reasoning, imparted
as we saw, had laid open.} ' General Canrobert,' Ragian.
writes Lord Raglan, ' taking rather a gloomy view
' of what might possibly arise, represented that it
' was probable that when the Allies should open
' their fire upon Sebastopol, the enemy would
' attempt a general attack upon us, making a
> sortie with 20,000 men on the extreme left
' of the French with a view to reach their ship-
' ping and establishments at Kamiesh, and assail-
* So that the resolve which I called the • vow ' was disre-
garded. See ante, p. 74.
t Despatch, 'Secret,' to Secretary of State, March 17, 1855
+ See ante, p. 83.
86
canrobert's gloomy state.
CHAP.
IV.
Lord
Raglan's
comment;
and its tend
ency to re-
lieve his de-
spondency.
Lord
Raglan's
power of
repressing
despond-
ency.
' ing at the same time the right of our position
* on this ridge with 40,000 men, and the ground
' in front of Balaclava with an equal force by
' a simultaneous movement. He expressed also
' some apprehension that, if this great operation
' should be undertaken, the Allies, occupied as
' they would be by the Siege, might be over-
' powered.'
' Sir Edmund Lyons and myself were surprised
1 to hear him hold such desponding language. I
' ventured to express my opinion that the tone
' of his observations was somewhat serious.' *
Whether Canrobert felt, or felt not, that this
reception of his anxious forebodings implied a
gently veiled censure, he well may have quitted
the room a much happier and a much stronger
man than when he came in. The greater the
diversity of character, sentiment, habit, and social
station between any two men in council, the
abler will one of them be to allay the other's
despondency. It is amongst men ground down
to a state of what the French call 'equality' thai
panic revels and spreads.
' In those times of trial,' said one who best
knew Lord Raglan, ' he ceased to be equal with
' other men.' . . . ' Without dissembling facts,
' he would calmly withhold his assent to all
' gloomy apprehensions, and manfully force at-
' tention to the special business in hand, and
' thus — or rather perhaps by a kind of power
* Despatch marked
March 1855.
1 Secret ' to Secretary of State, 13th
canrobert's gloomy state. 87
* that cannot be traced or described in words — c 11 a p.
he threw upon those who conversed with him
' the spell of his own undaunted nature. Men
' went to him anxious and perturbed. They
' came away firm.' *
May it be that — in part from their contact Did this
" *- change Can
with the mind of Lord Raglan — the spirit of the ™£**B
French commander began to undergo a great
change ? What we know is that, having spoken
to Lord Eaglan in the ' desponding language '
above recorded of the battle that he thought
might be provoked by the re-opening of the fire,
General Canrobert (in addressing his Emperor t) ^'^j.0^
soon after began to point out that very same closures,
dreaded contingency as one for which he was
yearning.(6)
In common with but few of his time (of whom
Lord John Russell was one) Lord Raglan was
able to write a sentence so naturally that it re-
called the very sound of his voice. So to read
the five following lines is like hearing Lord
Raglan speak, nay almost like seeing him smile :
' I think our friends [meaning the French] are
' a little uneasy, and are anxious for the arrival
' of some of the Turkish army from Eupatoria ;
* Speech of General Airey to the Board of General Offi-
cers.
+ See his words to the Emperor of the 10th of April, in
which he speaks of the previously dreaded contingency as ' cette
' attaque desir^e avec tant de raison ; ' Rousset, ii. p. 147 ; and
his letter to the Emperor of the 19th May, ibid., p. 178 et seq.,
partly quoted also post, in Appendix to chap, xi., Note 3. See
also reference to these letters post, chap. viii. and chap. ix.
88
Til 10 KNKMYS GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
chap. * but they continue/ he archly adds, ' to have full
! ' confidence in their English allies.' *
VIII.
Vigorous ad-
vance of the
French ' ap-
proaches'
against
the new
Lunette.
Anxiety of
the enemy
to check
them.
His night
sorties, 22d
of March ;
his great
ni^'lit sortie
against the
French.
General Bizot, meanwhile, had been pushing
on his 'approaches' with a good deal of vigour;
and before many days, the moment seemed to be
near when by working close up to the lodgments
he might convert a whole chain of them into a
new parallel, and thus become clothed with a
power which would put the Lunette in grave
danger.
To check the advance of 'approaches' which
threatened such consequences, and perhaps at
the same time to compass an object of yet greater
moment, the Eussians judged it expedient to
hazard a step that might cost them a not trif-
ling sacrifice of men.
So, on the night of the 22d of March, the
enemy undertook an adventure with a much
greater number of troops than are commonly
charged with the task of making a sortie in
darkness.
He effected four sorties (of which we shall
afterwards hear) against his English besieger,
thus largely extending the front of his great
night attack, but still threw the main weight
of his onslaught on that chosen part of the
ground where our French allies were engaged
in sapping their way towards the Mamelon.
* To Lord Panmure, 30th March 1855.
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 89
The night was dark, and a wind blowing high chap.
intercepted the sound of troops marching, when L .
at about ten o'clock nine battalions of infantry
commanded by General Khrouleff moved out
from the flanks of the Kamtchatka Lunette along
the Victoria Eidge ; and, another battalion acced-
ing, it was with a strength of no less than 5500
men that the Russians soon came into action.*
What these forces had before them were first,
die disputed lodgments, next, the foremost of the
new French 'approaches' where (with no troops
at all under arms except a few score of Zouaves)
500 men gathered in ' working - parties ' were
labouring at their appointed tasks, and beyond,
the one parallel which as yet had been brought
to completion. The French 'guards of the
' trenches,' that night, were under General d'Au-
temarre, and comprised four battalions. Three
of these were so posted that they could be
brought up in time for resistance to Khrouleff s
impending attack.
Though not without some hard fighting, and
even at one point encountering a somewhat long
check, General Khrouleff s battalions recovered
the lodgments which their adversary had been
suffered to occupy, advanced to the head of the
sap, and invaded the foremost ' approaches,'
whence — after, however, encountering a brave
and stubborn resistance — they at last drove in
the French working-parties along with the hand-
* Khrouleff was the general repulsed by the Turks when
assailing Eupatoria. See ante, chap. ii.
90 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
chap, ful of Zouaves. After leaving in the ' ap-
! ' proaches ' thus seized a large number of sailors
who there wrought all the havoc they could,
Khrouleffs force moved on in pursuit, and did
this without being met by any blasts of artillery,
since the Frenchmen retreating before it were re-
treating on the completed parallel, and therefore
masking its fire.
Here, however, by this time were gathered the
three French battalions which d'Autemarre had
within reach ; and his force now opposed to the
Eussians a resistance so strong that those of them
who made bold to adventure beyond the parallel
met only their deaths, whilst those who remained
on its verge soon found themselves engaged in a
hot and obstinate fight.
To the enormous preponderance of numbers
already enjoyed by the Eussians there now ac-
ceded a new and unexpected advantage ; for —
led forward by Enseigne Zavalichine — a little
body of troops had by this time moved up a
good way upon what one may call English ground
along the edge of the Woronzoff Eidge ; and thus
it came to pass that the French, whilst engaged
against the host in their front, now suddenly
found themselves stricken by a fire from across the
ravine, and moreover from ground so far south
that it took their troops in reverse. Under this
serious trial, however, the French showed what
on the whole may well be called excellent firm-
ness ; * and the enemy on the other hand failed
* General Todleben says that their left fell into a complete
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 91
to receive any wholesome impulsion from the chap.
sight or the sound of the fire thus newly be- L_
friending him. His masses still remained hang-
ing back on the verge of the parallel, and ap-
parently with the loss of their headway they
lost all their clearness of purpose. There were
glimmers of light in the sky which enabled the
French to observe that their assailants were
gathering into groups, like men — not stricken
with panic, yet — bewildered, and in need of sure
guidance. The onset had spent its force, and
the counter-sway followed. Whether simply, as
Todleben says, obeying their general's signals
reiterated again and again, or yielding, as Niel
asserts, to the prowess of d'Autemarre's force,
the assailants at all points fell back. They
were pressed for a while in retreat, but soon
found the shelter they needed beneath the guns
of the fortress.*
The conflict thus sustained by the French had The sorties
6ff6Ct6(l
hardly yet reached its height when their English against the
neighbours, established on the Woronzoff Ridge, smle-works.
were also becoming engaged in what — because
now far extending — seemed almost a midnight
battle.
In designing the enterprise levelled against
rout ' deroute complete ' ; but it being undisputed that the
French, on the whole, stood fast and repulsed the attack, I have
not been brought to think that my statement in the text is
unwarranted.
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 68 el seq.; Niel, p. 177 et seq. The two
accounts are conflicting.
92 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
chap, his English adversaries, the enemy did not make
TV
' the mistake of sending out into the darkness a
huge, unwieldy force ; but divided his attack on
our siege-works into four distinct sorties, each
effected with moderate numbers;* whilst he
wisely resolved that these columns (which com-
prised in their ranks many sailors) should all be
commanded by naval officers — men whose skill
and resources were such that they would know
how to steer in the dark. We shall see every
one of these captains overcoming the obstacle of
darkness, and successfully bringing his craft to
the chosen point of attack.t
colonel The 'field officer,' that night, on duty in the
dispositions, precincts of ' Gordon's Attack ' was Colonel
Kelly; and of the 1200 men he had under him,
one-half at first guarded the third — their fore-
most— parallel which (if reckoned with the trench-
work prolonging it) may be said to have crossed
the whole breadth of the Woronzoff Ridge from
the Dockyard Eavine on his right to the Woron-
zoff Road on his left. These last 600 men were
composed of detachments from several regiments,
and stood ranged in the order here shown : —
Left.— Rifles, 90th, 34th, 88th, 77th, 97th.— Right.
With 300 of his men Colonel Kelly had fur-
* I do not undertake to give these numbers except in the
case of Beruleff's column.
f It will be remembered that, when advancing by night upon
Tel-i'l -Kebir, our army received welcome guidance from the
skill of a naval officer who led it by aid of the stars.
THE ENEMY'S GEE AT NIGHT ATTACK. 93
nished the ' working-parties ' employed- that night, chap.
under the guidance of Colonel Tylden of the !
Eoyal Engineers, and the remaining 300 he kept
higher up in reserve. Colonel Kelly enjoyed an
advantage which of course for one acting at mid-
night was beyond measure great — that of having
at his side Major Gordon (the directing engineer
of the ' Gordon's' or ' Eight Attack' siege- works),
who thoroughly well knew the ground.*
Marking all that through darkness and storm
the eye and the ear could still tell him of the
conflict sustained by the French, and learning
thus that — though slowly — the enemy had car-
ried their trenches, Colonel Kelly divined that
the Eussians would very soon turn to their right,
and try to make a sweep along the ground in his
rear, where the 300 men he had furnished were
busy with pickaxe and spade. To prepare against
any such onset, Colonel Kelly made these dispo-
sitions:— Not disturbing at all the detachment
composed of the ' 97th men ' which formed the
extreme right of the line, and was critically cir-
cumstanced, but resorting instead to the two
next detachments (troops furnished by the 77th
and 88th regiments), he shifted them both from
their places in the advanced trench, and drew
them up at right angles to it, the 77th men fore-
most, in skirmishing order, supported by the
88 th men in line.t To take up the positions
* The greatly distinguished officer who was afterwards Gen-
eral Sir Willian Gordon, K.C.B.
f These dispositions were highly prized by the gifted officer
94 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
CSap. thus vacated, there came down soon afterwards
IV.
. a fresh detachment — one furnished by the 7th
Fusiliers,
zavaiich- Directed by Enseigne Zavalichine (whose fire,
inc's flank J ° v
mov.ment. though from ' English ground,' had been hitherto
poured on French troops), the attack planned
against our right flank was opening with some
shots from his skirmishers, when under the
orders of Boudistcheff, and designed to take ef-
fect on our front, a heavier onslaught began.
Bomiist- Greatly favoured of course by the darkness,
chefPsat- , _ \ , . • -. .
tack. but also by the roar of a wind overpowering the
sound of their march, a body of Eussian troops
moved out from the lines of Sebastopol, and as-
cended the Woronzoff Ridge* Undertaking a
front attack on the extreme right wing of our
advanced parallel, the column opposed its strength
to the detachment of our 97th Regiment — a de-
tachment comprising no more than some 70 or
80 men, but commanded by a brave, warlike
officer — by Captain Hedley Vicars.
charge by The column advancing in silence had not
Vicars with . °
to or so men seemingly come up so close as to be vet driving
of the 97th. ° J r J t>
— Major Gordon — who saw them made, and were afterwards
officially eulogised by General Eyre, ' the general officer of the
' trenches.' Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 27th March
1855.
* 'A force so far as I could judge of at least 800 men.' So
writes Colonel Kelly, relying upon such personal observation as
was possible in the darkness, but also upon a Russian despatch
which purported to give a detail of the forces engaged by the
enemy. The estimate, however, cannot be reconciled with
Todleben's account
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 95
in the out-sentries, when it all at once fired chap.
IV
a volley. Then instantly awaiting no orders, '. —
entertaining no doubt, and listening only, it
seems, to that gallant spirit of his which used
always to prompt him in action, Captain Vicars
sprang over the parapet, carrying with him the
whole of the 70 or 80 men who formed his little
detachment, and their ringing cheer, heard amid
darkness that gave to every sound a more than
treble significance, was the cheer of a soldiery —
not halted but — joyously attacking an enemy.
With Gordon still at his side Colonel Kelly vicars
was at this moment busied with the lesser affairs Keiiy and
„ „ Gordon.
oi the flank attack, but on ground not far from
our advanced parallel ; and at the sound of the
volley followed close by the cheer, they both of
them sped off at once to the new scene of action,
and were presently in the midst of the men of
the 97th who had newly sprung over the parapet.
Gordon sharing the fervour of the soldiery was
even lending his voice to the joyous tumult of
war when he received a wound from a musket-
shot which struck his right arm, and disabled
him ; but Colonel Kelly running forward over-
took Captain Vicars, and was presently moving
down alongside him against the enemy's column.
It is supposed that, baffled by darkness, the Defeat of
Eussians perhaps may have failed to divine
the exceeding scantiness of the impetuous little
force that assailed them with a strength we have
already seen estimated at only about one to ten ;*
* See ante, p. 94, and footnote.
96 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
chap for. when the advance of our soldiery was be-
IV
! — coming, or had nearly become what Englishmen
mean by 'a charge,'" the column fired a last
volley ; and then — still hanging together after
the manner of Kussians in flight — began to re-
treat at the double, its rear files turning however,
and firing back shots whilst they ran.
By one of these Parthian balls there was taken
the life of the captain who had ordered and led
the charge. Whilst moving eagerly forward at
the side of Colonel Kelly, and whilst listening
indeed to his words, Hedley Vicars was stricken
and killed.
Our soldiery, in spite of the darkness, saw
enough to be sure that their cheers were accel-
erating the flight of the column ; and a brave
little bugler of the 97th, whose irrepressible zeal
kept him always far out towards the front, was
unsparing in the use of a power with which he
seemed to think himself armed. As he rightly
or wrongly imagined, he made the retreating
mass spring at the blast of his clarion like a
horse that is touched with the whip, and so kept
the whole force at a gallop by ' sounding the
' advance ' in its rear.
Colonel Kelly at last stayed the chase, and
brought back the '97th detachment' to its for-
mer post at the trench.
Defeat of With his men of the '77th detachment,' SUp-
Zavallch-
ine-scoi- ported by that of the 88th, Captain Eickman,
after a well-sustained fight, and losing several
men, defeated the venturesome column which
nmt.
THE ENEMY'S GEE AT NIGHT ATTACK. 97
Zavalichine had led, and drove it back down chap.
the Kavine. ' —
From this time — about midnight — until one
other hour had passed, there was peace on the
Woronzoff Heights.
But again at one o'clock in the morning the sound of
& ° firing
tumult of more and more fighting began to make towards
° ° ° the more
itself heard ; and the seat of conflict, this time, weste™
part of the
was a part of the Kidge further west. Ria>oenz0ff
With his newly received detachment of the
7th Fusiliers now marching westward by fours
along the course of the foremost parallel, Colonel colonel
i ! i .li Kelly tak-
Kelly made what haste he could towards the ingim
. n i i ,, measures:
sound of the firing; but the darkness and the
state of the trench — still unfinished and en-
cumbered with stone — made the progress of the
troops somewhat slow; and the Colonel himself
being able to move at a faster pace pushed for-
ward impatiently in advance of his men. Soon,
he met Lieutenant Jordan with some men of the
34th (the Colonel's own regiment), and by him was
apprised that the Eussians had seemingly entered
a part of the trench further west. The Colonel
said that our people must try to drive the enemy
out, told Jordan to get his men together, in-
formed him that the detachment of 7th Fusiliers
was coming up, and then once more hastened on
towards the sound of the firing. He had gone
but a little way further, when — standing together
in the trench — he saw a group of seven or eight
soldiers whom he took in the darkness to be men
VOL. VIII. G
prisoner.
98 THE enemy's great night attack.
chap, of his own regiment— the 34th. So, going close
IV- up to them, he directed these men to 'fall in'
with the other men under Jordan. He was met
by an uproar of outlandish cries, and found that
but he had been accosting the enemy. He brought
rndiaken out his revolver, and pointing it at the head of
his nearest foe, pulled hard, though in vain, at a
trigger held fast by the 'safety catch.' Whilst
lowering his weapon in order to push back the
bolt, he was felled — felled by numbers of blows
laid upon him with the butt-ends of muskets, and
when on the ground was bayoneted in the right
shoulder, in the left hand, and in the right
leg, whilst also his assailants — not Russians but
Albanian Christians, engaged in the enemy's
service — were so emulous in the truculent work
of pounding and battering at him with the stocks
of their tin 'arms that many of the blows they
were levelling intercepted each other, and the
victim had not succumbed, nor even indeed lost
his consciousness, when a young Russian officer
no less generous than brave interposed. Stand-
ing over the prostrate Colonel, and so courage-
ously shielding him as himself to become the
recipient of some of the fiercely aimed blows,
this chivalrous noble at last proved able to make
good the rescue, and caused the wounded Colonel
— of course as a prisoner of war — to be safely
brought into the fortress.*
* Where by all, let me say, by Prince Gortchakoff, by
General Osteu-Sacken, by Admiral Pamphiloff, he was treated
with the most generous and thoughtful kindness. It was from
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 99
The misfortune which threw Colonel Kelly chap.
rv.
into the hands of the enemy was unknown at
the time to our troops, and men supposed after
a while that 'the field officer of the night' had
been killed.
Jordan did not mistake when he said that
a part of our foremost parallel was seemingly
in the enemy's hands. Moving out from the
fortress a body of troops under Astapoff had The attack
it j? under As-
advanced, and advanced unobserved so far up tapoir.
the right bank of the gorge which carries the
Woronzoff Eoad as to be able to assail by sur-
prise the left flank of Gordon's attack, and to
operate thence advantageously against its fore-
most parallel. They accordingly — surprising the
trench-guards — broke into a part of the parallel
lying westward of the Mortar Battery ; * and
after thus entering the work, pursued the advan-
tage some way along the course of the trench
without meeting, so far as is known, any strongly
sustained resistance at the hands of troops caught
under circumstances which prevented them from
showing a front.
Able officers, however, were busied in the task Means of
... . i resistance
of collecting some means with which to repel the collected.
invasion. Marsh (the 'Adjutant of the trenches '
that night) got together some men. Lieutenant
the table of General Osten-Sacken (the Commandant of Sebas-
topol) that food was supplied to the wounded officer.
* Whether they entered (as Todleben thought) at the flank
or (as Lord Raglan supposed) by the left front, or, as seems
probable, by the left rear, there are seemingly no means of
showing.
100 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTAl K.
chap. Jordan went on endeavouring to increase the
IV' small number of 34th men already brought
under his leadership. The detachment of the
7th Fusiliers under Captain Cavendish Browne
was coming up in a collected state ; and finally,
Colonel Tylden of the Eoyal Engineers (the
officer destined to command our people in the
approaching combat), got together the men of the
working-parties whose labours he before had been
guiding, and caused them to stand to their arms.
Fight ai The conflict drew to a head on the sight of a
&itte£rr.Lar new mortar battery which occupied the trench
near its centre.
The enemy advanced on this battery from the
west, the English from the east, and within it the
two forces met, moving each of them with bayo-
nets fixed alongside the parapet, and of course
therefore facing the traverses. At the first tra-
verse, the Eussians made a protracted stand.
Colonel Tylden came up in person, and his own
idea seemingly was to execute a charge straight
forward from east to west along the foot of the
parapet ; but our people instead, with a rush,
drove their way round the end of the traverse,
overthrew at the point of the bayonet all they
then found before them, and, pursuing, ap-
proached the next traverse, where the enemy
Defeat and made his last stand. Colonel Tylden by yet
u^ian*110 'one charge more' overcame the resistance there
column. offered, drove the Eussians all out of the battery,
and pursued them some way along the course of
the trench, but the fugitives before very long
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 101
were all of them over the parapet and making chap.
off towards the Kedan. ,, 1_
The two English detachments engaged . in this
part of the field lost, three officers an,d several
men.* « ■ . -*„ , ... I
Whilst this last combat was raging, yet one Beraieflrs
° . surprise of
other sortie began, and was directed against our ourad-
° vanced
Left Attack. A column commanded by Beruleff siege-works
J in the Left
about 500 in number, moved out against that Attack,
foremost trench at the base of Green Hill which
was afterwards called the 4th Parallel.! Fav-
oured greatly, as had been other columns, by the
darkness of the night and the roaring of the wind,
but also by the sound of the fighting then rife
on the Woronzoff Eidge, this column surprised
and drove in the detachments of the 20th Regi-
ment, which had lined the parapet of the advanced
trench, and, driving forward yet further, a great
number of the assailants soon entered the two
new and incomplete batteries, the ' advanced No.
' VII.' and the ' advanced No. VIII.,' which had
been established in our 3d Parallel, there surpris-
ing the 'working-parties' — 250 in number — which
under Captain Montagu of the Eoyal Engineers
were busied in thickening the parapets. The rest
of the assailants, if minded to pursue their advan-
tage, were still at the time hanging back in or
* Captain the Hon. Cavendish Browne of the 7th Fusiliers
and Lieutenant Jordan of the 34th were killed, and Lieutenant
McHenry of the 34th Regiment wounded.
t Todleben puts the strength of this column at 475, with
besides a company of the Okhotsk regiment in reserve. — Vol. ii.
p. 76.
102 THE ENEMY'S GEEAT NIGHT ATTACK.
CHAP.
IV.
Part of the
invading
force
checked by
some men of
the 21st
Fusiliers
under Carl
ton;
and ulti-
mately re-
treat mg
before it.
Russian
troops for
a while in
the two
advanced
bitteries;
near to the trench they had carried. In the hope
of apposing to these some beginning at least of
resistance, Lieutenant Carlton of the 21st Fusi-
liers—a . young officer, on guard at the Zigzag
uniting the two foremost .parallels — collected his
own little force — about 50 in number — adding to
it some men of the 57th whom he found within
reach, and then at once opened fire on the hesi-
tating conquerors of the advanced trench who
were thus, as it seemed, brought to bay. Instead
of advancing, they replied to the fire of our people
with fire from the ground where they stood. After
combating in this way for some time with the
small English force which had challenged them,
the intruders slackened their fire without seeming
inclined to advance. Observing this, Carlton once
more collected his men, pushed forward into the
trench, and there found the enemy already in the
act of deserting it.
Those separated bodies of men which had en-
tered the ' VII.' and ' VIII.' batteries, where our
men were at work, took three of them prisoners
with also the captain of engineers who was direct-
ing their labours. They made themselves at home
in the ' advanced No. VII.' and the ' advanced No.
' VIII.' during nearly, it is said, half an hour, doing
all the little mischief they could to unfinished
sandbag - batteries which had not at that time
been armed.
They also possessed themselves of seventy pick-
axes, together with fifty shovels, and the simple
Russian soldier — always strangely enjoying the
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 103
capture of any small chattel — was perhaps some- c ha p.
what slow to infer that those who had thrown _
down their tools might have taken up arms —
might be on him with what men in general can
see through even much darkness — the shining of
bayonets fixed.
Yet that was the sequel awaiting him. Captain but routed
by the meu
Chapman of the 20th (but acting that night as an of our
r u working-
engineer) led forward some men of the working- parties.
party who already had stood to their arms against
the 500 intruders, overthrew them by a charge
with the bayonet, and drove them all out of our
siege-works. They left behind them ten of their
killed, and two of their wounded men.
In two out of those four sorties which the comment on
i -ii J. -i • -i-i t i the four sor-
enemy thus aimed with much skill at his English ties directed
J against the
besiegers, he surprised the guards of the trenches, English.
so that obviously, in the planting of the out-
sentries, or in some of the other known tasks
by which troops maintain a good watch, there
must needs have occurred grave defaults ; but
against want of vigilance — the usual defect of
our people — may be set the rare prowess, the
warlike presence of mind, the inborn love of
close fighting which sooner or later defeated and
turned to rout and confusion every one of these
midnight attacks.
Lord Eaglan was warm in his praises of the
gallantry with which officers and men — men. so
many of them called from their toil with pickaxe
and spade — had met the successive emergencies,
104 THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
chap, and — not confused by the darkness, not putting
! — a weak trust in cartridges — proved able to drive
off the masses one after another by simply the
use of the bayonet.
To this wise appreciation of feats which, al-
though, it is true, taking place in very small
spheres of action, were not the less fraught with
good proof of the quality of our officers and men,
the Queen was pleased to respond in gracious
words of approval.*
Comments Still, of course, the great, dominant feature of
on the . ,
great sortie the engagements which the enemy undertook on
a-ainst the the night of the 22d of March was his attack
French. °
delivered in darkness against the French ' ap-
' proaches ' with 5500 men.
Tested simply by what it effected, or avowedly
sought to effect, a night attack of this kind might
be made to seem almost trivial. What, however,
prevented the enterprise from ranging with those
petty sorties which I do not undertake to record
was the strangely great number of troops that
the enemy engaged in his venture, and the car-
nage his effort involved. Moving out into dark-
ness with several thousands of men, he inflicted,
it is true, on the French a loss of 600 in killed,
* Lord Raglan's means of informing himself on this subject
were impaired by losses of officers ; and with the materials
before me, I have been prevented from adopting some of his
conclusions. His reports are contained in despatches to the
Secretary of State of the 24th and 27th March (published),
and in a private letter of the 24th to Lord Pan mure. The
Official Record of the combats by the Royal Engineers is in
Part II. of the Journal, p. 94.
THE ENEMY'S GREAT NIGHT ATTACK. 105
or wounded, and on the English a loss of 70, but chap.
. IV.
then also of Ms own troops he sacrificed no less .
than 1300.
General Niel has officially stated that the in-
juries this strong effort wrought on the works of
the besiegers were, after all, insignificant ; * and
has thence gone on to submit that an enterprise
which effected so little at so heavy a cost is a
wholesome example of the error there always
must be in attempting any great sortie under
cover of darkness.
On the other hand, General Todleben has
commented on the very same enterprise in a
victorious, satisfied tone, and maintained that
the capital object of putting a check on the
French approaches at the point they had reached
was one of truly great moment which the sortie
completely achieved ; but then, I see, he goes
on to eke out his defence of the measure by
referring to its moral effect, and insisting that
it not only cheered opportunely the hearts of
the Kussians, but also wrought such discourage-
ment on the minds of the French as long sufficed to
deter them from closing with his darling Lunette.!
It may be that, to check the 'approaches/
though for only a very brief interval, was to
gain some great, lasting advantage;! but in the
absence of even a statement on which to found
* ' Insignifiants.' — Niel, p. 179.
t Todleben, vol. ii. pp. 78, 79.
t As, e.g., to gain time until the arrival of expected rein-
forcements.
IOG PROGRESS OF THE COUNTER-APPROACHES.
.-hap. such a belief, it is hard to feel sivre that for
IV
' any purpose so small as that of merely upset-
ting gabions, or doing other like mischief, the
enemy would really have brought himself to
plunge into outer darkness with the thousands
of men he thus hazarded ; and perhaps one may
fairly surmise that in secret he harboured some
greater, some much more ambitious design than
the one he avowed — some design of which — since
it was frustrated — he did not feel bound to speak.
Conjecture points to an enterprise which, if com-
passed, and well followed up by the proper ul-
terior measures might have forced the Allies to
give battle — give battle by daylight — under des-
perately adverse conditions.
IX.
Great ex- "Whilst continually strengthening the armament
given by of his three new creations, Colonel Todleben at
Todleben to
his counter- this time fore-trenched them by connecting some
approaches. .
of the lodgments already protecting each Work ;
and moreover he added and added to those an-
nexed lines of defence which prolonged right
and left the front shown by his now strong
Lunette. When the first week of April was end-
ing, he had fastened his counter-approaches on a
front (in advance of the Mamelon) which from
ground so far east as the bed of the Careenage
Eavine stretched far away towards the south-
west, and at last crossed the WoronzofT Road *
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 80 et seq. The gorge which carried the
FRENCH AND ENGLISH SIEGE-WORKS. 107
As though he were indeed the besieger, and chap.
IV.
his new trenches so many parallels, he armed . —
them here and there with artillery. If he had
not yet barred by an unbroken line of entrench-
ments the ground lately won on Mount Inker-
man, he had covered it nevertheless by the fire
of his two White Eedoubts; and on the whole
one may say that his new outer line of defence
extended now from the foot of St George's Eavine
to the course of the Woronzoff Eoad. It en-
circled at all but one place the whole land-front
of the Faubourg.
Thus on that newest ' front for attack ' of which
the Allies had made choice when devising their
great change of plan, the terrible Colonel of Sap-
pers was already forestalling, and baffling their
studied designs ; nay was even indeed so employ-
ing the spells of his art that — not the garrison
merely but rather — the fortress itself might
almost be said to advance against the French-
men besieging it.
The French did not arrest their ' approaches ' The design
_... .-r-,-1 /i l 1 ■ .• l of the 1st
along the Victoria Eidge (where by this time they of January
now so far
touched on their left a new parallel formed by frustrated
. . as to be
the English), and they still continued their siege- almost in
works begun long ago on Mount Inkerman ; but
in the absence of any resolve to counteract re-
cent checks by seizing the two White Eedoubts
and the now strong Lunette on the Mamelon, it
Woronzoff Road was by the Russians called 'the Laboratory
' Ravine. ' Our people used to call the ravine by the name of
the road passing through it.
108
MOVEMENT OF TURKISH TROOPS.
CHAP.
IV.
The siege
operations
maintained
against
the town
front;
and by the
English
against the
Redan and
its neigh-
bours.
Continu-
ance and
final success
of General
Cuirobert's
efforts to
draw rein-
forcements
from the
Turkish
army at
Euiiatoria.
would be hard to deuy that at this time, the great
design of the 1st of January had undergone so
much frustration as to be nearly in a state of
abeyance.
X.
Our allies, all this time, both above and below
the earth's surface had been pressing their siege
operations against the town front of Sebastopol,
whilst the English with scantier numbers, and
besides on more difficult ground, had been slowly
pushing forward their batteries against the Kedan
and its neighbours ; but then also — resorting to
means such as those we before saw him use — the
unwearied Colonel of Sappers had never for one
moment ceased to keep his assailants confronted
by so strong a growth of defences, and so eager,
so constant a handling of his warlike resources,
that, although it cost them great sacrifices, and
extended along a front of four miles, this now
subordinate part of the general conflict did not
rage in a way that seemed tending towards any
momentous result.
XL
General Canrobert, as we have seen, had long
been desiring, and at last craving almost passion-
ately that a great part of Omar Pasha's force at
Eupatoria should be brought to the Chersonese ;
but Lord Eaglan was strongly opposed to the idea.
He conceived that Omar Pasha firmly planted at
Eupatoria with 40,000 victorious troops on the
MOVEMENT OF TURKISH TROOPS. 109
flank and rear of the enemy was doing excellent chap.
service, and besides did not like that the narrow, '.
the cramped seat of war to which the besiegers
unfortunately had perforce become chained should
be loaded by the additional presence of Turkish
troops, whilst moreover he took it for granted
that the measure would be displeasing to Omar
Pasha. But in proportion to the increasing depth
of that gloom which we have seen overcasting the
mind of General Canrobert was his anxiety to
secure the proposed reinforcement ; and his in-
stances made with this object became more and
more constant and more and more urgent. Lord
Eaglan still resisting, Canrobert approached Omar
Pasha himself, and found him willing on certain
specified terms to come on in person to the Cher-
sonese with a large portion of his army, and to
remain there for a limited time. Lord Eaglan did
not think fit to oppose the thus conjoined wishes
of the French and Turkish commanders ; and Arrival
before the close of the period which this chapter Pasha in
person with
spans, Omar Pasha was brought to the Chersonese a large force
r ' ° of Turks.
with from 15,000 to 18,000 men supported by
thirty pieces of field-artillery.*
XII.
It was perceived by the Eussians that the men-
of-war they had sacrificed after the battle of the
Alma in order to close the entrance of the Eoad-
stead were no longer so holding together as to
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, April 7, 1855.
110
VARIOUS OCCUKRKNCKs.
CHAP.
IV.
Sinking of
more Rus-
sian ships.
Deatli of
Nicholas
imparted
to the Se-
bastopol
garrison.
Change of
Russian
com-
manders.
Prince M.
Gortcha-
kofT;
wliat made
this a
supremely
constitute a secure barrier, and towards the end ot
February they sank six more of their ships.*
In Sebastopol, the death of the Emperor
Nicholas was concealed with much care for
some time;t but afterwards, there came in a
Eescript from the new Czar which brought both
condolence and greeting to the valiant garrison.
With none of the misty grandeur which veils
like conceptions in the poems of Ossian, and
rather indeed with the air of a flat — though celes-
tial— 'Court Circular' describing the movements
of princes, the garrison were informed that ' trans-
' lated to eternal life the supreme chief of the
' orthodox warriors ' (that is, the late Emperor
Nicholas) 'was blessing from on high their un-
' equalled firmness and intrepidity.' J
In the command of the Russian forces Prince
Mentschikoff was succeeded by Prince Michael
Gortchakoff; and General Osten-Sacken was
placed at the head of the Sebastopol garrison.
Prince Michael Gortchakoff was a man of intel-
lect and ripe cultivation, with some theoretical
knowledge of the art of war ; but what rendered
the choice of this general supremely advantageous
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 40. + Ibid., p. 45.
t Ibid., pp. 45, 46. The Russians are a poetic people,
and I cannot doubt that in that true Muscovy of which
Moscow is the centre, people might have been found who
could express a thought of this kind with dignity and genuine
enthu.sia.sm ; but to get such a task performed worthily by
a cold-blooded clerk at St Petersburg was beyond the range of
things possible.
BURGOYNE. Ill
to Russia was his early and sustained apprecia- chap.
tion of the great volunteer.
The new commander-in-chief being he who had c'h0i""? e
had the good fortune to launch Colonel Todleben
on the scene of his glory, might prove able to
secure him — against strong and jealous opposers
— in his hold of the power he needed for continu-
ing the defence of Sebastopol.
On the 17th of March, the Kussians lost their Admiral
. Istomiue
valiant Admiral Istomine. A cannon-ball killed killed.
him whilst standing by the then new Kamtchatka
Lunette.*
Before the close of the period embraced by this
chapter, our Headquarters lost the assistance of
that veteran engineer officer whose counsels, since
the day of the Alma, had exerted an unrelaxed
sway on the chequered course of events. Pur-
suant to the early decision of Lord Palmerston's
new Administration,! General Harry Jones on
reaching the Crimea was at once put in orders
as the commander of our military engineers, and
Sir John Burgoyne being apprised of the instruc-
tions recalling him ceased of course to hold power
officially at the seat of war.J Lord Kaglan, how-
ever, believed that at that particular time when
the French overmastered by Todleben were sub-
mitting to his counter-approaches, the continued
aid of Burgoyne would be of great value to the
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 64. f Ante, vol. vii. p. 284.
X Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure — Private Letter — 3d March
1855.
112 BURGOYNE.
chap, public service,* and he therefore requested the
1 — general to remain for a while at headquarters.
Departure This Burgoyne did, and it was only in the third
of Sir John e J ' J
Burgoyne. week of March that he left the Crimea.t
In the autumn of the previous year Burgoyne
not only championed that measure which restored
to the enemy's forces their all-precious line of
communication, but opposed himself to any
prompt seizure of the then almost helpless Sebas-
topol which Mentschikoff had left to its fate; J
and he clung indeed so tenaciously to the idea
of proceeding against the place by means of
covered batteries that — almost without knowing
it — he drew the Allies on and on into the curious
error of preferring a siege to a conquest, though
better than most men he knew that the siege
thus strangely preferred must needs be one under-
taken with grossly inadequate means ;(7) and of
course with the plain facts before me, I have not
been able to think that any such counsels were
sound.§
But when once the Allies had committed them-
selves to the task of a siege, and the thus nar-
rowed question asked only how best to conduct
it, Burgoyne — then no longer the strategist but —
the skilled, the accomplished engineer, brought to
* Lord Raglan of course imparted to his Government the
step he thus took. — Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure — Private
Letter— 3d March 1855.
f Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 19th March 1855.
% See ante, vol. iv. pp. 12, 13, 19, 92, 100, 129. 148, 149, 150.
§ See ante, vol. iii. chaps, iii. v., vol. iv. chaps, iii. iv. v. vi.
vii. viii. x. xii. xiii. xiv. and xv.
BURGOYNE. 1 1 3
bear on his objects a keen, piercing intellect, a chap.
bold, hopeful spirit, vast energies always sus- !_
tained by a manful warlike zeal ; and the events
of the 17th of October— the day he dealt his first
blow — showed plainly enough to all that the
veteran when striking struck hard.
Owing mainly perhaps to the circumstance of
his being styled an ' adviser ' instead of holding
simple 'command,' he used often to recommend
measures without having learnt antecedently the
number of troops or workmen that well could be
spared for the purpose, and therefore of course
the foundations on which any such project rested
were ' postulates ' rather than facts ;(8) but, al-
though for this reason his counsels furnished
often much more of suggestion than of actual,
present guidance, they still were always enlight-
ening, and at last, as we saw, they won their
own way to acceptance by Canrobert and all
his generals.
Lord Palmerston's newly formed Government
were content with the plan of siege formed on
the 1st of January at the instance of Sir John
Burgoyne ; and one therefore may fairly surmise
that, when determining to recall the 'adviser,'
they mainly based their resolve upon a disap-
proval of those 'early counsels' anterior to the
siege which I have not attempted to screen from
the charge of being pernicious; so that, if my
conjecture be sound, the Ministers may be said
to have judged him for what he had done much
more than for what he was doing. In the ab-
VOL. VIII. H
114
GREAT AND VAIN PREPARATIONS.
CHAP.
IV.
Prepara-
tions for a
great can-
nonade.
sence of that explanation, it would seem in some
measure anomalous that they should be determin-
ing to withdraw him from the scene of action at
a time when they knew that the French had at
last accepted his guidance.
The actual withdrawal of Sir John Burgoyne
from the seat of war was — for him at least — more
opportune than the order recalling him. From
the 24th of February to the time of his departure
on the 20th of March, he had been under the tor-
ment of seeing the French acquiesce in the coun-
ter-approaches, and this too on ' the Inkerman
' flank ' where his very heart seemed to dwell.
Lord Eaglan did not suffer Burgoyne to depart
without addressing to him a letter expressive of
the grateful appreciation with which he regarded
his services.
XIII.
During all the latter part of the period em-
braced by this chapter, the Allies had been not
only busied in arming their batteries with more
and heavier guns, but also — and with good help
at last from the railway our people had made —
in bringing up to their heights such huge loads
of ordnance ammunition, and other artillery
stores as might serve for a great cannonade.
The bulk of the allied armies had looked for-
ward for weeks and for weeks to the thus pre-
pared effort of heavy ordnance power as a mea-
sure that seemed to be big with the long-delayed
fate of Sebastopol ; but some light newly thrown
GKEAT AND VAIN PREPARATIONS. 115
on the transactions of 1855 has enabled me, if chap.
iv.
so one may speak, to avert disappointment, and
warn enquirers beforehand that, when seeing recentais-0
General Canrobert engaged in the promised cosures
bombardment, they will see in him — not a real
Chief, but rather — a fettered lieutenant without
the freedom of action, without the ulterior pur-
pose which alone could give mighty significance
to his use of the French breaching guns.*
* The nature of the ' light newly thrown ' will appear potf
in chap. v.
116
SECRET TEKMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
CHAPTER V.
TITE SECRET TERMS OF THE MISSION ENTRUSTED
TO GENERAL NIEL.
CHAP.
V.
Those who now have sufficiently seen General
Canrobert yielding and yielding to the series of
affronts put upon him by an audacious garrison,
will be in the mood for enquiring whether this
long-continued submissiveness was all his own,
or might partly be traced to misguidance imposed
by the hand of authority.
The French
Emperor be
ginning in
secret to
interfere
with the
<iiege.
The engagements of the 1st of January were
still only new, when the Emperor Louis Napoleon
began to counterplot them, and — concealing his
design from our people — to frame an ill-omened
scheme which tended to put in abeyance the
enterprise of Canrobert's army, and keep it for
nearly three months in what might well seem to
observers a faltering, half-hearted state, though
its real condition, as now we are able to see,
was one of another kind. It was an army — not
stricken with palsy from any defect in itself, but
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 117
— persistently held back by its sovereign in fur- chap.
therance of a secret design. —
The Emperor concerted his measures with General
General Niel, an engineer officer of ' high stand-
ing and repute' who, though not having yet
taken part in the Eastern campaign, had still
brought himself to form on the subject some
strongly rooted opinions.
So far as concerned that past era which ex- ms opin-
ions on tlic
tended from the victory of the Alma to the open- subject of
^ . . the wai-
ing of trenches against Sebastopol, his opinions in the
were of a kind which — in deference to general
accord — may now be treated as sound. He con-
sidered that the Allies had gone far astray when
they wilfully restored to the enemy his captured
line of communication, and — instead of breaking
into Sebastopol — resolved to assail it by siege
without first investing the place.
Fully granting the errors thus charged against
the Allies, it did not of necessity follow that, after
all they had done — after giving back to the enemy
his strong Mackenzie Heights, and for months at
the cost of huge sacrifices going on with the siege
— the wisest course they could take was to act,
as it were, penitentially, and try to retrace their
false steps. Niel, however, entertained no such
doubt. He believed that by simple resort to what
he considered fit means, Sebastopol might surely
be taken, whilst also he firmly maintained that,
without resort to those means, it could never be
taken at all. In order to carry Sebastopol, the
Allies, he declared, must invest it.
ll.S SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
CHAP.
V.
The desire
til' tin'
French
Emperor.
The 'mis-
' sion ' of
General
Niel.
Tin's condition involved a resort to some new
campaign in the open.
Now also, the brooding French Emperor had
begun to imagine that a little campaign of this
sort might win for him infinite glory with pro-
portionate increase of strength, if he himself —
present in person — were to lead the field-army,
thus bringing about by swift magic that long-
deferred fall of Sebastopol which other mortals
as yet had been signally failing to compass.
The judgment of the engineer officer was there-
fore found to harmonise well with the desire of
the Emperor ; and the two men were soon of one
mind, nay apparently were so well agreed that
the object of General Niel's ' mission ' was rather
to mature on the spot an already sketched plan
of campaign than simply to enquire, and seek
light. It was seemingly intended at first that,
after maturing the plan, General Niel should re-
turn to France, and submit his conclusions to the
French Emperor; but after a while, it appeared
that, without resort to that step, the understand-
ing between the Emperor and his counsellor had
been rendered sufficiently complete by inter-
changed letters or messages ; and, although it is
true, General Niel had at one time made all his
arrangements for returning to France, and did
indeed go to Constantinople (whilst waiting for
further instructions), we still may say that sub-
stantially, his mission was uninterrupted.*
* This results, I think, clearly from the extracts which M,
Rousset gives of Niel's letters, vol. ii. p. 34 et seq.
SECRET TERMS OF NJEL'S MISSION. 119
The position he held at the French Head- chap.
quarters could not plainly be other than one of 1
a strange and exceptional kind. His ostensible ^onatThe
function was that of an ' Aide-de-camp of the HeTdquar-
' Emperor on mission to the Army of the East,' ters"
with a military position which placed him at the
top of the Engineer Staff;* but of course the
bare fact of his ' mission ' sufficed amply to show
that he must be acting in concert with the Em-
peror, and therefore wielding great power. He
did not disguise from himself that the ' mission '
entrusted to him was perforce overshadowing
Bizot, the commander of the French Engineers,
whilst also indeed it is plain that his presence
obscured the authority of even the Commander-
in-Chief, though to Canrobert — a man not self-
seeking, but fevered by doubt and anxiety — the
shade which thus overcast him may perhaps, after
all, have been welcome. He might naturally
enough have been glad to find himself much
shorn of power, and proportionately disburdened
of care.
When advising the arrangements recorded on mspian
the 2d of February, General Niel, we now see,
was preparing a retreat for the French from their
engagements of the 1st of January, and bringing
things into conformity with his inchoate plan
of campaign then already approaching completion.
By the middle of February he had not only
brought this new plan to what he thought per-
* As shown by 'la situation' of the 15th February. — Niel,
p. 476.
120 SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
chap, feet maturity, but had even proceeded to use it,
! or rather, I must say, to use part of it for the
enlightenment — or guidance — of Canrobert.*
The all-governing condition of the new plan
was one which required the Allies to reverse, as
it were, their ' flank march,' to win and take up
a position between the Tchernaya and the Belbec
in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie's Farm, to
besiege the Star Fort, and in short to make them-
selves masters on the north of the Roadstead.!
The resources Mel judged to be needed for effect-
ing this reconquest of ground both won and
abandoned by the armies which made the ' flank
' march ' were stated to be 50,000 men and 6000
horses provisioned for two days with 220 wag-
gons, 1100 draught-horses, and 3500 mules.* By
a due use of these resources the investment of
Sebastopol was to be completed ; and the measure
was supported for reasons which, if once accepted
by Canrobert, would at once extinguish all chance
of his going on with the siege in any such spirit
as that which had ruled the Allies on the 1st of
January. The authoritative adviser explained
that, until completely invested, Sebastopol could
not be taken ; § thus in other words laying it
* See post, p. 122, as to the 'Separate Article' which was
withheld from him.
t Line 27 et seq. in the Letter from General Niel to the French
Emperor, 14th February 1855. (*) Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 33, 34.
X Ibid., line 62 et seq. However sound in its main principles,
the plan without more explanation than Niel gives is made to
seem strangely crude.
§ Ibid., line 25 et seq. In a letter to the Minister of War
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 121
down that, till that undefinable time when a chap.
newly imagined campaign might be brought to ! —
a fortunate close, any enterprise attempted by
storming would be a vain sacrifice of life. He did
not, however, leave this conclusion to inference,
but went on in set terms to denounce as too hazard-
ous the idea of any great onslaught attempted by
storm against either the Town or the Faubourg.*
There was to be an artillery-fire carried on with-
out undue haste under cover of which the 'ap-
' proaches ' might be pushed on so close to the
defences as at last to allow of assault by compara-
tively small numbers of men against either the
Flagstaff Bastion or the Malakoff;! but those
future assaults were not meant to take place until
the investment of Sebastopol should be brought
to completion by the newly projected campaign.
After having thus shown what he meant as
regards abstention from enterprise, Niel used a
compendious adverb. He summed up his con-
clusions by saying that the right course was
this: — 'To go on "prudently" with the siege,'
and to cut off ' as soon as possible the communi-
' cations [of the garrison] with the interior of the
• Crimea.' i This plan was one framed in substan- The plan
in general
tial conformity with what Mel rightly under- conformity
stood to be the wish of the French Emperor; S wish of
•*■ " the French
and so early as the 14th of February, it won the Emperor ;
(quoted by Rousset, vol. ii. p. 34) he says : ' Croyez, Monsieur
' le Marechal, qu'on ne fera rien sans investir.'
* L. 45 et seq. in Letter, Niel to French Emp., Feb. 14, 1855.
t Ibid., line 49 et seq. t Ibid., line 56 et seq.
§ Speaking of a time not later than the 3d of February 1855,
J -J -J
SKCKKT TKii.MS OK KIEL S MISSION.
CHAP.
V.
uid ap-
|iroved by
Canrobert.
Niel's task.
The army of
Canrobert
kept secret-
ly under
restraint.
The Empe-
ror's plan
put in
course of
execution.
approval of Canrobert;* whilst also I gather
thai from the day (the 23d of February t) when
Niel returned to the French Headquarters after
his very brief visit to Constantinople, he con-
stantly made it his task to keep the siege in
conformity with that restrained system of action
which his written precepts enjoined.f
Thus the first of the two objects indicated by
General Niel's summary — that of putting re-
straint on Canrobert's army — was fully secured ;
and measures were promptly taken for achieving
the other great object — the investment of Sebas-
topol on its North Side. A part of the plan
which — because not imparted to Canrobert —
may be called its ' Separate Article ' had laid it
down from the first that the task of thus com-
pleting the investment should be undertaken by
the Emperor in person with the aid of fresh
troops in large numbers sent out from France
or Algeria ; and, so early as the 3d of February,
Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of War, was al-
ready giving his orders for assembling on ground
near Constantinople the new forces meant to
take part in Louis Napoleon's enterprise^
Rousset says : ' L'Fmpereur avait en principe adopte" les iddes
' de son aide de camp.' Vol. ii. p. 35.
* Line 58 etseq. in Letter, Niel to French Emperor, Feb. 14,
1855. It is immediately after his summing up of the plan that
Niel adds : ' Le Ge'ne'ral Canrobert le juge ainsi.'
t Lord Raglan to Lord Panraure, 24th February 1855.
X See the quotations from letters of Niel given by Rousset,
vol. ii. p. 34 et seq., and especially the one of the 17th of Feb-
ruary 1855.
§ From 40,000 to 60,000 men.— Vaillant to General Larchey
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 123
So, the project of Niel and his Emperor was chap.
no longer a mere creature of the brain, but a ! —
military plan in full course of execution. The
very peculiar task of restraining Canrobert's
forces without showing them to be under re-
straint was successfully begun and continued.(2)
The business of assembling an army to serve
under Louis Napoleon was carried on with alac-
rity. There of course came a time when the pro-
cess of collecting this force on the Bosphorus
disclosed itself to the world ; but the object for conceai-
which it was destined could still be concealed, the plan
And, concealed it was — concealed from our Gov- English;
eminent, and concealed from Lord Raglan,* but
also, strange to say, from General Canrobert him-
self, the Emperor's half-trusted commander ! t
France and England, remember, were — not and of iu
merely joined in alliance but — arrayed side by 'article'
side in the presence of a powerful enemy ; and, robert
that under such conditions the French Emperor,
and official men under him could deliberately
persist in the notion of hiding away from Lord
Raglan the very plan they were executing may
seem almost too strange for credence, yet must
quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 35. However, in the middle of April,
the French ' Reserve ' army collected in the neighbourhood of
Constantinople had a strength of only 25,000.
* So late as the 3d of April, Lord Raglau wrote : — ' What a
' body of French troops is collecting at Constantinople for, I
' cannot divine.' To Lord Panmure, Private Letter.
t Rousset : — ' Le secret sur ce grand envoi de troupes devait
: etre absolument garde". Le general Canrobert lui-meme n'en
devait rien apprendre.' Vol. ii. p. 35.
124 SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
chap, needs be believed — because true. Our people
! are not suspicious, and the Emperor's scheme of
concealment was crowned with real, lasting suc-
cess^3)
impres- It is true that with what seemed like frank-
sions caused
by the pros- ness the Emperor from time to time spoke to
pect of the * _ x
Emperor's Lord Cowley and others of his intention to go
going to the J °
Crimea. out to the Crimea, but those surface disclosures
apparently gave actual aid to concealment of the
inner purpose by causing the surmises of men to
fly off in other directions. Some thought with
alarm of what might happen in Paris during the
Emperor's absence ; and others — with yet more
anxiety — of what might take place in the Crimea,
if the Emperor should go out and entrust himself
with the command of the French army.* Gen-
eral Canrobert was apparently left to hear from
private sources or from rumours in camp of the
Emperor's intention to visit the Crimea ; t and
he thought that the step would be a ' very false
' move.' J Lord Eaglan considered that, if ever
adventured at all, the visit from Louis Napoleon
would be a measure fraught with dangers and
mischiefs to be looked for in France as well as
at the seat of war ; § and his conditional forecast
included the embarrassing burthen — the 'great
* Lord John Russell to Lord Raglan, Private Letter, March
12, 1855.
t Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, April 3,
1855.
t ibid.
§ Ibid., and letters to same of 17th, 20th, 27th, and 31st
March.
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 125
'gSne,' as he expressively called it — that would chap.
be laid upon the Allies before Sebastopol by the ! —
Emperor's undesired presence ; * but he did not
allow himself to be made at all anxious on
the subject, being sanguine enough to believe,
in face of all contrary assurances, that the Em-
peror would never come out.t No one seems to
have divined that the Emperor — though a man
strangely fond of effecting theatric surprises,
and believed to be intent on the notion of as-
suming high command at the seat of war — might
desire to keep Canrobert's army in a state of re-
straint, with its fires, as the phrase is, ' banked
' up ' until the time of his own arrival, when
troubles unnumbered, and successive disappoint-
ments, and the weariness of hope long deferred
would be all at once followed by what the play-
books call ' flourishes,' by victory, conquest, and
triumph. The 'mission' of General Niel was
full fraught, as we saw, with this purpose; yet
— secrecy being maintained — it did not afford to Thecon-
... cealment
observers apt means of seeing the truth. Lord from Lord
. , Raglan
Eaglan knew that the General — an Engineer main-
° ... tainedwith
officer — had come out with instructions ' to look continued
success.
• into the state of the siege ' ; \ but, far from ap-
* Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, March 17,
1855. Lord Raglan liked Louis Napoleon personally; and
after writing to the effect above stated, he added this : — ' Per-
' sonally I should have no difficulty in communicating with
' him.'
t Same to same, April 3, 1855.
t Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, Private Letter, Jan
uary 29, 1855.
12G SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
chap, pearing disposed to put restraint on Canrobert's
' army, the new comer spoke as one urgent in the
very opposite direction. In conversation with
Lord Raglan he professed to maintain that 'a
' regular approach to the Tower of Malakoff
1 would inconveniently defer the attack of the
' place,' and caused his hearer to think he was
' evidently bent on an assault ! ' *
Lord Raglan would scarce have complained, if
frankly informed by Canrobert that the Empe-
ror's new adviser disapproved the engagements of
the 1st of January, and wished them to be all re-
considered. But no such suggestion was made.
With the aid of very recent disclosures we have
been able indeed to perceive that by his disposi-
tions of the 1st and 2d of February Niel was
preparing — and covering — a retreat from the en-
gagements made with Lord Raglan at the begin-
ning of the previous month ; but our allies at the
time gave no indication at all of any such pur-
pose. Both Lord Raglan and Burgoyne were
effectually led to believe that the French arrange-
ments of the 1st and 2d of February had been
honestly adopted in furtherance — though with
varied appliances — of the stipulations made be-
tween General Canrobert and General Airey on
the opening day of the year.
A day indeed was approaching when Lord Rag-
* Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, Private Letter, Jan-
uary 29, 1855. Niel spoke mysteriously of 'other measures,'
and we can now see that he was thinking of the proposed in-
vestment, but he conveyed no such idea to Lord Raglan.
SEGEET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 127
Ian would be openly told that the French com- chap.
mander was hampered by his sovereign's restrain- '. —
ing orders ; but 1 am speaking now of the inter-
val from the 27th of January to the third week
of April ; * and what I say is that from the be-
ginning to the end of that period, all knowledge
of the fact that Canrobert had been brought under
the restraints imposed by the Emperor's plan was
effectually concealed from Lord Kaglan.
After the close of the period above indicated
the Emperor and his confidential servants still
went on concealing the fact of their having been
pursuing a plan during several months which they
had all the while kept strictly hidden from their
English allies ; and it was only from disclosures
which the fall of the Empire made possible that
the unseemly truth came to light.
Between the plan concerted with Lord Eaglan Greatness
r ° ofthedif-
on the 1st of January, and the one now accepted ference be-
from Niel by General Canrobert, the difference of piancon-
^ . certed
course was immense; for this project of invading with Lord
' r ° ° Raglan by
' the North Side ' had had no part at all in the canrobert,
r and the one
former arrangements ; and, so far as concerned all framed by
those weeks if not months that must pass before
any investment of Sebastopol could be completed,
the difference between the old and the new plan
* The 27th of January was the day of Niel's landing. It
was on the 16th of April that Canrobert (as recorded in the se-
cret despatch of the 17th) read out to Lord Raglan the passage
of a letter from the Emperor which will be found post, chap,
viii. p. 224 ; and that, I believe, was the earliest intimation
Lord Raglan received of the ' tethering ' to which the French
army was subject.
V
128 SECEET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
chap, of siege was almost as wide as the difference be-
tween a sword and a scabbard, or between using
force and conserving it; for the engagements of
the first of January provided that, with no more
delay than was needed for perfecting two designed
batteries, the French should make themselves
masters of the Mamelon, and thence drive on
at once by siege-process against the Malakoff
Tower;* whereas those new counsels of Niel's
and of the Emperor seemed in terms to ordain
for the time strict avoidance of onslaughts with
troops on any serious scale, not allowing in the
way of aggression any effort of war more adven-
turous than a steadily maintained cannonade, and
slow advance by ' approaches.'(4) So, whatever
might be the hopes based on this newly imagined
campaign when — at some later time — driven
home against the 'North Side,' and whatever
might then be the duties assigned to General Can-
robert, it is plain that during the interval, his
adoption, or even approval, or even indeed his
mere cognisance of the Imperial plan must have
tended to throw his whole spirit of warlike enter-
prise into lifeless abeyance, and render him mor-
ally powerless to execute the engagements of the
1st of January with the daring, the firmness re-
quired for promptly seizing the Mamelon, and
making it his path to the Malakoff.
For, although partly aiming at measures still
* ' Des que le temps le permettra, on marchera sur la tour
'Malakoff. Nous nous chargerons de cette attaque.' — Bizot to
Vaillant, 12th January 1855, quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 31.
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 129
in the future, the secret counsels aimed also at a chap.
v.
change of great moment intended to take effect .
instantly, and indeed were of such a kind that, Theaiibut
when once imparted to Canrobert, they could not conse-
but tend to deflect him from the straight path of imparting
? . the Em-
duty — the path of duty marked out for him by poor's piai
engagements made with Lord Eaglan. robert.
This is easily shown. To any thoughtful com-
mander engaged in besieging a fortress it must
always of course be distressing to have to ordain
an assault which seems likely to cost him the
sacrifice of numbers of his most precious troops ;
and it is only under the cogency of what he deems
a great purpose that he steels himself by sheer
force of mind for so painful an effort of will ; but
how doubly hard would he find it to perform the
stern duty, if a General skilled in siege business
were to come out express from his Sovereign and
assure him with unflinching confidence that (un-
less the essential preliminary of a thoroughly
completed investment should first be made good)
all this painfully contemplated sacrifice must,
after all, fail in its object — must be therefore a
sheer waste of life ! And how yet more hard —
how impossible — will the effort become, if he
himself by the processes of genuine conversion is
brought to share the opinions thus authoritatively
pressed on his mind by the recognised Chief of
the State !
It is under this aspect that concealment of the ?f t °J£!m-
pith of Niel's mission from our Government and practised
from Lord Eaglan shows the stain of revolting English.
VOL. VIII. I
130 SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION.
CHAP.
V.
Way in
which tho
Imperial
will was
brought to
bear on
Canrobert
No appar-
ent reluc-
tance on
the part of
Canrobert
to be guided
by his
Emperor's
wish.
disloyalty. Whilst consulting together in secrecy,
the Emperor and General Niel were at liberty to
frame a new plan without being bound to disclose
it to any ally; but, after having caused General
Canrobert to know — nay to share — their conclu-
sion, and prove ready to give it effect, they of
course could no longer — with honour — go on
maintaining concealment against the English
Commander.
The Emperor did not yet go the length of ad-
dressing to General Canrobert decisive, positive
orders which would force him, whether willing
or not, to break loose from his engagements
of the 1st of January ; but proceeding from an un-
fettered Sovereign whose will in such matters was
legally absolute, the expression of a formal opin-
ion, and of a consequent wish, may have natural-
ly appeared all-sufficing ; and so it apparently
proved. Nor indeed do we see that the General
deferred to the wish of his Sovereign with any
degree of reluctance. On the contrary, we are led
to believe that this sudden interposition of Louis
Napoleon found an eager — because ready — wel-
come at the French Headquarters.
There, apparently, unless signs mislead us, the
authorities after a while had grown to be so little
enamoured of the frowning Malakoff that they re-
pented— and not without anger — of having under-
taken the task. Forgetting that the English had
themselves desired eagerly to undertake the Mala-
koff instead of the Redan, and had only been pre-
vented from doing so by Canrobert's rejection of
SECRET TERMS OF NIEL'S MISSION. 131
their proposal,* the French seem to have thought chap.
that, to their own injury, and to the advantage of !_
their English allies, they had been unwittingly
drawn into what, on reflection, they judged to be
an ugly predicament,! If their chief shared at
all in those feelings, he may not have been griev-
ously pained, when his Sovereign (through Niel)
interposed, and thus — in a manner — released him
from the arduous part of his promise.
The Imperial plan was one destined to reach a Lengthened
t x _ an(j baneful
much fuller maturity than Niel at first gave it, incumbency
J ° of the Em-
but still to be ultimately discarded, though not peror's plan
until the end of three months ; and there seems
to be no room for doubting that its pendency dur-
ing the interval was baneful enough to account
for much of what perhaps otherwise might be un-
fairly traced to the weakness of an anxious — too
anxious — commander.
Marshal Canrobert is happily living ; and al- Expiana-
rr J ° tions that
though of course — being mortal — he may hardly might be
& ° . appropri-
kiiow what on the whole were his really dominant ateiy given
" by Marshal
motives, there would still be much interest in canrobert.
hearing how far, if at all, he believes that his
conduct was swayed by the judgment which
nature had given him, and how far pursued
under stress of those counsels, scarce short of
commands, which (along with the opinions of
Niel) had imparted the wish of his Sovereign.
One might also be told how the Marshal would
* See ante, p. 23.
f ' Les difticultes de la position que nous ont faite nos allies.'
— Bizotto Vaillant, 8th February 1855. (6)
132 SECRET TERMS OF NIEl/S MISSION.
CHAP.
V.
The l>are
facts.
The light
thrown by
this chap-
ter on Can-
robert's
successive
' absten-
' tions.'
justify any concealment from Lord Eaglan of this
newly formed plan which — already in course of
execution — was surely, though secretly, altering
the whole spirit and tenor of that share of war-
like duty which the French had engaged to
assume.
Apart from all question of motive and con-
science, the bare facts seem plain. From the
time when Niel's ' mission ' came into full play,
General Canrobert's course of action fell out
of all harmony with his enterprising engage-
ments of the 1st of January, and conformed to
all the restrictions imposed by the Emperor's
plan.
Thus in knowledge of the Emperor's plan, or
rather of its heavy incumbency on the French
Headquarters, we have found means that help
to account for General Canrobert's tolerance of
all the counter-approaches, and the same light
will usefully fall on those other ' abstentions '
of his to which we shall presently come.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 133
CHAPTER VI.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
I.
In determining (against the counsel of Niel) to chap.
undertake the bombardment now planned for the . —
9th of April, General Canrobert's object appar-
ently was to meet the requirement insisting that
'something ought to be done,' and besides, to
indulge a wild hope that, though not followed
up by assault, the mere artillery effort might
produce some stupendous result ; but — if keep-
ing the Emperor's counsel — he could not, of
course, turn his troops — the splendid legions of
France — into thousands of fellow - conspirators
entrusted — by a whisper — with knowledge of
Louis Napoleon's secret; and accordingly, al-
though preordained by the inexorable stress of the
' Mission,' to be always striking in vain, we shall
not the less see them acting as people busied in
earnest, and disclosing a strength in rude contrast
with the hollowness of their commander's design.
General Canrobert and General Niel knew Expect*
tions
their own concealed purpose too well to be cap- formed
134 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, able of dreaming, like others, that the bombanl-
VI
' ment about to begin would be followed up by the
whowere French with any decisive attacks; but — effectually
Efttw^ecret kept out of such secrets — the Allied armies gen-
miision! erally, as also indeed their antagonists within the
lines of Sebastopol, were agreed in believing that,
whether for good or whether for evil, this vast and
long promised exertion of artillery-power must be
pregnant with desperate fights resulting in some
mighty change ; and even Lord Raglan himself
— a known enemy of overcharged language —
did not differ at heart from the officer who spoke
of the business in hand as being ' a grave affair.^1)
When, however, Lord Eaglan thus judged, he
had not discovered the secret which Time has
now rudely laid open, and therefore took it for
granted that the merely preparative blow then
about to be struck by artillery was as matter of
course to be followed by those ulterior measures
which alone could make it conduce to the ruin
and fall of Sebastopol.
So believing, he lived, we now see, under what
was not other or less than a practised deception ;
for of course the genuine use of this long-designed
cannonade was to open a way for assaults ; and
the last brief chapter has taught us that from
enterprises of that pithy kind the French Army
would be firmly held back by the leading-strings
of General Niel's 'mission.'
The conditions, moreover, were such that no
imaginable attempt to carry the Fortress could
be made by our people alone ; so that, to forbid
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 135
an assault by the French was substantially rais- chap.
ing a bar against any assault at all; and on the '—
whole, with our newly gained knowledge of the
Imperial devices which thus clogged and ham-
pered the action of both the besieging armies, we
see, and see in good time (so as thus to escape
disappointment) that — because never meant by
the Emperor to be firmly spelt out to the end
— this merely penultimate measure of a great
cannonade will achieve no decisive results. We
shall have to observe the performance; but the
narrative of its progress and sequel will rather
complete our knowledge of General Mel's ' mission '
than bring us perceptibly nearer to any moment-
ous crisis.
II.
In preparing, however, to execute this long- Prepara-
L i ait i i ii tion for tin
designed cannonade the Allies had expended April can-
° it nonade.
great efforts, undertaking to deliver their fire
with 501 pieces of ordnance which (except
thirty-seven of them) were all of great calibre ; *
and for the service of all this artillery, they had
accumulated a vast supply of ammunition. Of
the 501 pieces only 123 were English, the rest
being, all of them, French ; t but, in aggregate
weight of metal, the difference was less; for
computed in that way the proportion of the
* Niel, pp. 187-190. Table printed in Journal of the Royal
Artillery, or rather in its Appendix, p. 205.
f 1 believe that on the first day the English opened with
only 101 guns.
136
THE APRIL BUMHAKD.MENT.
CHAP.
VI.
Counter-
prepara-
tions by the
Russians.
Conditions
placing the
Russians
at a disad-
vantage.
French siege-gun power to that of the English
was only as sixteen to thirteen*
Of the 998 guns which by this time they had
established in battery the Eussians could bring
into action against the now threatened attack
as many as 466 pieces of ordnance, with an
aggregate weight of metal which, compared with
that of their adversaries, was as twenty -three
to twenty-nine.t In that one respect, therefore,
we see that the conflict would open on terms
not far removed from equality ; but by other
and weighty conditions the scale was decisively
turned.
First, with only some small exceptions, J the
batteries of the Allies were on Heights over-
looking the Fortress.
Next the zone of ground reached by their
missiles included, besides the defences, much
more that was hardly less precious — included
bodies of troops, included barracks and streets, in-
cluded the vast buildings used for warlike stores,
warlike factories, and all the treasures unnum-
bered that constitute a fortress and arsenal ; so
* The weight of projectiles thrown by the French pieces of
ordnance in one salvo was . . . 15,957 lb.
By the English . . . 13,333 ,,
Conjoined salvo . . 29,290 „
— Todleben, vol. ii. p. 164. With respect to the 'effectively
' battering-power ' at the command of our people, see post, p. 141.
f The weight of the single Russian salvo being 23,102 lb.,
and that of the Allies 29,290.— Todleben, vol. ii. p. 165.
X The little advanced batteries No. VII. and No VII I. in the
3d Parallel of our Left Attack were both of them on low ground.
THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT. 137
that any projectile, though sparing the outer line chap.
of the ramparts, might still go on driving its way _
through flesh and blood, through those all-preci-
ous works of men's hands which contributed, each
in its way, to maintain the defence of Sebastopol.
Next again, the besiegers enjoyed that blissful
prerogative which the nature of things — almost
cruelly — has bestowed on him who attacks as
compared with him who defends ; since of course
for those conflicts with infantry on which all
(except only a secret knot of French counter-
plotters) supposed them to be firmly resolved,
they could choose their own time, could choose
their own place, and were not under any such
exigency as would oblige them to keep under
fire collected masses of soldiery ; whilst lie who
defended Sebastopol, without knowing when or
where his immense line of Works might be
stormed, was on the contrary forced — a hard
and distressing trial of warlike resolve ! — was
forced to keep many and powerful bodies of men
on ground close to his front, where hour by hour
and day after day they had to stand ready, yet
passive under the enemy's fire.
Yet again, it so happened that during the
earlier days of this April bombardment, the
garrison, which always before had been richly
abounding in munitions of war, and indeed ever
ready to squander them, was now so far straitened
for gunpowder as to be obliged to economise its
fire with a stringency which was distressing, and
even fraught with grave danger.
138 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap. On the whole, it beforehand seemed plain that
VI
' in this artillery conflict the balance of advantage
leant strongly against the besieged.
III.
opening and On Monday the 9th of April, the morning
continua-
tion of the opened so dimly with heavy mist, storm, and
April bom- L J i
bardment. raiR) that each object on which the Allies had
been minded to drive their projectiles was thickly
obscured, but not the less, soon after daylight
they began their designed cannonade ; and the
piety of Sebastopol gave them a little time of
immunity from hostile shot and shell ; for the
sacred festivities and greetings commenced on
the previous day — the Easter Sunday of the
Greek Church — were still — on the Easter Mon-
day— so strangely engrossing as to cause a good
deal of delay, and in almost every bastion some
twenty or twenty-five minutes were suffered to
pass before their batteries opened. At the end
of that time, the garrison began to make answer,
but still — for the reason we gave — to fire with
a rigid economy of warlike munitions ; and this
very unequal interchange of artillery missiles
had not gone on many hours, when already, as
may well be supposed, the richly supplied be-
siegers were seen to be having the mastery.
All day, the besiegers went on with their
great cannonade, and, even when darkness came,
they did not relapse into silence, but plied the
defences at night with a powerful vertical fire.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 139
On the 10th, and on all the days following, chap,
until the close of the 18th of April, they — less 1_
rapidly and with long intermissions — continued an£eand
to work their guns, and to work them with de- fffectofthe
structive effect; but then always at night-time, m°ent;
though still more or less under fire, the enemy
laboured indomitably, never failing before morn-
ing dawned to repair his broken defences and
restore his artillery -power. Still, although the
gains made good by day were thus subject to
resumption at night (since not clenched in good
time by assault), it is nevertheless strictly true
(this will afterwards be shown more particularly)
that, so far as concerned the great duel of guns
against guns when regarded as a conflict apart,
the besiegers prevailed in the west against the
lines of Sebastopol, and prevailed besides in the over both
r the Town
east against the main counter -approaches pro- front and
tecting its Karabel Faubourg; for (with some part of the
° , . Faubourg ;
little help from our people) French siege-guns
broke down the most precious, the most fondly
cherished defences of what was called the ' Town
' front ' ; and again in the opposite quarter, put
to silence the two ' White Eedoubts ' that had
fastened themselves on Mount Inkerman ; whilst
(with aid from Canrobert's ordnance) our English
artillery mastered the interposed batteries of that
Kamtchatka Lunette which had blocked all ap-
proach to the Malakoff.
With the light that has tardily fallen on the
contrivance of the French Emperor, and the two
or three agents who served him, it is galling to
140 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
uhap. have to speak of these siege- work achievements,
. — since we now can no longer be ignorant that —
foredoomed to sheer barrenness by the spell of
General Mel's ' mission ' — they involved exer-
tions and losses which (so far as concerned any
purpose directly, honestly warlike) were deliber-
ately meant to prove bootless ; and this cold-
blooded sacrificing of troops for a sovereign's
personal object was more especially cruel to
Canrobert's forces, because their siege-work was
vast, and — against the Town front — so close-
pressed as to be engaging them night after night
in struggles costly to life.* Excepting Canrobert
and Niel, and the very, very few men, if any, to
whom their secret was trusted, the gallant Trench
troops did not know but what they were real be-
siegers— besiegers commissioned in earnest to toil
and to fight, and if need be, to die in the effort
to carry Sebastopol ; yet, as now we have learnt,
they were, all the while, rather what courtiers
might call an 'Army in waiting.'
Still, it must not be put out of sight that, al-
though— because not followed up — the advantage
obtained ran to waste, the siege-trains, French
and English together, did nevertheless achieve
the essential part of their task. They prevailed
towards the east, they prevailed towards the
west, and in each of the two distant quarters,
laid open a path for assault.
They, however, obtained no such mastery over
* Treated as distinct from the ' April Bombardment,' those
struggles will be recorded in another chapter.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 141
those intermediate defences which extended in- chap.
VI
clusively from the ' Garden ' Batteries on the
skirts of the Town to the great Eedan in its oveVthe
Faubourg ; and, since those were, all of them, Lt/battelies
works which our people directly confronted, it fronted by11"
., , • i l • -U the English.
was impossible to avoid sharp comparison be-
tween what was done by the French, and what
by the English artillery.
IV.
The extent of real battering - power at the what kept
n , . within
command of our people was far from being com- limits the
„ battering-
mensurate with the number and weight of the power of the
° . English.
ordnance they brought into play ; for their means
of compassing havoc were always kept within
limits by the nature of the ground in their front,
and by want of the ' hands ' they required for
more instant, more closely pressed trench- work ;
but also, to judge from the frequency of recorded
complaints, they were too often checked by the
way in which our system applied itself to the
ordinary toils of a siege.
Our system did not invest any officers under
Lord Eaglan with that comprehensive authority
which — applied to the tasks of the siege — might
have brought the Engineers, the Artillery, and,
with these, the infantry ' working-parties ' to act
as trained fellow-servants obeying in their several
ways the same all-propelling director ; and from
want of such governance, there often occurred a
great slackness, if not indeed actual default in
1-12 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, the rendering of that needed help which men in
VI
. one 'branch,' as we call it, were forced to be
daily requiring from some other 'branch of the
' service';* whilst also there sometimes appeared
an only too plain want of concert in matters
where concert was needful.!
incomplete- It was natural enough that a system which
some of the failed in this way to co-ordinate the forces re-
paratives, quired for siege-business should cause our people
to furnish a sample of English ' unreadiness ' ;
and Official Narrative tells us that on the eve
of this ' April bombardment/ General Dacres pre-
ferred a request — one not however conceded —
that, in order to enable him to complete his
arrangements, the opening of the fire might be
postponed for forty-eight hours.j
The Left What caused General Dacres to ask for delay
Attack
was the backwardness of certain preparatives in
the realms of our Left Attack.
There, the state of the siege-works was this : —
In the 1st Parallel, there ranged a line of
powerful batteries all ready for action, but at
a distance of 1340 yards from the Great Redan,
the nearest of the enemy's Works. In front of
* See tlie Journal of the Royal Engineers. It teems with
complaints against the infantry summoned to aid in the siege-
works, sometimes denouncing the officers, and sometimes de-
nouncing the men.
f As e.g. in the omission to countermand the order for Older
shaw's fight in the advanced No. VII. when the endeavours to
arm the sister battery had failed, see post, p. 153.
+ Journal of the Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 145. Lord
Raglan would not listen to the proposal. — Ibid.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 143
this array, there stretched the 2d Parallel, then chap.
unfurnished with any siege-battery.* Beyond it, 1
however, in the 3d Parallel, and on -round so
far in advance as to be only some 700 yards
from the nearest of the enemy's "Works, two
batteries had been long since begun ; and at the
opening of the April bombardment, the task of
constructing them had nearly been brought to a
close. They had not, however, been armed ; and
it was from his anxiety to attain that last object
before the opening of the bombardment that
Dacres had asked — though in vain — for a little
extension of time.
So, in point of siege-guns prepared to open im-
mediate fire, the spectacle presented by our Left
Attack at the opening of the bombardment was
a single array of batteries looking down on the
New Sebastopol created by Todleben's genius
from a distance as great as at first in the old
autumn days of the siege.
This spectacle caused irritation on the part of
our people, and it turned out that what had pre-
vented the two advanced batteries from being
brought into action was the difficulty of arming
them. The task of taking siege-guns over more The arming
000 of its two
than a half-mile of ground sloping down towards advanced
0 to batteries
the enemy was one that could be only attempted delayed,
under cover of night ; but the darkness sought
as a screen proved at times so intense as to
become an insurmountable obstacle, and torrents
* It was only in later days that they constructed other bat-
teries in the 2d Parallel.
144
TIIK AI'IML HOMBAliDMKNT.
CHAP.
VI.
The angry
impatience
thus
caused.
of rain brought the ground to a state which
baffled the power of even large bodies of men
applying their strength to the drag - ropes ; *
whilst also in the interposed parapet of the 2d
Parallel there existed a physical barrier which
would have to be eluded or conquered before
any guns could be lodged in the advanced bat-
teries. Some advised the course afterwards fol-
lowed ; but the idea at Headquarters was that
the guns — they were 32-pounders — might each,
one after the other, be forced up and over this
obstacle by using the machine called a 'gin.'
But, even to reach the foot of the interposed
parapet was not for some time found practic-
able. On the night of the 8th, on the night
of the 9th, and again on the night of the 10th,
the stubbornness of physical obstacles defeated
the efforts of all who successively tried hard
to conquer them ; and accordingly, all day on
the 9th, all day on the 10th, all day on the
11th, the Left Attack was still seen to be hav-
ing no siege-guns in action except those which
plied their fire from the line of the good old 1st
Parallel.
There resulted, as may well be supposed, a
great deal of angry impatience ; and this, it
would seem, was most felt by the Eoyal Artil-
lery, since theirs was the branch of our service
* That these difficulties were very formidable is shown (at
least as to one night) by the fact that they baffled so able, so
determined a man as Captain — now Lieutenant- General —
Henry. With respect to his services and Lord Raglan's warm
appreciation of them, see post, sec. viii.
THK APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 145
entrusted with the arming of batteries. By Ar- chap.
tillery officers chafing at all the protracted delay . —
there seems to have been formed at this time
an extremely high standard of duty for judging
what ought to be done when at last the two
advanced batteries should be armed and ready
for fighting. As expressed in the language of its apparent
& & r . . , effect.
friendly intercourse not aiming at rigid exact-
ness, men plainly enounced the opinion that,
when once in action, these batteries ' should not
1 be silenced, whatever the odds against them.'*
Those speakers might think they were exercis-
ing their faculties of military judgment; yet in
truth, they were rather expressing the genuine
old fighting sentiment that bases itself on just
pride — on the personal pride of the man, on
the aggregate pride of the corps. Hence seem-
ingly sprang the instruction for the fight of
the 13th of April, to which we shall presently
come.
The officer destined soon afterwards to execute a coin-
. , cidencs
that grave instruction was the one, as it chanced,
now directed to try to conquer the obstacles which
had hitherto baffled all efforts.
Before evening on the 11th of April, the
ground had become much more firm than it
was on the clays last preceding; and when our
Left siege - train commander directed Captain
* I give what I believe to have been the purport of inter-
changed words, and do not undertake to supplement them by
attempting to show what the speakers may have really desired
to inculcate.
VOL. VIII, K
146
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
Order given
to Captain
Oldershaw;
and exe-
cuted the
same night.
12th April.
The ad-
vanced
No. VII.
completed,
and its guns
before sun-
set engaged
with the
enemy.
Oldershaw of the Koyal Artillery to take down
the 'guns meant for the arming of the advanced
'No. VII.,' and lodge 'them, that night, in the
' battery,' he was answered by a cheerful 'AH
' right, sir,' that had the ring of decisiveness*
With the aid of 300 infantry men whose
services he obtained for the purpose, Captain
Oldershaw opened a road through the parapet
of the 2d Parallel, brought his guns through
the passway thus won, and before morning,
lodged them all safely in the 'advanced No.
' VIL'
On the morrow of the night in which he ren-
dered this service, Captain Oldershaw was on
duty elsewhere; but that day — I speak of the
12th — our Engineers executed some completing
work in the ' advanced No. VII.,' and supplied it
with mantlets. In the course of the same after-
noon, four out of the five guns brought down
were put in battery ; t and with these, some two
hours before sunset, our artillerymen opened fire
on the enemy's Works, drawing fire in return
from the garrison ; but it does not appear that
the engagement thus begun at a somewhat late
hour proved gravely destructive, that day, to
either our small 'advanced battery' or the
enemy's opposing defences. J
* With respect to the number of guns sent down, see Ap-
pendix, Note (2).
t One of the five guns was disabled, it seems, by a shot
striking its muzzle whilst still on its ' travelling-carriage.'
X I have not been able to learn who commanded in (he bat-
tery that day.
THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT. 147
With a view to the morrow, however, this be- chap.
ginning of a fight did some harm. It withdrew !._
from our ' advanced No. VII.' the shelter of that
blank indifference with which the enemy's gun-
ners were wont to treat every dumb battery, and
invited them to perfect their 'ranges.' More-
over, though by what exact means no one seems
to have learnt, it caused the new mantlets to
vanish.*
An official narrator has stated that our gun- Decision
. . , said to have
ners on the 12th of April were very soon or- been based
... on observa-
dered to cease firing, and this tor the reason turn of this
i i i c encounter.
that — unsupported — the battery could be or
no service;! but, if any such judgment then
held the ascendant, it was— not merely changed,
but — reversed.
V.
The advanced No. VII. of our Left Attack The two
. . advanced
was the battery destined to be fought on the batteries of
i -i ~ -i - our Left
13th of April by Captain Oldershaw, and on Attack.
the 14th by Captain Henry. It was one of
two batteries rooted in the 3d Parallel of our
Left Attack, and was not only in a position of
great comparative proximity to the enemy's
frowning defences, but moreover so very low
down as to be commanded from most of the
ramparts which it seemed to be audaciously
* They apparently were either ' shot away ' by the enemy's
guns or ' blown away ' by our own. — Journal Royal Engineers,
vol. ii. p. 135.
t Journal of the Royal Artillery, p. 80.
148 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, challenging.* To say nothing of the nests of
! — riflemen ensconced in its front, the Work was
•vanced" so circumstanced as to be looking up into an
arc that bristled along its whole bend with well-
covered, well -planted artillery. t Of course, it
was certain enough that this vast arc of ord-
nance array would exert its main strength against
other and greater ' objectives ' ; but it is not the
less true that the little ' advanced No. VII.' was
placed so forlornly as to be openly inviting a
fire of almost indefinite power. Thus, if (say
on the 13th of April) the garrison by chance
should be minded to crush the then lonely as-
sailant presuming to approach them so closely,
they could pour, and pour down on their vic-
tim the fire of a hundred guns — guns all of
fortress dimensions, and some of them of the
greatest calibre then used in even sea warfare.!
The enemy's The enerny had his own settled way of treat-
accustomed . ^ j
way of deal- mg these advanced batteries. With other huge
mg with aii °
advanced tasks on his hands, he did not turn aside lightly,
battery. o J '
to bend his giant power on a weak, unoffending
adversary ; and, so long as any small ' advanced
' battery ' was suffered to remain strictly silent,
he in general did not molest it. If — unmask-
ing its guns — the small battery opened against
him, he took care to answer the challenge with
* From all of them, I believe, except the ' PeYessip ' or
'Creek' battery.
+ See the Plan.
t If trying to deal more exactly with the number of guns
that could be used against our ' advanced No. VII.,' one might
reckon them at 113.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 119
a fire immensely superior, yet still hardly such chap,
as could aptly be called ' overwhelming.' But, if '. —
the advanced battery should do signal harm to
Ms Works or their armament, then the enemy's
policy, reinforced by hot anger, impelled him to
ruin, to crush the offender by an unsparing use of
his power.
The distance of the advanced No. VII. from
the 'Crow's Nest' (the nearest of the enemy's
guns) was only about 700 yards.
The battery, when brought into action on the
morning of the 13th, would have to fight all alone
in the 3d Parallel ; * and moreover have to fight
without any artillery support from our 2d Par-
allel in its rear, because there at the time, no
guns at all had been planted.!
The nearest artillery support that this 'ad-
•' vanced No. VII.' could receive from the rear
was that which might be afforded by our Green
Hill batteries in the 1st Parallel, and these were
far off. The nearest of them was more than half
a mile in rear of the ' advanced No. VII.' I
How under conditions so adverse, our siege-
conductors persuaded themselves that this little
' advanced No. VII.' should singly adventure a
* Because, though constructed, the sister battery (No. VIII.)
had not then beeu armed. This I say with full knowledge,
though in the teeth of the official R.A. Journal, p. 83. There
were two field-guns (9-pounders used against riflemen) in the
3d Parallel, but they formed of course no exception to the
above statement.
t It was afterwards that the batteries 9 and 10 were estab
lished in the 2d Parallel. J 966 yards.
150 THE APRIL BOMBABDMENT.
chap, fight beneath the guns of the Fortress, I cannot
' at all fully say ; but it seems that one of their
objects was to try to gain better security for
the men and guns in our distant 1st Parallel
by causing its assailants to be themselves as-
sailed at close quarters ; * and on the other hand,
they trusted much to a theory that our artillery-
men thus thrown out in front to tempt the wrath
of Sebastopol might be effectively supported by
the fire passing over their heads from our bat-
teries on the top of Green Hill, if not also indeed
by some guns on the left flank of Gordon's At-
tack. Still our Engineers did not conceal from
themselves that the fight of the 13th under Older-
shaw was to be an experiment.!
This ' No. VII. battery ' had a small ' return ' at
each Hank, and within the two angles thus formed,
good, sound magazines had been built ; but else-
where, the Work was on a straight line.
Composed almost entirely of sand -bags, its
parapet, with a height of some 8, had a width of
Great, yet about 18 feet ; I but nevertheless was not strong
suv'S"1 enough on the day of Oldershaw's light to absorb
oumpara- ^ w}10ie force of such missiles as might well be
directed against it by an enemy rich in ship's
guns; and, before seeing how men once fought
under this almost treacherous shelter against the
* Journal Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 147.
+ See post, p. 156, the words of Sir Gerald Graham.
+ Our Engineers reckoned its width in some places at so
much as 22 feet or more.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 151
mightiest ordnance, one ought to have some idea chap.
of the ways of a cannon-ball when obstructed ! —
without being stopped.
Whether taking its flight through the air, or The ways oi
encountering more solid obstacles ; a round-shot baunwhen
p , , i i • . • , i obstructed
of course must be always obeying strict, natural without
laws, and must work out the intricate reckoning stepped,
enjoined by conflict of power with absolute, ser-
vile exactness ; but between the ' composition of
' forces ' maintained in our physical world and the
fixed resolve of a mind made up under warring
motives there is always analogy, with even some-
times strange resemblance ; * and to untutored
hearers a formula set down in algebra would
convey less idea of the path of a hindered,
though not vanquished cannon-ball than would
the simple speech of a savage who, after tracing
its course (as only savages can), has called it a
demon let loose. For not only does it seem to
be armed with a mighty will, but somehow to
govern its action with ever-ready intelligence,
and even to have a ' policy.' The demon is
cruel and firm ; not blindly, not stupidly ob-
stinate. He is not a straightforward enemy.
Against things that are hard and directly con-
fronting him he indeed frankly tries his strength,
and does his utmost to shatter them, and send
them in splinters and fragments to widen the
havoc he brings ; but with obstacles that are
* I ouce saw an instance in which ' composition of forces ' —
forces simply mechanical — was so completely mistaken for
heroic resolve that it excited a lively enthusiasm.(3)
152 THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, smooth and face him obliquely he always com-
pounds, being ready on even slight challenge to
come, as men say, to ' fair terms ' by varying his
line of advance, and even if need be, resorting to
crooked, to sinuous paths. By dint of simple
friction with metal, with earth, with even the
soft, yielding air, he adds varied rotatory move-
ments to those first enjoined by his mission ; he
improves his fell skill as he goes ; he acquires
a strange nimbleness, can do more than simply
strike, can wrench, can lift, can toss, can almost
grasp ; can gather from each conquered hind-
rance a new and baneful power ; can be rushing
for instance straight on in a horizontal direction,
and then — because of some contact — spring up
all at once like a tiger intent on the throat of a
camel.(4)
So far, one may say, his devices are not un-
familiar to men versed in war, and some of his
changes indeed, as for instance, his flight by
ricochet, they can dictate at their own will and
pleasure ; but under special conditions, he some-
times will toil in a way that is much less com-
monly known. When encountering things that
are tough (such as gabions or sand-bags well
filled) which do much towards obstructing his
course, yet have not the required strength of
numbers with which to withstand and defeat
him, he plays the conqueror over them, he
presses them into his service, he compels them
to forget their inertness, compels them to fight
on his side, and sends them hurled this way
THE APKIL BOMBAKDMENT. 153
and that against all they can reach with their chap.
blows.
To know how one round-shot disports itself
when able to tear through a sand-bag parapet
is to have some help towards imagining the con-
dition of a battery where ruthless intruders like
this from time to time come driving in at the rate
of some ten in the minute.
Our advanced No. VIII. was the battery des- The'ad-
, H . , , _. .' vanced No
tmed to be fought on the 14th by Captain «vra.'
Walcott, having Lieutenant Torriano as his sub-
altern ; but at the time of Oldershaw's fight on
the 13th, it had not been armed.
VI.
On the evening of the 12th, Captain Oldfield The order
(the officer commanding the artillery of the Left captain"
-11^- ■ /-ki j i Oldershaw
Attack) ordered Captain Oldershaw to work the to engage
i the ' ad-
No. VII. advanced battery on the morrow. He ' vanced Nu
■ vii. bat-
peremptorily forbade the opening of fire until 'tery* on
mantlets (if not there already) should be sup- -M-u-
plied by the Engineers, and then he added an
order which under the existing conditions was
one of a very grave kind. He was an able, a
gallant officer ; * and perhaps did not mean to
do more than make his instruction conform to
what, as we saw, had become a ruling idea ;
but, be that as it may, he unflinchingly enjoined
* He (Captain Oldfield) was killed not long afterwards before
Sebastopol.
154 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap. Captain Oklershaw 'to work the battery to ex-
' ' tremity.'
As on the former occasion, when only directed
to go and try to overcome teasing obstacles, so
now, charged with desperate service, Captain
Oklershaw answered once more with the same
captain ready, cheerful 'All right, sir.'
Oldershaw ; «" o
Of rather small stature, compact, fearless,
quietly resolute, an accomplished artillery officer
endowed with powerful energies, Captain Older-
shaw was a man always bent upon carrying his
warlike zeal to the extreme of devotion, yet so
persistently firm in abstaining from self-celebra-
tion that (as sometimes occurs in such cases) the
people around him in camp proved all the more
ready to see his genuine worth ; * and — whether
governed by whim, or by inference from close
observation — there were numbers of our gunners
who persistently thought that the ' Zouave ' —
for so, amongst themselves, they used to like
calling their favourite — was a man they would
gladly have over them in any hard -fighting
battery. (5)
Considering not only the confidence he was
known to inspire in men under him, but also
what he had done on the night of the 11th
towards arming this very same battery, one
might be easily led to imagine that he was
singled out personally, on account of his well-
known qualities, for the obviously adventurous
* A characteristic instance — and proof — of the 'abstinence
• from self -celebration ' will be seen j>ost, p. 173.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 155
service of once more attempting an enterprise CHAP
which only a few hours before had been aban-
doned as hopeless ; but Captain Oldershaw him-
self did not know that the selection had been
made on such grounds. It was only, he thought,
in conformity with what is called ' turn of duty '
that both he and the force he commanded were
assigned to the work they went through on the
13th of April.*
Yet if so, how superb must have been that old
' Eegiment ' of the Eoyal Artillery from which a
blind choice by the 'roster' could 'tell off' the
man and the men for fighting a little lone battery
in the way we are going to see !
Long enough before sunrise to be under cover entering the
of darkness, Captain Oldershaw moved down into
the Work, having with him one subaltern (Lieu-
tenant W. E. Simpson t), one surgeon, and as
many as sixty-five gunners.
Captain Oldershaw found time to visit the No. its state.
VIII. battery, and discovered what we have seen
to be the fact, that no guns had there been
mounted. Without any support of the kind that
that battery, if armed, might have given him,
he saw that his own ' No. VII.' would have to
fight out its own fight.
There, four guns stood planted in battery, and
a fifth one was near them, but lying on its
* I have reason to doubt whether Oldershaw's belief on this
subject was the right one, and to conjecture that both he and
his men were specially selected for the work set before them.
f Now Major-General Simpson.
156 I UK APKIL BOMbAliDMENT.
(J ha P. 'travelling- carriage.'* It was with the four
guns already established in battery that Older-
shaw undertook to fight.
The effort about to be made was regarded by
the scientific conductors of the siege as a bold, if
useful, experiment ; and therefore it was that an
sir Gerald able young officer of our Engineer force (now a
Graham. „ . ° s
tar-famed victorious commander) went down to
the 3d Parallel on the morning of the 13th, and
there — first from a part of the trench close
adjacent to Oldershaw's battery, and afterwards,
until wounded, from within the battery itself —
observed the course of the fight.t For means of
showing what was confronted by our four 32-
pounder guns, I gladly resort to his words. Sir
uis account Gerald Graham thus writes to me: — 'On the 13th
of what the . . ._
battery con- ' oi April, I was the Engmeer officer on duty on
' the Left Attack, and I took a strong interest in
' the artillery conflict about to commence. It
' was our first attempt at taking up an advanced
' position for our artillery, and I knew well that
' we were greatly overmatched by the enemy's
' guns in number, weight, and position. Before
' us, we had the Barrack and Creek batteries ; to
' our right, the Great Eedan ; and to our left,
' the Flagstaff and Garden batteries.} The latter
* So left, it was presumed (see footnote ante, p. 146), because
out of order. Captain Oldershaw caused it to be moved to the
most sheltered part of the battery.
t At the time, a lieutenant, now General Sir Gerald Graham,
R.E., V.C., K.C.B., renowned for his victories in the Eastern
Soudan.
X There being two tiers of these, and of widely different
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 157
' were perhaps the most formidable, being armed CHAP,
' with guns equal to our 68-pounders, and having
1 a considerable command over our advanced bat-
' tery, of which, as events showed, they — the
' enemy — knew the range very accurately.
' To the best of my recollection, owing to dif-
' ficulties in transporting the guns across the
' trenches by night, only four guns were ready
• to open fire in No. VII. battery on that morning
' under Oldershaw and Simpson of the Eoyal
' Artillery. I placed myself on the right of the
' battery in the advanced trench ' [i.e., the trench
of the 3d Parallel] 'so as to note the effects of
' our fire, and if possible, to assist the artillery
' officers in getting their range.' *
6'
Morning came without yet rousing fire from
either the Allies or the Eussians ; and, so far as
concerned his own battery, Captain Oldershaw
was not at liberty to break the general silence ;
for, as we saw, he had been peremptorily in-
structed that he must not let his men open fire
without having mantlets before them to guard
against the enemy's rifle-balls, and no mantlets
were found in the battery.!
altitudes (one firing over the other), they were distinguished
as the ' Upper Garden ' and the ' Lower Garden ' batteries. It
was to those last that the ' Crow's Nest ' battery belonged.
* Letter to me, August 19, 1883.
t They had been duly placed in the battery by our Engineers
on the 12th (Journal, vol. ii. p. 135), but were afterwards
destroyed.
158 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap. Captain Oldershaw and his men, as seems
vi. .
natural, were charing at the painful restraint
The fight. whic}} t]lus kept their battery silent, when from
the (proper) left face of the Flagstaff Bastion,
a 68-pounder shot came tearing in through the
parapet, struck the sergeant (who was speaking
at the moment to his captain), and tossed him up
high into the air ; whilst also by the blow it had
dealt them when forcing itself through the barrier,
there were some of the sand-bags so driven that
they came charging, knocking, and banging
against all that stood in their way. By sand-
bags thus hurled, the captain with two of his
men was roughly thrust, knocked, and sent lifted
over a pile of shot. Discovering — almost with
surprise — that, despite all the blows heaped upon
him, he was not a disabled man, the captain
hastened back to where the mangled — nay separ-
ated ! — remains of the poor shattered sergeant
were lying. The sufferer was still able to see,
and even to speak. He saw the tempting hilt of
a pistol in Oklershaw's breast-pocket, and asked
his captain to shoot him. This of course was
a favour that Oldershaw could not grant. He
could only tell the poor sergeant (with all tender-
ness, yet still in words giving firm guidance, if
not indeed even command) that — good soldier to
the last — he 'must die properly.'*
Of course, all understood without words that
the 68-pounder shot thus crashing into their
battery was a challenge that released them at
* He died a few minutes afterwards.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 159
once from the order not to fire without mantlets; chap.
VI
and, the gunners that ( )ldershaw saw now await- .
ing his orders were men angry indeed, yet re-
joicing in the sudden escape from delay, men
devoutly intent on a purpose, men elate with the
sense of having vengeance — swift vengeance — in
their own, in their very own hands, men hardly
moving their lips except for some such brief
utterance as, 'Now then we'll give it 'em,' but
looking intently to their chief for the pregnant
monosyllable, ' Load ! ' and almost anticipating
his word of command by hastening to strip off
their coats, and — with something of truculent
carefulness — rolling up, every man, his shirt-
sleeves, to bare the arms for hard work.
The embrasures stript of their mantlets, and
not yet wrapped in dense clouds of smoke, invited
the enemy's sharpshooters ; and at first, during
interval moments, the malicious ' ping-ping ' of
the rifle-balls too often carrying death was from
time to time catching the ear; but soon, this
sharp twang either ceased, or else was drowned,
turned into nothingness by the masterful roar of
great guns. It was well, I believe, on the whole
that the mantlets had all disappeared ; for in so
hot a fight of artillery as the one now beginning,
they would not have long kept their places, and
must soon have been found taking part with the
enemy's gunners by helping them to choke our
embrasures, and to fill them with cumbersome
wrecks.
Captain Oldershaw now found himself engaged
1G0 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, against five batteries, and undergoing the con-
. — centrated fire of their twenty heavy guns.
However unequal this strife, our four guns
were worked so effectively that after two hours,
they had silenced the far-famed ' Crow's Nest '
battery;* and — a spectacle always enchanting
to gunners who compass the change — its disabled
guns stood tilted up, making public confession
of ruin.
But in vengeance, as it seemed, for this con-
quest, the enemy then brought to bear on Older-
shaw's little battery a greater weight of metal
than ever. It might seem that, if not long before,
the time had now come when a conflict so un-
equal should cease ; but Oldershaw remembered
the order to ' work his battery to extremity ' ;
and — not choosing to let his obedience under
such a command fall short of being exact, whilst
happily sure that his men were still in good heart
— he resolved to hold on. For a while, the chiefs
losses in men went on faster than the disabling
of his guns ; and there soon came a time when,
with three pieces still undisabled, he could barely
find unstricken men in number sufficient to work
them. Still, all who could toiled heart and soul,
and one of those seen (with coat off) to be labour-
ing thus, hard as any, was Oldershaw's subaltern
Lieutenant Simpson, a zealous and valiant officer.
* The afterwards famous nickname of the Work had not at
that time become familiar, and Oldershaw only designated the
battery his gunners had silenced as the one that was ' circular ' ;
but there is no doubt that the ' Crow's Nest ' and the ' Circular
' battery ' are identical.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 161
At this period of the fight (when still he had chap.
three guns in action) Captain Oldershaw sent off . —
a messenger to the 1st Parallel with directions to
ask for reinforcements.
Great and greater with every minute was the
havoc thenceforth being wrought in his hugely
overmatched battery. Soon, another of his guns
was disabled ; and — insatiate of destruction — the
enemy's mighty ship cannon-balls never ceased
to come crashing in at a rate computed by some
at no less than ten in the minute.
He who happily escaped actual contact with
one of these missiles might still not escape its
power, for the sand-bags set going by round-shot
struck and swept men before them with a terrible
violence, inflicting now and then what at first
might be easily taken for death - blows, and
leaving a man for the time in an utterly pros-
trate state.
We observed the immense weight of metal by
which, if so minded, the enemy might repress
the lone battery of only four 32-pounders ; but
with all that command of power, how far was he
deigning to use it for a small special purpose ?
Engaged in defending the Fortress on a front of
several miles, he of course did not bend all the
energies of a hundred guns upon one diminutive
battery ; but against it, whether acting deliber-
ately, or, as sometimes occurred, in hot anger, he
brought to bear what power he chose. And, the
power he thus chose to exert against our little
lone battery was not at all narrowly stinted.
VOL. VIII. L
162 THE APRIL BOMBAKIiMENT.
chap. From even the most distant extremity of the
VI .
__ blazing arc the batteries that armed the right
face of his Great Eedan thundered raging against
the small prey ; and it was well for our ' advanced
' No. VII.' that a hair's-breadth of uncorrected
error in the nicety of ' gun elevation ' caused the
missiles of war tearing down from the further-
most Work to fly howling and screaming in vain
close over the heads of our people. Nowhere
else did the enemy seem to be wasting his
ordnance-power. From the opposite extremity
of the arc, that is, from the Flagstaff Bastion
(which had dealt, as we saw, the first blow), the
big round-shot again and again came tearing in
through the parapet of Oldershaw's little battery ;
whilst besides, in the north it was powerfully,
directly confronted, and confronted, as we have
seen, at close quarters ; since from not only the
Upper and the Lower Garden batteries, and the
rampart formed on the P^ressip, but again further
east from the ranges of the Barrack Battery and
its neighbouring satellites there poured in an
unsparing fire, and this, too, at so close a range
that for some of the 68-pounders placed high on
commanding ground the firing was almost 'point-
' blank.' On the whole, we can say that the little
advanced No. VII. with its four 32-pounder
pieces, of which two had now been disabled, was
from time to time kept under fire by not less
than thirty great guns*
* General Simpson writes : ' At least 30 guns ' ; and the
italics are his.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 163
With all the power yet left them our gunners c ha p.
still answered the storm, but their guns of course, !_
after a while, had been wrought by incessant dis-
charges to a state of intense, scorching heat, and
could only be tired at intervals.
Not content with his mighty ascendant in
weight of metal the enemy even increased it;
and it was on a battery newly opened against
him that Oldershaw with his own hands was
' laying ' his No. 3 gun when the voice of Mr
De Vine (a devoted, brave, non-commissioned
officer, standing up on the top of the parapet)
was heard giving warning of ' shell ' ! * Then
— delivered by vertical fire — a hollow shot en-
tered the embrasure through which Oldershaw
was laying his gun, and achieved what perhaps
is unique in the annals of gunnery conflicts ; for,
killing two, wounding the rest, and yet sparing
the Captain himself, it laid the whole of the ' gun
' detachment ' at his feet.
The same widely ravaging shot wrenched away
the right wheel of the gun, turned its spokes into
deadly missiles, and flung off its ' round ' with a
force that jammed it deep into the side of the
nearest 'traverse.'
Twice before, this same gun had been struck
by a shot without becoming unserviceable, but
it now of course was disabled.
So, of the four guns with which Oldershaw had
* It was for the purpose of giving such warnings that Mr De
Vine, in a spirit of valiant self-sacrifice, had asked leave to go
up, and stand on the top of the parapet.
164 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP, begun the conflict there was now only one that
VI. .
remained undisabled. With that one gun, how-
ever, the Captain still continued to fight.
In compliance with the request of Captain Old-
ershaw preferred, as we saw, at a time when he
still had three guns undisabled, two fresh 'gun
' detachments ' had, by this time, come down to
the battery ; but, considering the state of its
parapet and of its armament reduced to one
gun still remaining in a serviceable state, the
Captain did not judge that this succour could
now be of any great use. He thoughtfully,
rightly determined that the men newly come
should not be needlessly sacrificed in the des-
perate service which had fallen to his own lot,
and sent off all those he could spare to find
shelter and peace in the empty battery near him.*
In the midst of the havoc surrounding him,
Captain Oldershaw with his now only gun was
obediently working his battery to the enjoined
limit of ' extremity,' when he found himself re-
ceiving the visit of a brave and true - hearted
soldier, who came because he divined that the
battery must be in dire trouble.
We saw Graham place himself in the 3d Par-
allel and near to Oldershaw's battery with the
double object of watching a hazardous experiment
deeply interesting to our Engineers, and if pos-
sible helping our gunners to 'get their range.'
In that last object, however, he constantly found
* In the ' advanced No. VIII. , ' which had not, as we saw,
been then armed, and was unassailed by the enemy.
THK APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 165
himself baffled by the keenness, the skill, the chap.
. VI
alacrity with which the Eussians exerted their !
vast artillery -power ; for they did not so much
as allow him to find out what points had been
reached by shots already discharged. Whenever
a gun of ours fired, the garrison instantly an-
swered it with three or four guns from their side,
and by thus piling up banks of smoke put it out
of the power of Graham to see where the English
shot struck.
And, so far as concerned the ' experiment ' of
operating against the great Fortress with Older-
shaw's four advanced guns, Graham seems to have
found himself driven to an early and decisive con-
clusion. 'The battle,' he writes, 'was from the
' beginning a hopeless one for us. . . . No.
' VII. made a gallant fight, but in a short time
' three out of the four guns were disabled, and
' half the gun detachments killed or wounded.'
Then Graham goes on to say simply, and as
though it were merely a law of any man's nature
to go where conditions are desperate : — ' About
' this time seeing how our fire had slackened, I
' visited the battery.'
It would have been interesting to hear an ac-
count of any conference passing at such a moment,
and between two such men as Captain Oldershaw
and Lieutenant Graham, but the enemy granted
no time. By the blow of a round-shot, or rather
by blows from the substances and the mass of
stone which the round-shot — after striking a sand-
bag— sent driving against his breast, Graham was
166 THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT.
ijhap. struck down, and it seemed for a while that he
_ ' had received his death.*
In the battery, destruction was rife. Shells
from time to time dropped down and burst upon
the tops of the magazines, blowing up in one in-
stance a number of powder-boxes ; in another,
tearing bodily off, and carrying away with its
blast so much of the all-precious roof as to be
choking an embrasure, and silencing its over-
whelmed gun under the weight of the ruins.
Gunners seeing such incidents might well think
perhaps for a moment of the one least beloved
form of danger ; but happily from the first to the
last, there was no magazine that wholly gave way
under either the blows of the round-shot, or the
bursting of shells on its top.
Elsewhere, however, the havoc had been in-
creasing from minute to minute during a period
of several hours ; and at length a time came when
nearly the whole of the parapet had been torn in-
to ruins. The battery, wrote Mr De Vine,t was
' almost demolished.' ' My poor little battery/
wrote Oldershaw, 'was literally swept away.' J
The men, I believe, would have judged it, as
* The mass of stone was hurled with a force which drove it
through Graham's greatcoat, and caused it to strike at his heart.
It smashed a watch which was in his waistcoat-pocket.
f With respect to whom, see ante, p. 163, and Note (9) in the
Appendix.
t And, hear the Engineers who looked at the havoc scien-
tifically, and had to repair it: 'The embrasures and magazine,
' and the battery generally, are much cut up by the enemy's
' shot and shell.' — Journal Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 138,
April 13th. 'It' [the No. VII. on 13th April] 'was moreover
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 167
their phrase is, more 'comfortable' to work a chap.
gun in the open than in what yet remained of
the battery ; but so entire was their devotion to
the chief that he and they by some magic were
all, as it seemed, of one mind. He did not ad-
dress the brave men in any sort of harangue, but
mingled encouraging words, spoken calmly in
genial tones with every special direction required
for guiding their labours. What they liked was to
see him, and to hear him, to feel that they were
ruled by his will.* With no longer a parapet left
that could even do so much as delude them with
any specious promise of shelter, they went on
working, and working their one undisabled gun.
That one gun however at last became, like the
others, unserviceable, and then — since unable to
strike at the enemy, able only to stand and be
stricken — the man and the men, one would say,
had reached the uttermost limit of what any
commanding officer could have meant to assign
when directing that the battery should be worked
to ' extremity.' Still Oldershaw did not retire,
because he had an idea that no such step should
be taken without the warrant of ' orders ' ; and ac-
cordingly, even after the silencing of the fourth and
last gun, he remained with his men in the battery.
He did not from first to last see that (in har-
inuch broken, and its salients knocked into grotesque forms.'
-Conolly's History of the Sappers and Miners, vol. ii. p. 275.
* Mr De Vine (who was one of them) writes eloquently on the
effect produced upon the men by their feeling of devotion to
the chief, and the absolute, unmeasured trust they gladly re-
posed in his guidance.
168 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, mony with the reasons adduced for undertaking
' the venture*) there was given him any support
from other English batteries.!
Captain Oldershaw had maintained the con-
flict nearly five hours, when at length Captain
Shaw — an officer his superior in rank — came
down into the battery, pronounced it untenable,
and directed him to retire.(G)
He however was allowed, before moving, to in-
dulge a whim characteristic of the Artillery Arm.
Of his guns — all disabled — there were three de-
ranged only so far that they could not be ' laid '
for an aim ; and these last, although useless of
course for anything like fighting purposes, and
'pointed' grotesquely from under the superin-
cumbent ruins, could still be fired — could still
therefore be made the means of bantering the
enemy's gunners.
This last quaint object achieved by a mocking
salute of three guns which proved not to be dumb,
although ' silenced ' in the Artillery sense, Captain
Oldershaw withdrew his small remnant of men
from the ruins of what, if for hours, that day, a
hard-fighting battery, had since become rather
the scene of an almost romantic self-sacrifice.
Captain Oldershaw's lengthened persistence
had been sanctioned of course — because dictated
* See ante, pp. 149, 150.
t Whether it was possible that he might have been receiving
some little support from other and distant batteries without
being able to discern it, artillerymen will judge.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 169
—by the order bluntly enjoining him to work his chap.
guns to ' extremity ' ; but one does not very easily —
see how the long keeping up of a tight by an
advanced, weak, isolated, and commanded battery
engaged at close quarters against enormous odds,
could have well been an object so vital as to
warrant indefinite sacrifices; and accordingly,
there is room for surmising that Captain Oldfield
—an excellent officer — did not mean to have his
words construed literally when he gave the direc-
tion to 01dershaw.(7)
If the sanction of ' command ' had been want-
ing, one perhaps would be forced to confess that
throughout the latter half of this conflct of five
hours' duration, the persistency of Oldershaw and
his gunners was Chivalry rather than War.
battery.
The losses sustained by our gunners in this The losses
sustained in
Ions, unequal fismt were, of course, very great ; oidershaw's
and indeed, when people compared the original
strength of the detachment with that of the little
remnant which came out unscathed at the close
of the action, they thought there was ground for
saying that the force had been almost ' annihil-
' ated ' ; but, happily, that simple plan of testing
the loss involved a material error, because some
of those who had entered the battery in the morn-
ing were sent on duty elsewhere before the fight
came to an end.(s)
The numbers seem to stand thus : The detach-
ment at first comprised 65 gunners. Of these, at
the close of the fight, 18 had been moved by
VI
170 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
°H a p. ( )ldershaw, and sent away out of the battery with
orders to bear off wounded men ; so that thus the
number of gunners destined to be in the battery,
without being sent away from it in the course of
the fight, was no greater than 47. Of those 47,
the enormous proportion of 44 were either killed
or wounded ; and so on the whole it occurred
that the remnant of the original body of 65 gun-
ners with which Oldershaw at last marched out of
the battery had a strength of only three men.(9)
However, along with these three, the 18 men we
saw charged with duties outside of the battery
made up a strength of 21 gunners not only surviv-
ing but unwounded, and of the warlike spirit of
this score of men we are presently going to hear.
The fairest parallel to this engagement of Old-
ershaw's might be found, I believe, on board ship
— on board some ship of war close beset in the
fiery ' heart of oak ' days ; for it would be hard to
say where — on dry land — a like concourse of shot
and shell ever had such a five hours' revelry in
one small, yet still lighting battery as the one
that fate reserved for our advanced No. VII. on
the 13th of April ; and in truth, to bring about
what took place, there was needed a concurrence
of circumstances that may never before have
been joined : —
1. A small and weakly armed battery brought
and kept all alone for some hours beneath the
fire at close range of a mighty artillery command-
ins it from higher ground:
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 171
2. A sand-bag parapet strong enough to wrestle chap.
with the 6 8 -pounders, but not strong enough to
arrest them :
3. A captain not only directed to work his four
guns to extremity, but obeying the grim com-
mand, and carrying it through to the letter :
4. A body of gunners so valiant, and so pas-
sionately devoted to their chief that — without
any seeming unwillingness to be sacrificed
with him — they worked and fought on to the
last.
On the day of the fight the Brigadier-General General
1 'ncrcs *
commanding (afterwards Sir Eichard Dacres) rode
accompanied by his staff to the tent of Captain
Oldershaw, and there thanked the Captain per-
sonally for his exploit of that morning, saying,
' You fought vour battery nobly, and are an his words to
• i * i j i t-n Oldershaw.
' honour to your regiment. Asked by Dacres
what he would like, he said, ' Staff duty as
' Adjutant,' and a Staff appointment as Adjutant
he quickly received. A greater Staff appoint-
ment soon followed, but that last one withdrew
him from the Sebastopol theatre of war.
On the evening of the 13th, our authorities An order
1 i t i-i i ,i given out bj
promulgated a direction, which was to be the mistake;
next day, 'in orders.' This order 'in orders'
directed a body of men told off for the purpose to
go down in the morning — the morning of the 14th
— under the command of Captain Oldershaw, and
to fight the 'advanced No. VII.' The order —
given out by mistake — was countermanded in
172 THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, time to prevent any baneful confusion;* but it
. — happily remained in force long enough to elicit
the manful petition of which I am going to speak.
From the moment of becoming apprised of the
order ' in orders ' until he received the counter-
mand at 4 o'clock the next morning, Captain
Oldershaw followed a course which was character-
istic of the man and of the soldierly bent of his
mind. He did not judge it his duty to inter-
change explanations with the ' authorities,' but —
in silence — to obey their commands ; and accord-
ingly in the early morning of the 14th, he was
preparing to go on parade and to march down
once more with the men there already assembling
to the scene of yesterday's havoc, when he re-
and the ceived a message so touching that it ought to be
cidentto known and remembered — a message trulv illus-
which it . ° J
gave rise, trative ol the quality of our soldiers, and the love,
the trust, the devotion with which they range
under an officer who, whilst able in other respects,
seems instinctively prone to hard fighting.
The score of undisabled survivors who had
fought under Oldershaw might be few, yet were
many enough to have an aggregate sentiment —
the sentiment of a body proved staunch by the
ordeal of a long, hearty fight; and these brave
men believing that the direction set out 'in orders '
must import a resolve to go on, as it were, with
their fight, they were filled with an eager desire
to be once more amid the ' mad sand- bags ' of
* It would have clashed with the order which was given, as
will be afterwards seen, to Captain Henry.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 173
' advanced No. VII.,' affronting the pride of Sebas- C ha p.
topol, and obeying their favourite chief. Know- 1_
ing that a sand-bag battery, though broken up
into ruins, could still be quickly repaired, and
that all the disabled guns might be either made
ready for use or else be replaced before sunrise,
they saw before them a prospect that st rangely fas-
cinated their imaginations— a prospect of fighting
once more under Oldershaw, and ' having it out '
with the enemy on the site of their five hours' strife.
They imagined, it seems, that if Oldershaw
would prefer their request, they, although not
' told off ' for the service in accordance with strict
' turn of duty,' might still have him once more
for their chief in that new fight on old ground
which the order ' in orders ' announced.
The message that resulted from this nobly
warlike impulsion was brought to Captain Older-
shaw in his tent by the ' corporal on duty ' in
the artillery camp, and delivered in dry, simple
words : — ' The men who fought with you yester-
' day, sir, wish to fight again with you.' Captain
Oldershaw answered the Corporal, and briefly
confessed himself proud. He spoke of his own
feelings only towards those who had sent him
the message ; but our people now, after long years,
will understand and will share the pride he took
in such men.
VII.
One is all the more bound to lay stress on this; Gnmndfor
laying lull
tight of the 13th of April since — withdrawn by a stress on the
174 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, series of mischances from the cognisance of the
vi. .
! Commander-in-Chief — it was never by him re-
ifthof e corded in either a public despatch, or any less
pn' formal document.(10)
Besides Lieutenant Graham, disabled in the
way we observed, there was simply no witness of
the fight of the 13th of April except Captain
Oldershaw himself and the officers and men en-
gaged under him.(u) Oldershaw was not ordered
to make a report of his fight, and — true to that
singular modesty — or was it not soldierly pride?
— which I have ascribed to him — he not only
omitted to volunteer any formal account of his
engagement, but even refrained from those un-
official statements which might have sufficed to
make the truth known. (12)
So austere a neglect of the task of self-asser-
tion by an officer in command of a detached force
was, after all, too majestic for this busy maze of
a world, and his subsequent absence from the
Crimea — because on staff duty elsewhere — com-
pleted the chain of circumstances which pre-
vented Lord Raglan from receiving any account
of the fight of the 13th of April in the ' advanced
' No. VII.' On that subject the Artillery Records
fell into a state of confusion, and so remain to
this day.
sir Gerald But the chasm thus left in our records has now
been substantially filled. We saw an Engineei
officer keenly watching the fight ; but he was
only a young lieutenant, well able indeed to give
testimony of the highest value, yet not to speak
Graham.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 175
with authority. Time, however, has changed the chap.
conditions ; for the then young lieutenant was des- . —
tined to attain to high fame in the profession of
arms ; and it is with the mature judgment of a
general officer well versed in the business of war
that now he reviews what he witnessed on the
13th of April 1855 — the fight maintained under
Oldershaw in the ' advanced No. VII.'
Speaking thoughtfully of a branch of the ser- msjudg-
vice which was not, remember, his own, Sir Ger- oiderenaw'
aid Graham says: — 'The Koyal Artillery never
' hesitated to engage at any odds, and they never
' had a hotter morning's work than in No. VII. on
' that 13th of April' *
VIII.
The 'advanced No. VII.' was restored and pre- Both the
advanced
pared for new fights with so great a despatch as Nos. vii.
to be asain in working order before sunrise on batteries
° ° . got ready
the very next day, that is, on the 14th of April ; for fighting
•i <* > on the hum d
and, its sister work 'No. VIII.' having also at 11'^hofthe
last been armed, the commanders of the two little
batteries now supposed to be both in readiness
could engage them, men thought, side by side, in
a renewal of the venturesome conflict which had
been maintained the day before, that is, on the
13th, by our ' advanced No. VII.' alone.
On this day (the 14th) the 'advanced No. VII.' Bngagemeni
. t> of the No.
was commanded by Captain Henry t of the Uoyal vn. bat-
* Letter to me, dated Cairo, Egypt, Nov. 18, 1883.
t Now Lieutenant-General Henry.
170
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
tery under
Captain
Henry on
morning of
the 14th of
April.
Artillery, having undei him Lieutenant Conolly,*
and thirty-five men.
Again, as on the previous morning, it was with
four 32-pounders only that the ' advanced No.
' VII.' at daylight once more delivered its chal-
lenge to such of the hundred guns opposite as
the enemy might deign to unleash against so
small an antagonist.!
Captain Henry engaged the Barrack Batteries,
and they answered him with a power that soon
proved him to be hugely overmatched ; whilst
also he was assailed front and flank by the Gar-
den Batteries, and placed besides under fire —
under strong enfilading fire — by the (proper) left
face of the Flagstaff Bastion.
In so far as Captain Henry could see, his four
guns were working no havoc in the mighty array
of the ' Barrack ' defences ; and the enemy, — not,
this time, provoked by the silencing of his ' Crow's
' Nest ' battery, — was of course unimpelled by the
rage — rage vented in unmeasured storms of artil-
lery-fire— which had given a wild, strange char-
acter to the fight of the previous day maintained
in the same little battery ; whilst moreover, this
day on its right, the now armed and unmasked
'No. VIII.' was drawing some of the fire that
might otherwise have been lavished on the sister
* Now no more.
f As to the hundred guns potentially opposing our advanced
batteries, see ante, i>. 148. Much of what goes before, includ-
ing especially the pages from p. 147 to p. 153, applies to the
conditions under which this fight of the 14th took place.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 177
battery. It would seem that, when restoring the CHA.P.
shattered parapet of this ' advanced No. VII.,' our _
Engineers must have given it a greater degree of
strength than it had on the previous morning;
for, although it is true there were instances of
the 68-pounders impinging upon the tops of the
parapets, and thence driving the sand-bags before
them, it was generally through one or other of
the embrasures that the shot and the shell on
this day came leaping into the battery. One of
these took a life of much worth. Brave, zealous,
endowed beyond other mortals with the gift of
cheerliness, Boyd (a corporal of the Eoyal Artil-
lery) was laying a gun, and casting a satisfied
glance along the line of its ' sights,' when a can-
non-ball shot away the upper part of his skull,
and killed him so instantaneously that his face —
with the blood pouring down — still kept its radi-
ant smile. The body of this valiant corporal,
with that of another good artilleryman who had
also been killed, was placed with care on a spot
where one of the traverses seemed to offer a
semblance of shelter; but soon, a shell blew up
the traverse and buried the dead in its ruins.
Out of his small force Captain Henry lost two
men killed, and five men wounded.
From each of his 32-pounders he fired about
one hundred rounds, but one of his guns was,
after a while, disabled.
Kept for nearly eight hours under a powerful
fire, the battery and its embrasures suffered havoc.
'I remember,' says Colonel Torriano, 'going down
VOL. VIII. M
178
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
Simultane-
ous en-
gagement
of the No.
VIII. bat-
tery, under
Captain
Walcott,
on the
morning of
the 14th.
' to see the No. VII. battery, and found it quite a
' wreck. I always wondered how Henry and his
1 detachments could have stood up to it as they
' did for so long.' *
' Stand up to it,' however, they did with an ad-
mirable valour and persistency during a period of
nearly eight hours, never ceasing their fire until
— at half -past one o'clock — the reliefs came down
to succeed them.t
Manned by Captain Walcott J of the Eoyal
Artillery, with under him Lieutenant Torriano,§
Assistant -Surgeon Cockerill, and the requisite
number of gunners, the ' advanced No. VIII.' was
on the right of the ' advanced No. VII.,' and in
the same — that is, the 3d — Parallel. Armed with
six 32-pounders, it courted the fire of those same
hundred guns which — potentially — opposed the
sister battery ; and by some indeed of those guns
— guns arming the (proper) right face of the
great Kedan — it could be even more effectively
searched.
Thence accordingly, and (in an opposite di-
rection) from the Garden Batteries as well as
from other works, our ' advanced No. VIII.' was
brought and kept under a strong fire — fire, some
of it, enfilading, and some bestowed on its front.
* Letter of 30th Oct. 1883.
f Lord Raglan's warm appreciation of the services of Captain
Henry and the officers and men under his command will be
shown post, p. 180. J Now no more.
§ Now Colonel Torriano, R.A.. commanding the Royal Artil-
lery at Sheeruess. To the best of his memory, the armament
of the No. VIII. was as I state it.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 179
Within the first half -hour, two of Walcott's chap.
VI
guns were disabled, and he began to lose men. . —
And to this cannonade no effective reply could
be made. Our Engineers had not found time to
shape down the ' soles ' of the embrasures to the
level required ; so that thus the allotments of
space left open in front of our guns were not
sufficiently deep. Discharged under such con-
ditions, the round-shot impinged every time on
the outermost edge of the 'sole'; and — because
by this contact deflected into a higher path — flew
harmlessly over the object at which our people
had aimed it.
Perplexed by this baffling obstacle, Captain
Walcoit went to the sister battery and there con-
sulted its chief. Captain Henry advised that,
rather than submit to be silenced, the ' advanced
' No. VIII.' should, however ineffectively, continue
its fire ; and, when afterwards Walcott despatched
Lieutenant Torriano to the 1st Parallel with orders
to represent the condition of things in the ' ad-
vanced No. VIII.,' and to ask for further instruc-
tions, he received from his commanding officer
some words of guidance equivalent to Captain
Henry's counsels.
Whether rightly or wrongly conceived, this in-
struction made clear the path of duty; and Cap-
tain Walcott with the officers and gunners he
commanded passed manfully through a long or-
deal that could hardly have been otherwise than
galling to warlike men; for they had to remain
submitting to so much of fire as the enemy might
180 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
C vr"P' vouchsafe them, without having themselves any
■ — sense of a power to strike in return. For the
sake of what they owed to punctilio, they of
course could go on with a fire which, if harmless
to the enemy, was still provoking enough to make
him persevere in his efforts against their own
hampered battery ; and this they faithfully did,
never ceasing from the task thrown upon them
till, after nearly eight hours of what was perhaps
too one-sided to be aptly called ' fighting,' the
appointed reliefs in due course came down to
take their places.
Of the force under Walcott, Assistant-Surgeon
Cockerill and seven men were disabled.
It was in recognition of the services thus ren-
dered in the No. VII. and No. VIII. batteries on
the 14th of April that Lord Raglan awarded high
praise to Captain Henry and Captain Walcott
and the officers and men engaged under them ;(13)
doing this at the first by an Order of the 15th of
April, which not only expressed his ' approbation
1 of their conduct,' but also his ' warmest thanks
' for their gallantry and steady perseverance in
' the discharge of their duty ; ' and two days
afterwards by a despatch of like import addressed
to the Secretary of State.*
The engage- Our reliefs, bravely steadfast, gave full effect
meats in the J ' °
Nos. vn. to the theory then largely accepted in camp — to
* I believe that Lord Raglan trusted mainly to the Report
framed by Major (now Lieutenant-General) Bent, R.E. See
Appendix, Note (l:i). With respect to the brilliant part taken
by General (then Captain) Bent, R.E., in the battle of Giurgevo.
see ante, vol. ii. chap. xiii.
and VIII.
THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT. 181
the theory laying it down that with even so chap.
much as one gun in an undisahled state, these ! —
batteries ought not to turn silent until after sun- 0nth"wth
set. Their tenacity even exceeded what opinion bythew-
enjoined ; for when darkness had fully set in, our dark,
people in camp were still hearing the fire of the
two 'advanced batteries.'(14)
Though constraining me indeed to record them
for the sake of our valiant artillerymen, and the
country they served, those fights that we have
seen undertaken — undertaken one hardly sees
why — in two small, forlornly placed batteries,
were not, after all, efforts destined, nor even, I
may say, at all calculated to govern the course
of the siege.
IX.
I lay no stress at all on the havoc sustained at
this period by the principal batteries of the Allies,
since it was not so great as to be overpowering,
could be always repaired in due time, and did not
for a moment coerce them into either any change
of their plans, or any relaxation of effort. What
kept within bonnds the intensity and the dura-
tion of their bombardment, was — not the enemy's
tire, but — the limit they knew there must be to what put
' " limits on
all their own stores — though immense — of heavy the bom-
° bardment.
siege-gun ammunition.
With their siege-guns in this bombardment ot tion of siege
... ■. CI ^U" :l"""u"
ten days the Allies are believed to have fired mtion.
182
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
C H A P.
VI.
Losses of
men sus-
tained by
the Allies
in the
artillery
conflict.
Large pro-
portion of
the losses
sustained
by our
sailors.
Their ways
whilst
manning
a battery.
some 130,000 shots, and to have been answered
by the Russians with about 88,000.*
Though inflicting on the Russians huge losses,
of which we shall afterwards hear, the mere artil-
lery conflict provoked by this lengthened bom-
bardment cost the French and the English to-
gether no more than a few hundred men.
Of this loss in killed and wounded a large pro-
portion, as usual, was borne by our sailors. They
had whims of their own so deep-rooted that
authority did not like to disturb them, or else —
for this too is possible — the young naval officers
present were themselves prone to share in the
joyous, dare-devil spirit which always gave life
to a combat maintained by those men of the sea.
A landsman observing the numbers in which they
liked to work a great gun might almost suppose
them determined by some such gay rule as that
of 'the more the merrier'; and, when they had
loaded, they did not deign to move aside in such
way as to obtain the shelter of the parapet, but
maintained instead a 'look-out' through the em-
brasure open before them. They were masters of
the art of bantering the enemy by making humor-
ous signs to him ; and, too often a Russian officer,
when seen to be bending his field-glass on one
of these batteries, was destined to find himself
mocked by some kind of raillery, as for instance,
by a seaman standing up on the top of the para-
pet to tease his observer by gestures, or perhaps
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 169. As to the weight of the respective
nalvoes — French, English, and Russian — see ante, p. 136.
THE APRIL BOMBABDMENT. 183
by the favourite prank of extinguishing his own chap
mirthful head beneath an inverted bucket. By '
these careful arrangements our seamen proved
able to draw upon themselves much more than
their due share of fire, and their losses were
heavy ; but the spirit they kept alive was a
treasure of untold worth.
To appreciate the general tenor of the bom-
bardment, to teach ourselves whether it opened,
or whether it failed to open a hopeful path for
assault, and withal, to learn something of the
stress that it put on the enduring courage of the
garrison, we must leave the Allies for a while,
and pass over into Sehastopol.
X.
Those duties and pleasures of Easter which Thede
had long been engrossing the enemy, and even sebastopoi.
for some minutes luring him from his post in
the front, were allowed, one may say, to com-
mingle with the fighting maintained in his bat-
teries. At a time when the Flagstaff Bastion lay Their
Knstcr
stricken, and torn, and bleeding beneath a lire of festivitiea
,i i ,i • • .i mingling
great power then hotly raging against it, the with the
work was visited by General Osten-Sacken (the batteries.
brave officer in command at Sebastopol), who
came to give each of the combatants his rital
embrace, and inform every man of them separ-
ately— inform him under round-shot and shell
— of the rising of Christ from the dead. To
184
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
The forti-
tude they
needed for
their task.
Their want
of ammu-
nition.
The sacri-
fices they
had to
make in
order to
be ready
to meet
assaults.
that practice of a Church which in peace-time
our young Western Churches might spurn, the
hour of battle gave dignity. At every step the
commander thus addressing Easter words to his
troops, was greeted, was followed, was cheered
by the roar of their warlike 'hourrahs.'
If thus cheered for a while by religious and
festive distractions, the enemy was at all events
entering on a task that demanded rare fortitude.
Because forcing him to maintain a great parsi-
mony of fire under a hot cannonade, the dearth
of ammunition was torture ; whilst moreover it al-
ways compelled him to harbour the ugly thought
that, from this mere material want of sufficing
barrels of gunpowder, Sebastopol might be des-
tined to fall ; and, when he sought to parry the
evil by borrowing a supply from the sea-forts or
the unsunken ships, those resources were at first
closed against him by signs that they all might
be needed to meet an attack from the fleets. He
was driven to the expedient of obtaining for his
Flagstaff and Central Batteries a small supply of
gunpowder taken from out of the infantry cart-
ridges.
And, because of the need that there was to
keep troops in readiness for withstanding the
expected assaults, he had to bear cruel losses ;
so that, whilst the Allies by comparison were
losing only a few from the fire their bombard-
ment had challenged, he every day, whilst it
lasted, was sending heavy numbers of his people
to their graves on the Severnaya, or else — pain-
THE AI'lilL BOMBABDMENT. 185
ful contrast of thoughts! — to the once brilliant, chap.
VI.
gay, sparkling ball-room in the Assembly House
of the Nobles, then changed to a reeking hospital.
Within the ten days taken up by this April bom-
bardment, and mainly from the effect of its fire,
the Russians lost 6000 men.* Tn almost cold
blood, and with a greater distinctness than com-
monly attends such hard sacrifices, these thou-
sands of men were surrendered to what I have
called a ' prerogative ' — the prerogative wielded
by him who — resolving to take the offensive — is
able to choose time and place.
The submission to losses so great without The heroism
, of their de-
means of avenging them was a striking ex- fence at thu
. . . . time-
ample of passive, enduring heroism ; whilst of
that other kind of heroism which, along with a
valiant and protracted confronting of danger, de-
mands also a prodigious exertion of human en-
ergy, the Russians gave signal proof ; for when
towards the close of each day, they found their
defences in ruins, they calmly moved out in the
twilight, began to repair their Works, and, though
kept all the time under vertical fire which was
commonly one of great power, toiled on through-
out the night, never failing (except in one in-
stance) to bring the shattered defences into a
state for fighting again so soon as the morning
should break. To attain such an end, no sacri-
fice, says the great Engineer, should be ever con-
sidered too great, and according to his belief, it
was by efforts in that direction that the French
* 6131 killed and wounded. — Todleben, vol. ii. p. 170.
1SG THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, for ten davs were prevented from carrying for-
VT °
\ ward their siege- works ; whilst also he holds that
thus checked, they perforce became greatly dis-
couraged, and even shaken in purpose.*
On the whole, one may say — and there is no
higher praise to utter — that, although conducted,
this time, with the aid of mighty appliances, their
resistance to the April bombardment was not un-
worthy of those who — inspired by the then living
Korniloff, and the matchless Colonel of Sappers
still kindling and guiding their energies — had
begun under desperate conditions their glorious
defence of Sebastopol.
supplies of In some respects, after seven days, the ordeal
andreta- °n became less trying ; for on the night of the 15th,
forcements. , , . . ■■ 1 p i -,i
the enemy obtained a supply or gunpowder, with
assurance that much more would follow; and
soon, he began to enjoy a good measure of those
many blessings which are commonly denied to a
Fortress when really beleaguered ; for the needed
ammunition came peacefully into Sebastopol,
whilst the garrison was strengthened and com-
forted by the arrival of reinforcements, and be-
sides, by exchanges of troops made at will with
the Russian Field army.
Apart from that object of checking the French
approaches with which we were dealing elsewhere,
the enemy's task was twofold. He had, if he
could, to prevent the assailant's artillery from
opening a path for assault.
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 187.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 187
And, because he well knew that his efforts in chap.
VI
that first direction might, all of them, fail, he was
forced, as we have seen — and this at a dire cost whtch the
of life — to keep himself in absolute readiness for gebastopoi
the climax in that case assumed to be certain, involved,
and close at hand.
Towards maintaining that terrible ' readiness
throughout the ten days' bombardment, the
enemy, it is certain enough, did all that well
could be compassed by skill of the highest order,
by vast unremitting energy, and by resolute sacri-
fices of life exacted under trying conditions ; bu l
did he prove able to achieve the first part of his
task, and prevent the besieger's artillery from
opening through the defences a practicable path
for assault ?
To see our way towards an answer, we need
not be taking account of the havoc from time to
time wrought on the enemy's other defences, but
must look to those Works which more closely
protected the life of his Fortress by blocking the
paths for assaulting it.
On the side of the Faubourg, those Works were
the Malakoff Tower itself and the counter-ap-
proaches protecting it.
On the side of Sebastopol Town, the ' Flagstaff1'
and the ' Central ' Bastions with their closely ad-
jacent auxiliaries.
Between the two ' fronts for attack ' which thus
offered themselves to bombardment on both the
east and the west, there stood ranged an extended
and strongly armed line of ramparts which in-
188 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, eluded the 'Great Eedan,' and its western neigh-
'. bom s the ' Barrack,' the ' Creek,' and the ' Garden '
Batteries ; but, although these Works all formed
good links in the enemy's chain of defence, they
still guarded his Fortress at points which were
not for the moment endangered.
Dealing first with the Faubourg, its principal
counter-approaches were the two White Redoubts
on Mount Inkerman, and the now strong Kamt-
chatka Lunette which covered the front of the
Malakoff.
The two The two White Eedoubts on Mount Inkerman
White Re-
doubts were confronted by the French, and by them so
crushed and " •>
silenced, successfully battered as to be silenced and crushed
on the second day of the bombardment ; * but
what is more, the conditions were such that the
and not Russians for once proved unable to repair the
havoc, and they supposed that the ' worst ' was at
hand. They assembled their troops before dawn
and awaited the expected assault.!
but still not The French did not follow up their advantage
assaulted by , . .
the French, and retrained from laying hold by assault of the
path which their guns had laid open to them.
This was the more astonishing to Todleben, since
lie knew — and supposed all must know — that by
taking the White Redoubts the French would
have insured the fall of the Kamtchatka Lun-
ette.
When the enemy afterwards found that the
French were not moving in the thus opened path
of conquest, he proceeded at his leisure to repair
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 127. t Ibid., p. 130.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 189
and rearm the two White Redoubts thus strangely C HA P.
left under his sway.
We next come to the Malakoff Tower ; but re- The Maia-
> n £ l. a -i koff covered
garded as an 'objective for the fire of the April by counter-
° approaches,
bombardment, this Work, though not spared alto- and not
° r therefore
aether, was of course for the moment a less pro- strongly
° assailed.
vocative target than that bold Kamtchatka Lun-
ette which had sprung up to cover its front.
This Lunette, as we have seen, was confronted, The Kamt-
chatka
and even in siege- form ' approached/ by a part of Lunette
° rr J r brought tc
Canrobert's army ; whilst also the Work was so ruin,
circumstanced that it could be assailed by the
French with their ' Artilleur ' range of great guns
established on the slopes of Mount Inkerman, and
on the other flank by no less than nine English
batteries pouring fire of great power from the pre-
cincts of ' Gordon's Attack.' By this strong and
concentrated fire the Lunette was ' cruelly tried '
the first day of the bombardment, and brought
to a state of sheer ruin ; * but, the French not Not, how-
ever, as-
assaulting it, the Work was restored at night ; sauitedby
° J ° ' the French ;
and thenceforth, although mightily plied by ver-
tical fire, it was less torn by round-shot.t There
were signs — and the signs proved true guides — but star ap-
that the French would not promptly assault the byrt°heCiresap.
Work ; for they continued to approach it by sap.j
In all their artillery efforts against the Great complete
\ ° failure of
Redan our people — and with them mainly rested the English
r r J batteries
this part of the task — may simply be said to have against the
* Todlebeu, p. 109. t Ibid., pp. 127, 132.
X Ibid., pp. 140, 143.
190
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
fireat Re-
dan.
failed ; since by dint of their ten days' bombard-
ment they did not lay open the Work, did not
make it more ripe for assault than it was when
the firing began. Here and there in the batteries
of the Work and its neighbours they of course,
every day, wrought seme mischief, but mischief
so far from overwhelming that always, and with
comparative ease, the enemy found means to
repair it in the course of the following night.
General Todleben was able to say that in its con-
flict with the English batteries, his Great Redan
won a ' full victory.' *
The Town
front.
The Rus-
sians ima-
gining the
French to
lie resolut'-
and deter-
mined to
seize the
Flagstaff
Bastion.
Moving always from east to west, we come last
to the close-threatened part of what men called
the ' Town Front ' — to the ' Flagstaff Bastion,' to
its neighbours the ' Central,' and the lesser Works
clustering near them. There, the Russians in
many a combat had been feeling the keen, sus-
tained vigour of General Pelissier;t and it
seemed to them that the French, in a resolute
and peremptory mood, were intent to take the
life of the Fortress by coming at last to close
quarters with its Flagstaff Bastion.]:
To win this all-mastering key, it was necessary,
or at all events right, that the neighbouring ' Cen-
' tral Bastion' and other adjacent Works should
be also assailed by siege-guns.
* Todleben, p. 182.
+ Then commanding the 1st Corps, see post, pp. 206-212.
t That the fall of this Bastion would involve the fall of Se
bastopol, see post, p. 192 and p. 198.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 191
On Monday the 9th April, the first day of the chap.
bombardment, the Central Bastion with its auxil-
iary batteries suffered heavily under the fire, and BU8tained
towards evening was reduced to silence ; whilst Flagstaff
also in the crenelled wall near it, there was and its
111 i • i mi -r<i auxiliaries
wrought a breach seven yards wide, llie r lag- on the first
day
staff Bastion itself was declared by Todleben to
have been ' literally buried under an enormous
' mass of hollow projectiles which inflicted upon
* it great damage, and terrible losses of men.' At
sunset on this, as on every succeeding day of the
bombardment, the task of repairing began, and
was continued all night.*
Next day — the 10th of April — the besiegers so, on tie
renewed their fire ; and the dearth of ammunition
from which the enemy suffered was on this day
brought home to him painfully by orders direct-
ing that the guns with which he replied to the
mighty bombardment should only be fired at long
intervals. On this, as on the previous day, the
Flagstaff Bastion was ' buried ' once more under a
mass of projectiles, and eight of its guns were dis-
mounted ; whilst besides, almost all its embrasures
were brought to ruin. There at last remained
only two guns with which to continue the action ;t
and, although for some reason the French bad not
clenched their success yet more tightly by the
* When I speak of 'repairs' and 'repairing,' I include sub-
stitutions ; as for instance, the replacing of crippled guns by
sound ones, and the construction of new defeuces with which
to close a gap opened in part of the crenelled wall.
t Todleben, p. 127.
192 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, opportune use of 'dismounting batteries' estab-
' lished on well-chosen sites, it was judged by him
who best knew that the all-precious Flagstaff Bas-
tion which he held to be the key of Sebastopol
had at last been made ripe for assault.* This
besides, as we saw, was the day when the White
Eedoubts seemed to be placed at the mercy of the
French; and accordingly Todleben writes: — 'We
' were then in expectation of seeing the Allies
' take advantage of this opportunity for advanc-
' ing to the assault of the Flagstaff Bastion and
• the White Eedoubts.'
so, on the On the 11th of April, the French artillery-fire
brought the Central Bastion and its auxiliary the
Schwartz Eedoubt to a state of utter disorder, and
assailed the Flagstaff Bastion with so great a
power that all the guns in its salient were dis-
mounted and all the embrasures of its left face
destroyed.!
so, on the On the 1 2th of April the Flagstaff Bastion was
again plied with violent fire, and Todleben judged
it to be in a critical state.j
so, on the On the 13th of April the enemy concentrated
his efforts on the Flagstaff Bastion, which was
once more thrown into a state of complete dis-
order, and towards evening, it was silenced.§
so, on the On the 14th as on former clays of the bombard-
sixth day.
* According to Todleben, the French were in possession of
admirable sites for any such dismounting batteries ; and he
particularly specifies one — viz., the site of their Mortar Battery,
'No. 25, bis.'— Todleben, p. 109.
f Ibid., p. 131. $ Ibid., p. 137 et seq.
§ Ibid., p. 140.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 193
merit, the Flagstaff Bastion was the Work that CHAP.
VI.
suffered the most.* . —
By this time, the Flagstaff Bastion had been state of
under a fire of great power during several sue- Bastion,
cessive days; and Todleben judged that, to keep
it in fighting condition, a more than common
effort was needed. There were therefore applied The great
effort made
to this task the concentrated energies of no less to repair it
than 1500 men who toiled all night in the
battery, and with so much the more of devotion
since they toiled, all the time, under fire.t
On the 15 th of April again, the Flagstaff Bas- Peril of the
c ° ° . Bastion on
tion lay stricken under a devastating fire ; and it the seventh
J ° day;
was only, says Todleben, from the brave emula-
tion of all its defenders that this Work — more
menaced, he thought, by assault than any other
part of the Fortress — maintained its means of
defence. + No effort was spared to keep the Work
in a condition for answering assault with mitrail.§
The evening of this 15th of April was the one
on which our allies opened up by explosion three
craters in front of the Flagstaff Bastion ; || and,
since this measure visibly offered to aid the ad-
vance of infantry, there seemed to be now one
more reason for making sure that French columns
would be presently assaulting the Work. 1T
On the 16th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion was on the
, , - . ei8hth dav:
once more ' buried ' under a mass of projectiles,
and its armament was thrown into a state of utter
* Todleben, p. 147. t Ibid., p. 141.
X Ibid., p. 147. § Ibid., p. 147.
|| Bee post, p. '202. IT Todleben, vol. ii. p. 150.
VOL. VIII. N
194
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
on the
ninth day ;
on the
tenth day.
Desperate
slant of
Bastion.
Cessation of
the general
bombard-
ment.
disorder; whilst also its embrasures and its mer-
lons were demolished and swept away.*
On the 17th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion
with its auxiliary the Kostomaroif Battery sus-
tained heavy injuries, having five guns dis-
mounted, and six gun-carriages broken; whilst
those of its embrasures which confronted the
advanced works of the French were, most of
them, demolished.
On the 18th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion
was the main object of the besieger's fire; and
at the close of this the last day of the general
bombardment, the Work was in so ill a plight
as to be judged no longer sustainable by even
augmented exertions ; since apart from that out-
ward, that instantly visible havoc which the
labour of each night had made good, the con-
tinued fire by degrees had been acting against
the strength of the Work with a cumulative
effect, and had caused at last injuries of the
deeper sort that could hardly be met by any
common ' repairing.' The salient of the Bastion
had fallen in, and its ruin seemed to be immi-
nent ; t but, like all the preceding temptations
to assault the Work, this last one, great as it
seems, was successfully resisted by Canrobert.
On the 19th, the general bombardment ceased,
and under a flag of truce agreed to for the burial
of the dead, French and liussian officers met at
* The ' merlons ' arc those parts of the parapet which stand
bel ween the embrasures,
i Todleben, p. 156.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT. 195
the boundary line. In the course of the friendly chap.
conversation that followed, they exchanged warm !
acknowledgments of the prowess displayed by their fr„£e°f
respective foes ; and it was then that a straddling memtsex-
comparison which afterwards had vogue in Paris between
is said to have first been made. In recognising R^ssiar/1"'
the splendid tenacity of the defence, a French °
officer compared the siege of Sebastopol to the
siege of Troy. He did not say (as said Mene- • siege of
laus according to one tradition) that the siege
had been a wretched mistake*
In the course of the four days that followed the contimw-
cessation of the general bombardment, the Flag- the bom-
staff Bastion with its neighbouring auxiliaries directed
continued to suffer heavily under the fire of the Flagstaff
. Bastion
besiegers, and on the 2 Oth, the breach wrought in and its
° auxiliaries.
the ' crenelled wall ' was increased to a breadth of
28 yards.
On the 21st of April, the Flagstaff Bastion was Their peril
reduced to complete silence ; and this, we shall of April,
see, was the day when the French, after dark,
proved able to top the craters opened up by their
mining, to join them all three together, and to
connect them with their system of trenches, thus
establishing at last their 4th Parallel at a distance
of but a hundred paces from the counterscarp of
the opposite Work. Then indeed the concurring
success of two separate and vast operations might
well seem to threaten a crisis in the life of the
Flagstaff Bastion.
At the cost of exciting an ebullition of warlike
* Lempriere, voce Helen.
196 THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
chap, wrath in his own army, General Canrobert still
vi. .
abstained from assaulting the battered Work.
XL
question Here then is a long string of facts, pointing all
whether r>i . ,, ,. .. . . .
the hom- or them m the same direction; but, to judge of
opened their cogency, and say whether this crreat bom-
paths for , , T 1 „ , .
assault; baidment did or not open paths for assault, it
is right to hear the voice of authority,
answered by Commanding on this subject more weight than
and by the any other man of our times, General Todleben
authorita- . .
tive opinion answers the question.
Todieben. Having previously disclosed an opinion that
the two White Eedoubts on Mount Inkerman,
and the Kamtchatka Lunette might have been
successfully and advantageously stormed, he goes
on to speak of the Flagstaff Bastion, and says of
it that after having undergone a constant and
violent bombardment, the Work was 'in a desper-
' ate plight. Its artillery had been dismounted,
' its embrasures and its merlons almost entirely
' demolished, and a part of its salient had fallen
' in. So, during each of these days we were con-
' tinually expecting to see the enemy take advan-
' tage of the critical state to which the bastion
' was reduced, and advance to the assault of the
' Work.' *
'The French might have advanced to the
• assault of this Bastion with an absolute cer-
' tainty of success, and this so much the more,
* Todleben, p. 181.
THE APEIL BOMBARDMENT. ] 97
' since they found themselves at a distance from chap.
VI
' it of only some hundred paces.' * '
After stating that the Allies had planned
assaults, and failed to execute them, he goes on
to say : — ' It is thus that the Allies failed to
' profit by the important advantage they had ob-
' tained ; yet they had it completely in their
' power to take the Flagstaff Bastion, and that
' would have carried with it the fall of Sebas-
' topol. Let us remember that, like the rest of
' the defences, the Flagstaff Bastion had been
' never secure against an attack by assault, and
' that at this time from the effect of a prolonged
' bombardment, it was in a state of half ruin,
' because a part of its salient had fallen in.
' Each day, after a firing of some hours, its
' artillery was thrown into a state of complete
' disorder, and it happened several times that
' the Work could only fire with two guns. The
' violent fire of mortars under which the Bas-
' tion was constantly kept forbade our keeping
' there more than a weak garrison ; and even this
' was not kept within the Work itself, but placed
' under cover in rear of the gorge, for other-
' wise the enemy's shells must have inevitably
' destroyed the whole force.'
' Under such conditions, the besieger, witli the
' power of choosing his own day and his own hour
' for the assault, would always have been able
' to anticipate our troops on the ramparts of
' the Bastion.' t
* Todleben, p. 182. + Ibid., p. 185.
19b tiik apkil i;o.mi;ari>mknt.
chap. Then, after showing with care and detail that
VI.
' the fate of the Bastion, if assaulted, could not have
been averted by any of the Works on its Hanks,
or by any of those in its rear,* the great defender
of Sebastopol goes on to say what the besiegers
might have done : t —
'After having occupied the Flagstaff Bastion,
1 and fortified himself in that advantageous po-
' sition where the Ditch of the Work offered a
' covered lodgment for large reinforcements, the
' besiegers might have turned its batteries against
' the Works of the Central Bastion which, de-
' prived of the co-operation of the troops of
' the 2d section, would have been soon re-
' duced to the same plight as the Flagstaff Bas-
' tion.'
'The fall of the Flagstaff and the Central
* Bastion would have necessarily rendered im-
' possible all further defence of SebastopoL'(15)
i-be bom- The bombardment must therefore be said to
aoWOTedtts 1|live really achieved its set purpose; but then,
butfS?088' after all, the proceeding was only preparative,
lowed up, and the French did not take their next step.|
inrhanneto After having brought to bear on their object for
several months both strong energies and immense
State resources, the Allies at last with their siege-
guns laid open fit paths for assault to General
Canrobert. He did not use them when opened ;
* Todleben, pp. 185, 186. t Ibid., p. 186.
X I Bay ' the French,' not the Allies, because it was only to
the French that an opportunity of assaulting accrued.
the Allies.
THE APKIL BOMBARDMENT. 199
and therefore, of course, what resulted to the chap.
. VI.
Allies was a huge waste of time and of power, .
with a yet further loss of the ascendancy won
by their battles.
To understand why the Allies thus abstained Todieben's
J inquiry ;
from assaulting his Fortress, General Todleben
has exerted divining power.* He had not, how-
ever, the clue. It was only in a later year that the clue.
the Government of France — then once more a
Republic — allowed a servant of the State to
search the long - hidden archives of the War
Department, and on their authority show that
what had passed for an Army sincerely employed
by its Chief in earnest though mismanaged efforts
against the lines of Sebastopol, was, after all,
only an Army kept waiting for Louis Napoleon,
and meanwhile restrained from engaging in any
determined attack.!
* Todleben, p. 186 et seq.
t The disclosure was made through Monsieur Rousset, a
public functionary on the staff of the French War Department
See ante, chap. v.
200 THE DEATH OF GENERAL BIZOT.
CHAPTER VII.
THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL (WITH EXCLUSION OF THE
APRIL BOMBARDMENT, ALREADY NARRATED) FROM
THE 9TH OF APRIL TO THE MIDDLE OF MAY.
I.
chap. Simultaneously with the great cannonade, and
• with those troubled counsels which lasted until
the middle of May, there took place not only
some fights, but also some other occurrences that
must not be left unobserved.
On the 11th of April, the French — and indeed
I will say the Allies — sustained a painful loss.
Whilst making his way along one of our unfin-
Bizot ished trenches, General Bizot was struck by a
wounded, shot, and the wound, some days later, proved
mortal. Commanding the French Engineers, he
had pursued his huge task with a zeal that never
relaxed. So habitually a scorner of danger that
he always had seemed to be courting it, he pre-
served in the most trying moments a noble seren-
ity of mind, with besides that serenity of temper
which was one of the characteristics of his kindly
THE DEATH OF GENERAL BIZOT. 201
nature.* The French army had always held chap.
Bizot to be a man of genuine worth.t Disloyally 1_
treated, and weakened by his Emperor's self-seek-
ing intrigue, he still was so true a soldier that he
did not allow himself to become at all soured
by the overshadowing presence of Niel, and went
on thinking only of duty, duty, duty. From the
counsel we heard Bizot giving on the 10th of
March, it may well be inferred that he had not
been then made a sharer of the ugly design set
on foot for keeping a French army tethered in
the enemy's presence ; and those who respect his
memory may hope to remain in the faith that
even down to his death he stood apart, free from
the stain of having been ever initiated in any
such ignoble mysteries. An abrupt disinterment
of words confidentially written has indeed com-
pelled us to see that in February — when still the
' Winter Troubles ' were rife — General Bizot
could find heart to sneer at the ' indolence ' of
the English, whose only real fault, as we know,
was that of being so few ;{ but already we have
learnt how that perilous want of numbers was
masked by the noble demeanour of our suffering
army, and may therefore forgive a French officer
who imagined that its semblance of strength im-
plied a power of adding to its daily allotment of
work. If acquainted with our dread ' Morning
* Niel, p. 199.
t Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, 17th April 1855.
J M. Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32, prints the words in which Bizot
(writing to the French Minister of War) speaks of Niel's having
' tried in vain to galvanise their indolence. '
202
A PARALLEL OPENED BY MINING.
CHAP.
VII.
And suc-
ceeded
after an
interval by
Niel.
' States,' he — a man noble -hearted and just —
would never have harboured the thought which
inspired his ungenerous words.
It was on the 15th of April that General Bizot
died. Lord Eaglan in person, together with those
of his Staff who could be spared from their im-
perative duties, showed the feeling with which
they regarded the memory of the brave Engineer
by following his remains to the grave.
In command of the French Engineers General
Bizot was succeeded provisionally by General
Dalesme, and definitively — after an interval
which lasted until the 5th of May — by General
Niel, who proposed himself for the place. This
last appointment, however, was not of a nature to
clash with the secret, the personal services which
Niel had engaged to perform.
The French
opening
ground by
mines in
front of the
Fhigstaff
Basticn ;
General Bizot had scarce breathed his last,
when the French carried into effect a design he
had long entertained, and had long been seeking
to execute.* At the close of that series of min-
ing operations which he had devised for the pur-
pose, they at length on the evening of Sunday
the 15th brought about some convulsing explo-
sions which opened up from below a line of vol-
cano-like craters at a distance of less than a
hundred yards from the counterscarp of the Flag-
staff Bastion, and thus formed in front of the
Work a long, deep cavity, interrupted, it is true,
* See ante, p. 36, an account of his earlier effort in the same
direction.
GROUND FOR EXULTATION. 203
in one place, but forming elsewhere what, if chap.
VII.
shaped by the hand of nature, might almost have '
been called a ' ravine.'*
This artificial opening of the ground close in and there
front of the Flagstaff Bastion became for the 4th Parallel.
French a beginning of their 4th Parallel, and —
though not until after hard struggles — they were
ultimately able to establish themselves in the
hollow, taking care of course also to connect it
with their 3d Parallel — full 100 yards less in
advance — by covered lines of way.t
Unaware of the secret resolves which were too
surely baffling its efforts, the French Army taken
at large might have well felt a right to exult,
when two - thirds of the distance which had
separated their foremost Parallel from the Flag-
staff Bastion were thus all at once overleapt by
the art of the miner, and their people— with cover
to shelter them — were planted at last within
stone's-throw of that very counterscarp which
they had hopefully begun to • approach on the
earliest night of the siege. But that same French
Army comprised in its thousands two men who
must needs have been gravely embarrassed by
seeing — on the day of his death — this completion
of Bizot's design ; for, in faithful obedience to the
' Mission,' both Canrobert and Niel had been
* The incompleteness of the hollow at one spot resulted from
the afterwards ascertained fact that in part of the mine some
charges had failed to explode.
t In anticipation of the explosions destined, as we saw, to
take effect on the 15th, the formation of these covered lines of
way was begun on the night of the 11th. — Niel, p. 201.
204 SUCCESS FOUND EMBARRASSING.
chap, minded to abstain from attacking the Bastion;
' — yet how to excuse themselves for thus hanging
dencyof back when at last after six months of toil their
fuTexpioit53' troops were now close to the goal, and when also
canrobert188 in that dire extremity which before we observed,
the defence of the Bastion was collapsing under
the fire of great guns ? * The two generals, it
seems, would have liked to resume their subter-
ranean warfare against the Flagstaff Bastion ; t
and in such case of course their resolve to abstain
from assaulting it instantly might have been
palliated, or even defended by alleging a not
empty reason ; but from that resource, it soon
proved, they were altogether cut off by their own
engineering exploit ; for the mighty explosions it
wrought had blown away into mere chaos the
useful stratum of clay which till then had always
welcomed their miners, and — confronted now in-
stead by hard rock — they could not hope tc make
good any further advance underground.!
Thus for not following up the creation of his
4th Parallel to its natural conclusions General
Canrobert found himself left without any more
valid ' reason ' than the one put forward by Niel
of which we .shall afterwards hear.§
"When writing in 1870, General de Todleben
had the ' reason ' before him, but apparently did
not regard it as having been set up in earnest.
Why — unless still intent upon mining — the
* See ante, p. 194. + Niel, p. 208. t Ibid.
§ Post, pp. 205, 206. See Niel, pp. 196, 197 ; and 6ee post,
p. 212.
todleben's town-side encroachments. 205
French did not come on at once to storm his chap.
vii
Flagstaff Bastion, he professed that he could not L_
divine.*
Passing yet further west to the front of the Todleben's
Central Bastion, Colonel Todleben at this time mentsin
front of tho
began to fasten new Works on the zone there central
. . Bastion.
dividing his lines from the French, doing this —
at the first — by establishing lengthened chains of
those greatly aggravated Rifle-pits which he has
taught us to distinguish as ' lodgments ' ; and, as
previously on Mount Inkerman, and the Victoria
Ridge, so here too before the Town front, General canrobertg
Canrobert, it seems, showed reluctance to make nesstore-
any resolute stand against the offensive encroach-
ments.!
In professing to explain the reluctance attri-
buted to General Canrobert, Niel, as usual, has
passed by in silence that ill-omened ' Mission ' of
his which, we know, was the true master-key for
unlocking any such secrets ; J and instead, has
given this reason to account for his Chief's state
of mind : — He has explained General Canrobert's
reluctance to withstand the enemy's main en-
croachments in this western part of the tield by
saying that the Malakoff had become the real
object of attack, that the siege against the Town
front had grown to be a task of less moment, and
that therefore, to grudge making sacrifices in
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 150.
+ Niel, p. 239 ; Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 166, 167.
+ See ante chap. v.
206
THE RISE OF PELISSIKK.
CHAP.
VII.
conflicts no longer thought cardinal might not
after all, be unwise^1)
This, how-
ever, over-
come.
Pelissier;
not brook-
ing the en-
croach-
ments
against his
own front
But whatever its cause, the French commander's
reluctance to make a vigorous stand against
Todleben's successive aggressions was destined,
this time, to be vanquished, or perhaps one may
say overruled.
The truth is that in this the ' old siege ' — the
siege against the Town front — a man stronger
than Canrobert, and stronger than Canrobert's
Emperor, was beginning to make himself felt.
Pelissier, it is true, at this time commanded
only a corps ; but his, as it chanced, were the
troops affronted, challenged, defied, by this last
growth of new Eussian works thrown out in
advance of Sebastopol ; and, although of course
lawfully he was even on this his own ground a
subordinate owning obedience to the acknowledged
Commander-in-Chief, he still was by nature so
constituted as to be in hot rage at the notion of
quietly, tamely enduring the enemy's audacious
encroachments. And rage with him was a power.
Having great strength of will, whilst able at
pleasure to arm himself — almost dramatically —
with an overpowering vehemence of manner and
speech, and besides, exerting his pressure on one
who well knew him to be indicated by a Dormant
Commission for the exercise (under certain con-
tingencies) of even the highest command, he —
after some effort apparently — got his way over
Canrobert, and was either empowered or suffered
PfiLISSIER'S APRIL FIGHTS. 207
to make that war against 'lodgments' of which chap.
, vii.
we are going to speak.*
Thence sprang the anomaly of Frenchmen Theanom-
r ° . J aly thence
yielding tamely to pressure in that chosen part resulting.
of the field where they meant the attack to be
real, and asserting their strength with decisive-
ness on ground far away towards the west where
their chief regarded the task as one of inferior
moment.t What thus turned the scale against
seemingly fair presumptions was — a well-known
disturbant of inference— the strong, fierce will of
one man.
The ' Cimetiere ' chain of Lodgments was one Fights
so boldly thrown forward that from some of them cimetiere
. Lodgments
the enemy commanded a near, an endangering
view of the French siege- works ; and Pelissier,
not willing to brook so plain an affront, deter-
mined to attack them on the night of the 10th of
April. His purpose being divined by the Rus-
sians (who had seen him preparing his enterprise),
they resorted to a plan which apparently was
based on some theory that in contests for lodg-
ments, it is better to have to attack than it is to
have to defend them. Under cover of evening,
they withdrew their troops from the lodgments
and prepared to ply the new occupants who
might soon be there posted with a powerful fire
* Niel, p. 203. With respect to the ' counter-guard lodg-
' merits,' my inference that Pelissier carried his point alter some
'effort,' is warranted, I think, by Niel's account, pp. 239, 240,
and more decisively hy Rousset's, vol. ii. p. 166.
t Ibid.
208
PELISSIER'S APRIL FIGHTS.
CHAP.
VII.
Resulting,
after some
days, in the
definitive
success of
the French.
of artillery poured out from the Central Bas-
tion.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the evening
the French, taking it for granted that a combat
awaited them, advanced in some strength and
planted themselves in the then empty lodgments,
but were presently assailed (in accordance with
their adversary's design) by a powerful artillery-
fire. Under this ordeal, the French held their
ground firmly during several hours, but not with-
out suffering losses.
Then at two o'clock in the morning, the enemy
made a powerful sortie, retook at once two of the
lodgments, and did not give himself rest until he
had recovered them all. In like manner, on the
nights of the 11th and the 12th there was a
taking and retaking of these pits; but on the
night of the 13th, P^lissier caused them to be
attacked in some force and destroyed.
Todleben's
project for
a new
Work of
counter-
approach.
The fighting
for lodg-
ments con-
structed in
furtherance
of the pro-
ject.
With the deliberate purpose of covering a
somewhat weak part of his defences by a species
of ' counter-guard,' Colonel Todleben had estab-
lished in front of his Schwartz liedoubt another
strong chain of lodgments which were to make a
beginning of the Work designed.
These lodgments Pelissier seized on the last-
mentioned night — the night of the 13th of April;
but after dark on the 23d, and again on the 24th,
the strife was renewed. From that last night
forward until the close of the month, the Kussians
not only remained masters of the lodgments, but
THE SOUSDAL COUNTER-GUAEU. 209
deliberately converted them into a new Work of chap.
. VII.
counter-approach affecting the form of a redonbt, '—
and so audaciously thrown forward as to be 141
yards in advance of the Russian line of defence
and within 116 yards of the French siege- works*
Although not yet supplied with its appointed
armament, this new Work — the Sousdal Counter- TheSou3dai
Counter-
guard — was furnished already with nine little guard.
6-pound mortars which, along with the fire of the
riflemen, were used to annoy the French work-
men who toiled in their most advanced trenches.
The work was connected with the flank of the
Schwartz Eedoubt by a trench so placed as to
be concealed from the eyes of French gunners by
a fold of the ground. On the whole, this new
counter-approach, if endured long enough to allow
of its being completed and armed and defiantly
maintained (as had been the Kamtchatka Lun-
ette), would bring General Pelissier's corps d'armee
into almost the same sort of plight as that in
which we saw the French placed when fended off
by new Works to a distance greater than ever
from the front of the coveted Malakoff.
General Canrobert, we know, grudged the loss
that would have to be suffered in wresting this
Sousdal Counter-guard from the enemy ; t but by
strength of will armed with overpowering vehe-
* Todleben does not deny that this extreme proximity to the
enemy's siege-works was a defect, but says its position was
dictated by the lay of the ground. The new Work was exe-
cuted by troops of the Sousdal Regiment, and thence acquired
its name.
f Niel, p. 239, and Rousset, vol. ii. p. 166.
VOL. VIII. O
210
p£lissier's conqukst
C II A P.
VII.
Brilliant
attack by
the French
on the
Sousdal
Counter-
guard,
and capture
of the Work
mence Pelisaier brought his Chief to consent that
the attack should be made, and orders were given
accordingly.*
At halt-past ten o'clock on the night of the 1st
of May, a strong body of French infantry com-
manded by General Motterouge advanced against
the Work in three columns, of which those on the
right and left Hanks were respectively under the
orders of General de Salles and General Bazaine,
whilst General Motterouge in person led forward
the two battalions which formed his centre
column.!
Either in or about the Work, the enemy at this
time was present with no less than four bat-
talions; but devoting his care to the task of
repairing havoc done in the daytime by French
artillery, he is said to have been off his guard,
and to have been taken in part by surprise.^
Without firing a shot, the assailants made good
their advance to the edge of the Work, and
the centre column at once broke over its parapet
intent on the use of the bayonet. Some lively
fighting ensued, but did not last long. The centre
column prevailing soon drove out the Kussians,
pursued them some way in their flight, and was
master of the counter-approach including its nine
little mortars.
Then with admirable valour and skill Colonel
* Niel, pp. 239, 240 ; Rousset, vol. ii. p. 1G6.
+ Niel, p. 240 et seq. I am unable to give the numerical
strength of the columns ; but they comprised, it seems,
altogether two entire battalions, with besides twenty -seven
companies.— Ibid. + Todleben, vol. ii. p. 198.
OF THE SOUSDAL COUNTER-GUARD. 211
Guerin of the French Engineers and the officers chap.
. . VII
and men working under his guidance made haste _
to clench the victory. Eeversing the parapets of
the captured Work, they converted to the use of
the French what so lately had sheltered the
Eussians, and achieved under fire the perilous resulting
and difficult task of forming (by flying sap) the pietesuc-
gabionaded approach — full 350 yards long — that French.
would link to their system of trenches the newly
effected conquest. The conduct of the French
troops, that night, was, as Lord Eaglan said, ' very
' brilliant.' *
The time for attacking and seizing this work of
counter-approach was happily chosen ; for (ex-
cept as regards the small mortars) it had not as
yet been armed, though its ramparts had already
attained such a height and solidity that, when
once in the hands of the victor, they afforded him
a much-needed shelter against the fire of the place.
It was not without making sacrifices that the Losses su*.
French achieved this conquest of what at the first the night
had been only a chain of those aggravated Eifle- theistof
pits which Todleben used to call ' Lodgments,
In killed and wounded, they lost, it would seem,
about 600 officers and men ; t the Eussians 425.1
* I quote this high praise from Lord Raglan's published
Despatch, May 5, 1855.
t Niel, p. 241. The numbers killed and wounded on the
French Left at the time in question — i.e., from the 1st to the
2d of May — is stated at 602, and it does not appear that there
was any other combat that night. The French losses at the
battle of the Alma were not, it seems, quite so great as those
they sustained in this combat.
t Todleben, vol. ii. p. 199,
May.
212
EGEKTOK S ENGAGEMENT,
CHAP.
VII.
Canrobert
apologising
for this
victorious
exploit.
The Sousdal
Counter-
guard con-
verted into
a French
Work;
and held
fast.
Strange as it may seem to those who have not
grasped the full bearing of General Niel's ' mis-
' sion,' it is actually true that General Canrobert
offered an excuse to the Home Government for
this victorious exploit, as one of a kind inconsistent
with ' the system of waiting ' — a system which
seemed to forbid all such actions ; and he added
that the embarrassment thus caused was ' one of
' the difficulties of the situation.' *
On the following day, the French strengthened
themselves yet further in the conquered Work,
and gave it a name. They called it, ' The Work
' of the 2d of May ' ; and afterwards, at about
three o'clock, they promptly repulsed a sortie
which the Russians attempted against it.
On the night of the 13th, they repulsed a new
sortie attempted against the Work, as also one
made further west with a view to aid the main
object by making a diversion elsewhere.
The fighting
for lodg-
ments in
front of
' Gordon's
' Attack.'
Pelissier had not yet opened his small, though
determined campaign against the ( Counter-guard '
Lodgments, when on other and distant lodgments
confronting the left advanced sap of Gordon's
Attack our people made an assault. Against that
same part of our siege-works, and to prevent the
English from seizing those very same lodgments
(which our people still always called rifle-pits),
the enemy had determined to make a sortie on
the night of the 20th of April;! but our people
* Kousset, vol. ii. p. 167.
T Todlebeu, vol. ii. p. 162.
AND CAPTURE OF RIFLE-PITS. 213
anticipated him by twenty-four hours; and it chap.
was at nine o'clock on the evening of the 19th _
of April that, commanding in person a detach-
ment of his splendid 77th Eegiment, Colonel Egerton-s
Egerton assaulted the lodgments. He attacked ment.
them with an 'impetuosity' — Lord Eaglan uses
the word — which did not prevent the conflict from
being severe for a time, but caused it nevertheless
to be short. He promptly carried the lodgments,
but suffered some loss, and Captain Lempriere of
his regiment, a young, though most able officer,
was one of the killed.
In one of the captured lodgments, our Engineers
resolved to establish a lodgment of their own, and
to connect it with the head of their sap. This,
though only of course incompletely, they found
means to do in the course of three or four hours.
They determined that they would not retain the
other lodgment ; but some men — perhaps eight or
ten — were left there on watch for the time.
At about one o'clock the Eussians advanced
with a whole battalion of their famous Vladimir
Eegiment, reinforced by some hundreds of men
volunteering from its other battalions for this
special service. The assailants drove in our cov-
ering sentries and the eight or ten soldiers left
watching in the otherwise unoccupied lodgment.
Then advancing against the lodgment which
our people had resolved to hold fast, the Eussian
force moved in its strength ; but the English
coming up in good time, soon drove back the
Vladimir troops, thus defeating the enemy's efforts
214 egerton's death.
chap, to reconquer what he had lost. Thenceforth the
V1L coveted lodgment remained connected definitively
with the siege-works of ' Gordon's Attack.'
This capture destroyed all the value of the
other lodgment, which therefore was left un-
occupied by the Kussians as well as the English.*
But this ' brilliant achievement' — I quote the
two words from Lord Raglan — was one that cost
our people some lives, and — what is more — it
cost them a life. Whilst forming his troops for
the second of the two encounters, Colonel Egerton
His death, was killed. In his official despatch, Lord Raglan
speaks with great warmth of Colonel Egerton's
services, declaring indeed that the army 'could
' not have sustained a more severe loss ' than the
one which his death inflicted, and that ' so it was
* felt in the army, and in the 77th where he was
' much beloved and was deeply lamented ' ; but
in a private letter of the same date he could not
help giving a further expression to his sense of
ins fame. Egerton's worth ; saying even that, although the
achievement would, he 'doubted not, produce a
' good effect both on the enemy and our allies, it
1 was dearly bought by the sacrifice of the life of
1 Colonel Egerton, who was one of the best officers
' in the army, and looked up to by all.' t
But more puissant than all words of praise is
the memory of what Egerton did on the morning
* And so it remained until the morning of the 21st, when
Lieutenant Walker of the 30th, moving gallantly out with a
party of volunteers, completely filled in and razed it. — Lord
Raglan to Secretary of State, April 24, 1855.
t Private Letter to Lord Panmure, 21st April 1855.
REPULSE OF SORTIES. 215
of Inkerman, where, General Buller commanding, chap.
VII
he with less than 300 men of his glorious 77th 1_
turned back the whole tide of a battle then roll-
ing in with the weight of Soimonolfs gathered
masses*
It happened that, in proportion to the strength
of the rank and file, a somewhat large number of The praises
nn r> i j» l i i bestowed
officers were present in these fights tor the lodg- by Lord
i • i b Raglan on
ment, and I observe that the conduct of eight of the troops
taking part
them won the high approval of Lord Eaglan.i in this com-
° *- A ° bat.
Lord Kaglan reported the conduct of the troops
to have been admirable.
In killed and wounded, all reckoned, the losses The losses
were, it seems, sixty-eight. \ our people.
In the course of this period the sorties — made The night
always at night — against the French and the during this
English trenches, were efforts of a determined
kind, but after more or less fighting, were all of
period.
* His exact strength was 259. See chap. vi. sec. xvi. of Inker-
man vmame, p. 148 et seq. of 1st (Octavo) Edition, vol. vi. of
Cabinet Edition, p. 127 et seq. It will be seen that the gallant
young Lempriere, struck down on this 19th of April, was one
of the officers present under Egerton at Inkerman.
+ Namely, besides Colonel Egerton and Captain Lempriere,
both killed, General Lockyer (general officer of the trenches in
the Right Attack), Colonel Mundy of the 33d (who succeeded
Egerton in the command of the force), Colonel Tylden, Captain
Owen, and Lieutenant Baynes, all three of the Engineers, and
Captain Gwilt of the 34th Regiment. The same despatch men-
tioned Captain King of the Engineers in words of high praise,
but for services rendered before the 19th. He had been
wounded on the 17 th.
$ Journal of Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 158. The amount
of the Russian loss is not given.
216 OMAR PASHA'S RECONNAISSANCE.
CHAP, them duly repulsed without having done any
' harm great enough to be specially memorable.
The real advantage achieved by these petty en-
terprises was of a general — not special — kind.
They kept the besiegers on the alert, and made it
their duty to go on unceasingly with the always
harassing task committed to their ' guards of the
' trenches.'
These night sorties against the English trenches
took place sometimes under conditions which
gave our people occasion for showing their superb
fighting qualities, and winning the gracious ap-
proval of Lord Eaglan — a commander so just and
so generous, that he did not like his praise to be
stinted by the smallness or obscurity of the arena
in which his officers and men might be often dis-
closing their prowess. There for instance was
heart in his tone when, to take but one sample,
he told the Home Government that a determined
sortie had been ' most nobly met and repulsed.' *
Arecon- Omar Pasha, one day, from his camp in the
naissanco
by Omar plain of Balaclava, effected a little reconnaissance
to the left bank of the Tchernaya. This I mention
because the battalions composing his principal
* See his published Despatches on the sorties of the nights
of the 5th, 9th, and 11th of May. — Sayer's Collection, pp. 158,
160, 161. In these Lord Raglan accords high praise to the
troops, and — by name — to Captain Williamson and Lieutenant
Gubbins of the 30th, Lieutenant Rochfort of the 49th, Colonel
Trollope, Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy, Captain Turner of the
Royal Fusiliers, Captain Jordan of the 34th, and Captain
Edwards of the 68th, killed.
ACCESSION OF FKESH ALLIES. 217
force were flanked on their left by some cavalry, chap.
and field-batteries, which with excellent courtesy
the French and the English Commanders had ^rded."
placed — for once — under the guidance of a
Turkish and Mussulman Pasha.
Towards the end of the month of April, the submarine
telegraph
task of laying down a submarine telegraph cable connecting
J _. ° the cher-
connecting the Chersonese with Varna was sonesewith
° Varna.
brought to completion ; and so early as the 2d
of May the arrangements for intercommunication
were perfected. Thenceforth a few hours sufficed
for the passage of messages flying from either
Paris or London to the camps in front of Se-
bastopol.
This facility of communication, however, was its counter
not an unmixed advantage ; and perhaps indeed mischief!,
many of those who will see its effects as experi-
enced in the night of the 3d of May will impa-
tiently say that the change was rather a curse
than a blessing.*
There also was laid down a cable which con- The Eupa-
nected the Chersonese with Eupatoria.
Lord Raglan towards the close of this period Theacces-
was happily strengthened in numbers by a large 15,000 sar-
• iiii dinian
and welcome accession of troops placed under his troops under
General de la
Orders. Marmora.
The King of Sardinia had so aimed his exalted
ambition as to make the cause of Italy his own,
* See post, p. 263 et seq.
218 ACCESSION OF THE SARDINIAN AKMY.
chap, and his counsels at this time were guided by a
VII
Minister of rare sagacity, who perceived that an
object so great, yet also so perturbing to Europe,
was one wholly out of the reach of common, hand-
to-mouth statesmanship, and could only be ac-
complished, if ever accomplished at all, by what,
as distinguished from 'statesmanship,' may per-
haps be called far-sighted statecraft. When
England and France had taken up arms against
Russia, Count Cavour — with some aid, it would
seem, from the clear-seeing mind of a woman * —
made bold to adopt a policy which appeared at
first sight highly venturesome, and by many per-
haps would be treated as somewhat unscrup-
ulous ; (2) but, so far as concerned its policy, he
at least knew how to support it by a fair show
of reasoning. He argued that sooner or later,
the war, as matter of course, would be followed
by a treating for peace in which the belligerents,
all of them, would naturally have to take part,
and that therefore, if the ICing of Sardinia were
simply to take the step of declaring war against
Nicholas, he too (by his Minister) would be neces-
sarily present in Congress, and there by mere
utterance of the name of ' Italy ' might already
be advancing her cause ; whilst also, if furnishing
troops to fight side by side with those of the
Western Powers, he might earn a clear right to
have their goodwill, and deserve it indeed all the
* Cavour's niece, the Countess Alfieri. I owe my know
ledge of this to Mr Hayward. See in his Biographical Essays
the one on Count Cavour.
ACCESSION OF THE SARDINIAN ARMY. 219
more, since he had not himself any grievance, or chap.
. VII.
ground of complaint against Bussia. .
Thus it happened that on the 8th of May-
General de la Marmora, with a part of the 15,000
Sardinian troops despatched to the seat of war,
and followed by the rest of the force, was already
landing at Balaclava, and placing himself, as
agreed, at the English Commander's disposal.
Words other than mine will commemorate the
battle of the Tchernaya, and the part there vic-
toriously taken by General de la Marmora at the
head of his Sardinian army ; but without break-
ing loose from that tether which confines me
within the period ended on the 28th of June, I
can say that, whilst Lord Eaglan lived, his re-
lations with the welcome allies thus joining their
strength to his own were always thoroughly
cordiaL(3)
220 TKOUBLED COUNSELS
CHAPTER VIII.
TROUBLED COUNSELS OF THE FKENCH.
chap. The work of destruction effected in the two White
— Kedoubts, in the Kamtchatka Lunette, and above
all, in the clusters of batteries which included
the Flagstaff Bastion, must needs have been
partly descried, and partly also inferred by many
of the artillerymen busied in the Trench advanced
batteries ; * but, supposing him to have bestowed
little care on their necessarily piecemeal accounts,
it was possible for General Canrobert to be far
from completely aware of the havoc his siege-
guns had wrought ; and if, on the other hand,
knowing the whole, or one-half of the truth, he
Tendency of must have found himself strangely embarrassed
bombard- by the exigencies of his Emperor's plot ; since,
inenttode-
range the to own that the April Bombardment had opened
working of r
Niei's'mis- fit paths for assault, would be almost the same
' slon." *
as acknowledging that sound warlike counsels
* For the extent of that work of destruction, see ante, pp.
187-189.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 221
demanded those very exertions of force which chap.
. VIII.
the ill-omened ' Mission ' forbade. __
Be all this as it may, General Canrobert ig- Canrobert
nored from the first, and persistently went on success of
ignoring the effects of his own cannonade. bardment.
So early as the 10th of April (which was only
the second day of the bombardment, and one on
which the defence of Sebastopol was languishing
for want of ammunition, and whilst also the
White Eedoubts and the Flagstaff Bastion were
falling into that state of utter helplessness which
they reached before sunset) General Canrobert
intimated to Lord Eaglan that he did not much
expect the bombardment to produce a successful
result;* and on the same day, he addressed to
his Emperor this very significant letter : — ' If the
' superiority of our fire is not completely estab-
' lished (which we shall know to-morrow) we shall
' diminish it, and if necessary, stop it altogether,
' keeping ourselves in readiness against any at-
' tack by the relieving army. If this attack (de-
' sired with so much reason) does not take place,
' we (though harassing the enemy meanwhile to
' the best of our power) shall await the arrival
' of your Majesty's Army of Eeserve, convinced
' in such case that upon the action of that Ee-
' serve army will depend the fate of Sebastopol.' t
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 14, 1855.
+ Rousset, vol. ii. p. 147.
TROUBLED COUNSELS.
CHAP.
VIII.
Conference
of 1 ith
April.
Disposition
on the part
of the
French,
except
Pelissier, to
stop the
bombard-
ment;
but success-
fully com-
bated by
Lord Raglan
and Lyons.
A slight
relaxation
of the fet-
ters imposed
on Canrobert
II.
On the 14th of April — a day when the Flag-
staff llastion, as we saw, was in desperate plight
— there took place a conference at which (besides
the principal French and English Artillery and
Engineer officers) there were present General
Canrobert, General Pelissier, General Bosquet,
Omar Pasha, Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir George
Brown, and Lord Raglan.* The Conference
lasted more than four hours, and all agreed that
an immediate assault ought not to be attempted^1)
The French (excepting Pelissier, who advised
going on with the siege) were at first for arrest-
ing the bombardment, if not indeed even for
stopping all other aggressive proceedings until
the place should be invested. Then Canrobert,
Lord Raglan, Omar Pasha, and Sir Edmund
Lyons retired into another room, and it appeared
that Canrobert was for maintaining the ' status
' quo ' ; but ultimately, though with no little diffi-
culty, Lord Raglan — greatly aided by Sir Edmund
Lyons — prevailed upon Canrobert to agree that
the bombardment should be continued, though
with diminished fire, in order that the ammu-
nition might last the longer.t
General Canrobert at this time obtained what
might seem at first glance like some small, very
small relaxation of the miserable fetters he wore
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 14, 1855.
t Lord Raglan to Lord Pan mure, private letter, 14th April
1855, and same (Secret) to Secretary of State, 17th April 1855
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 223
in obedience to General Niel's 'mission.' Whilst chap.
viii
confronting at close quarters a powerful enemy, 1-
and having encamped at his side an unsuspecting ^m^ou.
ally kept in ignorance of the all-ruling 'mission,'
he had patiently held the command during several
weeks of what I called ' an army in waiting ' ; and
against the strange lot cast upon him, his pride,
it seems, had not rebelled. But when the time
for a great artillery effort drew nigh, the French
Emperor dimly perceived that he had been plac-
ing his army in a predicament which might prove
under certain conditions to be one of an odious
sort, and well calculated, if the truth should leak
out, to bring his name into disgrace. If indeed
the bombardment should produce good and whole-
some results, yet not of a kind so conspicuous as
to be appreciable by all observers, its success
might be ignored, concealed, and denied; but
what if its destructive power should prove over-
whelming ? If Sebastopol should seem to be
lying at the mercy of a French army, was Can-
robert still to be hindered from laying his hand
on the prize by the exigencies of the Imperial
mission ? Plainly under the stress of such
thoughts, yet clinging still to a hope that both
the French army on the Chersonese, and the
Army of Eeserve at Constantinople might be
kept in unimpaired force to await his good plea-
sure, he did, as too often men must, when torn
by conflicting motives. He tried, as well as he
could, to give some effect more or less to each of
the opposing forces which strove for the mastery
224
TROUBLED COUNSELS.
CHAP.
VIII.
The miser-
able in-
struction
given to
Canrobert
by his Em-
peror.
Canrobert.'!
state of
mind.
of his will ; and at last, whilst announcing that he
would have 40,000 men at Constantinople before
the end of the month ;* he yet did not grant the
general leave to move any part of that force, save
only in the desperate conjuncture of its proving
to be peremptorily needed for the safety of his
arniy.t And, after thus perversely continuing
the disjoinder of his forces in the East, the
Emperor ended by giving to General Canrobert
this miserable instruction: 'Do what you can,
' but do not compromise yourself.' J
With the slight, very slight relaxation of the
rules of Niel's mission which this letter granted,
it also kept in force so much of the old restraint
that General Canrobert, it would seem, suffered
tortures. There were times when he thought
himself capable of directing that an assault
should take place within perhaps less than a
week, but none that found him inclined to take
such a step the same day, or even so soon as
the morrow ; and one who has had access to his
correspondence with the Emperor and the War
* Letter from Emperor to Canrobert, partly read out by him
to Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret,
17th April 1855. The letter, or at all events the part of it
read out to Lord Raglan, did not say what use was to be made
of the 40,000 men.
f Lord Raglan (after hearing this from Canrobert) to the
Secretary of State, Secret, 14th April 1855, and again (there
stating the exception above shown) same to same, Secret, 24th
April 1855.
+ Canrobert on the 16th of April read out to Lord Raglan
the passage of a letter he had received from the Emperor which
contained those words. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State,
Secret, 17th April 1855.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 225
Minister describes him as a man who between chap.
viii.
the conflicting ideas was ' painfully oscillating.' * L
Niel — never forgetting his ' mission ' — stood over The conduct
r~* i ■ /mi • » • i mi i an<* baring
the Commander- ln-Cmei with a will to denounce ofNiei.
every notion that Canrobert might venture to
harbour of assaulting Sebastopol, and the Im-
perial aide -de - camp thus superintending the
general mingled even some scorn with his use
of the curb ; for he did not so much as believe
that any design of assaulting would last until
the cardinal moment for turning resolve into
action.!
On the 16th, General Niel seems to have been His letter
,., n . , r^ , P . ., ofthel6th
displeased with (Janrobert tor not acting with of April to
„ the Minister
more steadfast deference to the precepts of the of war.
' Mission,' and apparently for even allowing the
growth of consultations with reasoners who har-
boured the thought of assault ; for he thus wrote
to the Minister of War : — ' I am going to try to
' turn the minds of the commanders from an at-
' tempt no less dangerous than useless, which I
' hope will be abandoned. ... I did not advise
' engaging in this artillery conflict ; for I had,
' and still hold the conviction that, even if it had
' proved more successful than it has, there still
' would not have been an assault driven into the
' town.' % Incredible, as it would seem, if not
proved, this Aide-de camp superintendent estab-
* Rousset, pp. 146, 147.
+ See post, p. 227, his letter to the Emperor of the 17th
April 1855.
+ Rousset, voL ii. p. 145.
VOL. VIII. P
226 TROUBLED COUNSELS.
chap, lished at the French Headquarters made bold
VIIL to reprove the Minister of War for not having
lectured the unfortunate Canrobert, and thus
kept him in more close obedience to the com-
mands of the ' Mission.' ' I must regret, M. le
' Marshal, that you did not speak to the Com-
' mander-in-Chief about the conduct of the siege.
' From the accounts furnished to you, you know
' pretty well what Sebastopol is, and besides,
' being close to the Emperor, you know many
' things that are not known here. I am con-
• vinced that if you had written in the sense in
' which I spoke, a great deal of faltering would
' have been avoided.'*
It was on the 16th of April that Lord Eaglan
received his first knowledge of what 1 have called
the ' miserable instruction ' ; t and thenceforth he
of course understood that the French Commander
associated with him in the enterprise against
Sebastopol was not at the time a fr,ee agent ;
but one must not be led to infer that an end
no termina- was thus put to the secrecy which had shrouded
secre°y * the ' Mission ' of Niel. Nothing short of the fall
shrouded of the 'Empire' with other favouring circum-
■sion/ m ' stances sufficed to lay bare the truth, and show
how the ' Mission ' of Niel had been secretly
taking effect from the time of his arrival in
January to the mid-April period now reached.
i6th April. On the 16th of April (after a preliminary dis-
made be-" cussion between the chief Engineer and Artillery
* Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 145, 146.
-f- See ante, p. 224, and footnote.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 227
officers of the allied armies), the three com- chap.
. VIII
manders met in conference determined that the 1
contemplated assault should be delayed for some ^bertand
days (not saying how many), in order to give J^f Rag"
time for the construction of certain additional
works ; and they also put off their decision re-
specting what should be done against the Kamt-
chatka Lunette as well as against the place
generally ; but they agreed that an attack in
one quarter should be made by a joint use of
forces, French, English, and Ottoman. They re-
solved that, upon orders to that effect being given,
the White Eedoubts should be seized by troops
to be drawn for the purpose from each of the
three allied armies*
Three days afterwards, however, Lord Eaglan, butaban-
i • -i • i • ii n t doned three
when reminding his colleague of the agreement, daysafter-
& fo & wards by
found Canrobert appearing to think that the canrobert.
capture of those works, after all, 'would not be
' attended with any important advantage ' ; t and
accordingly the project was dropped.
On the 17th of April — the morrow of a day 17th April.
when the Flagstaff Bastion had been brought to Niei to the
p • i -H.T- t Empercr.
a state of miserable wreck — JNiel wrote direct to
the Emperor : — ' Sire, our artillery has not ob-
1 tained great results. Every morning the Place
' resumes its fire, and each embrasure has its gun
' in a state for firing. The English little fright-
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 17, 1855.
t This was on the 19th. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State
Secret, 21st April 1855.
228
TROUBLED COUNSELS.
C HAP.
VIII.
ened at having to pass over 600 mttres of ground
before getting from their parallel to the Redan
had declared that they were ready to assault;
but since, reflections have come, and yesterday
evening, the three commanders determined that
they would prolong and diminish their fire
without stopping it. Sire, it is with lively
regret that I see the confirmation of what I
have always thought : the assault is so difficult,
so dangerous for the army, that when the mo-
ment comes, people shrink from before it. The
truth is that in this (so-called) siege, people
aim at an object which they yet do not ven-
ture to grasp when they closely approach it,
that there is no solution but in the investment
of the Place after having beaten the enemy,
and that consequently it is necessary to hasten
as much as possible the arrival of the Army
of Reserve which your Majesty is forming at
Constantinople.' *
Ki.ullition
of warlike
impatienco
on the part
of the
French
army
III.
When the Flagstaff Bastion, on the evening of
the 21st of April, had been not only silenced and
brought to ruin by overwhelming fire, but also
laid under the pressure of a 4th Parallel then
newly opened against it at less than a hundred
yards' distance, the French army hitherto patient
could no longer be prevented from judging that
the time for final action was ripe ; and in the
* Rousset, vol. ii. p. 146.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 229
course of the following day a great weight of chat.
opinion pronounced that the enemy's shattered !_
defences were meet to be carried by storm.
Whether hurried along by this feeling, or — for Canroi»ert
i ■ • A i r\ eitli. r shar-
the moment — advisedly sharing it, General Can- i«a tiie ivei
J . ing or liur-
robert took strides on the road which seemed <i<<i along
by it.
leading to resolute action.
But Niel ? Euled alike by the exigencies of Niei.
his 'Mission,' and by the strength of his con-
victions, he could hardly have relaxed his desire
that the prudently guided Allies should adven-
ture no assault of Sebastopol without first in-
vesting the place ; and, if he did not stamp out
the notion of prompt appeals to the bayonet by
a peremptory use of his delegate power, nay even
appeared for some hours to approve a resort to
such measures, he has left behind him a clue
from which one perhaps may infer that without
foregoing his object he only changed his means
of obtaining it. He believed that, though de-
termined beforehand to assault the Eedan, Lord
Eaglan, when it came to the point, would never
send forward his columns of infantry across the
breadth of interposed ground — which divided the
goal set before them from their most advanced
parallel;* and accordingly, he was free to im-
agine that his long- pursued task of preventing
assaults might be, this time, performed by the
English. Let the French with apparent decisive-
ness propose a general assault. The English, thus
* See ante, p. 227. Niel's Letter of the 17th of April to the
Emperor.
230
TROUBLED COUNSKLS.
CHA P.
VIII.
23d April.
The French
ostensibly
ready to
assault.
Preliminary
conference.
Evening of
the 23d.
Agreement
bel ween
Ci n robe it
and Lord
Raglan for
a general
assault of
Sebastop)!.
brought to the point, would refuse, he imagined,
to march against the distant Redan. Their re-
fusal would at once put an end to the whole
project, and on them — not the French or their
Emperor — would fall the whole anger of those
who were yearning for an assault of Sebastopol.
It was with a purpose made to seem firmly
settled that the French on Monday the 23d of
April began to concert fitting measures for a
general assault. At a conference held in the
morning, the chief Engineer and Artillery officers
of the French and English armies declared their
opinion in writing — a writing drawn up by Niel
himself — and advised that, unless the investment
of Sebastopol should be effected within ten days,
the place should be assaulted.*
In the evening, General Canrobert came to Lord
Raglan's quarters, bringing with him, as it seemed,
bold resolves. He proposed that the Allies should
assault Sebastopol; and to this Lord Raglan agreed.
After a discussion which lasted two hours, General
Canrobert and Lord Raglan arranged that the fire
which had been slack for some days should be re-
sumed on the 26th, and that after this fire should
have been kept up for two days and a half, ad-
vances should be made against the place in such
manner as should be thought most desirable.!
( )n t he ground, as he wrote, that ' General Can-
1 robert and the greater portion of the French
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855.
Rousset, vol. ii. p. 154.
+ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 231
' superior officers had hitherto shown such un- CHAP.
VIII
' willingness to undertake anything that might __
' involve serious risk,' and that ' the General-in-
' Chief had always previously manifested a dis-
' position to pursue a very cautious course,' and
had been ' warned by the Emperor not to commit
' himself,' Lord Eaglan was greatly surprised at Lord Rag-
the apparently sudden conversion of his French pression.
allies to the policy of undertaking assaults, but —
at first — he did not doubt their sincerity ; * and
accordingly addressed his Government in terms
well befitting what seemed to be a grave con-
juncture.t
IV.
Not many hours had passed, when Lord Raglan
perceived, as he thought, that under this new re-
solve to assault Sebastopol, General Canrobert did General
not feel ' comfortable ' ; J and how well he divined apparently8
the truth we are able to see ; for on the very mor- state.
row of the agreement made with Lord Eaglan in
the evening of the 23d, General Canrobert was His letter
writing to the Emperor in terms which not only (24th April)
, , , . ill! i to the Em-
declared the assault he had proposed on the pre- peror.
vious evening to be a hazardous measure, but
* This is shown, I think, by his surmises as to the cause of
their being determined (as he then thought they were) to
undertake an assault.
t Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855.
In quoting some words from the despatch, I have corrected
what seemed to me a clerical error by substituting ' involve '
for ' incur. '
1 Ibid.
232
TIinri.LKI) COUNSELS.
CHAP.
VIII.
Niel writing
to the Km-
peror at the
same time.
The Em-
peror's ac-
count of the
two letters.
Morning
of 25th.
Canrobert
resolved to
put off the
assault;
even shadowed out an intention — then already
appearing half formed — to abandon the accepted
agreement, and supplant it by other designs.
Niel also wrote to his sovereign by the same
mail, and the Emperor thus cites the two letters :
— ' A letter from General Canrobert of the 24th
' of April, and another from General Niel an-
' nounce to me that in accord with Lord Eaglan
' they have decided that the assault should be
' delivered on the 28th or 29th of April, that
' the enterprise is hazardous, and that perhaps
1 they will make up their minds to attack the
' enemy * and to invest the place, if the army of
' reserve receives orders to proceed to the Crimea.
* I received these two letters on the 5th of May.' t
. . . ' Canrobert himself says that on the 24th
' the situation was so strained that it could not
' last more than fifteen days.' J
With his mind in the state thus disclosed,
General Canrobert might perhaps be expected to
appreciate a newly found reason for abandoning
the warlike agreement he had made on the pre-
vious day, and this he accordingly did — did even
within a few hours.
On the morning of the 25th, Niel came to the
English Headquarters, bringing with him a letter
— a letter not very new (dated Paris, the 7th of
* Some such words as 'in the field,' or 'on the north side,'
appear to be wanting ; but, if the sentence be without them
imperfect, it can hardly be called obscure.
f The Emperor of the French to Lord Cowley, dated Palace
of the Tuileries, 7th May 1855.
t Ibid.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 233
April) from the Minister of Marine to Admiral CHAP.
Bruat — which intimated that the French Keserve _
troops at Constantinople would be ready to em-
bark for the theatre of war on the 10th of May.
This letter Niel read to Lord Raglan, and he Theinter-
view be-
founded upon it a conclusion which already, he tweenNiei
r ... and Lord
showed, had been reached with unanimity by Raglan.
General Canrobert and ail the French Generals
assembled to give him counsel — a conclusion pro-
nouncing it 'desirable to postpone the offensive
' operations against Sevastopol.' He urged that,
although inconvenient, delay was 'preferable to
' the immediate adoption of a course which would
' be attended with great risk and could be pur-
' sued under altered circumstances with better
' chances of success.' * ' Niel,' continued Lord
Raglan, 'made some rather curious admissions.
' He avowed that he had been strongly opposed
' to the reopening of the batteries of the Allies,
' and that he held to the opinion he had origin-
' ally formed that an assault could not be success-
' ful, and yet he had been constantly urging Gen-
' eral Rose to press upon me the necessity of re-
' suming the lire, and he drew the Paper of the
' 23d already before your Lordship which con-
' tained the recommendation of the Artillery and
' Engineer officers that an attack should be made
' upon the place after an active bombardment of
' forty-eight hours. I ventured to point this out
' to him, and he fully acknowledged that I was
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 28th April
1855.
234
TROUBLED COUNSELS.
! HAP.
VIII.
Course
taken by
Lord Rag-
lan.
25th April.
Canrobert's
letter pat-
ting olf the
attack.
' right, but he observed : — " I am not the Corn-
' mander-in-Chief."'*
Lord Raglan of course could not baffle a
scheme of postponement demanded by the un-
animous authority of the assembled French gen-
erals ; but, after all that had passed, he thought
himself entitled to require that the proposal to
put off the assault should be in writing. Niel
judged the demand to be reasonable ; and ac-
cordingly on the same day General Canrobert
addressed to Lord Eaglan a letter fulfilling the
purpose. After saying that all had been pre-
pared for the delivery of a general assault on
about the 28th of April, he wrote: — 'To-day, I
' communicated to the generals commanding the
' two Army Corps and the Engineers and Artil-
1 lery of the French army an official despatch
' announcing that the Corps of Eeserve forming
' at Constantinople will be ready to commence
' operations on the 10th of May next. In the
' face of this communication, and seeing the pos-
' sible consequences of a general assault beset by
' the most difficult circumstances that can take
' place in war — circumstances that might com-
1 promise the two allied armies, and the future
' of the great interests which they defend, the
' conference unanimously expressed the opinion
' that it was fitting to wait for the commence-
1 ment of operations by the Corps of Eeserve. I
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 28th April 1 855.
I translate the last words from the original French in which
Lonl Raglan gives them.
TKOUBLED COUNSELS. 235
1 sulmit to your Lordship this opinion which chap.
' seems to be inspired by considerations of a !_
' value that will not escape you, and to which I
' think you will be willing to give your approval/
'What surprises me,' writes Lord Raglan, 'is LordRag-
: that, the proposition of the assault having Nation oT
'emanated from the French on the 23d, they change of
' should all have been opposed to the proceeding
' on the 25th.'
The letter of the 7th of April, from the French
Minister of Marine, which General Niel brought
to Lord Raglan on this Wednesday the 25th, had
seemingly reached Admiral Bruat in the course
of the previous week ; * and on the 24th, in the
presence of both Canrobert and the English Com-
mander, the admiral had stated its purport ; t yet
no one then broached the idea of making it serve
as a ground for putting off the assault.^ Nor circum-
indeed can one say that this rudely disturbing under which
•i tit i i it ii ■ the letter to
idea would have ever been broached at all, it Bruat was
T111 . in •\ii- -i put forward
Lord Raglan (instead of consenting) had justified
the calculations of Niel by declining to assault
the Redan.§
When Canrobert (having found that the Eng-
lish were ready to take part in the assault) fell
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 28th April 1855.
'Must' have done so is what Lord Raglan says.
t Ibid.
J This clearly results from the 2d paragraph of the last above-
cited despatch.
§ With respect to Niel's idea that the English on reflection
would not undertake a task so desperate as the assault of the
Redan, see ante, his letter of the 17 th of April.
236 TROUBLED COUNSELS.
chap, afterwards into the state of unliopefulness, and
VIII
J_ doubt, and anxiety disclosed by his plaint to the
Emperor, he of course became ripe for that logic
which drew from the letter to Bruat a reason for
stopping the enterprise ; but a general who, ever
since February, had been suffering the audacious
garrison to defy him with its counter-approaches,
and had thrown away every occasion for seizing
the Flagstaff Bastion, could hardly bespeak from
our people a welcome for any discovery which
only furnished new reasons for not yet assault-
ing Sebastopol.
Still, what men in dispute call ' an afterthought '
is not of necessity worthless ; and in fairness it
ought to be said that on this 25th of April, the
opportunities offered by the bombardment had
already been lost ; * so that then there were not
those sharp reasons for prompt appeal to the
bayonet which we saw had been pressing enough
weight due on many of the earlier days. Perhaps therefore,
to the letter ... -i i i e e i_t 1 j
of the 7th of if men had been free from the anger provoked
at the time by Canrobert's numberless falterings,
they might hardly have refused to acknowledge
that, whilst having before him the prospect spread
out to his sight by the letter of the 7th of April,
the French Commander was justified in resolv-
ing to wait for the co-operation of the Corps
of Reserve before venturing to undertake such a
measure as the general assault of Sebastopol.
* The general bombardment had ceased on the 1 8th, and
the fire directed specially against the Flagstaff Bastion had not
lasted beyond the 22d.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 237
CHAP.
VIII.
V.
But supposing this conclusion accepted, and ac- The previous
. . , concealment
cordinQ'ly aQ;reein<>' with Canrobert that a vitally fromcan-
& J B ° J robert.
momentous decision was rightly averted by the
letter of the 7th of April, it seems wondrous that
he of all men should have long been excluded
from that very parcel of knowledge which was
held (when discovered at last) to afford the sure
clue for his guidance, and left to find it out acci-
dentally, after many a day, from a letter which
Admiral Bruat had for some other purpose ad-
duced.
The truth is that on the subject of his Corps of
Reserve the French Emperor had been maintain-
ing from the first a system of almost childish
concealment against his own general Canrobert ; *
though perhaps it was mainly from sloth, or from
want of comprehensive brain-power, that he let
concealment run on to its more extravagant
lengths. That his admirably organised Ministry
of War failed to save him from so huge a default,
is not perhaps very wonderful ; since plainly his
interposition, being fitful, ill-conceived, and mys-
terious, must have tended to hamper its clock-
* As well showed by Marshal Vaillant's mysterious letter to
Canrobert. Rousset, vol. ii. p. 35, and quoted post, in the next
page. ' Le general Canrobert lui-meine n'en devait rien ap-
' prendre.' These words are given by Rousset authoritatively
because he had had access to the secret papers of the War De-
partment. Vol. ii. p. 35.
238 TROUBLED COUNSELS.
chap. work. 'The Emperor' writes Vaillant to Can-
VIII
robert 'chooses to have his Army of Reserve in
' liand ; I cannot better explain myself.' * "When
absolute concealment from Canrobert of what
thousands were partially knowing had become
impossible, the Emperor still went on concealing
from him as much as he could — concealing from
him, for instance, the aim with which a French
Army had been gathered on the shores of the
Bosphorus.
This discrediting collapse of an enterprise
which had quickened the pulse of three armies
would have all been escaped, if the Emperor,
or the Emperor's Government, proceeding in a
straight course of action, had simply kept Can-
robert's knowledge abreast of that furnished to
Bruat; for the outburst of warlike impatience
which provoked strong resolves on the Monday
would have plainly been calmed on the Satur-
day or the Sunday before, by assigning that
ground for delay which was afterwards declared
to be cogent by all the assembled French
generals.
VI.
Uncertainty How long this postponement of the assault
duration of might continue no one then could divine. The
ponement. letter from the Minister of Marine to Admiral
* Rousaet, vol. ii. p. 35.
TROUBLED COUNSELS. 239
Bruat showed indeed that (as judged by its chap.
writer) the Corps of Eeserve would be ready to !_
take ship at Constantinople on the 10th of May ;
but whither it was to be borne when embarked,
and when, and where, and how it was to be
brought into real co-operation with Canrobert's
army, no men in the Crimea yet knew. Accord-
ing to Canrobert, and all his assembled advisers,
' it was fitting to wait for the commencement of
' operations by the corps of reserve.' * If, how-
ever, brought into close harmony with the design
of Niel and his Emperor, the postponement would
be one carried on to that fondly imagined time
when (after a brilliant campaign that was not to
be even begun until some — as yet — unknown
period) Sebastopol would be on all sides invested.
Nor indeed was a general assault the only canrobert's
measure postponed until that imagined time, scope.
General Canrobert desired that meanwhile the
Allies should even abstain from the easier, the
narrower task of storming the outworks thrown
out in advance of the fortress ; and accordingly,
when, on the 30th, Lord Eaglan proposed to
Canrobert an assault on the counter-approaches,
he encountered a decisive refusal.!
It was thus that after an interval of seeming The old
freedom which lasted some forty -eight hours, fastened'
General Canrobert once more submitted to have u
* See ante, p. 234.
t Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 5, 1855.
Experience soon afterwards proved the wisdom of Lord Rag-
lan's proposal.
240 TROUBLED COUNSELS.
chap, refastened upon him the whole suit of long-worn
fetters with which Niel'a 'Mission' had loaded
him.
We are beginning to see something now of war
business superintended by the Emperor Louis
Napoleon. It was this same weak, meddlesome
hand still playing with the same State machinery,
that afterwards in the fulness of time brought
cruel disasters on .France.
INTERFERENCE OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR. 241
CHAPTER IX.
THE NOW ACTIVELY PERTURBING INTERFERENCE OF
LOUIS NAPOLEON IN THE WAR FOR SEBASTOPOL.
How oppressively Louis Napoleon had been chap.
weighing on the allied armies from February to U"
the close of April, we have well enough seen : but The hither-
A ° ' to paralys-
(with the idea of suspending decisive action until ^s intfe[uer'
after his arrival) he had been hitherto only pre- ^^ Em-
venting — not ordering — any attacks. When,
however, the 3d of May came, General Canrobert
found himself placed under more perturbing in-
structions. He learned that his Emperor — this
nearly a fortnight before — had entered upon the powchanged
system of driving him into warlike activity by j?erCc£'"v
orders sent from afar — from indeed — of all the dlctatl0n-
places on earth ! — Windsor Castle and Buckino--
ham Palace.
At a time in the middle of April when still the His visit to
bombardment was raging, when it seemed that ng'and'
the war was fast entering upon a critical phase,
and when also the advance of the spring was in-
viting to enterprise, the French Emperor with his
VOL. VIII. q
242 INTERFEKKNUK OF THE FkKNCH KMI'KROK.
CHAP.
IX.
The Council
of War at
Windsor
Castle.
The Em-
peror's re-
solve to join
his army.
His agree-
ment with
our Govern-
ment upon
preliminary
questions.
beauteous Empress paid a visit to England;* and
alike by the Queen, by the Government, by the
people at large, was received with a genial wel-
come— a welcome all the more animated, since he
came with a warlike intent — with intent to form
and execute plans for compassing the fall of Se-
bastopol. He had with him Marshal Vaillant,
his Minister of War.
The first Council of War (if so one may call
such a conclave) was held at Windsor Castle,
and there were present the Emperor, Prince Al-
bert, Lord Clarendon, Lord Palmerston, Lord Cow-
ley, Lord Panmure, Sir John Burgoyne, Marshal
Vaillant, and Count Walewski. The Emperor at
this meeting was pressed to abandon his project
of going out to the Crimea, but without being
then at all shaken in what seemed his steadfast
resolve; and he not only gave his opinion on the
prospects of the Sevastopol siege, and the principle
which should rule future action, but also went on
to disclose the plan of campaign he had formed.
With his consciousness of all he had done to-
wards arresting (through General Niel's 'mis-
'sion') the genuine advance of the siege, the
French Emperor of course had some grounds on
which to found a prophecy that the then still rag-
ing bombardment would fail in its object; and he
found our Government ready to avow the same
faith, as also to accept his theory that Sebastopol
could not be taken without first investing the
place.
* He came on Monday, the 16th of April.
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN. 243
II.
CHAP.
IX.
The preliminary arrangements on which the
Emperor proposed to base his plan of campaign
were framed in a spirit appreciative of both our
army and its chief; for Lord Eaglan with his
whole English force, and a largely extended com-
mand over the troops of other nations, was to be
withdrawn from the tedious labours of the siege,
and entrusted with the more brilliant service of
opening a campaign in the field.
With an understanding that Eupatoria should The Em-
be held by 30,000 Turks under Omar Pasha, the po^[3?pra:'
Emperor proposed that the forces to be engaged
against Sebastopol should be divided into three
armies : One of these armies charged with the
task of holding the trenches and guarding the
siege material as well as the ports of supply was
to have a strength of 60,000, consisting of 30,000
French, with besides a like number of Turks, and
to be commanded by General Canrobert.
The other two armies were to be called respec-
tively ' the 1st,' and ' the 2d army of operation.'
The ' 1st army of operation ' was to act in the
open field with the 25,000 infantry (supported
by our cavalry and artillery) which constituted
the English force, but with also a body of 5000
French troops ; with besides, the 15,000 men of
the Sardinian contingent, and moreover — so it
was hoped — with as many as 10,000 Turks, the
whole numbering not less at the least than 45,000
244
THE EMPEROK S PLAN.
CHAP.
IX.
Acceptance
by our
Government
of the pre-
liminary ar-
rangements ;
aa recorded
at Bucking-
ham Palace.
men (with perhaps indeed 10,000 more), and to
be commanded by Lord Kaglan.
The ' 2d army of operation ' — called afterwards
by Louis Napoleon ' the army of Diversion ' — was
to consist of 45.000 French troops withdrawn from
before Sebastopol, and of the 25,000 men — also
French — assembling in reserve at Constantinople,
in all 70,000 * men, under the personal command
of the Emperor or such person as he might appoint.
So far, our Government approved the suggest-
ed arrangements ; and accordingly, after another
Council of War assembled at Buckingham Palace
(at which were present the Queen, the Emperor,
Prince Albert, Marshal Vailhmt, Lord Palmer-
ston, Lord Clarendon, and Lord Panmure), there
was framed a Memorandum recording the agree-
ment thus reached. Lord Panmure duly signed
the agreement by command of the Queen, and
Marshal Vaillant by command of the Emperor.
TIL
The Era-
peror's plan
of cam-
paign :
his plan as
regarded
the ' 1st
1 army of
1 operation.'
For the conduct of the held operations, the Em-
peror's proposals were these : — He proposed that
Lord Piaglan, at the head of the ' 1st army of
' operation, should move forward across the
' Tchernaya, and, first of all, take and occupy the
' high ground above Inkerman, including Mac-
' kenzie's farm.' t Not aware that those Heights
* Put in subsequent expositions at 65,000.
f So understood at the time by our War Minister.
Panmure to Lord Raglan, Private, ^Otli April 1855.
Lord
THE EMPEKOK'S PLAN. 245
were by many deemed all but impregnable, our chap.
Government seemed to approve, and at all events, ! -
expressed no dislike of this part of the plan ; Q) obfecfedto
but did not of course prematurely, and without Govem-
consulting Lord Eaglan, send out any peremptory men '
orders for carrying it into effect.
With respect to the task reserved for his ' army
' of Diversion,' the Emperor's project was this : —
By the marching of the 45,000 French troops
withdrawn from before Sebastopol over a distance
of some 70 miles, and the arrival of the steamers
from the Bosphorus with the reserve force of
25,000, his army of 70,000 men was to be gath- TheEm-
ered at and near the distant port of Aloushta, on afrTgai^d
. the ' 2d
the south-east coast of the Crimea, was thence to • army of
reconnoitre the ground, was (if then the advance
should seem feasible) to ascend from the shore to
the mountains, to move up and over the shoulder
of the lofty Tchatir Dagh by way of the Ay en
Pass, was thence to march on Simferopol, and at
length, in co-operation with Lord Eaglan (already
victorious, on its left), was to overthrow all Eus-
sian forces collected on the north of Sebastopol,
and so complete the investment.*
If following this plan of campaign Lord Eaglan
should be storming the Mackenzie Heights, and
the Emperor at the same time filing through the
Ayen Pass with his ' army of Diversion,' the two
commanders would be separated from one another
* Lord Paiimure to Lord Raglan, Private, 20th April 1855.
As will be afterwards seen, I have before rne several expositions .
of the plan in its successive stages of development.
246 THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
chap, by a mountainous and trackless region extending,
! even as crows fly, to a distance of some 34 miles,
and substantially so prohibitive of transit that the
readiest mode of communicating would be to send
horsemen circuitously by a trebly long route.
The idea of the ' field telegraph,' as applied to
such conditions, was then unripe, and not brought
to bear on the project,
opinion By our Minister of War this last project was
our Govern- regarded as ' perfectly visionary,' as 'a wild, iin-
ment of that . . n . . .
lust part ot ' practicable scheme, and even as one that, it ex-
the plan.
ecuted, would 'lead to the inevitable ruin of his
'(the Emperor's) army';* but Lord Panmure
does not say, and plainly it is not the fact, that he
imparted his adverse opinion to Louis Napoleon.
Me seems to have calculated that, in the closer
presence of realities, our imperial ally would
abandon the more flighty part of the plan pre-
pared for his ' army of Diversion,' and bring its
left into contact with the right of Lord Raglan's
field army ; so that thus (after fighting and hap-
pily gaining a battle), the two forces acting to-
gether would effectually conquer their way to the
object of investing Sebastopol.t
'Genemi pin • Although only a portion of the forces to be em-
imtirepian. ployed would consist of troops newly landed, the
intended operation was to be one far dissevered
from the tasks of the besiegers, and perhaps on
the whole might be called a re-invasion of the
Crimea from its south-eastern coast — are-invasion
* Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, Private, 20th April 1855.
t Ibid.
THE EMPEROli's FLAK. 247
to be executed by 65,000 or 70,000 French troops., chap.
commanded by the Emperor or his lieutenant, and ! —
a composite force of 45,000 or 55,000 troops (En-
glish, French, Sardinians, and Turks) under the
orders of Lord Eaglan, making up altogether a
strength for these field operations alone of from
120 to 135 thousand men.
rv.
On the 21st of April, the Emperor closed his The Em-
visit to England; and in Paris a few days after- doniugins
. . . . intention of
wards he abandoned his intention of going out to going out to
. ~ the Crimea ;
the Crimea* By a letter of instruction to Can-
robert, dated the 27th of April, he announced his
change of purpose ; and showed as one of its con-
sequences that Canrobert (not replaced by his
Emperor) would continue in command of the His letter of
r ' instruction
army, whilst Pelissier (not replaced by Canrobert) to can-
would command the Siege Army. With great
elaboration and care — not omitting to explain Ins
design for making a feint on the Euxine — he
showed how he himself (as he thought) would
have led the imagined campaign, and (not without
vehement diatribe against the rival scheme of an
advance from Eupatoria) declared his unabated
approval of the plan he had formed. He fondly
expounded it. He showed how he would dispense
with a base of operations for his Aloushta cam-
paign by not only putting eight days' rations on the
* Not, as M. Rousset imagined, after Pianori's attempt of
the 28th, but before it.
248 THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
Chap, backs of his soldiers, hut also (in the way pointed
. — out) bringing up more supplies from the west.
Computing the garrison of Sebastopol at 35,000,
and the Russian troops gathered on the north of
Eupatoria at 15,000, he attributed to the enemy's
field army between Simferopol, the Belbek, and
the Tchernaya a strength of 70,000 ; but disclosed
what was evidently his ruling idea — an idea that
the conquest thus planned for his ' army of Diver-
' sion ' would or might take effect by surprise^2)
In this later development of the imperial plan,
the task assigned to Lord Eaglan was declared
(at the outset) to be still, as before, that of seiz-
ing the Mackenzie Heights ;* but upon going into
fuller details the Emperor forgot or ignored the
earlier part of his exposition, and proposed that
Lord Raglan should go on conducting a series of
only preparatory operations until after the anti-
cipated capture of Simferopol by the French,
when — by virtue of processes more easy to dram-
atists than to generals engaged in 'flank marches'
under the eyes of a powerful enemy — he was
to either advance in pursuit of the Russian field
army then already compelled to fall back by the
advance of the French in its rear, and to seize the
' Old City Heights,' or else find himself brought
into contact with the ' army of Diversion ' victo-
riously advancing to meet him from the town
newly seized. Then of course was to follow a
triumphant co-operation of the two forces thus
joining hands, and the whole of the enemy's field
* ' S'emparer des hauteurs de Mackenzie.'
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN. 249
army was, as the Emperor expressed it, to be chap.
either driven into Sebastopol, or otherwise into '.
the sea.(3)
Such, we know was the dream. But men
versed in real war understood that the plan
sought to break up an army of 180,000 men into
three fractions so far disparted as to be incapable
of affording to one another any mutual support,
and next, so contrived that, supposing the enemy
to be at all fairly served by his emissaries, his
spies, and his scouts, two at least of the fractions
thus separated would be brought into desperate
peril, whilst the third — the one under Lord Rag-
lan— would perhaps for a while be intact, and
possibly even victorious against its immediate
adversaries, yet find itself in the crisis so placed
as to be unable to come to the rescue of either of
the two other ' armies ' in time to avert the ca-
tastrophe.^)
Whilst professing in terms to desire that his
plan should be calmly weighed by Canrobert in
concert with Lord Eaglan, the Emperor neverthe-
less took pains to urge its adoption with almost
vehement earnestness, and in doing so disclosed
a strange confidence in his own untried powers
as a strategist. ' Such is,' so he wrote, ' such is,
' my dear General, the plan I wished to execute
' at the head of the brave troops which you have
' hitherto commanded ; and it is with the deep-
' est and the most bitter grief that — forced by
' interests more weighty to remain in Europe — I
' am obliged to renounce a plan in the execution
250 THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
chap. ' of which I am sure T should have succeeded.*
IX
'Consider it coolly with Lord Raglan; and, al-
' though I do not pretend to be always right, I
' cannot abstain from reminding you that, if Mar-
1 shal St Arnaud had followed exactly the plan
' which I traced out for him, we should now
' have Sebastopol in our power, and the army
' would not have been exposed to so much suf-
* fering.'t
Before this imperial letter had passed the sixth
day of a journey performed by old - fashioned
means, the injunctions it carried were destined
to be outstripped, outdone, overpowered by words
that flying more swiftly were also a great deal
more wild. J
V.
3d of May. By despatches brought out with the mails, and
eralsinthe already in their hand s before noon on the 3d of
qiain?edC' May, the French and the English Commanders
peiiaipian. were made acquainted with the general purport
of the arrangements concluded at Buckingham
Palace, and with the tenor of the Emperor's pro-
jected campaign, whilst Lord Raglan was also ap-
prised of the opinion which our Government had
formed of its merits, and of the prospect of super-
seding it by a more feasible scheme. He soon
* Made on the 27th of April, this the first mention of the
Emperor's change of purpose was despatched by mail, but out-
stripped by the telegram to the .same effect which we shall see
reaching Canrobert in the night of the 3d of May.
t The Emperor to General Canrobert, 27th April 1855.
t See post, pp. 264-268.
LORD PANMURE'S SATISFACTION. 251
ufter received the Agreement drawn up at Buck- chap.
ingham Palace, with instructions to concur in the ! —
measures for carrying it into effect ; and, the
Paper containing a proviso that orders were ' to
' be given to Generals Canrobert and Lord Pag-
1 Ian to take the necessary steps for rendering
' their troops available for the intended services/
it followed of course that those words when im-
parted to the two commanders were meant to be
the rule of their conduct.
Owing plainly of course to some accident, this
State Paper was not transmitted by the Emperor's
Government to the French Headquarters ; but
Lord Raglan imparted his copy of it to General
Canrobert.
It resulted from the Agreement that General
Canrobert (drawing plentiful aid from the Turks)
was to relieve Lord Raglan in the English trenches,
and Lord Raglan — set free from all the toils of the
siege — was to make ready with all fit despatch for
his promised command in the field.
It was in a spirit of unconcealed exultation The joy uf
„ . Lord Pan-
that Lord Panmure framed this announcement, mure.
Erom the day when he made, as we saw, a
strange and ugly beginning of Ms task as War
Minister, he had been learning every day more
and more to see, to feel, to confess the true worth
of the English Commander ; and having spoken
indignantly of what the War Minister wrote in
his early despatch, I can all the more gladly com-
memorate the unstinted, the generous confidence
he now reposed in Lord Raglan when entrusting
252 ITS FRAIL BASIS.
chap, him (as he believed he was doing) with the
_ — splendid task of undertaking a campaign against
Eussia on open ground, at the head of a separate
army not less than 45,000 strong.*
VI.
The frail How joyfully the English Commander and the
basis (Hi * ^ °
wind! it all army under his orders would have bidden fare-
rested.
well to the siege- works, and entered upon a cam-
paign in the open, may be easily imagined; as
may also of course the vexation of being mocked
by an offer which could never be really made good.
The whole plan was one built on a notion that
(if only receiving the promised accession of
Turks) General Canrobert could and would send
away 50,000 of his French troops,! losing also
the accustomed support of Lord Raglan's whole
army, and in the truncated state thus attained
attempt to hold the Chersonese and the ports of
supply against the Sebastopol garrison, or rather,
one may say, against Russia, because her field
army could join (as indeed it had done at Inker-
man) with the not yet invested fortress. Lord
Eaglan did not believe that General Canrobert
would accept such a task.
In the day-time, however, of that Thursday the
3d of May which was destined — at night — to be
stirring with almost mad orders from 1'aris, both
* Secretary of War to Lord Raglan. Secret and Confidential
23d April 1855.
t 45,000 to his Emperor, and 5000 to Lord Raglan.
ITS FEAIL BASIS. 253
Lord Baglan and General Canrobert might nat- chap.
IX.
urally enough understand that the elaborate plan
of campaign submitted a fortnight before to the
conclave at Windsor Castle was not so much a
subject inviting to prompt, sudden action as one
meet for subsequent study, and accordingly, until
evening came, they were rather intent on the en-
terprise of which it is now time to speak.
254 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH.
CHAPTER X.
THE INTERPOSITION OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CON-
TINUING AND BRINGING ABOUT THE RECALL
OF A JOINT EXPEDITION.
CHAP.
X.
Project for
opening a
passage inti
the Sea of
Azof.
The Straits
of Kirtch.
I.
To open the fortified straits leading into the
' closed ' Sea of Azof, Lord Raglan adopting with
warmth the eager counsel of Lyons had been
pressing the French to concur with some of our
land and sea forces in a joint expedition to
Kertch, or, more explicitly speaking, to that
long, bare, steppe-land peninsula which borrows
its name from the town.
This peninsula of Kertch on the one side, on
the other, a forked tongue of land jutting out
from the coast of Circassia, approach each other
so nearly that the waters there rolling between
them are narrow enough to be reached by artillery
planted on shore. Whilst sundering thus the two
headlands, these waters unite the two seas and so
form the straits giving entrance from the Euxine
to what was the Palus Mteotis, that is, the Sea
of Azof. Known of old as the difficult waters of
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 255
the Cimmerian Bosphorus, they are now called x '
the Straits of Kertch.
By seamen the straits were regarded as con-
sisting of two distinct 'Narrows' — the first one
extending off ground adjacent to Cape St Paul,
and the other one off Yeni Kale\ The town of
Kertch (Panticapaeum, once the dwelling-place of
King Mithridates) faces those somewhat broader
waters which spread out between the two Nar-
rows.
II.
The enemy had long been alive to the import- The enemy's
. • r> i i • endeavours
ance of keeping the straits firmly closed against to guard
the enterprises of the Allies, and had made great
exertions to compass his object. Owing mainly
to storms, and the strength of the currents, he
had failed, it is true, in the strenuous endeavours
he made to block the two narrow channels by
either the sinking of ships, or the sinking of
anchors, or resort to explosive contrivances,
and his expedient of collecting an armed flo-
tilla in the roadstead of Kertch was not one
that strengthened him greatly against powerful
navies. He had planted no artillery on the
Circassian side of the straits , but along the
opposite shore — the shore of the Kertch ine
Peninsula — where it faced and commanded the
two narrow channels, he had established seven
powerful batteries which effectually kept the
straits closed against the ships of his adver-
saries. These batteries, whilst open in rear,
256 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH.
CHAP.
X.
The Pen
insula of
Kertch.
Baron
Wrangel
there in
command:
his forces.
were, each of them, also commanded by higher
ground rising behind them which had not been
fortified ; and the way in which a Russian com-
mander could hope to be able to protect them
from seizure was by operating against the assail-
ants with Horse, Foot, and Field-Artillery.
On the whole, it appeared to result that, if
there should spring up a conflict for the key
of the straits, it would take the shape of field
operations maintained in the Kertchine Pen-
insula.
This Peninsula jutting out eastward from the
main of the Crimea is some sixty-six miles in
length, and the isthmus, at its narrowest part, is
not much more than ten miles across ; though,
if measured (as indeed has been usual) from the
old fort of Arabat, on the Sea of Azof, to Theo-
dosia on the Euxine, its breadth is doubly as great.
Baron Wrangel commanded the forces in this
Kertchine Peninsula, and they numbered not far
from 9000;* of whom some 3000 were cavalry.t
The infantry comprised two battalions and one
company of troops of the line, the rest consisting
of Fencibles — that is, Foot Cossacks — and what
were called ' local troops ' — forces not at all
approaching in quality to Russian troops of
the line, and hardly, I believe, thought present-
able on fair, open ground to good European
battalions.]:
* 8750.
t 1143 Hussars. 152 Horse- Artillery, and 1711 Cossacks.
£ The above details as well as those which follow are alt
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KEKTCH. 257
Approaching without toil or trouble under the CHAP.
wing of supreme naval power, and gliding along
off a coast-line which offered several fit landing- ^V^fore
places, the troops of the Allies could make feints, Mm'
or commence real attacks at their pleasure. One
excellent landing-place on the beach, not far dis-
tant from Theodosia, invited the Allies to make
an attack on the isthmus. Another no less
convenient on the beach of Kamish Boroune,
attracted them towards what, we know, was
their real object ; for it offered a footing on
shore at a distance of only four miles from the
westernmost of the seven coast batteries.
Of course under these conditions, the defence
of the Peninsula was embarrassed by conflicting
exigencies. Baron Wrangel must have eagerly
yearned to secure, if he could, the great object
for which he was there, and accordingly to de-
fend the coast batteries which kept the straits
closed ; but then also and on ground so far west
as to be many miles distant from the centre of
such operations, he yet more anxiously wished,
and indeed had been specially ordered by his
Commander-in-Chief, to defend the Arabat Isth-
mus, and the great road passing along it which
gave him his means of communication with the
main of the Russian army.
Regarding this last part of his task as one of ms dispo^
great moment, he suffered his posts on the Isth-
mus to absorb three-fifths of his limited infantry
based upon General Todleben's expositions, vol. ii. p. 264 et seq.,
and Appendix, 415 et seq.
VOL. VIII. R
25S COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTl II.
chap, strength, and (if quality be considered) much
more, thus immensely curtailing, and substan-
tially indeed quite annulling, his means of effec-
tive resistance to any strong body of troops which
might seek to wrest from him the key of the
straits by simply assailing in rear his string of
seven coast batteries.
On the whole, it results that — abounding in
anxiety for the defence of the Isthmus, and the
great road passing along it which linked him
with the main of the army — he reluctantly made
up his mind that the seven coast batteries must
be left in a state of defencelessness against attacks
made in their rear by powerful bodies of troops.
He of course did not mean to endure that the
batteries should be insultingly seized without
resistance by any small body of men put on
shore — as in scorn — from the ships ; and accord-
ingly, whilst keeping his Hussars at Arghine
within a distance of only some 30 miles from
the landing-place of Kamish Boroune, he re-
tained in the neighbourhood of Kertch four
pieces of field-artillery, and a body of some
2500 men (chiefly Fencibles) of whom nearly
1900 could be spared to act as infantry ; * but
on the other hand, his adopted plan was to
abstain from defending these batteries against
an enemy disembarking in strength, and even
* More exactly 1883, the rest being employed in serving the
coast batteries, and other tasks confining them to particular
spots. In this body of 1883 men only 133 were regular troops,
the rest being ' Fencibles.'
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KEKTCH. 259
to destroy them himself, as soon as he might CHAP.
perceive that they were about to be gravely . —
attacked by soldiery either landing, or landed,
on the neighbouring part of the coast.
III.
Amongst those who had considered this pro-
ject, the French and the English alike were
agreed that their land and sea forces co-operating
in the measures proposed might put a great stress
on the enemy by embarrassing his more easterly
lines of communication, and cramping his means
of supply ; but our own people lured by an en- The eager-
terprise in which their Navy would act, whilst English to
...,.,. p . . have the
rejoicing besides in a prospect or carrying the attack set
empire of the sea to waters hitherto closed,
were more especially eager to have the attack
set on foot ; and it was mainly, I believe, from
his wish to meet this strong English feeling that
on Sunday the 29th of April General Canrobert General
in a spirit of friendliness agreed at last to the assent to it
scheme.*
A too anxious commander is the natural prey
of false ' emissaries.' Upon returning to his
quarters General Canrobert there found await-
ing him the report of an impudent spy who,
whilst either so ignorant or so deceptive as to
say nothing of the most conspicuous fact — Baron
Wrangel's great strength in cavalry — made bold
to declare that the enemy's infantry at Theodosia
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 4, 1855.
260 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KEltTCH.
CHAP, and Kertch alone had a strength of no less than
X" 27,000 ; and, though Canrobert did not give his
Squent" fall credence to such an account, he allowed it
$58taS to weigh on his mind. The next day, accord-
ingly, he wrote anxiously on the subject to Lord
Raglan.* At a later hour of the same day, he
fell into a state very near to despondency. His
imagination no longer content to dwell on the
great strength in numbers with which it in-
vested Baron Wrangel, went on to picture them
concentrated, and whilst asking Lord Eaglan's
counsel, he declared it to be his own opinion
' that the chances against succeeding in the en-
' terprise were much greater than those in its
' favour.' t
Lord Rag- Lord Raglan thus answered : 'The operation
teriy answer ' can only be undertaken on condition of its
' execution being immediate. The enemy is
' working at the task of barring the straits ; and,
1 if he were to succeed in completing the obstruc-
' tions he is now raising up, we should have to
{ abandon all hope of occupying the Sea of Azof
< — an object to which our Governments attach
' great importance. It might possibly have been
' well, if we had been able to spare more troops
' for the enterprise ; but it is in rapidity of action,
' as it seems to me, that we shall find our best
* chances of success. Considering that we do not
* Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th April 1855, first letter of
that date.
t Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th April 1855, second letter
of that date.
to him.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 261
' mean to establish ourselves in the Peninsula of chap.
' Kertch, but only by a coup de main to destroy '. —
' the defences which prevent the passage of our
' ships, we may fairly believe that 10,000 men
' will achieve this result. The enemy's numbers
' in the Peninsula may be greater, but they are
' not concentrated ; and, to effect a concentration,
' he would need more time than we should require
' for our coup de main.' * Then after showing in
detail how great (after landing) would be the
advantages of the Allies over the enemy in point
of comparative proximity to the batteries which
had to be taken, he ended by declaring his opinion
that the projected operation might be executed
without incurring risks other than the ordinary
risks of war, and with chances of success which,
considering the importance of the result desired,
were sufficient to justify the enterprise ; but
always, he said, on condition that it be under-
taken ' without the least delay.' t
General Canrobert replied : — ' Since your Lord- canrobert
' ship notwithstanding the observations I felt it to Lord8
' my duty to make in my letter of yesterday is of
' opinion that this enterprise undertaken with
' the troops before indicated presents itself with
' fair chances of success, I hasten to say that I
' am giving orders for the prompt embarkation of
' the French corps which is to participate in it
' concurrently with the English troops. 'J
* Lord Raglan to Canrobert, 1st May 1855. The original if
in Lord Raglan's always excellent French.
+ Ibid. t Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 1st May.
CHAP.
X.
262 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH.
IV.
sailing of So at last on the 3d of May, there embarked
tioneonethe upon this expedition from 10,000 to 12,000
troops, of which three-fourths were French and
one-fourth English. The English squadron was
commanded by Admiral Lyons, the French one
by Admiral Bruat. The French troops were
under the immediate direction of General d'Aute-
marre, but both that and the English part of the
land -service force were commanded by Sir George
Brown. Our people carried with them the all-
precious light of sound knowledge respecting the
enemy's dispositions and strength in the Kert-
chine Peninsula, and Major Gordon of the Royal
Engineers whose admirable report had made
clear the path of action was himself on board
the flotilla in command of a body of Sappers.
Together with the papers accompanying it, Lord
Raglan's instruction to Brown was a model of
lucid guidance.* It was believed that after
rapidly accomplishing their tasks, the troops
might be promptly brought back, and that no
risk of harm would be run by withdrawing them
for a very brief period from the Sebastopol
theatre of war.
To mislead Russian scrutiny, the flotilla at first
steered away as though making for Odessa, but
assumed its true course after dark.
* A copy of this was enclosed in Lord Raglan's despatch to
the Secretary of State, cited ante.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 263
CHAP.
X.
V.
But now, and even with suddenness, there TheSub-
. . 'ii i marine
began to interpose in the war that new and cable,
dangerous magic which has hugely augmented
the already great powers of mischief conferred on
an absolute ruler by carrying for him his orders
with a speed so transcendent of space that, al-
though perhaps the commanders to whom he is
dictating action be men parted from him by dis-
tance extending over thousands of miles, he still
may dare to look for obedience commencing from
almost the hour in which — perhaps smoking the
while — he lazily utters his orders to some Palace
servitor, or himself writes down a direction to
one of the telegraph clerks.
Where no electricity penetrates, a distant com-
mander is able to tell his rulers at home that the
clever instructions they send him are based upon
a layer of facts which has long ago ranged with
the past; but of course no such shield can be
used where the magic ' conductors ' are working ;
so that, if there be the ripest experience, the
amplest knowledge and wisdom, at one end of the
cable, and at the other, mere folly, mere ignorance
propped up by conceit and authority, it is the
experience, the knowledge, the wisdom — now un-
shielded by Distance and Time — that may have
in the clash to give way ; for wholesome jeers of
the kind that after cruel disasters laughed down
the old ' Aulic Council,' have been hardly as yet
264 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCII.
CHAP, brought to bear with any sufficing severity on
, those who dictate by telegraph.
No one saw the grave dangers of electric com-
munication more clearly than did the comman-
der of the Emperor's Reserve at Constantinople
' They will be able,' wrote General Larchey, ' to
' send orders and counter-orders from Paris which
' will shake the command of the army.' *
The Submarine Cable connecting the seaport
of Varna with the shore of the Chersonese now
came at last into full play (l) ; and our Govern-
ment did not abuse it; but — exposed to swift
dictation from Paris — the French had to learn
what it was to try to carry on war with a Louis
Napoleon planted at one of the ends of the wire,
and at the other, a commander like Canrobert,
who did not dare to meet Palace strategy with
respectful evasions, still less with plain, resolute
words.
VI.
Telegrams The first message brought out from Paris by
from Paris. , , , n i ■{
submarine cable was one or a wholesome sort;
for it simply empowered — and did not command
— General Canrobert to call up from Constanti-
nople the Corps of Eeserve ; but the messages
that rapidly followed were each of them strange-
ly perturbing.
Night of the Between ten and eleven o'clock on the night of
3d of May. ^.g g^ oj.. May, General Canrobert came to the
English Headquarters and informed Lord Raglan,
* Quoted, Rousset, vol. it p. 164.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 265
that by what was described as 'an important chap.
' telegraphic despatch ' newly come in from Paris
he had received — not authority merely, but — vias?t0toLord
positive orders to ' bring up at once the army of a ™wtdL
' Eeserve from Constantinople, and for that pur- giam"
' pose to send down without loss of time every
' ship he could place his hands upon to the Bos-
' phorus — to detach as soon as these new troops
' should arrive a division to be landed at Aloushta,
' and moved from thence to the head of a defile
' leading to Simferopol, and thus threaten that
' town — to march a large body by Baidar towards
' Baktchi Serai, and a third column by Tractir
' to the attack of Mackenzie's Heights, and, to
' enable him to make these movements in suffi-
' cient force, to bring half of Omar Pasha's army
' to this position from Eupatoria.' *
This was ordering the subservient, yet pain-
fully anxious Canrobert to go at once into a fit of
strategic hysterics, and in that weakly violent
state — after first too approaching Lord Eaglan ! —
begin a campaign against Russia.
In the frenzy thus enjoined upon Canrobert,
he was to become amongst other things a general-
issimo— was to ' march ' Lord Raglan with the
English army against the enemy in the field, and
to ' bring ' Omar Pasha's army from Eupatoria !
With a smile, I am sure, in his mind, though Discusskn
not perhaps on his lips, Lord Raglan told Can- two com-
liii i i • manders:
robert that the plan ' appeared very complicated.'
* Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, 4th May 1855, £ to
3 A.M.
266 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KHKTCH.
CHAP.
its result.
Alter discussing it for some time, General Can-
robert announced ' that these orders of the Em-
' peror would compel him to recall the troops
' which had left Kamiesh for Kertch.' Lord
Eaglan observed that ' such a proceeding would
' be a great misfortune, and would create a bad
' impression ' both in the army ' and elsewhere,'
and 'at last,' he wrote, 'I persuaded' General
Canrobert not to recall the troops 'upon the
' understanding that he relinquished his intention
' of doing so at my instance.' *
General Canrobert remained with his colleague
till nearly one o'clock in the morning ; and, when
he had at last gone away, Lord Kaglan was soon
in that sleep with which nature blesses the weary,
and especially a weary commander; but there
had not as yet come an end to even this single
night's revelry of the electric currents now in-
2.15 a.k. augurating their turbulent mission. At a quarter
aide-tie- past two, Lord Eaglan was awakened by the
yet another arrival of a French aide-de-camp, bringing with
him a letter from Canrobert, and another and
later telegram newly come from the Emperor —
from the Emperor acting in person. It was thus
that the Emperor telegraphed: — 'The moment is
' come for getting out of the 45 in which you
' are. It is absolutely necessary to take the
' offensive 450. As soon as the Corps of Ee-
' serve shall have joined you, assemble all your
' forces and do not lose a day. I greatly de-
* 'Sur ma demande.' Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons,
4tli May 1855, I to 3 a.m.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 267
1 plore my not being able myself to go out to chap.
' the Crimea.' X'
The confusion that well might be wrought by
thus madly pelting with telegrams an already dis-
tracted commander was a little augmented by
failure in the use of conventional signs ; for what
had been meant by '45/ and what by '450/ the
decipherers could not divine ; (2) but the inter-
preted words of these telegrams were so wild,
so perturbing, that perhaps by comparison the
two occult signs were not altogether unwelcome.
The accompanying letter from Canrobert to and letter
Lord Eaglan announced with strong expressions rXrt de-
of regret and vexation that this last Imperial seifing
telegram made it impossible for him to let the
French troops continue their voyage towards
Kertch, and that accordingly he was sending a compelled
despatch-boat in pursuit of Admiral Bruat re- Adm?rai
questing him to return to Kamiesh. He added
that he should feel very grateful if Lord Raglan
would address the same request to Sir Edmund
Lyons ; * and Canrobert's aide-de-camp proposed
that Lord Eaglan should send his letter to the
Admiral by the French despatch-boat ; but Lord Reception
Eaglan declined the offer, saying that for the LrdRag-
task of imparting what had occurred to Sir
Edmund he required a little time, and would
send his communication by an English ship.t
With respect to General Canrobert's wish as
* General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, ce 4 Mai 1855, 1 heure
iu matin.
+ Lord Raglan to Admiral Lyons, 4th May 1855, £ past 3 a.m.
2G8 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH.
chap, expressed in his last communication, Lord Raglan
x' vvas sternly reserved, and did not undertake to
do more than convey to Admiral Lyons the terms
of Canrobert's letter.*
VII.
' I cannot say,' wrote Lord Raglan to Admiral
Lyons, 'how deeply I deplore this unexpected
' interruption of an enterprise from which I
' anticipated not only success, but the most
' important consequences. My only consolation
' is that both you and I have done our utmost
' to. forward an object which the Government
' had much at heart.' t
venture- But Lord Raglan gave more than condolence.
some course „ . . ,, . i n ,-i
takeuby Perceiving at once the wide scope ot the niis-
ia^ ag" chiefs, the troubles, the dangers with which the
Great Alliance was threatened by this French
secession occurring — and perforce with publicity
— in the midst of a warlike enterprise, he was not
a man to sit moaning over such a ' dispensation '
without an effort of will to lessen or avert the
misfortune ; nor again was he one who, in such
a condition of things, could fail to be thinking
of our Admiral (Lyons) or of Sir George Brown
— they were, both of them, his personal friends
— now about to be overtaken at sea by the
palsying words of arrest despatched to Bruat
* Lord Raglan to Admiral Lyons, 4th May 1855, £ past 3 a.m
t Ibid.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH. 2C9
by Canrobert ; and, though not of course wish- CH Ap-
ing or meaning that, when they should see the L_
Expedition deprived of three-fourths of its sol-
diery, the Admiral and the General should — in
anger — go on, spite of all, with aims and plans
wholly unchanged, he yet dwelt with evident
wistfulness on a lurking idea that the two gallant
men, upon learning the orders sent out to the
French, might become passionately eager to re-
connoitre the coast with a mind to seize any
fair opening for the action of the truncated
force which still would remain under Brown.
The force numbered less than 3000, but these
were prime troops : the Highland Brigade, some
Eifles, some skilled engineers, 700 of the Royal
Marines; and, considering that to the very
utmost of naval competence, they would be
eagerly supported by Lyons with his ships close
at hand, what might not be done by such troops ?
It is true that Baron Wrangel was supposed to
be holding the district with forces about 9000
strong, of whom some 3000 (consisting mainly
of Fencibles) were believed to be in or near
Kertch ; but according to the latest Beports, his
troops — far from having been concentrated — were
established at distant posts. Was it not there-
fore possible, or even within the range of fair
likelihood, that Sir George being stronger im-
measurably than all the troops about Kertch,
might complete the destruction of the coast
batteries without being even molested by any
force brought from a distance except perhaps
270 COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTCH.
CHAP, bodies of cavalry with which lie would know
' how to deal ?
The latitude we are going to see granted was
not destined to be used by Sir George ; but to
such as would know the true lineaments of Lord
Kaglan's magnanimous nature, the bare fact of
his giving this warrant for separate action under
circumstances so strange and — at first sight — so
full of peril, will not be an unwelcome aid.
With rare boldness, with rare generosity, and
with a carefulness for the honour and fair name
of others which was never surpassed, he framed
a couple of sentences which opened a path of
high enterprise for his chosen lieutenant to take
upon the distinct responsibility of the com-
mander-in-chief, yet — beforehand — raised up a
firm barrier against all the impatient observers
who might otherwise blame the lieutenant for
not exerting his power.
The latitude The ' two sentences' addressed to Admiral
he gave to
sir George Lyons were these : — ' I apprehend that, if the
' French troops which form three - fourths of
1 your force be withdrawn, there can be no
' chance of your being able to proceed on the
' Expedition with a fair prospect of success, and
' without incurring a risk which the circum-
' stances would hardly justify. Should you and
' Sir George Brown, however, after due delibera-
' tion, think it advisable to go on, and see what
' the state of thin;.,-; may be on the coast with
' the view to take advantage of any opening
1 which may present itself, I am perfectly ready
Brown.
COMMENCED EXPEDITION TO KERTC1I. 271
' to support any such determination on Brown's chap.
' part, and to be responsible for the under- . —
' taking.'*
Thus Lord Eaglan accomplished the task of
giving his lieutenant full swing, yet relieving
him beforehand from all risk of blame for the
choice he might happen to make of either one
or the other alternative.
VIII.
Detractors of course may pronounce that this
warrant for separate action was the evident off-
spring of anger, and by natural consequence rash ;
nor can any deny to such critics the vantage-
ground they will hold, when reminding us that
the English Commander gave leave to push on
the enterprise with troops having only one-fourth
of the strength he himself and his colleague had
agreed to allot for the purpose. But Lord Raglan
at least based his daring on fairly accurate know-
ledge of the enemy's last dispositions.! This
knowledge gave him a right to anticipate with
something like confidence that our troops after
landing in the eastern part of the Peninsula
could be only encountered at first, if even en-
countered at all, by some 3000 J troops of
* Lord Raglan to Admiral Lyons, 4th May 1855, £ past 3 a.m.
f This I am enabled to say by comparing the knowledge as
evidenced by the papers before me with the statements of
General Todleben.
+ The real number as we have seen being less — viz., 2572, of
whom only 1883 could be spared for field operations.
272 RECALL OF THE KERTCII EXPEDITION.
CHAP, inferior quality which could have no preten-
!_. sions to stand against any such forces as our
Highlanders, or the Koyal Marines, and that
before the coming up from elsewhere of any
strong bodies of Eussians, our people (taking
care against Cavalry, as already he had warned
them to do) might complete their brief, simple
task — the task of destroying or maiming a string
of coast batteries lying all of them open in rear.
Still, Lord Kaglan, as we have seen, did not force
the adventurous step on his lieutenant ; and,
though arming him with power to hazard it,
did this only on condition that both he and the
admiral with him should themselves feel im-
pelled towards the enterprise.
That the granting of even this sanction was a
venturesome act I do not affect to deny ; but the
enlightenment we have received since the morn-
ing of the 4th of May, when the letter to our
admiral was written, gives us much better reason
for confidence than people can generally have
when speaking in the potential mood ; for we
see nearly all the conditions under which Baron
Wrangel would have been called upon to act if
Sir George in concert with Lyons had thought
fit to go on with the enterprise ; * and all that
seems undetermined is a question how far the
shoal \v;tters would have suffered our navy to
act — by either gunboats or otherwise — in repres-
sion of cavalry masses coming down the smooth
slopes of the steppe, and undertaking to operate
* See last footnote.
RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION. 273
against our troops on the shore. But even sup- chap.
posing them safe against any fire from the sea, . —
the Russian horse, if thus venturing, would have
found themselves confronted by bodies of infantry
which (duly forewarned as they were, against the
attempted surprises of horsemen by Lord Raglan's
thoughtful precaution) might be expected to prove
staunch as rocks against cavalry charges, and well
able to meet all such onsets with so steady a fire
as would be likely to prevent the experiments
from being too often repeated.
Turning thence to conjecture on the subject
of infantry against infantry, we find on the one
side, a body of 1750 Fencibles with only 133
men of the Line supported by four guns ; on
the other, the Highland Brigade, with 700 of
the Royal Marines, with a battery of field-artil-
lery, and besides a number of Riflemen, and a
company of Sappers under Gordon, all contri-
buting to make that choice body of less than
3000 men a formidable instrument of warlike
power. Under conditions like these, there was
no such approach to equality as could well raise
a doubt of the issue. What however seems most
likely is that not deeming himself to be in-
sulted by the scantiness of a disembarked force
which was, after all, greater in numbers than
his own 1900 foot-soldiers, Baron Wrangel would
have acted on his foregone resolve, and aban-
doned at once to our people the seven precious
coast batteries which formed the key of the Straits*
* See post, vol. ix. chap. iv.
VOL. VIII. S
274 RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
CHAP. Thus inquiry, if conducted with care, goes far
X" towards making it clear that Lord Raglan in
giving the warrant was, after all, rightly in-
spired*
Lord Raglan must have thought with great
care of the state of effervescence into which
our allies might be thrown, if the enterprise
should be pushed to an issue in spite of Gen-
eral Canrobert's secession, and must seemingly
have convinced himself that the effect of this
resolute measure on the minds of the French
would prove in the end to be good.
IX.
Return of With the forces engaged in this Kertch Expedi-
tion?xpet ' tion all seemed as yet to be prospering. The
conditions were such that a highly effective re-
connaissance could be made from the sea. Cap-
tain Spratt looking out from the Spitfire, and
Captain Le Bris from the Fulton, were able to
reach a conclusion — now known to have been
soundly based — that the success of the enter-
prise was likely to prove sure and prompt; but,
when so nearly approaching the field of the con-
templated operations as to be seen and duly re-
ported from the Light-tower marking Cape Takli,
the flotilla with all its keen hopes was overtaken
* The ' enlightment ' is more than commonly vivid, being not
only furnished by Todleben's admirable expositions, but also
by the actual experience deriving from the second Kertch Ex-
pedition.
KECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION. 275
at sea by General Canrobert's orders ; and under chak
the bitter compulsion thus put on the French, '
their Admiral — Admiral Bruat — obeyed the com-
mand to turn back. He moved slowly in order
that Lyons, if also recalled, might the sooner
overtake and rejoin him.
When Lyons, some hours later, received the
letter despatched to him from the English Head-
quarters, he and Brown did not make up their
minds to use that power of resorting to separate
action with which Lord Raglan had armed them ;
and therefore our people soon followed the retro-
grade move of the French.
Next day — it was Sunday, a Sunday remem- Feelings
bered with bitterness — the flotilla returned into its recall f
port; and the thousands on board it brought
back under such conditions as these were hurt, on board the
were aggrieved, were almost forced to know that
some untrustworthy hand had seized for the
moment a power to trifle with the armies and
navies whilst busied in warlike enterprise.*
The French Admiral's — Bruat's — report stated
only the facts without comment; yet the facts
being such as they were, it reads like a pitiless
charge against him who had sent the recall.
Amongst the myriads wondering at the re-
call of the flotilla were not only the enemy,
not only the fleets and the armies, but also a
* Lord Raglan declared his belief that the feeling of disap-
pointment endured by the men — French and English alike —
was universal and deep. — To Secretary of State, Secret and
Confidential, May 8, 1855.
27 G RECALL OF THE KERTCII EXPEDITION.
chap, multitude planted on the all -precious line of
communication which connected the invaders
of Russia with their homes in the West of
Europe.
Apart from any ideas of Sultan, statesmen,
diplomatists (all only adjacent dignitaries not
mingling in streets or Bazaars), the Mind of the
in con- Imperial City, if in those day unmastered by
stantiI101'lc; judgment, and affording no trustworthy guid-
ance to any mortals on earth, was still other
than null, was still— if hardly enlightened, yet
—after a manner suffused by the smouldering
fire of Greek Intellect— was keenly, was loudly
alive. Over-blest in her number of creeds, over-
Babeled in her number of races, and customs,
and tongues, brooding over the grave of one
empire, and the bed — the sick-bed — of another,
distraught between the East and the West, dis-
traught between the Past and the Future, inar-
ticulate, deaf to the reasoners, Stamboul all the
more heaved with opinions, if not with Opinion,
and was roaring with the voices of prophets.
She commonly fed upon Rumour, but fastened,
this time, on a truth — on the tidings of a West-
ern flotilla returning, as in fear or in penitence,
from before the Cimmerian Bosphorus.
We shall presently see, or infer, that the emo-
tion of French troops encamped near Constan-
tinople drew some at least of its strength from
the murmur of the Imperial city.
The fleets and the armies of the Allies had
met no reverse in arms. It was simply the
RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION. 277
message — the hysterical message — from Paris chap.
that, taking effect on an enterprise already .
begun, had raised the growth of scorn in their
rear.(3)
The fleets on the coast, and the armies en- on the fleet
camped before Sebastopol, shared the rage of the troops,
forces brought back, and this angry feeling ex-
tended with even augmented savageness to the
Emperor's corps of Reserve assembled on the
west of the Bosphorus; for these regiments lay
so near Constantinople as to be reached, one may
say, by the howl of the Imperial city ; and,
though guiltless themselves of all fault, they
seem to have felt gravely wounded by what
other Frenchmen had done. 'All the world,'
wrote General Larchey, the commander of the
French Eeserve force at Constantinople, 'ac-
' cuses the electric telegraph of having caused
' the failure of the Expedition to Kertch from
' which the best results were expected.* . . .
' Rightly or wrongly, there is a general outburst
' of indignation at the counter-order of the Ex-
' pedition to Kertch. Sailors and soldiers alike
' have been tearing themselves with rage.' t
The indignation of the fleets and the armies,
whether English or French, extended to our
people at home, and was fiercely expressed by
our Government. Lord Panmure wrote: — 'If
' he [General Canrobert] had refused his con-
* How just this instinctive suspicion was we have seen.
t'Se sont ronge les poings.' To the Minister of War
Quoted Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 164, 165.
278 RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
CHAP. ' sent to the embarkation, he might have been
X ...
' ' forgiven, but to recall an expedition after it
' lias sailed, and to expose your game to the
' enemy, shows him to be utterly incapable of
' high command or of weighing the results of
' so false a move as he has made. Well may
' the army and fleet be disgusted. I only won-
' der Bruat obeyed so desponding an order.* I
' never will believe that the Emperor's instruc-
* tions were such as to leave Canrobert no dis-
' cretion.' t
The Emperor soon spoke for himself, and the
tenor of what he alleged we shall presently learn ;
but first, we must hear General Canrobert, and
then try to do him more justice than was possible
in that angry time.
canroberfs In his telegram to the Emperor dated the 4th
the'recau. of May, General Canrobert, after stating that
the Kertch expedition had started on the previ-
ous evening, went on to say this : —
' Your despatch of yesterday 3d May, 1 P.M.
' has arrived. It compels me without losing a
' day to send all the means of transport of the
' French fleet to Constantinople. I am making
' the expedition return contrary to the advice of
' Lord Raglan, and am proceeding to conform
' myself to your orders.'
It seems just to acknowledge that, if Canrobert
* Disobedience on the part of Admiral Bruat would have
been mutiny, for he was under General Canroberfs orders.
f To Lord Raglan, Private, 7th May 1855. In several sub-
sequent despatches Lord Panmure repeated strong expressions
of his anger and disgust.
RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION. 279
really owed strict obedience to the Emperor's chap.
nighty commands, he could not have well helped '
recalling his troops from that Kertch Expedition,
which, far from aiding at all towards the instant
concentration of forces enjoined by his sovereign,
was drawing off the French means of transport,
and several thousands of men to serve for a while
at some distance from the three allied camps.
General Canrobert, it is true, went astray, but The justice
his error was one of old growth. It lay — not,
as believed Lord Panmure, in any misconstruc-
tion of orders, but — in his then confirmed habit
of undue subserviency to the will of a master
who of course could have no just pretensions to
be wielding his army from Paris.* Plainly not
understanding at all that a general with allies at
his side who would worthily command a great
army in an enemy's country must perforce be a
statesman as well as a soldier, he seems to have
fancied that his duty of simple obedience was
analogous to that of the Private expectant of the
' halt ! ' or ' quick march ! '
X.
It seemed that the wrath of our people was Letter from
endangering all prospect of concert between the Km^rorCh
Allies ; and in explanation of the course he had
* The Emperor himself once declared (though of course in-
consistently with much of what he had done) that he had no
such pretension. ' Je ne pretends pas commander l'arnie'e d'ici.'
To Pelissier, 23d May 1855, quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 192.
280 RECALL OF T1IK KERTCH KXPEDITION.
chap, taken, the French Emperor addressed a long letter
to our Ambassador in Paris : —
x.
in explana-
tinn , i the
course lie
had taken.
'Palais des Toileries, 7 Mai 1855.
'My dear Lord Cowley, — I request you to
' bring under the full consideration of the Eng-
' lish Government the bearing of the facts which
' I am going to state in a few words.'
Then after citing four documents with which
we are already acquainted,* the Emperor pro-
ceeds : —
' You see then, Milord, that I have not counter-
manded the Expedition to Kertch, but that in
the opinion of Canrobert this expedition is in-
compatible with the offensive movement against
the Eussians, and in this alternative, hesitation
is not possible, for Canrobert says himself that
on the 24th the state of things was too strained
to allow of its lasting more than fifteen days.
Also under date of the 6th of May midnight I
have received a despatch from Canrobert to this
effect : — " The squadron has just returned ; I am
" going to send all the disposable vessels to Con-
" stantinople. Lord Raglan awaits instructions
" from London for his concurrence in the field
" operations." Thus, then, the vessels which
were to have gone to Kertch are now engaged
in going to fetch troops at Constantinople, and
* Viz., the letters of the 21th April from Canrobert and
Kiel, the telegram from the Emperor personally of the 3d of
May, and Canrobert's telegi-am to the Emperor of the 4th of
May, mentioned ante, p. 278.
RECALL OF THE KERTCH EXPEDITION. 281
'I strongly approve this determination of Gen- chat
' eral Canrobert* The Expedition to Kertch L_
' might have been advantageous at either an
' earlier or a later time, but now, when the sal-
1 vafcion of the army before Sebastopol is in ques-
' tion, and that this salvation can come only from
' a combined attack on the Eussians, it would be
' madness, as it seems to me, not to concentrate
' all one's means of action on the principal point,
' and to take on one's hands a new expedition
' which, although useful, would have no imme-
' diately decisive effect. I request you therefore
' to be very seriously urgent with the English
' Government in pressing it to send Lord Eaglan
' precise orders, to the end that a general attack
' may be made against the Russians, and that, in
' these critical circumstances, not an instant be
* lost. — Eeceive, &c, Napoleon.'
The defence contained nothing dishonest ; and comment
indeed, it showed fairly the process by which this letter,
singular monarch had guided himself into error.
First, by plainly misreading General Canrobert's
letter of the 24th of April, he had brought him-
self to believe that his army was in imminent
danger. How was this to be met? Of course
by his infallible remedy. Having long before
made himself sure that his plan of campaign
was the one road to victory and conquest, he then
got to see in it also the one plank of safety by
* He says: — J'approuve fort cette determination du General
Canrobert.
282 RECALL OF THE KEKTCH EXPEDITION.
chap, whiijh to escape great disasters. Next — as though
at the time in a frenzy of prophetic assurance —
he complacently took it for granted that a tele-
graphed message from him would not only drive
General Canrobert, but even Lord Kaglan him-
self and all the gathered Allies, to clutch at ' sal-
' vation ' by the ' only ' way open, and enter at
once on his travesty of the famous Marengo cam-
paign. Thence it was that he had sent the hys-
terical telegrams which broke the rest of the
Generals on the night of the 3d of May, and
stopped short in mid-course a flotilla already in
sight of the enemy.
DICTATION FROM PARIS NOW RESISTED. 283
CHAPTER XL
THE EMPEROR'S DICTATION RESISTED, THE COLLAPSE OF
HIS PLAN, AND THE RESIGNATION OF CANROBERT.
Those telegrams which had the effect of arresting chap.
XI
the Kertch Expedition were messages addressed '
to the object of pressing on the execution of the andNteT
Emperor's campaigning plan ; and, whatever Gen- conswera-
eral Canrobert in his heart may have thought of Emperor'!
the project, he was not strong enough to encounter p ^
it with even respectful evasions, still less to set
it aside with a laugh, or an oath, as some other
men might have done ; whilst Niel was even so
circumstanced that he could scarcely help trying
to defend those Imperial notions which he him-
self, as we saw, had greatly helped to inspire.*
Niel was not a bashful man ; and on the 4th of
May — the very morrow of Canrobert's secession
from the enterprise commenced against Kertch —
he came to the English Headquarters full fraught
with the Emperor's plan. After amply expound-
ing the project, he requested that Lord Eaglan
* See ante, chap. v.
284 LORD RAGLAN'S JUDGMENT
chap, would discuss it with Canrobert. Lord Raglan
XL
. did not respond. On the ground that he was
takenby still in expectation of the instruction which Lord
ian: **" Panmure had promised to send him, he avoided
— at least for a time — the discussion proposed;
his opinion hut his opinion of the Emperor's plan was soon
of the plan; . L r
and decisively formed. 'The project/ he writes,
— ' the project of his Imperial Majesty appears to
' be open to many objections. It would divide
' the allied forces far more than is desirable, and
' throw a large portion of them into a country
' where from its nature the difficulty of communi-
' cation between the several columns would be
' necessarily great, and where therefore the en-
' emy might fall in great force upon one body
' without the one next it being able to render it
' assistance.' *
And relied ion confirmed his opinion ; for in
reference to that part of the plan which com-
mitted the defence of the siege-works to 30,000
French and 30,000 Turks, he afterwards wrote : —
' The trenches with the material in them would
1 not be safe ; and, should they be forced, the de-
' pots of Balaclava and Kamiesh upon which the
' existence of the allied armies depends would be
' exposed to great danger. The garrison of Se-
' bastopol is estimated at from 37,000 to 42,000
' men. The troops on the north side consist of
' very large numbers, and a great portion of them
' might be so massed in the town as that they
' could fall with a superior force upon either the
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 5, 1855
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE PLAN. 285
' right or the left attack, without the one being chap.
XT
' able to assist the other.' Lord Baglan also said
he should urge such a scheme as might seem
calculated 'to produce the desired result in the
' simplest and readiest manner.'*
And this he well knew how to do. What Lord and of what
Eaglan desired to achieve against the Sebastopol the right
,, , . course.
garrison was first to attack and reconquer the
counter-approaches which still remained in their
hands ; whilst in reference to the plans suggested
for completing the investment of the fortress, he
preferred to all others a movement which, with
competent aid, Omar Pasha might find means to
execute by advancing from Eupatoria against the
enemy's rear; and the Pasha himself approved
a campaign of that sort, saying even that, to make
good the task, he needed no help at all except
some French regiments of horse.
Of the opinion of Canrobert, who had submitted
himself, as we saw, to the government of General
Niel's ' Mission,' yet was destined, after all his
subserviency, to take a step roughly extirpating
his mystified Emperor's Plan, I need not here
speak; but in the French camp, a general of
other quality was now fast attaining to a great
meed of power.
II.
On the 5th day of May, General Pelissier ad- Peitssier's
dressed to his Chief General Canrobert a letter 5th of May
* Lord Itaglan to Secretary of State, Secret and Confidential,
May 8, 1855.
286 pp:lissier's dominant letter.
chap, so masterly, but also so masterful, that it became
' an event in the siege, and was pregnant with
consequences. First, Pedissier laid it down con-
fidently that with their then strength in numbers
and their other advantages, the Allies were secure
on the Chersonese from every great Kussian at-
tack. Next, he treated it as certain enough that
in spite of all the interposed difficulty they could
carry Sebastopol by proper siege operations.
Next again, he declared a conviction that without
too much turning aside in search of other expe-
dients, the right course was simply to push the
siege to extremity. Then boldly, but with con-
summate adroitness, he went on to deal with the
contingency which would have to be met if the
error (as he considered it) of resorting to field
operations should be ' inexorably ' commanded by
the Emperor. To comply in that case with the
mandate, or to treat it at the least with an out-
ward seeming of deference, he sketched a plan
of campaign, which — since mentioning the port
of Aloushta — might be said to have borne at first
sight a kind of superficial resemblance to the
Imperial project ; but then he went on to show —
to show with his Vauban in hand — that neither
this his own plan, nor any other field operation,
could be wisely or otherwise than rashly at-
tempted without first confining the garrison to
a strictly narrowed defensive, and reconquering,
to be^in with, all those of the counter-approaches
which still remained in their hands. Though
well knowing of course that, through Canrobert,
pelissier's dominant letter. 287
he was substantially addressing the Emperor, he chap
pressed this conclusion in language that might J —
well be called peremptory.
Now, whilst so pointed out by Pelissier as an wholesome
<?ii bearing of
absolutely needed preparative for any field oper- the letter
ations, this measure of reconquering the counter- counsels of
t ho A.111C3,
approaches was also the one he pronounced to be
no less essentially requisite for duly pressing the
siege ; so that, whether the Emperor's instructions
should be maintained or revoked, the course to
be taken at once, unless Pelissier erred, would in
either event be the same.* And this, as we have
seen, was the very same course which Lord Rag-
lan had already advised.
Thus, supposing him to stand unresisted in the
argument he based upon Vauban, Pelissier was
paving the way for a happy convergence of opinion
which would serve at the least to provide for the
immediate future of the Allies, and — without con-
travening too flatly a sovereign's plan of campaign
— might cause the preparatives made towards
rendering it eventually feasible to be absolutely
the same as those needed for pressing the advance
of the siege. From reasons thus offering guidance
for the immediate future there also resulted a Corollary
corollary which applied with bitter force to the from the
t^ to i • i • t letter in its
Past. It the reasoning was sound, it appeared bearing
, . irponthe
that the way in which the Emperor had clan- iJast
destinely prepared for the execution of his plan
was in point of warlike expediency, so wildly, so
glaringly wrong as to be almost the actual op-
* Rousset, vol. ii. p. 168 et seq.
288 PELISSIER'S DOMINANT LETTER.
chap, posite of what skill and wisdom enjoined. In-
. stead of turning his army on the Chersonese into
' an army in waiting,' and making it submit —
almost shamefully — to the enemy's audacious
encroachments, he, if primed with that knowledge
of War which Pelissier now pressed upon him,
would have, months ago, urged Niel and Can-
robert to prepare for the due execution of his
favourite project by peremptorily reconquering
beforehand every one of the counter-approaches,
and effectually confining the garrison to the
strictest defensive.
Thus the Emperor was taught after all, that
Honour would have been his best policy, and
that such a sincere prosecution of the siege as
would have kept him free from the guilt of dis-
loyalty towards Lord Kaglan would besides have
saved the French army from that error of sub-
mitting to the counter - approaches which, if
rigidly obstructive (so long as it lasted) to the
advance of the siege, was also one that forbade
the essentially needful preparatives for his own
cherished plan of campaign ; so that what to the
cynic was ' only a crime,' and — still better — a
crime undetected, now stood out exposed as a
1 blunder.'
paissier-s Pelissier's insistence on the policy of wresting
SwSdlnt the counter-approaches from the enemy's hands
came specially well from a general who was fresh
from the conquest of one of these strongly held
Works ;* and it was in the nature of things that
* See ante, p. 208 et seq.
pelissier's dominant letter. 289
he whose strong will had some five days before chap.
achieved the capture of the Sousdal Counter-guard '
should be taking an ascendant over one whose
relation towards the exploit of the 1st of May was
that of a general who had only consented to the
enterprise under violent pressure, and had after-
wards even apologised to his Government at home
for a victory implying deviation from the tasks
of an ' army in waiting.' *
Then again, the frank, manful, wise boldness contrast,
which marked Pelissier's treatment of the Em-
peror's instructions contrasted superbly with the
subservient attitude of the Commander-in-Chief
towards his mischievous sovereign ; and on the
whole one may say that from after the adminis-
tration of this powerful letter on the 5th of May, Effect of
General Canrobert was an almost annulled, and
Pelissier a conquering man.
III.
Before the middle of May, the Emperor's letter Expositions
of the 27th of April had reached both the French peror-s plan
and the English Headquarters ; as had also a new, the com-
ii- -n • • • niandera.
though in most respects similar Exposition of his
campaigning Plan.Q At the instance of Louis
Napoleon, our Government had been framing a
set of instructions for Lord Eaglan on the sub-
ject of the Emperor's Plan, but these did not
reach him in time for the Council of the 14th
of May, to which we shall presently come. They,
* See ante, p. 212.
VOL. VIII. T
290
CONFERENCES ON THE PLAN.
CHAP.
XI.
The duties
it assigned
to Canro-
bert and
Pelissier.
12th May.
The three
allied Com-
manders in
Conference.
14th May,
renewed
Conference.
however, were not at all needed. Lord Eaglan
knew the mind of his Government.
From Louis Napoleon's abandonment of his
intention to come out to the Crimea, and from
the order providing that Pelissier should be in
charge of the ' Siege- Army,' it followed that Gen-
eral Canrobert, if adopting the Imperial plan,
would himself have to execute that imagined
advance from Aloushta which the Emperor had
intended to lead.
Omar Pasha, invited by General Canrobert and
Lord Eaglan to take part in their deliberations,
came up for the purpose from Eupatoria ; and on
the 12th of May, the three allied Commanders
met in Conference. Though not coming then to
any resolve, they discussed at great length the
Emperor's plan of Campaign.
As we saw, the opinions of both Lord Eaglan
and Omar Pasha had been adverse to the Em-
peror's plan ; and each of them greatly preferred
the idea of an advance from Eupatoria; but
Canrobert, as seemed very natural, could not
easily escape altogether from the pressure of his
sovereign's will; and it was only by yielding a
little in that direction that agreement could well
be attained. Lord Eaglan on the whole thought
it was wise to humour the Emperor by consenting
to an attack from the south, but took care never-
theless to reject all the more nighty parts of Louis
Napoleon's plan.
Omar Pasha seemed to take the same view ;
and, when therefore on the 14th of May the three
CONFERENCES ON THE PLAN. 291
allied Commanders were again brought together chap.
"V*T
in Conference, they agreed to make a forward
movement from their right, and Lord Raglan Lord Ragiau
brought Canrobert to engage that, instead of ad- Element
vancing from Aloushta upon Simferopol, he would ^ fl°^lai1
place his extreme right at Baidar, and thence 0Perationa;
move on Baktchi Serai.* In such case, the task
of Lord Eaglan would be to advance on Can-
robert's left, and storm the Mackenzie Heights.
So far, therefore, the Commanders agreed ; but but no
their hope of ever really engaging in this projected
campaign was conditional on their making it har-
monise with the still greater object for which they
had not yet provided — the vital, the paramount
object of maintaining the position of the Allies
in front of Sebastopol and securing their ports of
supply.
This condition they did not fulfil.
Adverting to the detailed arrangements by
which the Imperial plan sought to meet this
great exigency, and in particular to the agree-
ment of Buckingham Palace, which stipulated
that the positions held by the English army in
front of Sebastopol should be occupied by French
and Turkish troops, Lord Eaglan asked General
Canrobert and Omar Pasha how they meant to
provide for the defence of our siege- works. The
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 15, 1855.
General Canrobert did not admit to his Emperor that he had
so far yielded.— Rousset, vol. ii. p. 173 et seq. ; but that he did
in fact so yield is not only shown by the above despatch of the
15th, but also — and more pointedly — by the secret despatch of
the 19th.
292
canrobert's notion of
CHAP.
XI.
Canrobert
peremp-
torily refus-
ing to guard
the English
trenches :
Omar Pasha
also refus-
ing.
The conse-
quences of
these re-
fusals.
Lord Rag-
lan's morti-
fication.
answers he obtained were positive. Both Can-
robert and Omar Pasha declared 'that it was im-
' possible for them to guard the English trenches.' *
Omar Pasha assigned some reasons for his refusal;
but — more flatly — 'General Canrobert said he
' could not impose such a task on any portion of
' bis army;'t 'and thus/ continues Lord Raglan,
' it became evident that the four Divisions of her
' Majesty's troops now engaged in occupying the
' trenches would have to remain on that duty
' when any operations of an offensive nature
' should be undertaken. I confess that this is
' a great mortification to me.' J
Lord Raglan might well have felt pained when
contrasting that great command in the field which
the united Governments of France and England
had agreed to provide for him with the task to
which he found himself riveted by the absolute
refusal of our French and Turkish allies to take
bis place in front of Sebastopol. He may even
have felt disappointment. It is true that, when
hearing at first of the Buckingham Palace agree-
ment, Lord Raglan had smiled at the notion of
Canrobert's ever consenting (whether aided or
not by the Turks) to hold the entire position
of the besiegers without an English force on
the Chersonese to share his anxious task ; but
the change which substituted for Canrobert so
strong a man as Pelissier to hold the immediate
command in front of Sebastopol may have led
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 15, 1855.
f Ibid. X Ibid.
DIVIDING THE ENGLISH AEMY. 293
the English Commander to think or hope for a chap.
moment that the French (as enjoined by the .
plan) would really takv charge of his siege-
works.
The refusal of Canrobert and of Omar Pasha to Rejection
take charge of the English trenches was substan-
tially of course a rejection of the Emperor's pro-
ject, and besides of that modified plan into which
Lord Raglan had changed it.
In this Conference of the 14th of May, it so An anomaly,
happened — at first sight anomalously — that Lord
Eaglan — by concessions — was able to approach at
some points towards the wishes of Louis Napo-
leon ; * and that he who delivered the blow which
destroyed the Emperor's plan was — of all men ! —
General Canrobert.
"When Canrobert reported these transactions to canrobert's
the Minister of War, he disclosed an idea that the English
. . army might
Lord Eaglan might have divided his force into be split into
00 . two.
two distinct armies, leaving one in front of Se-
bastopol and with the other (supported by the
Piedmontese contingent) undertaking to act in
the field.(2) To go and thus split up a body of
some 25,000 English troops into two little far-
sundered armies — dividing the diamond into
halves ! — would have been contrary to all policy,
to all common-sense, and, one may add, to the
dominant conception of the Emperor, who had
not only made it a chief feature of his plan to
keep the English army entire, but taken pains
* By assenting to an attack from the south, and by under-
taking to operate against the Mackenzie Heights.
294 THE PLAN SUBJECTED
chap, to augment its power by assigning troops of other
' nations to act with it under the same commander.
' The British army,' writes Lord Raglan, ' is too
' small to be divided. It should act in one body/*
rhe Em- A part of the havoc sustained by this ill-fated
exposeYto11 Han when it reached the Crimea can be shown in
realities!' ' arithmetical figures. The Emperor's Palace-made
reckoning had laid it down, as we saw, that, to
guard the positions of the besiegers in front of
Sebastopol, there were needed no more than
60,000 men, of whom one half might be French,
and the other half Turks ; but enquiry at the seat
of war soon made it appear that the army or
armies entrusted with this momentous charge
should have a strength of 90,000 — that is, a
with what force exceeding the one which had seemed great
enough to the planners in Buckingham Palace
by no less than 30,000 men.t And again, the
whole force which Omar Pasha now consented
to leave in the south of the Crimea was less by
15,000 than the Palace computers had imagined
or hoped it would be ; J so that, after making
these two corrections, and then beginning to learn
what forces might be actually assembled for cam-
* To Lord Panmure, Private Letter, May 1, 1855.
+ A joint commission appointed by the three Commanders to
i:i<[uire and report on this subject, recommended unanimously
that the strength of the force remaining planted before Sebas-
fcopol should be 90,000.
X Omar Pasha was sending some troops to the Chersonese,
but withdrawing others, and the upshot of his arrangements
was as stated above. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, May
]5, 1855.
TO MILITARY EXAMINATION. 295
paigning iu the open field, the difference between chap.
estimate and reality would already appear to be !
one of no less than 45,000 men, and the next
glance at these hard realities would show that of
the 30,000 Turks who were to concur with the
French in guarding the siege-works not a man
would in fact be there present.
There was no reason why the French Emperor
should not have set himself free from the error
of 15,000, and the two enormous errors of 30,000
each, before constructing his plan. If taking
that simple precaution, he would have seen the
imagined French Corps he meant to collect at
Aloushta reduced all at once from 65,000 to a
strength of but 5000 men.
When enquiry pushed close had thus shown
that, to defend the position before Sebastopol
and the ports of supply, there would be needed
— not merely 60,000, as provided by the Emperor,
but — 90.000 men, that Omar Pasha, instead of
contributing 30,000 men (as Louis Napoleon as-
sumed) towards the work of the siege, would
spare no troops at all for the purpose ; and
finally, when General Canrobert, disobeying his
sovereign, refused to liberate the English army
for field operations by taking charge of their
trenches, there sank from under this project the
basis on which it had rested, and the structure
of course fell to pieces.
The French Commander indeed reported to his statement
Government that he and Omar Pasha would im- royberuhat
mediately prepare to take the field ; but few, I sup- going to
2lJG RESIGNATION OF GENERAL CANROBERT.
chap, pose, can have thought that this second invasion
. — of the Crimea — without an English army to share
take the y. — wouy ke really undertaken by Canrobert.
Duration of Big with Louis Napoleon's scheme, the baneful
the harm »«■••• » w 1 -r-i
done by ' Mission of Niel began, as we saw, to clog T ranee
General . ° ' °
Niei-s; mis- m the first days of February ; so that, when the
design — meeting criticism at the seat of war —
collapsed in the middle of May, its incumbency
had been keeping the siege in a state of impuis-
sance for nearly three months and a half.
Nor even then — strangely enough — shall we
see its effects wholly cease. The Emperor was
never informed that his Plan, at the touch of
realities, had collapsed in the way we have seen;
and accordingly did not attempt to remove or
break down the huge obstacles it had encoun-
tered at the seat of war, nor to build up anew
calculations there roughly upset; but, as though
he were walking in sleep, he still carried with
him his dream, still went on vainly commanding
that people would hear and obey it.
IV.
General Whilst in conference on the 14th of May,
first endeav- General Canrobert was either fast reaching, or
himself of already had reached, the conclusion that, con-
the com-
mand, sistently with his sense of duty, he could no
longer command the Erench army.
Producing the Dormant Commission, he placed
it in the hands of General Pelissier, and requested
RESIGNATION OF GENERAL CANROBERT. 297
him to assume the command* This Pelissier, CHAP.
XI
with a plainly wise self-control, declined to do, '
maintaining that the instruction was only meant
to be acted upon in the event of Canrobert's
death or serious illness.t
General Canrobert, however, on the 16th of i6thMay.
. His second
May, wrote by telegraph thus to his ruler : — ' My endeavour.
' health and my mind fatigued by constant tension
' no longer allow me to carry the burthen of an
' immense responsibility. My duty towards my His resig-
nation ten-
' sovereign and my country forces me to ask leave dered.
' to deliver to General Pelissier a commander of
' skill and great experience, the letter for him
' which I hold. The army which I shall quit is
' intact, inured to war, ardent, and confident.
' I ask the Emperor to leave me a combatant's
' place at the head of a simple division.' J
General Niel must have felt that his ' mission,' strange in-
and his claim to be superintending the ostensible ofSSS. 0I
commander-in-chief, were brought into jeopardy
by a change which removed the docile Canrobert,
and raised up in his place so strong a man as
Pelissier; but acting, as may well be believed,
under an imperious sense of public duty, whilst
also perhaps somewhat eager to move, if moving
at all, on the topmost crest of the wave, he was
* This step, as Pelissier said, was taken by Canrobert ' five
' or six days ' before the 19th of May.
t I do not observe that this transaction was ever made
known to the French Government ; but General Pelissier im-
parted it to Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan to Secretary of
State, Secret, 19th May 1855.
+ Rousset, vol. iL
298
CANROBERT S REASONS
CHAP.
XI.
Oanrobert's
command
given up
and trans-
ferred to
Pelissier.
Assigned
causes of
Canrobert's
resignation.
audacious enough to advise, nay almost, one may
say, to enjoin the immediate withdrawal of one
man, the immediate raising up of the other ; for
he telegraphed thus to the Minister of War:
'16th May, 10 a.m. — Accept without hesitation
' the resignation of General Canrobert. He is very
' much fatigued. Answer by telegraph. General
' Pelissier is ready to take the command.' *
In reply to Canrobert's letter of resignation,
the Minister of War telegraphed : — ' The Emperor
' accepts your resignation. He regrets that your
' health is affected. He felicitates you on the
' sentiment which makes you ask leave to remain
' with the army. You will command in it — not
' a division merely but — General Pelissier 's Corps.
* Give up the command to that general.' t
General Canrobert accordingly handed over the
command of the army to General Pelissier. Per-
sisting in his wish to have only the lesser com-
mand for which he had asked, he was placed at
the head of his old force, that is, the 1st Division.
In a letter to his Emperor General Canrobert
pointed out several troubles as those which had
caused him to give up the command, and he
stated them to be these: —
1. The slight relative effect produced on Sebas-
topol by the excellent batteries of the Allies.
2. The disappointment of the hopes he had
entertained of being attacked by the enemy on
the reopening of the bombardment.(3)
3. The arduous difficulties encountered in pre-
* Rousset, vol. ii. + Ibid.
FOR GIVING UP THE COMMAND. 299
paring the execution of the Emperor's plan — an chap,
execution rendered nearly impossible (according '
to his account) by the non-co-operation of the
English commander.
4. The very false position in which he had
been placed with the English by his sudden
recall of the Kertch Expedition.
5. The exceptionally great fatigues moral and
physical which he had never for an instant ceased
to be undergoing for the last nine months.*
With respect to the first of the reasons adduced,
we have seen that General Canrobert was in
error; for over and over again the French and
English batteries brought to ruin the works they
assailed.t
With respect to the second of the reasons, we
saw much of the cruel anxiety suffered by General
Canrobert from an opposite cause — that is, from
the not irrational and not therefore unwarlike
dread of being brought to battle in an execrable
position.! He afterwards, as we have seen,
represented himself to be longing for another
Inkerman, but on what grounds I do not know.
With respect to the third of the reasons, we
have seen that a main foundation of the Emperor's
plan was his proposal to obtain the services of
Lord Eaglan and his army in the field by causing
Canrobert to relieve him and them from all their
* To the Emperor, 19th May 1855. Quoted, Rousset, vol.
ii. p. 180.
f See ante, the last sixteen pages of chap. vi.
$ See ante, chap. iv.
300 MERIT OF CANROBERT'S ACT.
chap, siege duties, and that is exactly what Canrobert
' — in disobedience for once to his Emperor — per-
emptorily refused to do.*
To the untoward circumstances which con-
stituted the fourth of Canrobert's reasons Lord
Raglan attached great weight. ' It is evident,' he
writes, 'that General Canrobert has felt very
' uneasy since he recalled Admiral Bruat from
' the Kertch Expedition, and that he has been
' very much weighed down by the anxiety this
' has occasioned him, and that he is not sorry to
• be relieved from a responsibility which had
' almost overpowered him.' t
Whilst agreeing that the remembrance of his
secession from the Kertch Expedition was a
burthen on Canrobert's mind, one may also give
weight to the twelve first words of his third
reason, and withal to the now felt ascendancy of
General Pelissier.
The letter of the 5th of May had dominion, and
in every line seemed to show that the writer —
not the recipient — was the man who plainly
The ment of ought to command. + It is under this aspect that
.sdf-sacrl- * General Canrobert's surrender of the command to
Pelissier seems loyal, patriotic, and wise. For
the honour of the French army, it was necessary
to shelter it from the dictation of an incompetent
sovereign undertaking to wield it from Paris.
To give it the shelter thus needed, and to con-
* See ante, p. 292
+ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 19, 1855.
X See last letter of Pelissier's, ante, p. 285.
SPIKIT OF THE FRENCH AEMY. 301
front a powerful enemy with the resources of his chap.
very own mind — a steadfast mind apt for war ! —
business — Pelissier was abundantly able; and,
General Canrobert not having the gifts or the
stern independence required, it followed of course
that the change must be one of the most whole-
some kind ; but not the less was there merit in
the resigning commander who forbade thoughts
of 'self to prevent him from achieving a great
public good.
Under the discipline of P^lissier's letter General The lesson
Canrobert must at last have discovered that what taught him
by Pelis-
he had mistaken for an honourable, loyal obedience sier's letter
to the will of his sovereign was a noxious and
unpatriotic subserviency which brought discredit
on France, and endangered the repute of her
army. He knew that what successful revolution-
ists are always the first to call ' law ' had directed
him to obey the mere Emperor as distinguished
from the Emperor's Government, and apparently
knew nothing at all of that greater though un-
written law which commanded him to do no such
thing. It was reserved for his successor to show
how the commander of a French army should
comport himself when put under stress of the
meddling persistently attempted against him by
a man such as Louis Napoleon.
By his well-tried personal bravery, by his zeal, Feeling of
, . . „ . . ,., .the French
by his fervour and many good, warlike qualities army to-
Weird s Cfln*
he had won the esteem of his army ; and this robert.
blessing had not been torn from him at the time
of his resignation by any untoward disclosures.
302
SPIRIT OF THE FlfKNCH ARMY.
CHAP.
XI.
Unaware of his having concurred in that raachin
ation which had long kept the siege of Sevastopol
in a state of semi-abeyance, they never, it seems,
marked him out as the object of camp discontents,
and were thoroughly in the mood to admire him
when hearing of his honest resolve to exchange
high and tempting command for simply a ' com-
' batant's place.'
The ' mo-
' rale ' of
the French
army under
Canrobert.
When Canrobert declared that upon resigning
the command of his army, he left it in a state of
high warlike ardour and confidence, he made an
assertion which, although it had come to be true
after General PeUissier's fights, might, if taken
alone, prove deceptive, and lead men to think
that the army whilst standing confronted by a
powerful enemy could long be kept in the fetters
of General Niel's Mission without, for the time,
losing heart.
The actual truth is that towards the end of
March, the ' baneful mission ' of Niel had pro-
duced its natural effect on the French troops;
and, although Lord Raglan himself had wisely
refrained from writing on so tender a subject,
our Home Government, drawing its knowledge
from other sources, became very deeply con-
cerned at what it believed to be the fallen spirit
of Canrobert's army. ' Basing himself upon what
were then his latest accounts on this subject, our
War Minister thus wrote to Lord Raglan : ' I
1 think you may be quite sure now of the Em-
' peror's advent to the Crimea. He professes that
SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 303
' it is his desire to place the fullest confidence in chap.
XT
' you, and to consult you as to all his plans. I ! —
' fear he will have great difficulty in restoring the
' morale of his troops which, from all . . .
' tells me, is greatly shaken not only in the eyes
' of the English soldiers, but in the estimation of
' the French officers themselves. This is alto-
' gether a very painful state of things, and gives
' me great anxiety as to the result of our present
' operations.' *
Down to even the middle of April, the spirit of
the French army was in such a condition that
Rousset describes it thus : ' The Russians were
' surprised and joyful, the English disgusted, the
' French, to say the least, astonished. One could
' no longer make out anything about the conduct
' of this siege, of these demonstrations of force
' ending always in the contrary, and men returned
' sadly into the labyrinth of the trenches as though
' destined never to leave it. There was — not dis-
' couragement but — a fatalist's sort of resignation
' to orders and counter-orders alike. The very
' Turks of Omar Pasha did not render a more
'dismal obedience.'!
Soon, the vigour of Pelissier exerted itself so
superbly against the wishes of Canrobert that
the spirit of the French army was restored — was
raised to a high pitch of warlike ardour on the
* Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, Private Letter, 16th April
1855.
t Rousset, vol. ii. p. 145. What gives value to this statement
is that the writer spoke with knowledge of all the most secret
papers in the French War Office.
304
OPINIONS ON CANROBERT EXPRESSED
CHAP.
XI.
Opinions of
Canrobert
expressed
by men in
authority.
22d of April, and to a victorious sense of its
power on the 1st of May when Pelissier, over-
coming the resistance of his then Chief, attacked,
and carried, and conquered the Sousdal Counter-
guard. It was therefore in spite of Canrobert,
and by the happily over-dominant energy of his
irrepressible subordinate, that the French army,
proudly emerging from out of that state of de-
pression to which the ' mission ' had lowered it,
stood ready and eager for action.
The men in authority were swift, I observe, to
appreciate the sacrifice implied in General Can-
robert's resignation; yet, even whilst expressing
this sentiment, they did not conceal their desire
to see the French army commanded by a more
determined Chief. ' General Canrobert,' wrote
Marshal Vaillant, 'is a noble heart.' ... 'I
' hope we are now going to advance more reso-
' lutely.'*
Lord Panmure, after speaking of Canrobert's
1 vacillation and indecision of character,' writes :
' I am riot sorry that he no longer fills a position
' to the responsibility of which he appears to
' have been quite unequal. Possessing in the
' most eminent degree all the qualities of courage
' and zeal which constitute the brave soldier, he
did not possess those comprehensive views, nor
' that moral courage in Council, which mark a
' sagacious and resolute general.' t
General Kiel was not silent. Referring to the
* To Niel. Quoted, Rousset, vol. ii. p. 177.
+ Despatch to Lord Raglan, 21st May 1855.
BY MEN IN AUTHORITY, 305
extraordinary letter in which he had reproved chap.
the Minister of War for not giving better in- 1
structions to Canrobert,* he now wrote to Mar-
shal Vaillant : ' I quite understand, Monsieur le
' Marechal, that it must have seemed to you
* extraordinary that I should have addressed
' complaints to you of the silence which you ob-
' served towards the General-in-Chief on questions
' which were ceaselessly occupying him. Now,
' you have the explanation. He was bending
' under the burthen ; and you will see that I must
' have gone through much embarrassment before
' determining to speak and act as I did.' Then,
strange as it seems, General Niel proceeds to ex-
plain how it was that he had not before advised
the removal of Canrobert ! — ' Certainly, I do not
' hesitate, where I see my line of duty clearly
' marked out ; but in this case, I have long been
' in doubt as to that singular nature [the nature
' of Canrobert] which has so exactly the appear-
' ance of decision when a resolution is to be taken
' a long time beforehand, and which always draws
' back when the moment for execution has come.
' He is a very worthy man.'f
Long afterwards, Marshal Pelissier (then Duke
of Malakoff and Ambassador at the Court of St
James's) tried kindly, one day, to impart to me
his estimate of the commander to whom he had
succeeded in the Crimea, but did this on a plan
* See ante, p. 226.
t Niel to the Minister of War, May IS, 1855. Rousset, vol
ii. p. 177 et seq.
VOL. VUI. U
306
OPINIONS ON CANROBERT.
CHAP.
XI.
so dramatic — he set up a kind of ' lay figure ' to
represent General Canrobert ! — that 1 cannot here
trust myself to attempt a reproduction of the
fervid, energetic performance by which he showed
the immensity of the difference established by
nature between his predecessor and himself.
Lord Raglan had perhaps been more troubled
by the failings of Canrobert than any other man
living, but he penned no severe, unkind word on
the qualities of the retiring Commander.
Effect of
recent dis-
closures on
Canrobert's
reputation.
The disclosures of a more recent time tend to
lighten or rather divert the weight of blame
thrown upon Canrobert by showing him to have
lost his free-will since the first days of February,
when Niel put him under the generalship of
Louis Napoleon ; and, although it be true that
the attempt of this fanciful sovereign to govern
from Paris the fight going on in Criin-Tartary
was an abuse of monarchical power which Can-
robert ought to have checked, just men, before
wording their censure, will at least try to gauge
the predicament of a hapless commander who
could only have shielded his army from imperial
dictation by breaking or evading the law.
DIPLOMACY MEANWHILE ALERT. 307
CHAPTER XII.
THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA WITH THE
BELLIGERENTS. — THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
RUSSIA. — THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS. — THEIR ULTI-
MATE REJECTION ENTAILING A CHANGE OF AUSTRIA'S
POLICY.
I.
None must think that, because the war raged, chap.
XII
Diplomacy had been all this while idle; but, to L_
know the condition of things which the Confer-
ence of Vienna encountered in the spring of 1855,
one needs must recur for a moment to rather an
earlier time.
When, as long since we saw, France and The union
England at last declared war against Russia in and Prussia
the spring of 1854, both Austria and Prussia western
Powsrs
united themselves with the Western Powers —
not indeed by engaging at once to take part in
the physical strife, but — by preparing for the
eventuality of having to take the field, by making
together the treaty devised with that object, and
withal by declaring in Conference that the de-
livery of the summons by which Prance and
England had brought themselves into a state of
308 THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA
chap, war with Russia was a step ' supported by Aus-
XII
' tria and Prussia as being founded in right.'
•
itsanoma- It was anomalous of course that four Powers
aeter? "" should be allied — for allied they were — against
Russia, when two of them only as yet had come
to be at war with the Czar, the other two simply
announcing that they ' supported,' and approved
the course taken by their more adventurous
friends. One can hardly deny that the part
thus played before Europe by the two applaud-
ing States had an aspect in some degree comic ;
for, though both of them owned mighty armies,
and though both were more closely aggrieved by
the lawless act of the Czar than either of the
Western Powers, they, whilst not themselves
taking up arms, declared instead with solemnity
— as though they were G-rotius and Puffendorf !
— that the conflict undertaken by others, that
is, by England and Prance, was what teachers call
' a just war.'
Still, in favour of this quaint proceeding there
really existed some reasons which obtained and
deserved no small weight ; for statesmen per-
ceived that by dispensing — at least for a while
— with the armed intervention of Austria and
Prussia they might narrow the area of the war,
thus postponing, or even indeed altogether avert-
ing, that evil which the phrase of the time used
to indicate as ' a general conflagration in Europe ; '
* Protocol of the 9th of April 1854. Treaty of 20th April
1854 between Austria and Prussia. See ante, vol. ii. chap, viii.,
and the Papers in the Appendix to that volume.
WITH THE WESTERN POWERS. 309
whilst moreover there was room to believe that chap.
xii.
the Turks, and the two Western Powers, with, to L_
aid them, the merely potential, the merely half-
drawn sword of Austria, could effectually expel
the Czar's army from those Danubian provinces
which he had seized as his 'material guarantee.'
And accordingly, in spite of the plan which its efficacy
-I • i • 1 -n e *°r t'le firs'
dispensed the two more aggrieved rowers from proposed
• t itt- i object.
any immediate need to be taking up arms, the
alliance of the four quickly proved that, so far
as concerned the repression of that particular
outrage which had brought on the war, these
States could enforce their will against Kussia in
a high-handed, summary way.
Secured against the contingency of any Eus-
sian attack by the attitude of her Western allies,
Austria had been able to approach the once
haughty Nicholas with commanding and per-
emptory words.
By mere summons, without the necessity of
having to strike a blow, she had soon forced the
Czar to abandon his hold of the principalities,
and to recross the Pruth; but also by convention
with the Sultan she had been peaceably enabled
to occupy the delivered provinces with her own
troops, thus establishing — at least for the time —
her authority on that Lower Danube which was
precious as an outlet for not only her own dom-
inions, but also those of all Germany. This, not
only for Austria herself but also for Germany,
and therefore also for Prussia (which could not
but heed German interests) was a happy result —
310
STRAIN ON THE LOYALTY
C II A P.
XII.
Tendency
of this too
speedy suc-
cess.
The danger
increased
by another
cause.
so happy, indeed, that, if Austria along with
Prussia and Germany had obtained it as the
fruit of a war victoriously waged against Russia,
the achievement securing so full a measure of
justice might well have been treated as ' glorious.'
Yet, without themselves going to war, Austria
and Prussia had been enabled to attain these ad-
vantages, because the Western Powers (but more
especially France) had been, all the while, stand-
ing ready to come to their aid in resisting any
measures of vengeance attempted against them
by Russia.
The too speedy good fortune, however, thus
wondrously blessing the German — that is, the
non - combatant powers — had a tendency to
weaken their union with England and France ;
for, since Austria and Prussia had already ob-
tained what they sought, their new friendships
in the West might grow cool. They were plight-
ed auxiliaries who had received their great prize
in advance, before being called into action ; and,
unless stayed by feelings of honour, might be
tempted perhaps to desert.
Moreover, France and England soon showed
thai against the aggressor they meant to be ag-
gressive themselves, and that their chosen plans
of campaign would withdraw no small part of
their forces to countries and seas far away, thus
materially reducing their power to support Ger-
man States in resistance to any invasion by
Russia. It resulted that, after a while, the two
great Powers of Germany which, though not
OF THE TWO GERMAN POWERS. 311
themselves taking up arms, had still solemnly chap.
blessed the good cause of the Western belliger- 1_
ents, were less and less under motives for going
to war with the Czar, and also less and less
sure that, if once committed against him, they
would have all the help they might need from
their French and their English allies.
Under stress of the reasons thus tending to
make them hang back, the two German Powers
were put to the proof of their loyalty, and one
of them soon fell away.
Prussia — destined in later years to become a Thedefeo-
, „ Hon of
great, conquering Power, and the basis or a new, Pmsaia.
mighty empire — was then under the rule of a
king — they called him Frederick William — who,
although not endowed with the qualities for any
such task, still kept in his very own hands the
whole conduct of foreign affairs. His policy, if
so one may call it, appeared to be in no degree
shaped by any sense that he had of the duty
attaching on Prussia as one of the five great
Powers, and what he seemed to take for a guide
was the mere composition of forces brought to
bear on his mind by many and conflicting fears.
Amongst these of course might be reckoned —
for think of the ruin that followed on Jena and
Auerstadt !— his lively fear of the French, with
also his fear that, if tamely enduring the Czar's
occupation of the Danubian Principalities, he
would find himself deserted by Germany, and
accordingly, as we have seen, he allied himself
to the Western Powers and to Austria by the
312 THE DEFECTION OF PRUSSIA.
chap. Protocol of the 9th, and the Treaty of the 20th
XII
. — of April.
But when he saw France and England engaging
their strength in the East far away from Berlin,
those tremulous scales that he used for weighing
fears against fears began to show a great change ;
for the separated armies of France were of course
for the moment less terrible to him as enemies
than when held together, and besides, as be-
frienders, less able to help him against the con-
tingency of his being attacked by Kussia ; so
that, visibly, his dread of the French now became
on the whole less oppressive than his awe of the
Czar ; whilst also his fear that Germany would
turn against him for acquiescing in a Russian
occupation of the principalities came soon to an
end ; because their approaching deliverance from
the grasp of Nicholas was then already in process
of being secured by the valour of the Turks, and
by the energy of Austria, co-operating with the
two Western Powers.
No dread of the evils that come with the
lowering of a Nation's repute appeared to find
any place in the Eoyal collection of fears ; and,
if the king for a moment felt qualms at the idea
of deserting those more warlike States which had
virtually wrought the deliverance, he very soon
stifled his conscience. Before the last week of
July, Frederick William began to hang back,
and then by fast degrees lapsed away into un-
dissembled neutrality.* His defection of course
* See ante, vol. ii. p. 90, and the footnotes in the same
THE DEFECTION OF PRUSSIA. 313
made it perilous for Austria to fulfil her engage- chap.
ments, laid Germany everywhere open to Eussian _ 1
diplomatists, made it even a clear, tempting field
for all their decomposing exploits, and soon broke
up the Confederacy into Statelets so feebly united
that, whilst some of them were consenting, there
were others refusing to ' mobilise ' their respective
armies, and one at least, if not more, that ingeni-
ously found for its troops a happy medium state
between being and not being summoned to gather
in arms — between standing up and sitting still.*
The harm Prussia did to her late — now aban-
doned— allies, by laying Germany open to Nessel-
rode's emissaries, was of a serious kind ; t for, in
its then absurd state of multiplied sovereignties,
the country offered intriguers a rich field of action ;
and the once famous Eussian diplomatists had
not yet been superseded, or robbed of their well-
tried power by marplots ranting at Moscow.
Prince Bismarck, it seems, in referring to the
origin and course of this war, has denied that his
country was bound to take a part against Russia ;
and no one, of course, should say lightly that
the great statesman erred ; but, to weigh his con-
tention with any advantage, it is essential to know,
step by step, the policy he would have chosen for
Prussia from the time when Austria, Prussia, and
Germany being all of them treated as nullities,
page. Prussia's first overt act of retrogression was a refusal to
attend the Conference of the 22d of July, that had been sum
moned for giving effect to the Protocol of the 9th of April.
* Called ' Kriegbereitschaf t. '
+ See the Official Diplomatic Study.
314 THE LOYALTY OF AUSTRIA.
CHAP. Moldavia and Wallachia were defiantly seized by
' the Czar.
The loyal The statesmen of Austria — in that respect like
ST^Hr." our diplomatists— have long been accustomed to
govern their public acts by the dictates of per-
sonal honour ; and, her honest, young Emperor
clinging fast under difficult trials to sound patri-
otic designs, she at this anxious time was well
steered through the numberless troubles besetting
her by a Minister of commanding ability and
invincible firmness. Against all the contrivances
of Eussia and her industrious emissaries, against
the hysteric urgency of the Prussian king, against
the ceaseless embarrassment of acting under an
Emperor whose feelings, although he controlled
them, still painfully clashed with his duties,
against a formidable proportion — including per-
haps the most powerful — of all his fellow-sub-
jects, and finally in the opposite quarter against
France and England when striving to draw him
too far in the direction of their special desires,
Count de Buol held his course with a steadiness,
temper, and skill that never seemingly failed him
throughout the long, perilous struggle.
Kept by this master-hand in the path of honour
and prudence approved by her loyal Emperor,
Austria did not forget the advantages with all the
consequent duties that had accrued from her
union with the Western Powers. Ear from
imitating the defection of Prussia, she armed at
great cost for a war, and — though slowly — drew
nearer and nearer to her Western Allies. Having
THE CZAR NICHOLAS SEEKING PEACE. 315
previously declared, as we saw, her full, unre- CHAP.
served approval of the warlike course they were !_
taking, she, in August, went on to record her
concurrence in those four stated demands which,
as France and England announced, they would
peremptorily force on the Czar.*
II.
Bv way of warning to Russia, and therefore in step taken
J J ° . by Austria
the interest of peace, the Austrian Cabinet mi- which made
a beginning
parted to that of St Petersburg the Protocol or ofhermedi-
1 ation.
the 8th of August with its statement of the Four
Demands, and so not only made a beginning of
that exceptional kind of mediation between the
belligerents which she afterwards pursued, but
also laid the foundation of what became after a
while the ' Conferences held at Vienna for put-
' ting an end to the war.'
The Czar at first did not deign to heed the course
, taken at
warning from Austria, nor to act in any way on first by
. . the \jZ3X
her statement of the Four Conditions which his Nicholas;
adversaries meant to impose ; and seeing this she
drew nearer to the Western Powers. She nego- and after-
wards,
tiated with them a Treaty, engaging for herself
that, if peace upon the basis of the Four Condi-
tions should not be assured before the end of the
year, she, in concert with England and France,
would go on to devise measures fitted for attain-
ing the objects of the alliance.
* Protocol of the 8th of August 1854. The purport of the
Four Conditions will be shown post, p. 323 cl seq.
31 G ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE
chap. But since August, the months had been pass-
! — ing ; and meanwhile, the once haughty Czar had
listened with so much attention to the arguments
adduced on the Alma, and afterwards repeated at
Inkerman, that in a communication to the Aus-
trian Government on the 28th of November, he
ins accept- all at once announced his acceptance of the ' Four
ance of the .
Four Condi- ' Conditions as a starting-point on which to ne-
tions. . & r
gotiate for putting an end to the war. He thus
in effect sued for peace, and even undertook to
accept it on the basis imposed by his enemies.
Treaty of This step on the part of the Czar did not hinder
the 2d of ; ~
December the Austrian Government from proceeding with
1854. r &
the Treaty we saw them negotiate. It was rati-
fied by the contracting Powers, and bears date
the 2d of December 1854*
Preliminary Prince Alexander Gortchakoff was sent by
negotiations . ,
for the con- Russia to the Austrian Court as Minister Pleni-
potentiary ; and in the last month of the year,.
France and England instructed their representa-
tives at Vienna to confer with the prince on the
subject of the basis proposed for peace negotia-
tions. An informal meeting between Gortchakoff
and the representatives of the three allied Powers-
took place on the 16th of December. The Allies,
however, declared that they must be explicit in
showing the interpretation they put upon the-
Four Points as drafted in the Protocol of the 8th
of August, and — substantially — insisted that the
* When yielding on the 28 th of November, the Czar had prob-
ably learnt that the Treaty of the 2d of December was im-
pending.
ference.
EXCLUDING PKUSSIA. 317
conditions as there stated must be recast in the chap.
xir
way they proposed. Accordingly in a Memoran- L_
dum of the 28th of December 1854, communi-
cated to Prince Gortchakoff by the Plenipoten-
tiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain, the
Allies newly formulated their Four Conditions;
but reserved to themselves a power to insist upon
any other conditions that might afterwards seem
to be required by the general interests of Europe.
It must be owned that this peremptory demand
on the part of the Allies was exasperating, if not
unfair, and the Russian negotiators appealed for
guidance to St Petersburg ; but — whether really
craving for peace, or for some other reason deter-
mined to let the Conference meet — the Czar at
once fully acceded to the new formulation re-
quired by the Allies, and Prince Gortchakoff
announced the decision at a meeting held for
the purpose on the 7th of January 1855.
Great efforts were made by Russia and the
small German States to obtain the admission of
Prussia to the now approaching Conferences ; but
the Allies would only consent to these prayers
upon condition that Prussia should engage to
take part in the war if the negotiations for peace
should fail.
The king would give no such pledge ; and ac- Exclusion
cordingly, to the horror and indignation of his from the
relatives, and of numbers whose interests were ences."
closely bound up with his monarchy, he remained
excluded from the Conferences.* His realm
* For the diatribes levelled against him by his friends and
318 BEARING OF CZAR'S DEATH ON THE PROSPECT.
chap, ceased in effect for the time to be one of 'the
XII
' ' five Great Powers ' — not because it had lost any
part of its physical strength, but rather owing
to failings which brought its king into discredit.
So low indeed had he fallen or seemed to fall,
that there was even a question of calling upon
him to agree that as a pledge for his future
conduct he should suffer one of his fortresses
to be occupied by Austria, another by France,
and another again by England.*
Question as When Nicholas died, many thought that the
to the effect . „ • i i j 11
ofNichoias'a passing away 01 a sovereign who had personally
death on the I ,° % ,-,,■,.,, 1
prospects of brought on the war would be likely to accelerate
peace. °
its end ; but some of those who had means of
forming a judgment believed that the late Czar
— well schooled by adversity — had not only re-
solved to make peace, if attainable on terms not
derogatory to his sense of honour, but also —
thanks to his habit of long -sustained absolute
rule and to the dominating strength of his char-
acter— would have been perfectly able to enforce
his will on all Russia against what might be the
desire of many of his more warlike subjects ; and
again, as already we have seen, there was room
for believing that the task thus regarded as feas-
connections at this cruel time, see Sir Theodore Martin's ' Life
' of Prince Albert. ' There virtually sat on the king what the
French call a ' conscil de famille,' and the tribunal, it seems,
was not merciful.
* England was to be asked to occupy Dantsic. Our Govern-
ment instantly rejected the suggestion ; but it was one sub-
mitted for consideration on very high authority.
OPENING OF THE CONFEKENCE. 319
ible when undertaken by Nicholas, might be one c ha p.
beyond the strength of his son. Madame Lieven — _
for instance pronounced that Alexander could not
open his reign with an act of surrender or, as she
fiercely worded it, cowardice.
The new Czar began his State utterances by
making two public statements which violently
clashed with each other. In a high-flying, loud
manifesto he told his people that he was going
in the glorious steps of Peter and Catherine. In
another and quite sober statement, meant rather
for non-Eussian Europe, he through his Minister
Nesselrode reminded mankind that his father had
begun to negotiate for peace upon a basis then
already accepted, and announced that he himself
too would march in the path thus laid open before
him.
III.
Pursuant to this declaration and to the con- The Peace
Negotia-
curring assent of France, England, Turkey, and tionsat
Austria, a formal Conference was opened at
Vienna on the 15th of March, under the presi-
dency of Count Buol, the Austrian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and at its first meeting, there
were present for Austria, Count de Buol and
Baron Prokesch ; for France, Baron Bourqueny ;
for England, Lord John Eussell and Lord West-
moreland ; for Eussia, Prince Alexander Gortcha-
koffand M. Titoff; for Turkey, Aarif Effendi.
The Conference was afterwards joined by, for
France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, her Minister for
320 THE MISSION OF LORD JOHN liUSSELL.
chap. Foreign Affairs, and for Turkey, by Aali Pasha,
. ! the Eeis Effendi.
Of Count Buol I already have spoken.
Lord John As conceived at the time when Lord Clarendon
Russell. ...
gave him his instructions on the 22d of February,
the mission entrusted to Lord John Russell — an
illustrious name in England — was a charge of
vast scope;* for along with the task of negoti-
ating a peace, he, to meet the event of its proving
that the war must go on, was to endeavour to
strengthen the existing armed league against
Russia by obtaining further accessions, and to
concur in providing for what, as confidentially
indicated, was made to seem nothing less than
a fearless resettlement of Europe, thus osten-
sibly lending the sanction of our own Foreign
Office to the dreams of Louis Napoleon.
Lord John first went to Paris without, it seems,
gathering there any aid towards the objects in
view. On reaching Berlin, he learnt that a bye-
negotiation for a treaty between France and
Prussia was then in progress ; and, although
nothing treacherous was intended by either State
against England, the circumstance seems to show
that both she and her French ally were wasting
their strength in cross purposes.
The personal reception accorded to their illus-
trious guest by the king and his Government was
most cordial ; but Lord John soon perceived that
* He did not at that time hold office. It was during the
course of his mission that Lord John became Secretary of State
for the Colonies.
THE MISSION OF LORD JOHN KUSSELL. 321
at Berlin there were none of the ingredients chap.
needed for forming a league. Concurrently with IL
a professed willingness on the part of the king
to concede the supremacy of Germany to Austria,
the feeling against her of both the sovereign and
his minister appeared to be one of bitter and deep
animosity. The king wished, Lord John saw, to
avoid a war with either Eussia or the Allies, and
was so anxious to abstain from acts tending to
commit him to the Western Powers, that, al-
though resenting his exclusion from the Confer-
ence, he would not purchase his readmission by
engaging himself to any definite course of action.
The king declared that admission to the Confer-
ence was his right, and that those who had ex-
cluded him would repent of it. The king said
he was not the adherent but the friend of the
Czar, and that ' as his friend ' he had frequently
given Mm unpalatable advice. He said he be-
lieved in the bottom of his heart that the Czar
sincerely desired peace, and would make any sac-
rifice for it compatible with the dignity of his
crown. On the whole, Lord John Eussell thus
wrote of the Prussian king: — 'While pursuing
' a policy to the last degree selfish, he gives him-
'• self the air of an injured prince, and assumes for
: his State a position ambiguous rather than dig-
' nified. His object evidently is to restrain Austria
' from acting on behalf of the Allies, and perhaps
* to induce the Western Powers to accede to such
* terms of peace as may be compatible with the
* interests of Eussia.' The manful Prince of
VOL. VIII. X
322 PRINCE ALEXANDER GORTCHAKOFF.
chap. Prussia (afterwards Emperor of the great united
!_ Germany) was strongly opposed to the adopted
policy, and tersely expressed his opinion of its
banefulness by saying that, if Prussia were to
join the Allies, there would be peace in a fort-
night ; but the fainter heart and the weaker mind
of the king remained in the state we have seen.
Under conditions thus adverse, Lord John did
not choose to present his credentials at the Prussi-
an Court; and bidding farewell to the prospect of a
general League, soon went from Berlin to Vienna.*
His task was thenceforth only twofold, that is,
to negotiate for England in the approaching Con-
ference, and meanwhile, if he could, to bring
Austria into the war.
Prince On Prince Alexander Gortchakoff as extant in
Gortcha- the Conferences of 1855 one can hardly cast even
a glance without more or less using the light
which he many years afterwards threw on his
own much exhibited character ; and since it
therefore seems necessary to make the allusion,
one perhaps ought to add that despite what he
had counselled and done, the man always re-
mained in high favour with his sovereign and his
country, thus acquiring some right to protest that,
except for being the foremost in a public declara-
tion of ill faith, he was not more dishonoured
than the Czar, nor more dishonest than Russia.
Committed in 1870, his offence does not fall
within the range of this narrative.
* Lord John Russell to Lord Clarendon, March 1, 1855.
koff.
DEBATES IN THE CONFERENCE. 323
It is with the negotiations of 1855 that I have chap.
to deal ; and in those, so far as I see, the prince L_
was not guilty of acting with falseness or undue
craft; and his faults, as displayed in the Con-
ference, were not even cognate to deceptiveness,
being rather what seemed want of skill, want of
mental resource, want of power to persuade or
conciliate, want of even the much-needed power
to keep his temper under control. A main part
of his duty, of course, was to draw Austria to-
wards the Czar, and detach her from the Western
States ; yet the process of exchanging ideas with
an Austrian negotiator was the very one that
more than all others provoked his ill-humour.
His subsequent career seems to prove that he
needs must have had more capacity than he
showed in the Conference-room.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys was a man of ability m. Drouyn
and very high personal character. Before trav- de Lhuya'
ersing the Continent on his way to Vienna he
had gone to London, and there exchanged ideas
with our Government. From the first he proved
anxious to frame such conditions as might either
lead to a peace or bring Austria into the war.
Count Buol ably opened the Conference by a Debates m
brief, compact speech well designed for its object, enceC°nf""
and in words approved by all present, set forth
the Pour Conditions imposed by the Allies, and
(in principle) accepted by Eussia : —
' 1. The Protectorate exercised by Eussia over
324 THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE.
chap. ■ Moldavia and Wallachia shall cease, and the
XII.
* ' privileges conferred by the Sultans on these
1 Principalities, as well as on Servia, shall hence-
' forward be placed under the collective guarantee
' of the Contracting Powers.
'2. The freedom of the navigation of the
' Danube shall be completely secured by effect-
' ual means, and under the control of a per-
' manent syndical authority.
'3. The Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall be re-
' vised, with the double object of connecting more
' completely the existence of the Ottoman Empire
' with the European equilibrium, and of putting
' an end to the preponderance of Russia in the
' Black Sea.
'4. Russia abandons the principle of covering
' with an official Protectorate the Christian sub-
' jccts of the Sultan of the Oriental ritual; but
' the Christian Powers will lend each other their
' mutual assistance, in order to obtain from the
' initiative of the Ottoman Government the con-
' Urination and the observance of the religious
' rights of the Christian communities subject to
' the Porte, without distinction of ritual.
' The development of these principles will form
' the object of our negotiations.' *
After a labour of several day., means of giving
effect to both the First and the Second Conditions
were agreed to by all the plenipotentiaries, and
* Eastern Papers, No. xiii. I have preferred Count Buol's
concise statement of the Four Points to the more wordy exposi-
tion furnished by the Memorandum of the 28th of December.
THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE. 325
there seemed to be a fair prospect of their prov- chap.
ing able to deal no less happily with the Fourth
Coudition (if ever, indeed, they should reach it),
whilst also they were able to come to terms upon
the first part of even the Third Condition ; but
its latter words plainly ordained that means
should be found for ' putting an end to the pre-
' ponderance of Eussia in the Black Sea ; ' and
this was the matter that promised to be the sub-
ject of lasting contention. By accepting the Four
Points, Eussia had committed herself to the prin-
ciple of submitting to be deprived by some means
or other of her preponderance in the Black Sea.
What, however, those means should be had not
been determined, and was the question to be
taken in hand.
The Allies with a thoughtful regard for the feel-
ings of Eussia proposed that she herself should
suggest the means of reducing her naval ' prepon-
' derance ' in the Black Sea ; but Prince Gortcha-
koff suspected a snare ; and (after a reference to
St Petersburg) she declined to take any such step.
There of course are two ways in which 'pre-
' ponderance ' can be terminated : — by either tak-
ing weight from the heavier scale, or adding
weight to the lighter one. The Allies proposed
that the object should be attained by either
entirely neutralising the Black Sea— that is, rid-
ding it of all ships of war, except a few mere
Police vessels — or else limiting the number of
war-ships that Eussia should there keep afloat.
On the other hand, Eussia objected with great
326 THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE.
• hap. energy to both those plans, and then — no longer
' refusing to make suggestions herself — she offered
some plans based on ' counterpoise ' — one for
instance proposing to open the Dardanelles and
the Bosphorus to all nations ; * another enabling
the Sultan to open the Straits whenever he
might find himself menaced, and to reverse the
' preponderance ' complained of by calling up to
support him the ships of any allies who might
choose to answer his prayer.t
The Allies not accepting any plan of that kind,
their difference with the Czar became sharply
pronounced. Limitation or no Limitation of his
Black Sea fleet was seen to be the question in
hand.
Baron Bourqueny showed very ably that the
plan of Limitation was only, after all, one pro-
viding that a fleet maintained on a closed inland
sea should be on a peace footing.
Prince Gortchakoff of course, if so minded,
might have declared the resolve of his Court
with a dignified sparseness of words, and need
not have sought to uphold it by any assignment
of reasons ; but — somewhat rashly — he urged (as
if he were talking at Moscow) that to engage to
limit the strength of the Russian fleet in the
Euxine would be submitting to an infringement
of the Czar's 'sovereign rights,' and thus sub-
* Annexes A and B to 12th Protocol. This plan was inad-
missible ; and, amongst other reasons, because it was wholly
inconsistent with the Sultan's ancient and most, cherished
rights.
+ Annex to 13th Protocol.
CONTINUING DEBATES. 327
jected himself to the answer relentlessly inflicted chap.
XII
upon him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who took L_
care to remind the negotiator that that very Sea
on which he claimed ' sovereign rights ' had as
matter of fact been swept clear of the Russian
flag, and brought under the full control of Powers
at war with the Czar.* M. Drouyn de Lhuys
might have added that, even when Eussia was
at peace with the Western Powers (though sub-
ject indeed to their anger) they had forbidden
her the use of those very ' sovereign rights,' had
ordered her war-ships into port, had taken good
care to see the order obeyed, and had done all
these things without provoking her Czar — a man
not thought much wanting in pride — to meet
their repressive authority with any Declaration
of War.t
Lord John Russell gave point to his French
colleague's argument by alluding to the future,
and saying that the resistance of Russia on the
question of Limitation would be obliging England
and Prance to find the guarantees they required
in a continued occupation of the Black Sea and
the Baltic.^:
To oppose that Russian contention which as-
* Eastern Papers, No. xiii. p. 58.
t So that the Czar if asserting in conference what his people
called ' sovereign rights,' must have owned, when pressed to be
accurate, that he referred to his former possessions. He could
neither have appealed to the principle of the 'uti possidetis,'
nor to that of the status quo ante beUum. Neither at the time
of the Conference, nor in the winter preceding the declaration
of war, was he master of the Black Sea.
X Eastern Papers, No. xiii. p. 67.
328 THE BEARING OF THE WAR
chap, cribed a kind of dishonour to the surrender of
XII.
any 'sovereign rights,' Lord John Kussell referred
more than once to the lessons of History, sub-
mitting for instance that Louis Quatorze had con-
sented to the demolition of Dunquerque without
its having been thought that in making the sacri-
fice for the sake of peace he descended from high
estate ; but Prince Gortchakoff was ready, this
time, with an adequate reply. He acknowledged
that a sovereign might be driven to such a con-
cession after meeting an unbroken series of mili-
tary disasters, but denied, as he had a full right
to do, that Eussia at the time of the Conference
had been brought into any such plight. She had
been vanquished in each of the battles ; but her
great Engineer had done much towards redressing
the balance thus swayed.
The Western Powers maintained that, to con-
tent themselves with the ' counterpoise ' plan
would be in effect to postpone the deliverance of
the Sultan's dominions from the danger of Eussian
aggression, and would leave it to be achieved, if at
all, in a more or less distant future, by other, if
any, men and by other, if any, alliances.
In the face of even that argument, there is
ground for maintaining that the ' counterpoise '
plan on the whole would have formed the best
sort of protection to the Sultan's dominions ; * but
* The Porte seems to have so judged in 1871, for it assented
with apparent willingness to the change then made ; and indeed
eo early as 1867 Fuad Pasha was willing that the Neutrality
principle should be given up. Beust, vol. ii. p. 106.
ON THE CONFERENCE. 329
against the idea of substituting it, as the Eussians chap.
desired, for a plan of Limitation there existed at !_
the time of the Conference one fatal objection.
The ' counterpoise ' plan was not one that imposed
grave restraint on the Czar, was not one that pen-
ally humbled him, and for that very reason of
course would not fasten upon him the badge of
acknowledged defeat, nor serve the Allies — like a
trophy — to show abroad amongst men instead of
a captured Sebastopol.
The Conference being one carried on simultane- compared
ously with the strife on the Chersonese, it fol- mere ad-
duccd
lowed of course that the ' reasons ' adduced on ' reasons,1
,.-.,.,,. , _. the actual
each side by the disputants were only as chaff stress of the
ji -i -I-11 -in 'motives.1
to the gram when compared with the weight of
the motives — the motives derived from stern war
— which, although not acknowledged in words
spoken out between foes at a table, were still
swaying every man in the Conference-room at
Vienna.
There was one — only one — tract of ground (and
this a tract not more extensive than many an
English 'estate') where the actual condition of
things was such as to give the Czar strength in
negotiating with his Western assailants. What
humiliations by sea and by land he or rather his
sire had been suffering one after another until the
25th of September 1854 we know and need not
repeat ; but then — as though heaven were grant-
ing that sagacious, old prayer which besought it
to darken the minds of her enemies * — she saw
* Quoted ante, vol. iii. p. 265.
330 THE BEARING OF THE WAR
i H A P. her invaders abandon their conquests made on the
XII
' Alma, saw them slowly descend from the vantage-
ground of the Mackenzie Heights, saw them coldly
1 lay siege ' to the more than half-open town left
deserted (as they themselves saw) by Mentschi-
koff' s fugitive army, and then day by day, week
by week, saw the genius of Todleben forcing them
to expiate their hapless resolves ; so that having
first utterly wasted the precious fruit of their
victories, they now, after six months of trench-
work, stood faltering and baffled before him.
But this was not all, was not even perhaps the
worst part of that distressing predicament in
which the Allies had contrived to plant their
now powerful armies ; for, whilst failing to carry
Sebastopol, and even losing ground in their efforts,
they also, we know, were so circumstanced as to
be unable to raise the siege. They, or more
strictly speaking a part of them, which was not
to have a less strength than 90,000 men,* stood
picketed fast in the front of an uninvested for-
tress drawing men and supplies without stint
from the powerful Empire of Russia, and held
fast too on ground which no man, if he could
help it, would ever choose as a battle-field. With
forces thus not only baffled, but held in strict,
perilous durance, the Western Powers of course
were under strong, tempting motives, which, un-
less counterbalanced by any opposing reasons,
might well make them look somewhat wistfully
at a prospect of peace ; and especially might this
* See ante, chap. xi.
ON THE CONFERENCE. 331
be the case with Louis Napoleon in those hours chap.
XII
when he was not intending to lead his army in L_
person ; for his power of weighing on the Con-
tinent by means of an army in readiness for strife
on ground nearer his frontiers was suspended, or
immensely impaired by the exertions of power he
had made and was making in a distant part of
the world.
So far, therefore, the condition of things gave
strength to the Russian negotiators ; but on the
other hand, it must be remembered that — because
unacquainted with that ' Mission ' of General Niel
which was sheltering the Sebastopol garrison from
all decisive attacks — they believed the Flagstaff
Bastion, and with it the Fortress itself, to be in
closely imminent danger; whilst also, we know,
they were pressed by the grave, disheartening
care of which I am going to speak. The effort
required for sustaining this defence of Sebastopol
by aid of troops marched from vast distances was
one of a cruelly exhausting kind. The stress of
the marches alone inflicted losses believed to have
reached enormous proportions, and seemed des-
tined to be always continuing until the siege
should end ; * so that Russia from that point of
view might seem to be driven towards peace by
painfully cogent motives ; and, when known in
St Petersburg, the losses sustained by the Rus-
The late Duke of Newcastle (who, however, since February
1855 had ceased to be War Minister) once imparted to me his
estimate of the losses which the Russians bij their marches alone
had sustained. His estimate was so vast that 1 am unwilling to
reproduce it.
332 THE BEARING OF THE WAR
CHAP, sians under the April bombardment would tend
YTT
L_ to load the same scale ; but then again it appeared
that the very excellence of the Sebastopol defence
(which seemed of course even more admirable
than it really was to those who believed that
since February the place had been sincerely be-
sieged *) put an obstacle in the way of her yield-
ing ; for how to agree that the prowess which had
hitherto saved, and still was maintaining the For-
tress, nay, making it perform the exploit of hold-
ing its besiegers in duress, should so far, after all,
go for nothing, as not to afford a good warrant for
refusing consent to harsh terms ?
The Allies having hitherto failed in their tedi-
ous siege, and being moreover entangled by their
own hapless policy between the seas and the For-
tress, might well be under strong motives inclining
them to obtain a peace, if only they could do this
on terms not offensive to their own self-respect ;
but considering all that had passed — the armies,
the fleets, the great united armadas, despatched to
far-distant shores in the face of a gazing world —
it would hardly be possible for them to escape
public ridicule if they were to end the war with-
out either taking Sebastopol, or winning instead
some advantage, that could be shown to the
scorners as a worthy equivalent for the fortress
they had striven and failed to reduce.
On the whole, one may say that what seemed
* General Niel landed in the last week of January ; but the
effect of his paralysing mission may roughly be said to have
commenced with the month of February.
ON THE CONFERENCE. 333
likely to govern the balance between peace and chap.
war were — not material interests, but — questions 1_
of warlike ' honour.'
Of course, the resolves of Diplomatists engaged
in the Conference-room might well be from time
to time swaying beneath the impulsion of tidings
fresh come from the seat of war ; but it so hap-
pened that the period occupied by the critical
part of the negotiation (from the 26th of March
to the 21st of April), was not one in which events
greater than a prolonged bombardment were oc-
curring on the Chersonese Heights. On the other
hand, it is true that during several months, the
general tenor of the strife for Sebastopol had
been bitterly disappointing to the Allies. Their
armies — unaware of the cause — had long been
under the palsy inflicted by General Mel's Mis-
sion, and their claims to dictate a peace ran
counter, one cannot deny, to the almost ridicu-
lous fact that (in the matter of gaining or losing
ground) an ascendancy at the seat of war had
been maintained — not, this time, by aggressive
besiegers, but instead by an audacious garrison ;
for Canrobert, ever since February, had been
more or less patiently submitting to the enemy's
counter-approaches.
The Powers in arms against Russia could of
course rest high hopes on the forces, now great
in numbers, with which they were preparing to
operate at the seat of war ; but the critical period
of the peace negotiations included a time when it
seemed to be only too certain that the French
334 FAILING PROSPECTS OF PEACE.
CHAP. Emperor, going out to the Crimea, would there
' command his forces in person. This measure- -
for two sets of reasons, some based on his absence
from France, others drawn from the idea of his
presence at the head of an army — was regarded
as one of ill omen.
The young Czar desired peace ; but in the face
of Opinion at home growing up more and more
into strength since the death of his sire, he did
not venture to purchase the blessing he sought
by any too obvious surrender of what — inoppor-
tunely— his envoys were pleased to call ' sovereign
1 rights.'
Failure of On the 21st of April, Prince Gortchakoff de-
negotia- clared in Conference the persistent refusal of the
fcioiis Cttrricd
on between Czar to limit his number of war-ships in the
eients. Black Sea; and thereupon Lord John Eussell
and M. Drouyn de Lhuys announcing that their
instructions were exhausted, the negotiations
directly maintained between Eussia and the other
belligerents fell into a state of abeyance, though
the actual close of the Conference was delayed
during several weeks.
"Writing to Lord Raglan from Vienna on the
23d of April, Lord John Russell said : — ' I hope
' you may succeed better in making war than I
' have in making peace. The Russians have
' rejected our propositions, and we would not
' hear of theirs. There remains one faint hope
' from a proposition to be made to our Govern-
' ments by Austria, and it is but a faint one, so
LORD JOHN RUSSELL ATTACKED. 335
1 we must look to your sword to cut the way to chap.
J XII.
peace.
IV.
Anticipating that failure of the direct peace TheAus-
• it i o *r'an Pro*
negotiations which took place on the 21st of posais.
April, Count Buol some three days before had
been submitting for the consideration of the
Western Powers three separate plans, all intend-
ed to meet the exigency of the Third Condition ;
and it was from the last of these plans — one
originated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys — that Lord
John derived the ' faint hope ' which we saw him
impart to Lord Eaglan.
Months later, when under the reign of a new Allusions
French Commander the prospects of the war had sequent
been changed, and when none without study and Lord John
access to much of what was then secret knowledge
could acquire a true idea of the questions encoun-
tered in the previous April, a sudden disclosure
of the reception accorded to Count Buol's pro-
posals roused in England an outburst of anger
against Lord John Russell — an outburst that
sprang from the notion of his having tried to
make peace on terms not sufficiently honourable
to the Western Allies; and accordingly, whilst
in close union with the rest of the Cabinet, and
no less determined than they were to press on
the war with due vigour, he all at once found
himself marked, and singled out as the object of
a great House of Commons attack — an attack by
33 G THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
chap, a concourse of men rightly eager to denounce any
! symptom of unworthy il inching in war-time, but
ill supplied with the knowledge required for
sitting in judgment on him whom they fiercely
arraigned.
Compelled by reasons of State to observe on
some subjects a well-guarded reticence, whilst
also deeply moved at the sight of a planned in-
surrection against him led on by men prized as
his friends,* Lord John met the storm of dis-
favour by resigning his office, and giving in the
House what of course could be only an imperfect
account of the grounds on which he and his
colleague, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, had judged it
their duty to act.
I am happily absolved from the task of exam-
ining the debate of the 16th of July, because it
took place at a time beyond the set bounds of
my narrative ; but no such excuse can relieve me
from the task of dealing with facts which occurred
in the April before ; and a feeling against in-
justice (whether caused by ill design or mistake),
with besides, I may own, a regard for the memory
of Lord John Russell, has made me imagine it
right — not indeed to controvert his assailants
but — to show the true import and bearing of the
measure which gained his support, leaving others
intent on the 'Life' of a high-hearted English
* Those members of the Govern merit in the House of Com-
mons who were not members of the Cabinet — i.e., those who
did not know the truth — acquainted Lord John that they could
not support him against the coming attack.
THE ATTACK ON LOKD JOHN RUSSELL. 337
statesman to contrast the attack made against chap.
XII.
him in the House of Commons with what, as I .
say, is the truth.
The third of the three proposed plans which The Third
Count Buol had submitted was so far entertained Austrian
by both the First French and the First English
Plenipotentiary that Lord John Russell on the
18th of April was able to speak of it thus: — ' M.
' Drouyn de Lhuys called upon me in the evening
' [the evening of the 17th], and we drew up
: together a rough outline of the proposals to be
' made.
' It will be seen that, supposing the second
' proposition to be rejected as well as the first,
' the value of the third depends on three things :
' 1. Guarantee by all the contracting Powers of
' the territory of Turkey.
' 2. A system of counterpoise in the Black Sea.
' 3. The limitation of the Bussian fleet in the
' Black Sea to the number of ships maintained
' before the war, under pain of war with the
' Allies. I confess it appears to me that if this
' third system can be made an ultimatum by
' Austria, it ought to be accepted by the Western
' Powers. In saying this I may seem to contra-
' diet my former opinions. But in fact I do not
' retract those opinions. The system of limitation
' I believe to be far better than that of counter-
' poise. But the question is between an imperfect
' security for Turkey and for Europe and the con
' tinuance of the war.
VOL. VIII. v
338 THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
chap. 'Should the Government of her Majesty in
Y TT
« concert with that of France be of opinion that
' such a peace can be accepted, they will instruct
' Lord Westmoreland accordingly. If not, I hope
1 to be allowed to be heard personally before a
' final decision is made.' *
At a later hour on the same day Lord John
mentioned the reserve of Count Buol on the
question which asked what Austria would do, if
all her proposals should be rejected by Russia,
and then added :
' If her Majesty's Government should decide to
' accept any one of the three systems which the
' Conference can agree upon, I think they should
' insist that Austria should make the rejection of
' all three a casus belli with Russia.' t
It was only on that condition (which Austria,
although at first hesitating, soon resolved, it
appears, to accept!) that Lord John entertained
the proposal ; and accordingly in weighing the
measure, we must treat it as a scheme which, if
leading under one supposition to peace, had also
its warlike aspect.
The plan was one resting in part upon the
principle of ' Limitation,' and in part upon the
principle of 'Counterpoise.' For the avowed
* Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon, 18th April
1855.
+ A second despatch of same date from same to same.
t ' En nous engagement a la soutenir au besoin par les amies
' une solution,' &c. Count Buol to Count Colloredo, 20th May
1855, communicated to Lord Clarendon, and not by him on
that point questioned. Eastern Papers, No. xv. p. 21.
THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL. 339
object of shielding the Sultan's dominions from chap
XII
Russian aggression, it was perhaps on the whole '
more effective than the plans which the Western
Powers had put forward in the Conference-room ;*
and even as regarded the object of publicly
humbling Russia, and winning in that way a
' trophy ' to show in lieu of Sebastopol, it was not
altogether deficient; for, to prohibit the Czar
from increasing the number and weight of his
ships of war in the Euxine beyond a given fixed
limit, was in principle nearly the same as forcing
him to lessen their strength.
With respect to its bearing on the more imme-
diate course of events, the plan showed alternative
prospects : — it would either drive the Czar to
make peace on the terms we have seen, or com-
pel him to face a new enemy already in arms on
his frontier.
To understand the bitter need that there was Thedead-
p i . , , , . ,, lock in front
tor bringing about some sharp change m the ofsebasto-
existing condition of things, one must turn from
Vienna to the Chersonese, and recall some idea
of the state of the war at the time. When Lord
John Russell penned his despatches of the 18th
of April, the prospect of taking Sebastopol by
dint of the siege as then constituted was judged
to be beyond measure dismal.t General Canro-
bert, as ever since February, was still enduring
* The experience of 1877 has a close bearing ou every such
question.
t See ante, chaps, vi. vii. viiL
340 THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
chap, the conquests wrested from him one after the
XII.
! — other by Todleben's counter-approaches. It is
true the great April Bombardment was day by
day going on ; but, there being, as we have seen,
no resolve to follow it up by assault, the bark
portended no bite. There was not at the time
any prospect that (except by the coming of Louis
Napoleon to the Crimea) General Canrobert
would be superseded in the command of the
French army.
The French Emperor and the English Govern-
ment agreed in believing that Sebastopol would
never be taken by means of the siege then on
foot against the South Side of the place.* They
hoped indeed that its ulterior fall might be com-
passed by successful operations in the field ; but
even over that prospect (which was only, after
all, one dependent on the issue of a future cam-
paign) there hung a dim, lowering cloud ; for the
command of the French army, and with it a
dominant voice in the ordering of the intended
campaign was, as then understood, to be ex-
ercised by Louis Napoleon personally ; and this
with a plan in his head which our War Minister
pronounced to be ' wild ' and ' visionary.' t What
brightened this part of the prospect was only the
gleam of a hope that plans which seemed absurd
in design might perhaps be transformed into
measures of wholesome strategy when encounter-
ing the test of real war. The Allies, we know,
were so circumstanced that, whilst thus unable
* See ante, chap. ix. t See ante, ibid.
THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL. 341
to carry the "Fortress, they could not, if they CHAP.
would, raise the siege. What on earth could 1_
they do ? Must they go on without any hope
except the one based on a future campaign
under Louis Napoleon's strategy, or else on the
chance of a battle, if the enemy should be pleased
to attack them in the execrable position they oc-
cupied with their backs to the cliffs and the sea ?
It may seem to be almost incredible, but still is
strictly true, that powerful and victorious armies
had come to be thus strangely hampered. The
predicament was one that appealed — not surely
for any weak yielding on a question of honour
or principle but — for such a new move against The need
Russia as might either untie or cut through the was for
i i r, i ii i pi • f effecting a
hard bebastopol knot by a fresh exertion of new move
against
power. Russia.
Knowing well that their armies lay thus
strangely tethered and hampered in front of
Sebastopol, the Governments of Paris and Lon-
don were bound of course, if they could, to find
and bring into play some new, some extrinsic
force calculated to work the needed change ; but
either they did not observe the path of duty
before them, or did not see how to pursue it.
Yet the lever was ready, and only awaiting The lever to
,. , -,-, P ,. , , be found at
their touch. Jbar from having declared that Vienna,
they would not negotiate without first taking
Sebastopol, they had chosen to say the contrary,
and for weeks, as we have seen, had been busily
treating with Russia in the Conference-room at
Vienna on the basis of the accepted Four Points ;
342 THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
CHAP.
XII.
Neglect of
this by the
Rulers in
Paris and
London ;
whilst also — and still in Vienna — they had at
their side an Ally not yet plunged in the phy-
sical strife, but acknowledging his obligations
under the Treaty of the 2d of December, and
not only willing, but even indeed almost eager,
to fix the easy conditions on which he would
take the field. Yet with these means of action
at their command, the Rulers in Paris and Lon-
don did not even make any endeavour to use
the power they held ; and were so far from help-
ing by statesmanship to ease the dead-lock on
the Chersonese that they wilfully matched it by
causing another dead-lock at Vienna.
but not by
De Llmys
and Lord
John.
The First French and First English negotiators
engaged in the Conference were, however, more
alive than their Governments to the exigencies
of the military predicament. M. Drouyn de
Llmys had the merit of conceiving and maturing
the plan which — unless forcing peace on the Czar
— would effectuate a mighty diversion in favour
of the hampered besiegers ; but Lord John also —
always eager and strenuous — was not the man to
stand idle, and see the Conference fail, without
anxiously turning his thoughts to the armies
besieging Sebastopol, and trying by a stroke of
diplomacy to help them in what at the time
seemed painfully diflicult straits. In the effort
to achieve this great good, he found himself able
to act in close, friendly concert with M. Drouyn
de Llmys, and to agree with him in believing
that for the objects they both had in view the
THE ATTACK ON LOKD JOHN RUSSELL. 343
Proposal in question was apt. What concession chap.
it exacted from the Western Powers was — not so .
much concession to the enemy, but rather con-
cession to Austria — concession made at her in-
stance, and of that honourable sort which a
belligerent may of course rightly make to a
great independent Power when persuading it to
join in a war.
Irresistibly cogent in either one or the other of The ten-
the opened alternatives, this measure was so far Uiue ofthe
from erring in the direction of weakness that it
rather perhaps might be censured as offering too
strong a remedy ; for, supposing the Czar to
resist this new pressure, the whole empire of the
Danube would be brought at once into the strife;
and, considering the defection of Prussia, there
was some ground for saying that, to compass the
armed intervention of such a Power as Austria,
with its consequent extension of the area of the
war, would be almost a ruthless act.* Be that
as it may, the whole measure was at all events
one which would either force peace on the Czar
by the leverage of an Austrian ultimatum, or else,
if he still should resist, bring Austria against him
in arms.
On the question that asked which alternative
would be the more likely to follow, opinions were
not agreed. M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord
John were both strongly inclined to believe that
this measure, because sharply barbed with the
* This, e.g., was the idea of Sir Edward Lytton-Bulwer, ex-
pressed in the debate of July 1855.
344
RESOLVE OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.
CHAP.
XII.
Austrian ultimatum, would force a peace on the
Czar; whilst Count Buol, with perhaps better
means of forming a judgment, was rather dis-
posed to conclude that the Czar would hold out,
and bring Austria into the war ; * but in one way
or other the plan could not fail to take effect
with great cogency.
If, instead of displaying this cogency, the mea-
sure had really been one which people under-
standing its import could honestly censure for
weakness or undue concession to the enemy, it
would not have found any favour with M. Drouyn
de Lhuys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and would never have been harboured a moment
in the mind of Lord John Eussell.
Lord John, as all knew in his day, was a man
of great intrepidity, was even from time to time
rash, and prone to spring into action under simply
spontaneous impulses that often enraged and dis-
tracted the anxious drill-sergeants of ' Party,' yet
endeared him to those of our people who prefer,
after all, a true man to any disciplined aggregate.
He was capable of now and then coming to a bold,
abrupt, hasty decision not duly concerted with
men whose opinions he ought to have weighed;
but for courage, for high public spirit, no states-
man in Europe surpassed him.
Reception When Lord John returned to England on the
byLoid Pat Sunday, the 29th of April, he found his colleagues
cabinet; wholly un willing to resume the negotiations for
peace ; and at a Cabinet held the next day, they
* Eastern Papers, No. xv. p. 30.
De Lhuys.
Lord John
Rusaell.
COURSE TAKEN BY LOUIS NAPOLEON. 345
avowed an unqualified reluctance to accept the c^p*
Austrian plan ; but it was necessary of course !_
that our Government, though desiring to act in
that sense, should first take counsel with France.
And it proved that Louis Napoleon disagreed and by the
h- » French Bib
with the English Cabinet. On the 2/th of April peror.
at the latest, and possibly two or three days be-
fore, he had found himself obliged to abandon his
idea of going out to the Crimea ; and thenceforth,
it would seem, for a time he was anxious that the
war should cease. ' I don't know/ he said to
Lord Cowley, 'what is thought of the English
' generals, but ours seem to know little of Euro-
' pean war, and this double command is fatal.' *
Accordingly, on the last day of April, the Em-
peror was in a good mood for listening with favour
to his Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had
brought him back from Vienna what was called
the Third Austrian Proposal, and now advised its
acceptance as a measure that would secure what
he judged to be a safe and honourable peace.
The Emperor and his Minister examined the pro-
ject together, made in it some changes which were
afterwards pronounced to be wholesome, and de-
termined that in this matured state it might be
imparted to our Government as a measure ap-
proved by France.
Lord John Eussell apprised of all this wrote
from London to M. Drouyn de Lhuys : —
1 My dear Colleague, — I congratulate you on
* Senior's Conversations, vol. i. p. 338 et seq.
346 COURSE TAKEN BY LOUIS NAPOLEON.
chap. ' the successful interview you had with the Em-
XII
* : peror. The plan has been made much more
' simple and less objectionable. . . . We
' shall, however, deliberate and decide to-day
' upon the propositions of your Government. It
' is the highest satisfaction to me that we have
' agreed, and, I trust, shall continue to agree,
' on the great principles upon which the future
' system of Europe is to be established.' *
Pronounced There was now therefore rife a clearly pro-
difference in n . . . . „ _ _TT
the counsels nounced division in the counsels ot the VV estern
of the West- .
empowers. Powers ; tor, excepting its powerful member new-
ly come from Vienna, the whole of Lord Palmer-
ston's Cabinet was still as before keenly anxious
to abstain from further negotiations, and firmly
go on with the war; whilst — intent on an op-
posite policy — not only the French Emperor him-
self, but also his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
with them Lord John Eussell, were, all three,
desiring to accept the Austrian proposal, and
make it the basis of peace.
The French After having matured the proposal in the way
andPLord we observed, the French Emperor intimated his
CowIgv
wish to see the English ambassador. Lord Cowley
found the Emperor smoking in the garden, and
was asked by him to ' walk up and down with
' him, and talk the matter over.'
' I think,' the Emperor said, ' that it is a good
' arrangement. What think you ? '
Desiring of course to support the opposite
•4th May 1855.
COURSE TAKEN BY LOUIS NAPOLEON. 347
opinion, as the one entertained by his Govern- chap.
ment, Lord Cowley answered : ' Well, it does not 1_
' appear to me that the Russian preponderance in
' the Black Sea will be materially affected.'
' Not/ replied the Emperor, ' by our having now
' a right to keep an equal force there ? '
Lord Cowley briefly and ably adduced for his
answer some arguments like those we heard used
at Vienna against the ' counterpoise ' plan.
The Emperor replied : ' I will talk the matter
' over again with Drouyn de Lhuys.'
Speaking then from a sudden impulse, Lord
Cowley made what was certainly a very abnor-
mal suggestion, saying, ' Would there be any ob-
' jection to my being present ? '
' The Emperor looked a little surprised, and
' then said, " Certainly not ; " and he appointed
' an hour for the next day.'
A soldier of other days, a survivor of the Mos- Marshal
J VaiUant:
cow campaign, now a Mmister wielding the re-
gathered power of France in another war against
Eussia, Marshal Vaillant was destined to utter
the few magic words which would shape the then
course of her history, overrule a new 'Emperor
' Napoleon,' and govern the march of events.
' When I arrived,' says Lord Cowley, ' Vaillant
' was in the antechamber, and Drouyn de Lhuys
: with the Emperor.' *
The Marshal and Lord Cowley were soon intro-
* Senior's Conversations, vol. i.
348 COUESE TAKEN BY LOUIS NAPOLEON.
CHAP.
XII.
his words;
their sud-
den effect.
duced, and the Emperor begged Drouyn de Lhuys
to explain the grounds of his arrangement.
Drouyn de Lhuys did so at considerable length.
' I think/ said Lord Cowley, ' that he talked nearly
' half an hour. The Emperor seemed to go along
' with him, and, when he had finished, said to me,
' Are you not satisfied ? '
' My only answer,' said Lord Cowley, ' is to beg
• your Majesty to ask Marshal Vaillant whether
' he thinks that this arrangement will really effect
' the purpose of the war — the putting an end to
' the preponderance of Eussia in the Black Sea
' and the Bosphorus.'
' The Emperor turned to Vaillant. " I am not
' " a politician," said Vaillant, " but I know the
' " feelings of the army. I am sure that if, after
' " having spent months in the siege of Sebasto-
' " pol, we return unsuccessful, the army will not
1 " be satisfied." '
'The Emperor then turned to Drouyn de Lhuys
' and said : " Write to Vienna and break off the
' " negotiation." '
Thus in less than a minute the Emperor re-
versed his decision.
1 All turned,' said Lord Cowley, ' upon Vaillant's
' presence. Louis Napoleon was pleased with the
' peace, and would have adhered to it, if Vaillant
' had not frightened him.' *
Resignation
of De Lhuys.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys from the first had been
closely identified with the measure thus suddenly
* Senior's Conversations, vol. i.
THE COUNSELS OF VAILLANT. 349
discarded; and before the evening closed, he sent chap.
xii.
in his resignation. The Emperor wrote to his
Minister, and asked him to reconsider this step ;
but M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied somewhat drily,
and repeated his determination to quit the Gov-
ernment.*
Because finding himself at variance with the unaccepted
rest of the Cabinet on the question of the Aus- ofLordJohn
trian proposal, Lord John Eussell twice tendered
his resignation to Lord Palmerston ; t but when unanimity
, i -jt, , -,-... . , after the 5th
the Emperors second decision was imparted to of May of
our Ministers, there remained, of course, no room cabinet,
for difference about the course to be taken by the
then reunited Governments of France and Encr-
land. Abstaining from further negotiations, they
could not, as all saw, do otherwise than vigorously
go on with the war ; and, since Lord John agreed
with his colleagues in the conclusion thus reached,
he was left without a ground for insisting that his
last resignation should be accepted. He continued
to be a member of the Government, and of what
from the 5th of May downwards was a closely
united Cabinet.
The Emperor's new and sudden decision brought The Govern-
him back all at once into what was substantial France and
accord with the bulk of the English Cabinet ; for, oncSe more
although he might thenceforth be fighting on the tiai accord,
ground pressed upon him by Vaillant, whilst the
English might hold that their object was still that
* Both these notes were shown by the Emperor to Lord
Cowley. — Senior's Conversations, vol. i.
+ Lord Palmerston in House of Commons, 16th July 1855.
350
THE COUNSELS OF VAILLANT.
CHAP.
XII.
Opening
for the new
policy sug-
gested by
Vaillant.
The sound-
ness of Vail-
lant's con-
clusion.
of forcing on Russia the hated principle of ' Limi-
' tation,' the immediate resolve of both Govern-
ments was in each case the same. Both resolved
to go on with the war.
Taking place, as we saw, on the 21st of April,
the suspension and virtual rupture of all direct
negotiations with Kussia had set free the Western
Powers from their engagements to treat for peace
on the basis assigned at Vienna. There accord-
ingly was room for advice that tended to shape a
new policy — a policy based in great part upon the
feeling of soldiers ; and perhaps one may own that
of all the public men seeking to guide the two
Western Powers at this conjuncture, the most
clear-sighted was he who declared himself no
politician. Inspired by his knowledge of what
the soldiers were thinking, and not borne down
by the cares of over-anxious diplomatists, Mar-
shal Vaillant proved able to see that due warlike
persistency in a long-pursued enterprise was the
Greater, the true Essential, and that clearly the
lesser object — to be afterwards, however, attained
by first attaining the greater — was that of con-
triving a shield for the imagined Turks of the
future by dint of parchments and words. He
saw that France and England— France and Eng-
land allied and in arms — could not meet the
vast exigency of their repute among nations, or,
as Frenchmen would say, of their 'honour,' by
coming home in the face of a bitterly scorn-
ful world with all their mighty armada, and
a bundle of mere Kussian promises to show
DROUYN DE LHUYS AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL. 351
abroad among men instead of a captured Se- chap.
bastopol. ,*
In effect, Marshal Vaillant's words prayed that
the war should go on, without offering any new
aid, as the Austrian proposals had done, towards
the object of making it prosper ; but the value of
his counsel depended on reasons more lofty, more
general than those which only point to ' expedi-
' ency ' of the humbler and narrower sort.
It was otherwise of course with diplomatists The course
n • °' duty Pre"
discharging fixed, ascertained duties. When con- scribed to
& & ' D. de Lhuye
sidering the Austrian proposal on the evening of and L01*1
the 17th of April, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord
John Eussell were not free to harbour a thought
of taking the soldier-like course which we heard
Vaillant afterwards counsel. Far from having
any shadow of warrant to act in such a direction,
they had come to Vienna instructed to negotiate
a peace on the basis then already laid down, and
to bring Austria under engagements for joining at
once in the war, if peace should not so be attained.
Some may think, as I do, that for Powers like
France and England, the simple, the manful in-
sistence recommended by Vaillant was better
than all the best meshes contrived by diploma-
tists ; but we must remember that speaking in
Paris after the virtual rupture of the negotiations,
and only professing to breathe the sentiment of
the army as distinguished from the opinions of
politicians, the Marshal was free to advise on
large and paramount grounds not open to men at
Vienna in the middle of April who, like Drouyn
352 DROUTN DE LHUYS AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
chap, de Lhuys and Lord John, had had laid upon them
* the task of negotiating a peace, without either
awaiting the fall of .Sebastopol, or insisting on its
surrender by Kussia as one of the terms to be
dictated.
Men plainly forbidden by Duty from acting on
Vaillant's principle, and obliged to observe what
I have called a 'humbler' sort of 'expediency,'
could not well fail to see the advantages of that
' Third Austrian plan ' which would either have
forced on the Czar a better peace than the one
for which France and England had toiled in the
Conference-room at Vienna, or else would have
brought against him — brought against him in
arms on his frontier — a new and powerful enemy ;
what they but obeying the letter of their instructions which
pointed exclusively to ' Limitation ' in exclusion
of the ' Counterpoise ' principle, M. Drouyn de
Lhuys and Lord John took care to keep them-
selves free from any approach to entanglement
with the Austrian Government ; and did no more,
after all, than impart and recommend the pro-
posal to their respective Governments.*
In what did they err ? The mistake of that
countless multitude which long afterwards brought
down storms of wrath on the head of Lord John
was caused, it would seem, in great part by the
oddly refracting way, and wrong, inverted order
in which events became known ; for the rupture
of the direct negotiations with Eussia was soon
* Lord John even, it seems, abstained from telling the Au&-
trian Government that he would take that last step.
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 353
after disclosed ; whilst the Austrian overture of c H A P.
XII
the 17th of April was — rightly — kept secret. '-.
The secrecy had lasted some weeks, and our Gov-
ernment and our people alike had gladly bidden
farewell to all negotiations, and were simply in-
tent on the strife, when an indiscreet statesman
— not English — revealed the Austrian overture,
affecting moreover to show, though not doing this
at all perfectly, the action thereupon taken by
Lord John Russell. The secrecy maintained by
our Cabinet was wholly ' State secrecy,' altogether
disjoined from any personal wish for concealment
entertained by Lord John ; but people not seeing
this fancied that they had made a discovery, prov-
ing him to have flinched at Vienna from what
was the plainly right course. How far this was
from the truth we have been able to see.
The chief cause of the mistake was, however, a
sheer want of knowledge. In that time of war,
ample reasons of State forbade the disclosures re-
quired for showing the truth, the whole truth.*
Of course, the same valid State reasons which
enforced silence on the Cabinet sealed also the
lips of Lord John ; and accordingly his resignation
did nothing towards giving him freedom of speech.
The House of Commons on the 24th of May
entered upon a great debate on the subject of the
war, including the Conferences, and (refusing to
* No one, for instance, could discuss the policy of accepting
the Austrian proposal without laying stress on the prospects of
the Sebastopol siege ; and this, of course, was not a subject with
which to entertain the public — a public that included the
enemy.
VOL. VIII. Z
354 CHANGE WROUGHT BY THE COU1ISE TAKEN.
CHAP
XII.
say with Mr Gladstone that it still cherished
hopes of peace founded, on parleys open through
vote of the Austria) came after many days to a vote which
commons, expressed its regret for the failure of the negoti-
ations carried on at Vienna, and declared that
it would continue to give every support to her
Majesty in the prosecution of the war until a
safe and honourable peace should be attained.
The Confer-
ence kept
formally
open until
the 4th of
June;
From the day, the 21st of April, when France
and England declared their instructions exhausted,
no real negotiation took place in the Conference-
room ; but allocutions intended to operate upon
the opinion of Europe were there made on the
26th of April and on the 4th of June. Prince
Gortchakoff on that last day made speeches which
tended to show that his Government, though ap-
proving in the main of the Austrian proposal,
would still always refuse to accept that part of
its terms which sought — in a measure— to limit
his master's 'sovereign rights.*
If this were true, it would follow (as Count
Buol had said he believed) that the acceptance
of the Austrian proposal by the Western Powers
would have drawn Austria into the war.
On the 4th of June 1855, this long open Con-
ference closed.
V.
change When rejecting all the proposals put forward
about by the by Austria, France and England did more than
* Eastern Papers, No. xiv.
and then
closed.
THE COURSE RIGHTLY TAKEN BY AUSTRIA. 355
forego the powerful aid she had proffered. They chap.
at once set her free to abandon that attitude of '
menace — armed menace — by which — without ^iuatriiw
going to war — she long had been pressing on propofals-
Eussia. It then became plain to Austria that frtee t0 ..
L change her
the Western Powers were going beyond what course-
she had pronounced to be the just exigencies
of the Four Points, and (by virtue of that dis-
cretion which they had taken good care to reserve)
were continuing their war with a mind to either
capture Sebastopol or else wring from the Czar
such a cession of what his men called ' sovereign
' rights,' as might serve like a ' conquest ' to show
instead of the untaken fortress. Austria judged The course
that under these conditions 'the responsibility,' took"8
as she called it, of going on with the war no
longer attached on the Eussians. She did not
deny — no one did — that upon this matter, the
question which asked how the Western Powers
should deal with the obstinate fact that they still
were defied by Sebastopol, France and England
must judge for themselves of the course which
their self-respect dictated, and go on with the
strife, if convinced that this was what Honour
required; but Count Buol rightly judged that
to aid them in the pursuit of an object so pecul-
iarly their own, he ought not to involve his own
country and bring it into a war — a war that must
needs have been formidable even when she began
to arm in the previous year, but had since been
rendered trebly embarrassing by the defection
of Prussia, by the ceasing of those Russian en-
35G THE COURSE RIGHTLY TAKEN BY AUSTRIA
chap, croachments of 1853 which had given offence to
XII •
' Germany, and besides by the fact that, with
mighty forces entangled in a far-distant region,
France was hardly for the moment so able as
she might otherwise be to support the Empire
of Austria against encompassing enemies.
What defeated the efforts of diplomacy to end
the war at this time was, in short, a point of
soldierly honour arising from the frustration of
efforts to carry Sebastopol ; and the notion of
assuming that Austria, who had had nothing to
do with the siege, should be expected to act as
a Power affected by this special exigency, was
of course altogether untenable.
Consistently with the new determination, Aus-
tria hastened to relieve her Exchequer from any
further continuance of the burthensome sacrifices
she had been making in preparation for war, and
abandoned that attitude of armed menace which
she long had maintained against Eussia.
It was natural that this course of action,
though no less right than wise, should provoke
great impatience in England, and the more so
perhaps since it happened that Lord Palmerston,
then our Prime Minister, had long shown towards
the much-challenged Empire of Francis Joseph a
curious, persistent antipathy. With, however, a
store of good humour which seemed inexhaust-
ible, the now disarming Austria clung fast to the
notion of her being joined to the Western Powers
by some gentle sort of Alliance. Not fearing the
High Court of Ridicule, she even gave them her
THE COURSE RIGHTLY TAKEN BY AUSTRIA. 357
blessing, and, whilst calmly receding herself from chap.
the perilous brink on which she had long been !__
standing, she expressed a wish that kind Fortune
might smile on her friends in the field. *
The steady, the accurate righteousness with
which Count Buol steered his way through the
sea of troubles he crossed was nothing less than
a feat marked by wisdom, by skill, by a never-
ceasing adherence to the dictates of honour ; but,
of course, proved immensely exasperating — for
so human nature commands — to the belligerent
powers ; and besides, there was theme for the
satirists — intent on their laugh — who could say
what they liked of ' the blessing,' ' the moral
' support,' quaintly offered to eager combatants
by a friend keeping clear of the strife; but it
still remains true that the course of action taken
by Austria in all these transactions was thor-
oughly loyal and right.
* Eastern Papers, No. xv. p. 22.
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.
Note 1. — Outnumbered by tens of thousands. — Including their
field-army outside (which could freely either enter or quit the
fortress at the will of the commander), the Russians had, at this
time, a strength of about 108,000 ; whilst — unless there were
counted some 11,000 Turks (whom Canrobert and Lord Raglan
had not learnt how to use with effect) — the French and the
English together were only about 61,000 strong.
Note 2. — On General Bosquet's front. — Of the defensive works
on Mount Inkerman, some were constructed by the French, some
by the English, and full accounts of them will be found in the
French and English Official Narratives, in Niel, p. 150, and in
the Journal of the Royal Engineers, p. 50 et seq. For account
of the works of countervallation on the French left, see Niel,
pp. 98, 99. My reason for avoiding details on these matters
is that the works were not destined to be put to the proof by
attacks.
Note 3. — Only by hundreds. — The average number of workmen
kept employed by the French was in November only 693 by day,
and 475 by night ; in December only 835 by day, and 628 by
night; and in January only 417 by day, and 192 by night. —
Niel, pp. 105, 123, 133. The numbers of Englishmen whom our
people proved able to keep employed at their works was far, far
more scant, as will be seen by the ' Trench Journal ' appended to
the Journal of the Royal Engineers, p. 159 et seq. ; and although
it is true, as shown by the same Journal, that small bodies of
Turks were also employed, these unhappily had suffered so
cruelly from privation and hardship as to be unfit for much
360 APPENDIX.
work. See the 'Remarks' column in the abo\e - mentioned
Trench Journal.
Note 4. — Of the Flagstaff Bastion. — The policy followed by
Todleben when thus closing the gorges of his defensive works
was at one time much questioned by scientific critics ; but on
the other hand, was defended by the great engineer with brilliant
clearness and vigour. It was my good fortune in 180!) to be
with him on the site of the Malakoff, and to learn from him there
his full reasons for having closed its gorge.
Note 5. — Minor pieces of ordnance. — Three small mortars.
The French military authorities at the time endeavoured to keep
this loss a secret. — Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, Private,
December 13, 1854.
Note 6. — Only 290 men. — Journal Royal Engineers, Part I.,
p. 82. And see the note, from which it results that, to meet
the requirement of a calculation ' universally admitted ' as just,
the guards of the English trenches should have had a strength
of not less than three-fourths of 18,000 — i.e., not less than
13,500 men.
Note 7. — At the object kept always in sight. — Journal Royal
Engineers, Part I., pp. 51, 52, 5(i, 57, 62, 70, 71, 71-2, 85, 128,
130-7-8, 138-9, 139, 140-1, 141-2, 14.S-4, 144-5.
I believe I might add largely to the number of these references
by citing the very numerous papers in the handwriting of Sir
John Burgoyne which I have before me.
Note 8. — Against the Malakoff front. — Journal Royal En-
gineers, p. 72; Niel, p. 139. The more recent of the counsels
thus tendered by Burgoyne and resisted by the French were sub-
mitted in Memoranda dated respectively the 11th and 20th of
December.
Note 9. — Happily able to accept the condition imposed. — Lord
Raglan to Secretary of State, January 2, 1855. There is no
mention of this agreement in either of the Official Narratives, the
Siege de Sebastopol by Niel, or the Journal of the Royal Engineers.
Both the compilers date the new departure — the new resolve of
the French to operate against the Malakoff — from the 1st of Feb-
ruary (when the French Council sat), or the 2d of the same
month, when the decisions of the previous day were put into the
form of written Instructions. By happening to remain unac-
quainted with the arrangement of the 1st of January, General
Niel was of course dispensed from the obligation of explaining
APPENDIX. 361
the delay which extended from the 1st of January to the 1st of
the following month.
Though not based on any actual reopening of the question
already decided, the unanimous vote of the Council of the 1st of
February was a little bewildering ; and coupled with the whole
month's inaction which had followed the New Year's Day, it had
the effect of bringing a curious error into the official narratives
of two great nations. Any reader of either the Official Si^ge de
Sebastopol or of the Official Journal of the Royal Engineers,
would imagine that the decision was on the 1st of February,
whereas it was really on the 1st of January. The error was not
of the kind termed • clerical,' but one such as might have been
committed by some simple village chronicler who on learning the
date of a mere coronation had given it as the date of the accession.
I suppose that one of the great Official Narratives must on this
point have copied from the other ; for otherwise, there would be
something wonderful in such a coincidence as that of the two
great records making, each of them, so big an error as that of
striking a whole month out of the calendar. M. Rousset, I see,
is aware that the engagements took place in January, and he
cites for proof Bizot's letter of the 12th of that month, vol. ii.
p. 31.
Note 10. — Till the latter part of the month. — Ante, vol. vii.
p. 340. It was only on the 21st of January that — threading his
way at last between two of the most ugly perils that well could
beset a commander — Lord Raglan obtained the aid of French
troops in relief of our overtasked soldiery.
Note 11. — Words described as 'Instructions.'' — The Official
compiler of the Journal of the Royal Engineers stated (p. 85)
that the Council of the 1st of February was a ' General Council
' of War ' ; but that was not the case. The Council had before
it Burgoyne's suggestions in writing, and amalgamated some of
them with the project approved, but was exclusively French.
The decisions of the Council embraced the whole plan of opera-
tions then adopted by the French, and were recorded in a paper
dated the next day — the 2d of February. A copy of this paper
is given in the 'Journal,' p. 148.
Note 12. — Other mortal then living. — General de Todleben
once did me the honour to speak to me of the zeal with which
at one period of his life he had devoted himself to the science of
mining, and I remember how greatly he astonished me by speak-
ing of the enormous proportion of his time which he then used
to spend underground.
362 APPENDIX.
Note 13. — Spreading system of countermines. — In anticipation
of what the French might attempt underground, the Russians
began countermining in the beginning of November ; but it was
only at the close of the month (when they had had time to draw
the inference stated in the text) that their system of countermines
began to assume 'vast' proportions. — Todleben, p. 596.
Note 14. — Unleashed a camouflet. — For want of any true
English word sufficing to express what is meant, the word
'camouflet' — the war-miner's 'whiff' — has been received into
the vocabulary of our military engineers. It means an explosion
which the miner or counterminer drives into his antagonist's
galleries without disturbing the surface of the ground above.
Note 15. — The intervening Mamelon. — The English began their
new (8-gun) battery No. 9 (the 'King Battery') on the 13th of
February (Royal Engineers, Part II. , p. 34) ; and soon after-
wards received admirably efficient aid from the French, who also
at about the same time, if not earlier, began toiling at the 15-gun
battery No. 1 (the ' Artilleur Battery') which was to be con-
structed on a western slope of Mount Inkerman.
Note 16. — Did the work. — After showing how the French
entered upon the work, the Official Journal of the Royal En-
gineers says : ' The order, silence, and regularity with which
' the work was conducted under the superintendence of a cap-
' tain of the French Engineers was very remarkable.' — Journal
of Royal Engineers, Part II., p. 34.
Note 17. — Destroying the Inkerman Bridge. — Niul, p. 104.
This act of Mentschikoff's was not one that relieved the Allies
from any apprehension they might have of another 'Inkerman';
for the bridge (as was proved on the morning of the great battle)
could be restored in a few hours.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.
Note 1. — With their blows. — Todleben did not consider that
the artillery of the enceinte defending the Faubourg could use-
fully interpose ; and the fire from that quarter — more dangerous
perhaps to the Russians than to the French — took place without
his sanction. The ships were to fire, but only up the ravine ; so
that, if the French, inclining towards their right, should dip
down into St (George's Ravine, they might incur fire, whilst the
APPENDIX. 363
Russians, if duly cautioned against the dangers, might of course
take care to avoid it.
Note 2. — Lost their way in the darkness. — Niel states that a
party of the attacking force lost its way ; and uses language
which seems to show that the Zouaves on the flanks did not do
so, thus showing apparently that the centre column must have
been the part of the force from which the lost troops had separ-
ated themselves. — P. 155.
Note 3. — Had been victoriously achieved. — Having been
authentically, though erroneously, informed of these good tid-
ings by direction of General Canrobert, Lord Raglan imparted
them to the Secretary of State in a despatch of the 24th Feb-
ruary 1855, which has been published. — Sayer's Collection, pp.
100-1. After having been undeceived himself, Lord Raglan
undeceived his Government. — Private Letters to Lord Panmure,
24th and 27th February 1855, and Despatch to Secretary of
State, March 31, 1855. Before sending off his despatch of the
24th February, Lord Raglan saw General Canrobert, and was
by him assured that up to that time he had received no further
report.
Note 4. — Without a simultaneous advance on the Malakoff
front. — Even in the absence of that extraneous information
which we owe to recent disclosures it would hardly be possible
to imagine that this proposal was made seriously. The pro-
posal was so extravagant that its rejection, or rather its non-
acceptance, seems not to have been thought worth recording.
Note 5. — Not again to attempt to drive the enemy from their
new works. — Considering that the French had been so lately
accepting the guidance of Burgoyne in the most momentous of
questions, an English reader will observe with surprise the tone
thus adopted towards him in council by French Generals. There
was apparently a feeling on the part of the French (see the
words of Bizot quoted elsewhere) that Burgoyne had persuaded
them into dangerous ventures, and it would seem that they there-
fore felt angrily towards him ; but 1 imagine that their per-
emptory manner of treating his counsels on the 6th of March
might be traced in great measure to his loss of official status.
They knew that he had been recalled ; and being great respec-
ters of official, as distinguished from personal authority, may
have thought that they owed less deference than before to one
who, in literal strictness, was now only a skilled amateur.
Note 6. — For which he was yearning. — General Canrobert is
364 APPENDIX.
iiving, and entitled, of course, in all fairness, to command full
attention if inclined to controvert the authorities on which I base
my statements, or to show that in the interval of eleven days,
bi tux-en the 30th of March (when Lord Raglan wrote) and the
10th of April (when Canrobert expressed himself as anxious to
be attacked by the enemy), there had occurred such a change of
circumstances as to account for the actual inversion of his opinions
and feelings on the subject of 'another Inkerman.' It is true
that in the interval, Omar Pasha, with from 15,000 to 18,000
men, had come up to the Chersonese, but it is hardly imaginable
that the accession of that force alone would account for so enor-
mous a change as the spring from despondency to a warlike long-
ing for the advantage of being brought to battle by the enemy.
Note 7. — With grossly inadequate means. — 'With most in-
* efficient means in men and material ' — words written under the
sanction of Sir John Burgoyne himself, if not with his own hand.
— Journal of Royal Engineers, Part I., p. 87.
Note 8. — Were 'postulates' rather than facts. — Sir John
Burgoyne's military status in the Crimea was that of a Lieu-
tenant-General on the Staff of Lord Raglan's army, with orders
to advise respecting the conduct of engineering operations ; and,
though not in terms constituted the Commander of the Engineer
force, he was practically armed well enough with all a com-
mander's authority. Accordingly the arrangement making him
an adviser instead of a Commander did not stint him in -power ;
but apparently it much influenced his habits of thought and action.
There is, after all, something in words ; and plainly a request
from the Chief saying, 'What do you advise V is not quite the
same as one saying, ' What do you offer to do ? ' In the first case,
the officer consulted would be almost led into the practice of
treating the question of ' means ' hypothetically, saying virtually,
'If the army can afford strength enough for the purpose, I advise
' such and such a course ; ' whereas, if asked to say what, as a
Commander of Engineers, he would offer to do, his mind would
be turned more distinctly to the question of ' means.' I owe my
perception of this difference to the tenor of Burgoyne's written
counsels taken in conjunction with the afterwards disclosed want
of means for giving effect to them. Thus, for instance, on the
23d of November he writes an elaborate and most able memor-
andum, given in the Journal of the Royal Engineers (Appendix,
No. 34), and after mentioning the suggestion, the Journal adds,
' The additional means that irmi/d l>< required for this operation
• appeared to be the only impediment to its adoption.'
This sample — and it is quite a fair sample — shows that, in Sir
John Burgoyne's mind, the all-important question of ' means' was
APPENDIX. 365
not so determined beforehand as to secure a basis for his opinion,
but left to be dealt with afterwards.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V.
Note 1. — 14th February 1855. — This letter was printed by
Niel in his ' Si6ge de Sebastopol ' (p. 478 et seq.), but relegated
to the cold shade of the Appendix, and not shown by the writer
to be anything more than one of the numberless documents by
which able men in those days were prone to record their opinions,
it seemed to have no more than an • academical ' importance un-
til the recent disclosures by M. Rousset invested it with a new
significance, and showed it indeed to have been something very
real indeed — to have been, in short (when approved), a full Memo-
randum of the principles on which Niel conducted his mission.
Note 2. — Begun and continued. — The brief, though valiant
night - attack of the 24th of February, under General Monet
and Colonel Cler was arrested in mid - course by the hand of
authority, and ivas never renewed; so that, taken as a whole,
it can hardly be treated as a substantial exception to the state-
ment in the text, and may rather perhaps be regarded as con-
firmatory of the general rule then repressing the enterprise of
the French army.
Note 3. — Lasting success. — We may take it for granted, I
trust, that the disloyal expedient of maintaining secrecy against
Lord Raglan must have been distressing to General Canrobert
as well as to General Niel ; and it seems probable that if Lord
Raglan, when sounded on the question of investing Sebastopol,*
had proved to be of the same opinion as Niel, all further conceal-
ment on the part of the French would have been gladly aban-
doned, so that thenceforth the Allies might have been frankly
acting together with the same immediate objects. Lord Raglan,
however, showing no such inclination, the French still went on
concealing from him their adoption of the Emperor's plan — the
plan on which they were acting !
Note 4. — By 'approaches.' — That the arrangements recorded
on the 2d of February were, as I have called them, a ' retreat'
on the part of the French from the engagements of the 1st of
January, and that Niel caused the change, is shown by General
Bizot, who wrote to Vaillant, 8th February 1855: * Le G6n6ral
* At the Conference of the 4th of March. See ante, pp. 75, 76.
366 APPENDIX.
• [Niel] a juge" trop aventuree l'attaque de vive force a faire
' immediatemcnt sur la tour Malakof, et a la suite dun conseil
' tenu en sa presence chez le General Canrobert, il a etc decide
' i pie nous allions entreprendre de ce cote les travaux d'une
' attaque plus rapprochee. ' — Quoted Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 32, 33.
Note 5. — To Vaillant, 8fh February I S55.— Writing on the 8th
of February (when it was understood that Niel was on the point
of returning to France), Bizot says to Vaillant, the Minister of
War: 'Le General Niel qui doit s'embarquer sur le prochain
' courrier va vous arriver parfaitement edifie sur nos travaux, sur
' nos chances de succes comme sur les chances contraires, et sur
' les difficulty de la position que nous ont faite nos allies. II a
1 essaye vainement de galvaniser leur inertie, et il a reconnu que
1 si nous voulions arriver, il faillait marcher pour eux, et pour
' nous.' — Quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VL
Note 1. — Grave affair. — 'General Niel regards it [the opening
'of the fire] as a grave affair, and so in truth it is.' — Lord Raglan
to Secretary of State, Secret, March 31, 1855. It may be asked
why, if the French commander was privately resolved to abstain
from assaults, either he or his messenger Niel should regard the
bombardment as a 'grave affair '; but to those who have read the
foregoing fourth chapter the answer will readily occur. General
Canrobert was possessed with a notion — not shared, I believe,
with Lord Raglan — that the bombardment would or might pro-
voke a second and more terrible ' Inkerman.' Thus, when he
and Lord Raglan concurred in regarding the intended bombard-
ment as a ' grave affair,' they concurred on different grounds —
General Canrobert concurring on the ground last stated, and
Lord Raglan concurring because he took it for granted that the
bombardment would be followed by assaults.
Niel personally, as was afterwards known, strongly objected
to the bombardment; but mainly, it would seem, on the ground
that it might draw on the Allies into acts of vigour which he
thought would prove vain.
Then again it perhaps may be asked why the French expended
time and resources on this immense cannonade without meaning
to follow it up. They may possibly have cherished some hope
that the mighty fire brought to bear on the enemy's earthen de-
fences would either force the enemy to capitulate, or retreat from
the place without lighting ; but another and yet stronger motive
for resorting to this cannonade was the evident necessity whicb
APPENDIX. 367
forced Niel and Canrobert to cover the state of abeyance in which
they were keeping the siege by seeming to do something great.
Considering the unmeasured pretension of superiority that is
made by belligerents who go and lay siege to a fortress, it was
all but impossible for the French, under the eyes of deriding
Europe and angry France, to go on presenting the spectacle of
continued impotence without at least trying to mask it by some-
thing like a semblance of action ; so that even if Lord Melbourne
himself had been associated with Niel in his ' mission,' he could
hardly have made good his stand against the remonstrant declar-
ing that 'something ought to be done.'
The necessity of veiling a plot which enjoined long delays
must of course have been seen from the first ; and, unless I mis-
take, the expedient of using bombardments as sedatives to allay
the very natural impatience of angry observers was in the mind
of General Niel on even that early day when he wrote to the Em-
peror his letter of the 14th of February.*
Note 2. — See Appendix, Note (2). — The battery was one
pierced for six guns, and six guns accordingly — each a 32-
pounder — had been placed in readiness to be taken down ; but
during the delays above spoken of, one of the guns was removed
from its fellows, and planted in another battery ; so that the
number destined to be actually taken down was Jive. — Journal
Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 129.
Note 3. — Enthusiasm. — Shortly before the first bombardment
— the one of the 17th of October '54 — I was (with two or three
others) on the heights overlooking Sebastopol, when we saw a
small trading-vessel approach from the north and draw nearer
and nearer to the batteries of the Severnaya. These at length
opened upon her, but — under very light breezes — she steadily
pursued her course, drawing gradually nearer and nearer to the
mighty sea-forts. Those of the Severnaya soon opened upon the
little vessel with a vast prodigality of power, and we saw the
shots dropping around her, but all apparently failing to strike
her, for there was no sign of displacement in the rigging or other-
wise. She seemed to have a charmed life.
Her course had brought her very near to the batteries of the
Severnaya, but was bringing her very much nearer to the even
more powerful sea-forts on the south side ; and the incident then
became highly exciting to the people of Sebastopol. We saw
them assemble in numbers on the top of one of the forts with the
evident intention to give themselves the amusement of seeing the
* Printed in Niel's Siege de Sebastopol, p. 478 et seq.; a ad see ante,
p. 120.
368 APPENDIX.
little vessel surrender, or else undergo her fate, and be sunk by
the mighty artillery of the Alexander and Nicholas Forts.
The vessel however glided on, and the great South Forts opened
upon her, making havoc with the waters surrounding her, and most
markedly with the sea in her wake, but still failing (like the
North Forts before) to touch the charmed life.
The wonderful calmness with which she held on her course
seemed beyond measure admirable to all, but especially so to a
French officer at my side, who supposed the little vessel to be
English, and was thrown into a frenzy of enthusiasm. Accosting
me impetuously, he declared that the Queen of England was
bound to bestow the very highest of all her Orders on the heroic
commander of the little sailing-vessel.
The vessel escaped all the wrath of the Sebastopol sea-forts,
and was ultimately brought into one of the Allied ports by a
steamer sent out to aid her. It turned out that she was an Aus-
trian vessel laden with hay for the use of the Allies ; but a dere-
lict not having a single human being on board her.
Her captain and crew finding that they could not get an offing,
had abandoned the vessel, first setting her sails and her rudder in
such way as to give her any chance there might be of sailing past
the entrance of the Sebastopol Roadstead, so that the instance as
stated in the text became an example of ' composition of forces '
so closely resembling a human resolve as to be actually mistaken
for heroism.
But an even better sample of the • resemblance ' I speak of may
be found nearer home — may be found in a little child's boat when
sailing 'close-hauled,' and 'beating up' against adverse breezes.
She seems to have volition, to have resource in emergency, to be
angry if ' taken aback ' or allowed to ' fall off,' to be swift in re-
pairing the fault, and to show something like manful pride when
again she ' comes up to the wind.'
Note 4. — Camel. — Every child that has twirled a teetotum, or
driven a top, is familiar with the vigorous leap that his toy will
suddenly take if he touches it whilst spinning round.
Note 5. — Battery. — I suppose that the sobriquet must have
been meant to indicate that Captain Oldershaw, like the ideal
Zouave, was eager and resolute in fighting ; but what other re-
semblance could have been traced by the inventor of the nick-
name one does not easily see.
That abstinence from self-celebration which I have ascribed to
Captain Oldershaw was not characteristic of the Zouave.
Note 6. — ' To retire.'1 — Except Captain Shaw, who thus came
down towards the close of the five hours, and put an end to the
APPENDIX. 369
fight, no officer of rank superior to that of Captain Oldershaw
was present in the battery from first to last on the 13th of April.
Nor did Oldershaw from first to last receive any orders except
those given him the night before by Captain Oldfield, and the
above-mentioned order from Captain Shaw.
Note 7. — To Oldershaw. — Captain Oldfield, it seems, took
pains to inform himself of the tenor of the fight to which his
order had given rise, and addressed to Captain Oldershaw on the
subject a letter which commemorated his fight in terms of high
praise.
That letter has been mislaid ; but I am not without hope that
it will be found. Captain Oldfield was killed on the 17th of
August 1855.
Note 8. — Came to an end. — If a man, although wounded, ia
still not so gravely disabled as to be prevented from appearing on
parade the next day, there is never a certainty that he will be
included in the Returns of 'casualties,' and indeed, as is com-
monly known, the question whether, in such a case, he will be
' returned ' or not, is often a matter of accident or even a matter
of choice. Thus, for instance, Lord Cardigan, who had received
the thrust of a lance at the battle of Balaclava, did not choose at
the time to have it ' returned 'as a' wound,' and accordingly his
name did not figure in the list of ' wounded. ' He used after-
wards to express his regret that he had not taken the opjiosite
course, and caused his name to appear in the ' Return ' of officers
wounded.
Thus it may and does constantly happen that the number of
men really wounded exceeds the number of ' wounded ' appearing
in the official Return ; but in this peculiar fight where ' assaults,'
if so one may call them, were being ceaselessly made by cumber-
some sand-bags sent flying under the impact of cannon-balls, it
was plainly to be expected that the difference between the facts
and the figures would be abnormally great ; for there was many
a man who, when felled by the blows thus delivered, lay prostrate
under the shock in an utterly helpless state, yet so free, all the
while, from any injury of a lasting kind as to be able to appear
the next day on parade, and avoid being ever put down in any
Return of the wounded.
The number of gunners thus stricken without being therefore
' returned ' was rendered so much the greater by the feeling
which animated them. Every man in those days of keen ex-
pectation strove his best to keep out of hospital, being not only
willing but eager to remain with the force under arms.
Note 9. — Strength of only three men. — Not going with any
VOL. VIII. 2 A
370 APPENDIX.
minuteness, or even any aim at strict accuracy, into the painful
reckoning of his killed and wounded, Captain Oldershaw (in a
letter written on the day of the fight) said only that 'half his
men were hora de combat, and Sir Gerald Graham, as we saw,
accepted the same rough estimate. It is to the kindness of Mr
De Vine (whose bravery, as we saw, was so conspicuous on the
day of the fight) that I not only owe the far more complete state-
ment contained in the text, but also other careful details which
give it additional weight.
In considering Mr De Vine's statement, it should be remem-
bered that reinforcements had come down, and that therefore,
when showing the unstricken remnant of the original combatants
present in the battery to have been reduced at the last to three, he
did not thereby represent the battery to have been at any time
manned by a force so diminutive.
Mr De Vine is now one of our public servants, holding respon-
sible office in India.
Note 10. — Any less formal document. — Without using the
language of positive assertion about matters of official business
occurring in times now long past, 1 may say what I understand to
have been the mischances from which there resulted this chasm
in the Headquarter records. Lord Raglan, it seems, had de-
termined that reports on the subject of these fights in the bat-
teries should be made to him — not by any artillery officer, but —
by a field officer of the Royal Engineers, and this special duty-
was judged to be one of so much importance that no less a man
than Major Gordon, R.E. (the commander of the Right Attack)
was charged with the task. He, however, whilst repelling the
sortie of the 22d of March, was wounded in the right arm,
and for that reason, though not quite at first, it was ultimately
found accessary to relieve him from the duty and to appoint a
successor. His successor was Major Bent, R.E. (one of the heroes
of the battle of Giurgevo), who. entering upon his new duty on
the 14th of April, made that Report of the fights of that day in
the No. VII. and the No. VII I. batteries, which, as is shown in
the text, was warmly approved by Lord Raglan. But between
the time when the slate of Major Gordon's wound prevented his
performing the task, and the time when his successor (Major
Bent) entered upon his new function, there was an interval,
which included the 13th of April — the day of Oldershaw's fight;
and thus it resulted that Major Gordon's wound was the first
of the mischances which led to there being this chasm in the
Headquarter records.
With his admirable clearness and mastery of military busi-
ness, reinforced by the knowledge he had in a general way of the
fights maintained in the English batteries, Lord Raglan, in all
APPENDIX. 371
probability, would have discovered the error and hastened to
repair it ; but then, on the part of the artillery authorities, there
occurred those official mistakes (shown post, in the sub-notes to
Note 15) which made it appear (though erroneously) that Lord
Raglan's commendations applied to the fight of the 13th as well
as to that of the 14th. The last and clenching mischance (if so
one may call it) was the resolute silence of Captain Oldershaw,
who persevered, as we saw, in abstaining from any attempt to
set the authorities right.
Note 11. — Under him. — I don't except Captain Shaw, who
came down at the close of the tight ; because what he witnessed
was — not the struggle itself, but — the havoc it had wrought.
Note 12. — To make the truth known. — Considering what I
have above written on the subject of General Oldershaw's long-
maintained abstinence from self-assertion, it may fairly be asked
whether his reticence has been continued down to this time, and
whether I have been honoured by communications from him on
the subject of his fight of the 13th of April in the 'advanced
' No. VII.'?
The circumstances are these : I some time ago received a letter
from the Provost of Worcester College, Oxford — a gentleman
then wholly a stranger to me — in which he did me the honour
to suggest that the fight maintained by his cousin Captain (now
General) Oldershaw on that 13th April 1855 might deserve my
attention ; and he kindly enclosed to me copies of two interest-
ing letters on the subject.
When afterwards bending my mind to the period in question,
1 became persuaded that it would be right for me not only to
speak of the fight in question, but even to lay some stress upon
it ; and — preparing a series of questions — I ventured to ask that
the Provost would have the kindness to submit these to his gal-
lant relative.
I suppose that the administration of those questions may have
caused the General to reconsider his old determination ; or in-
deed he may well have judged that whilst still persevering in
his resolve to avoid all complaint, he was not therefore bound
to withhold information from one who was only a writer en-
deavouring to learn the truth.
Be that as it may, the General (who had been previously an
entire stranger to me) was so kind as to give me either orally or
in writing all the information I from time to time demanded
from him ; and it need hardly be said that the knowledge I was
thus allowed to acquire extended beyond the mere ' points ' on
which I assailed him with questions. All these communications
passed between us in the summer and autumn of the present
372 APPENDIX.
year 1683 ; for it happily chanced that the General was then
' borne "ii Leave. '
From the only other combatant officer taking part in the fight,
that is Lieutenant, now Major-General Simpson, I have also had
the advantage of receiving indirect communications through Gen-
eral Oldershaw. My great obligations to General Sir Gerald
Graham, R.E. , V.C., K.C.B., who (then a Lieutenant) was pres-
ent and wounded in the battery, are so amply made evident in
the foregoing narrative that I here need hardly do more than re-
peat to him my cordial thanks.
Note 13. — Engaged under them. — In the teeth of official docu-
ments, I am able to say this with certainty because having before
me the report of Major (now Lieutenant-General) Bent, R.E. ,
with the words appended to it by Lord Raglan — words showing
that he warmly adopted the Major's account, and made it the
basis of the thanks and the praises next about to be mentioned.
On the 15th of April, Lord Raglan wrote: 'Colonel Dacres
' will be so good as to communicate to Captains Henry and Wal-
' cott and express to them not only my approbation of their con-
4 duct and that of the officers and men under them, but my
* warmest thanks for their gallantry and steady perseverance in
' discharge of their duty:'* and on the 17th wrote thus in a
despatch addressed to the Secretary of State: — 'The guns of the
' Russians have been turned upon some of our advanced works
' in vast numbers, and in [one particidar instance the injury
1 sustained by a particular battery] was so great that the unre-
4 nutting exertions of Captains Henry and Walcott, and the gal-
4 lantry and determination of the artillerymen under their orders,
* In the Ollicial Memorandum of the 28th of April which promul-
gated these thanks and praises to the army, the 'Brigadier-General
'commanding' the Artillery stated that they were 'Remarks made by
' Field-Marshal Lord Raglan on the conduct of Captains Henry and
'Walcott and the officers and men under their command whilst man-
' ning the guns in Nos. VII. and VIII. Batteries, Left Attack, on the
'mornings of the IBth and 14th April;' and, since neither Captain
Henry nor Captain Walcott was engaged in either of the advanced
batteries on the \Zth, there must have been an official imbroglio. The
Memorandum also promulgated officially a list of 'the officers referred
' to ; ' and at the head of it, as if he were an officer under Captain
Henry or Captain Walcott, whom Lord Raglan had (by reference)
thanked, there appears the name of — of all people in the world! —
the name of Captain Oldershaw, who was not engaged in either of the
advanced batteries on the 14th, but was engaged and, as we have seen,
to some purpose — in the 'advanced No. VII.' on the Y-'Ah of April.
The Memorandum is a singularly compact little parcel of official mis-
takes. I count eight of them — and all of a seriously misleading sort —
compressed with much neatness into the space of only an inch or two.
APPENDIX. 373
' alone enabled them to keep up the fire, and to maintain them-
• selves in it.'*
Note 14. — The fire of the two 'advanced batteries.' — The after-
noon reliefs passed through these ordeals with the same valor-
ous persistency as the detachments which they had replaced ;
and this was well manifested by the continuance — until after
dark — of the fire maintained by our people ; but, so far as I
know, the particulars of those struggles were not recorded ; and
I must own myself to be as yet unacquainted with even the
names of the officers who (along with the men they had under
them) proved able to keep the advanced batteries unsilenced
from half-past one until nightfall.
Note 15. — Defence of Sebastopol. — That General Todleben
was likely to be free from all bias tending to warp his judgment
in the direction it took may, I think, be inferred from the cir-
cumstances under which he had acted. By the almost sudden
creation of stupendous batteries the great Engineer had under-
taken to do battle with the siege-guns of the Western Powers ;
and it would obviously have been delightful to him to be able to
say that he had succeeded. Accordingly, where he could with
truth say so, he did, and with evident joy. Thus in his par-
donable exultation at the ascendant which his great Redan had
obtained over our English batteries, he used even the largish
word 'victory.' What obliged him to say — to confess — that he
had failed to prevent the French from opening a fit path for
assault of the Flagstaff Bastion was plainly his knowledge of the
truth.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.
Note 1. — Might not after all be unwise. — Niel, p. 239. ' Le
' front Malakoif etant devenu le veritable point d'attaque,' p.
213 ; and elsewhere, p. 239, he speaks of the siege against the
Town front as if it were ' secondaire.' With our knowledge oi
the ' motive ' there was for keeping French enterprise down in
a state of abeyance (see ante, chap, v.), we of course must natu-
rally yield less attention than might be otherwise right to any
• reason ' assigned for taking the preordained course. Niel (who
does not always so frame his language as to make it clear whether
* Upon the supposition that Lord Raglan must have been adverting
to the combats of the 14th, the words I have placed within brackets
should have been altered by making them plural. Captain Henry and
Captain Walcott did not tight together in any ' one ' battery.
374 APPENDIX.
he is expressing the view of the French military authorities gen-
erally, or simply his own personal opinion) can hardly have meant
to say that the siege against the Town front had become so
decisively 'secondary' as to warrant acquiescence under the
enemy's encroachments in that part of tlie field.
I have myself, it is true, represented that, considering the
immense value of the Malakoff position, an earnest conflict main-
tained in that part of the field would more and more draw to
itself the energies of both the besiegers and the besieged ; but
this was not originally the idea entertained by the French them-
selves, and the paper they framed on the 2d of February 1855
was so worded as to exclude with great care any notion that the
siege against the Town front was to lose any part of its impor-
tance. From that day, accordingly, until after the opening of
this period, the siege against the Town front (which was con-
ducted by the formidable Pelissier) continued to be pressed on
with vigour, whilst the new siege — the one against the Malakoff
— was maintained, as we have seen, with so little resolution that
— far from advancing — it retrograded.
Note 2. — Somewhat unscrupulous. — The Czar naturally pro-
tested against this unprovoked Declaration of War by Sardinia ;
but except on the principle that sanction for any opinion can be
gathered from the teachers of 'International Law,' a denouncer,
treating Cavour's intervention as 'unscrupulous,' could hardly
be recommended to look for support in his Grotius.
When once war is constituted between two or more Powers,
the quaint, old, unheeded admonitions against ' unjust wars '
don't aim, I think, even in theory at the conscience of any other
Power disposed to join in the fray.
Note 3. — Always thoroughly cordial. — I had the honour at one
time of being acquainted with the late Count Genoa de Revel,*
the Sardinian officer acting at the English Headquarters as an
organ of communication with General la Marmora, and it was
always in terms of devoted, enthusiastic attachment that the
Count used to speak of Lord Raglan.
* A brother of the late Count Adrian de Revel, long the Sardinian
Minister at the Court of St James's, and greatly loved and esteemed in
this country.
APPENDIX. 375
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.
Note 1. — To be attempted. — It must not be supposed that the
vote of the Council was based upon that general opinion which
in terms it might seem to express ; for the English on such occa-
sions did not sit in judgment on the opportunities of assault
which the French might really have before them, nor vice versa.
The French would simply say, ' We don't yet see our way to
' assaulting those defences which we confront,' and their an-
nouncement would be treated as conclusive ; as (reciprocally)
wotild be that of the English, who at their huge distance from
the Redan, had of course no intention of sending infantry against
it otherwise than in concert with assaults simultaneously under-
taken by the French.
Lord Raglan, I believe, had no independent means of becoming
acquainted with the full extent of the havoc wrought on those
Works which were attacked by the French siege-guns, and he —
almost necessarily — received his impressions on that subject from
General Canrobert. Of course Canrobert's representations as to
the failure of the bombardment seemed to be every day receiving
confirmation, because (owing to the repairs every night) the
enemy's defences each morning seemed as strong as they had been
&t the first.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.
Note 1. — This part of the plan. — Lord Panmure afterwards
learnt that Sir Colin Campbell had pronounced the Mackenzie
Heights to be virtually impregnable, and became very angry with
Lord Ellenborough, through whom Sir Colin's opinion had been
made known in London.
Note 2. — Take effect by surprise. — Speaking of the force he had
meant to lead up from Aloushta, the Emperor wrote that it was
sufficient ' pour d£truire toute l'armee Russe qui pouvait etre
' surprise, et prise a revers avant d'avoir pu r^unir toutes ses
• forces.'
It is hard to see how the Emperor (in the then listening state
of the world) could have hoped to see his plan take effect by way
of surprise like that famous Marengo campaign which he seems
to have had in his mind.
Note 3. — Or otherwise into the sea. — After speaking of what
was to be first achieved by his Army of Diversion, and of its
capture of Simferopol, the Emperor says : ' On s'empare de cette
376 APPENDIX.
' ville, et on y laisse une garnison suffisante, ou bien on occupe
' but la route que nous venous de parcourir une bonne position
• qui assure les derrieres de l'armee. Maintenant de deux choses
* l'une ; ou l'armee Russe qui est en position devant Sevastopol
* abandonne cette formidable position pour venir a la rencontre
' dc l'armee qui s'avance du cote de Batehi Serai, et alors la
' premiere armee d'op6rations sous les ordres de Lord Raglan la
• pousse l'epee dans les reins, et s'empare de la position d'lnker-
' man ; * ou bien les Russes attendent dans leur lignes l'arrivee
' de l'armee qui vient de Simferopol, et alors celle-ci s'avance de
' Batehi Serai sur S6bastopol en appuyant toujours sa gauche
' aux montagnes, fait sa jonction avec l'armee du Marechal Rag-
' Ian qui s'est avance' de Baidar sur Alhat, repousse l'armee
' Russe, et la rejette dans Sebastopol, ou dans la mer. '
I make this extract from the Emperor's later exposition of his
plan ; but nearly, if not quite the same words are contained in
his Letter of the 27th of April.
Note 4. — To avert the catastrophe. — As regards the siege-army,
this is amply shown by the statements contained in chap. xi.
As regards the force invading from Aloushta, we may say that
(unless upon the improbable supposition of the enemy's being
taken by surprise) the ' Army of Diversion ' would have to do
what is commonly understood to be all but impossible, that is, to
debouch from mountain-passes in the face of an enemy both
powerful and fully prepared.
As regards the ' 1st Army of Operation ' confided to the
English Commander, we must see that the more deeply Lord
Raglan might become engaged in trying to execute the Emperor's
plan, the more impossible he would find it to come in good time
to the rescue of either the ' Siege Army' or • the Army of Diver-
1 sion. '
NOTES TO CHAPTER X.
Note 1. — Into full play. — The laying down of the cable had
been completed a week before ; but till afterwards, the appliances
needed for making it carry a message were not brought into due
order.
From the beginning of the War, land-service wires of the elec-
tric telegraph had been occasionally used ; but till after the lay-
ing down of the submarine cable, they did no more than reduce
* The
ou the
te Emperor, adopting Russian nomenclature, means the Heights
right bank of the river, which I call the 'Old City Heights.'
APPENDIX. 377
the transit by about three days — i.e., for example from about
thirteen days to ten.
Note 2. — Could not divine. — A note accompanying Canrobert's
communication of the telegram said : ' Les deux chiffres conserves
• sont faux, et n'ont pu etre traduits.' One learns from the Em-
peror's letter of the 7th of May to Lord Cowley that by ' 45 ' was
meant 'defensive position,' and by '450,' 'attack the Russian
'army.'
Note 3. — In their rear. — Under many conditions not hard to
imagine, the howl of the Imperial City might have presaged
grave troubles for the Allies ; and it was well that the puissant
Ambassador, after an absence of several days, opportunely re-
turned to his charge. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been
visiting the Crimea. He landed there on the 26th of April, and
left its shore in the evening of the 3d of May.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XL
Note 1. — Campaigning Plan. — This Paper describing itself as
' Le Plan de Campagne elabore par S. M. L'Empereur Napoleon
' III.' is marked ' Tres secret,' but not dated, and was handed by
Canrobert to Lord Raglan on the 14th of May. It is much more
compressed than the Letter of the 27th of April, and Canrobert,
I see, in his note, calls it the ' resume of the Plan. ' It purports,
I see, to assign 70,000 instead of 60,000 men for the defence of
the siege- works ; but the larger figure was meant, I believe, to in-
clude the 10,000 ' indisponibles ' mentioned in the previous ex-
position, and did not therefore import any change. This last
Exposition discards the words which had described Lord Raglan 'a
' Army of Operation ' as ' destined to seize the Mackenzie Heights,'
but in other respects it does not differ very materially from the
Letter of the 27th of April. Both these Papers were frankly im-
parted to our people — the first one of the 27th of April to our
Government, and the second, as we saw, to Lord Raglan. One
or other of the two Papers was brought out by Colonel Fav4
Note 2. — To act in the field. — Canrobert seems to have under-
stood— but I am sure erroneously — that Lord Raglan whilst in
the Conference was willing to split his force into two armies, and
did not until the next day refuse to do so.
378 APPENDIX.
Note 3. — The hopes he had entertained of being attacked by the
enemy on the reopening of the bombardment. — His words were : —
' La non-attaque de nos lignes exterieures par l'ennemi a la re-
'ouvorture du feu, attaque qui paraissait tres-probable, et sur la-
' quelle j'avais fonde des esperances d'un succes plus d<5cisif que
• celui d'lnkerman. ' To learn how conspicuously this disappoint-
ment at not being attacked contrasted with Caiuobert's former
moods, see ante, p. 85.
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